O R D E R
Everett Pullett pleaded guilty to two counts of assaulting and robbing a mail carrier, 18 U.S.C. § 2114(a), and was sentenced to 144 months' imprisonment. He filed a notice of appeal, but his appointed counsel asserts that the appeal is frivolous and moves to withdraw. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). We notified Pullett of counsel's motion to withdraw, and he did not respond. See CIR. R. 51(b). Counsel's brief explains the nature of the case and discusses potential issues that an appeal of this kind might be expected to involve. Because counsel's analysis appears thorough, we
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. APP. P. 32.1
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limit our review to the subjects that counsel discusses. See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014). We grant the motion and dismiss the appeal. In September 2022, Pullett and another person approached a mail carrier for the United States Postal Service. Pullett held the carrier's arms behind his back, while the other person pulled out a gun and cocked it. They then took the carrier's arrow key, which unlocks any postal lock in the service area. The next day Pullett, acting alone, approached a different mail carrier. He struck the carrier in the face, causing him to fall to the ground, and took the carrier's arrow key. Police later recovered the gun and arrow key from the first incident in Pullett's apartment.
Pullett was charged with two counts of assaulting with intent to rob and robbing a person having control of property of the United States, 18 U.S.C. § 2114(a), and one count of knowingly and unlawfully possessing a Postal Service key, 18 U.S.C. § 1704. Pursuant to a written plea agreement, he pleaded guilty to the two assault and robbery counts, and the government dismissed the remaining count.
At his change of plea hearing, in relation to Count One, Pullett admitted that the victim of the first assault was physically restrained and that a firearm was brandished or possessed. In relation to Count Two, Pullett admitted that during the second incident the victim sustained a bodily injury, but Pullett did not admit to brandishing or possessing a firearm. Pullett agreed that during both incidents, he took property of the United States. The government explained that because Pullett had not admitted to brandishing or possessing a firearm during the second incident, it would argue against a guidelines reduction for acceptance of responsibility.
A probation officer then prepared a presentence investigation report (PSR) that calculated a guidelines range of 188 to 235 months based on a combined adjusted offense level of 31 and criminal history category of VI. The PSR calculated an adjusted offense level of 29 for each count. Starting with a base offense level of 20, U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(a), the PSR added two levels because property of the post office was taken, id. § 2B3.1(b)(1), and five levels because a firearm was brandished or possessed, id. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(C). For Count One, the PSR added two levels because the victim was physically restrained. Id. § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B). For Count Two, the PSR added two levels because the victim was injured. Id. § 2B3.1(b)(3)(A). The counts could not be grouped. Id. § 3D1.2. So, the PSR reached the combined adjusted offense level of 31 by designating each count as one Unit, as they were equally serious, and adding two levels. Id. § 3D1.4. Consistent with the government's position, the PSR did not include a reduction for acceptance of responsibility. Id. § 3E1.1. The PSR also calculated a criminal
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history category of VI, id. § 5A, based on a criminal history score of 13, id. § 4A1.1(a)-(e). The PSR noted that Count One carried a statutory maximum of 10 years and Count Two carried a maximum of 25 years. 18 U.S.C. § 2114(a).
Pullett raised three challenges to the PSR. First, he objected to the five-level enhancement for brandishing or possessing a firearm in Count Two, arguing that insufficient evidence supported it. Second, Pullett did not object to a criminal history category of VI but argued that the court should consider his youth (19) at the time he committed a crime that added 3 points to his score. U.S.S.G. § 5H1.1. Third, Pullett argued that he should receive a reduction for acceptance of responsibility. He requested a sentence of 110 to 137 months. The government contended that insufficient evidence supported the firearm enhancement, argued against a reduction for acceptance of responsibility, and recommended a within-guidelines sentence.
At the sentencing hearing, the court rejected Pullett's arguments related to the firearm enhancement and his youth at the time of a prior crime. First, it concluded that there was sufficient evidence that Pullett had brandished or possessed a firearm during the second incident. The court relied on the victim's statements to the 911 operator, to medics on the scene, and to medical personnel after he was taken to the hospital that Pullett pulled a gun on him. Moreover, the court explained, the gun used during the first incident was found in Pullett's bedroom two days after the second incident. Finally, the court reviewed video from a doorbell camera of the second incident and found it inconclusive as to whether Pullett had a gun. Next, the court concluded that Pullett's youth at the time of his prior crime did not warrant a lower sentence because the offense was not "an aberration" but rather "the first in a series of other offenses."
The court, however, agreed with Pullett that he was entitled to a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. Id. § 3E1.1(a). The government then moved for a further one-level reduction. Id. § 3E1.1(b). Thus, the court calculated a combined adjusted offense level of 28 and a guidelines range of 140 to 175 months. The court imposed 120 months' imprisonment on Count One and 144 months' imprisonment on Count Two to run concurrently, and 5 years' supervised release. The district court discussed the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), noting that these were serious crimes against civil servants and highlighting Pullett's extensive criminal history. But the court acknowledged that Pullett's criminal history was not especially violent and that he suffered childhood trauma and faced mental health challenges.
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In his Anders brief, counsel informs us that he advised Pullett about the risks and benefits of withdrawing his guilty plea and confirmed that Pullett does not wish to do so. Counsel therefore properly omits discussion of whether the plea was knowing and voluntary. United States v. Larry, 104 F.4th 1020, 1022 (7th Cir. 2024). Counsel first considers whether Pullett could challenge his sentence procedurally and correctly concludes that he could not. Counsel explores challenging the factual basis for the firearm enhancement on Count Two. We would review for clear error the district court's finding that Pullett brandished or possessed a firearm during the second incident, United States v. Prieto, 85 F.4th 445, 448 (7th Cir. 2023), and the record contains no reasonable basis for arguing clear error here. The district court properly credited the victim's repeated statements that Pullett had a gun, and those statements were consistent with a gun being found in Pullett's bedroom two days later and were not contradicted by the video evidence. See United States v. Contreras, 820 F.3d 255, 263 (7th Cir. 2016) (district court's credibility determination may not be upset unless statements "were so unbelievable that no reasonable factfinder could credit them"). The final offense level of 28, which included a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, combined with an agreed criminal history category of VI, yielded a properly calculated guidelines range of 140 to 175 months.
Because the 144-month sentence is within the guidelines range, we presume that it is substantively reasonable. See United States v. Major, 33 F.4th 370, 384-85 (7th Cir. 2022). Counsel does not identify any reason to challenge that presumption here, and we see none. The district court reasonably weighed the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) by acknowledging that Pullett had experienced childhood trauma and suffered from mental health challenges, while also emphasizing Pullett's extensive criminal history, the violent nature of the offenses, and the need for deterrence. Further, the court considered Pullett's young age when he committed one of his prior offenses but did not find that a departure was warranted under the circumstances. Finally, counsel considers and rightly rejects any challenge to restitution or the conditions of supervised release. The court did not impose any fine or restitution beyond the required special assessment. And Pullett has waived any argument regarding the conditions of supervised release where he acknowledged that he received and reviewed with counsel the PSR, which contained the proposed conditions, and did not object to them. See United States v. Gibbs, 130 F.4th 619, 622 (7th Cir. 2025). We GRANT counsel's motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.
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