DA 26-0037
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2026 MT 251
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF:
MARY JO BRADFORD,
Deceased.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the First Judicial District, In and For the County of Lewis and Clark, Cause No. ADP-2025-38 Honorable Mike Menahan, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Chris Walker, Silverman Law Office, PLLC, Helena, Montana For Appellees:
Jeffrey E. Janca, Lyons Law Firm, Billings, Montana Submitted on Briefs: September 16, 2026
Decided: October 27, 2026
Filed:
__________________________________________ Clerk
10/27/2026
Case Number: DA 26-0037
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Justice Katherine M. Bidegaray delivered the Opinion of the Court. ¶1 Rhonda Purtle appeals three orders of the First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County, concerning the estate of her mother, Mary Jo Bradford. On the requests of Purtle's brothers, Robert Bates and Kenneth Bates (the Bateses), the District Court removed Purtle as personal representative, directed appointment of a special administrator, and froze financial accounts that Purtle claims passed to her outside probate. The court removed Purtle without the statutorily required hearing. It later appointed a special administrator without a hearing and without an adequate basis for invoking the statutory emergency exception. Even assuming broader statutory authority to preserve the disputed assets, the court abused its discretion by imposing a blanket account freeze without a sufficient basis for its scope and continuing operation.
¶2 We address the following restated issues:
1. Whether the District Court abused its discretion by removing Purtle as personal representative without the hearing required by § 72-3-526, MCA.
2. Whether the Bateses have standing to seek Purtle's removal for cause or interim protection before resolution of their will contest.
3. Whether the District Court abused its discretion by appointing a special administrator without the hearing required by § 72-3-701(2), MCA, and whether the assigned investigation improperly shifted the burden of proof in the will contest.
4. Whether the District Court exceeded its statutory authority or abused its discretion by freezing all financial accounts in which Bradford held an interest at death, including accounts Purtle claimed through nonprobate transfer. We reverse and remand without deciding the validity of the will, the merits of the financial-exploitation claim, or ownership of the disputed property.
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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶3 Bradford died on January 9, 2025, while domiciled in Lewis and Clark County. Purtle and the Bateses survived her. Her husband, Alvin Ellis Bradford, had died on October 5, 2023. On February 13, 2025, Purtle applied for informal probate of a will Bradford signed on September 3, 2024, and for appointment as personal representative. The clerk admitted the will to informal probate and issued letters appointing Purtle that day.
¶4 Several provisions of the will underlie the dispute. The will states that Bradford is married to Alvin and identifies Purtle under the heading "Current Children," without naming Robert or Kenneth. It nominates Purtle as sole executor and specifically devises Bradford's Helena residence to her. It leaves the residue to Alvin if he survives Bradford by thirty days; otherwise, paragraph 13 directs division among Bradford's children then living, with provision for descendants of a deceased child. Paragraph 21 states that omission of heirs "as named above" is intentional. Paragraph 26 separately expresses a gift to Purtle of property and possessions and refers to a document titled "Bradford Family Trust." These provisions bear both on the challenge to Bradford's testamentary capacity and on the parties' disagreement about whether the Bateses have an interest under the will. ¶5 On May 30, 2025, the Bateses filed a verified objection and counter-petition challenging the will and Purtle's appointment. They asserted five counts: improper disinheritance, lack of testamentary capacity, undue influence, financial exploitation of a vulnerable adult, and removal of the personal representative. They relied in part on the references to Bradford's deceased husband and the omission of their names. They also
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alleged that Purtle had procured benefits through misconduct and could not impartially investigate her own conduct. They requested invalidation of the will, a determination of intestacy, forfeiture of Purtle's benefits, appointment of an independent fiduciary, and protection of assets.
¶6 The District Court granted the requested removal that same day, without a hearing. It revoked Purtle's letters; directed appointment of an independent third-party personal representative; stayed sales, transfers, and liquidation of Bradford's assets; and set a scheduling conference. Beyond referring to its review of the counter-petition and "good cause," the court gave no explanation for removal. It did not determine that Bradford lacked testamentary capacity, that anyone exercised undue influence or financially exploited her, or that the will was invalid. Purtle filed her response on June 9, disputing the allegations supporting the counter-petition and her removal. ¶7 The parties then conducted discovery under a stipulated scheduling order. Purtle supplied an inventory identifying property she regarded as probate assets and other property she claimed through nonprobate transfers, including an individual retirement account and multiple-party bank accounts. Discovery also identified Dallas Davis, a nonlawyer who had assisted Bradford in preparing the will. The Bateses questioned whether Purtle had disclosed all assets and financial records and whether the claimed nonprobate transfers were valid. Purtle disputed the significance of those concerns and maintained that the nonprobate accounts belonged to her individually. ¶8 In their November 17, 2025 amended motion, the Bateses requested a new schedule, immediate appointment of a special administrator, and a freeze of all financial accounts in
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which Bradford had held an interest. They sought a neutral fiduciary to obtain records, investigate the allegations in their counter-petition, preserve assets, and pursue litigation as the court might direct. Their exhibits included discovery responses, the inventory, correspondence, and bank records for a statement period encompassing Bradford's death. Purtle opposed the motion. She maintained that the court had removed her without the required hearing, that the Bateses had not established grounds for appointing a special administrator, and that the court lacked authority in the probate proceeding to freeze accounts she owned individually.
¶9 The Bateses replied that the unresolved questions about the assets and Purtle's conduct required a neutral fiduciary and immediate protection. They also invoked § 72-3-304, MCA, as authority to restrict an informally appointed personal representative during a formal testacy proceeding. They characterized the earlier revocation of Purtle's letters as a temporary protective measure rather than removal for cause. Their attorney submitted an affidavit addressing discovery and scheduling. The court did not hold a hearing on the amended motion.
¶10 On December 3, 2025, the District Court granted the amended motion. Its findings recounted the procedural history, the existence of accounts Purtle claimed as nonprobate property, and the limited period covered by the records. The court then recited the Bateses' contentions that allegations of incapacity, undue influence, financial exploitation, and possible unauthorized practice of law required immediate action. It concluded that appointment of a special administrator was necessary to preserve the estate and secure its proper administration, consistent with its earlier revocation of Purtle's letters. It further
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concluded that immediate preservation measures would prevent dissipation and maintain the status quo.
¶11 The order directed the Bateses to nominate two candidates for special administrator. It prescribed duties that included collecting and preserving estate assets, reviewing financial records, investigating matters in the counter-petition and motion, making recommendations to the court, and commencing or defending actions at the court's direction. It also froze every financial account in which Bradford had held a legal or equitable interest at death, whether she held the account individually, jointly, or otherwise. The order prohibited withdrawals, transfers, closures, and beneficiary changes without further court authorization or limited written authorization from the administrator. It directed financial institutions to honor the freeze upon presentment. The court vacated the scheduling order pending a preliminary report due within 120 days after appointment. ¶12 On January 15, 2026, the court appointed Seth H. Blades, CPA, and reaffirmed the December 3 order. It held no intervening hearing and made no additional findings supporting an emergency appointment. Purtle served notice of entry of the three challenged orders on January 16 and appealed on January 20. The Bateses moved to dismiss the first two appellate issues as untimely, arguing that Purtle should have appealed within thirty days after the May 30 order. We denied that motion on May 12, 2026, because the Bateses had not shown service of notice of entry before January 16. That order resolved the timeliness objection; we now consider the merits.
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶13 We review a decision to remove a personal representative or appoint a special administrator for abuse of discretion. In re Estate of Williams, 2023 MT 72, ¶¶ 17, 35,
412 Mont. 58, 528 P.3d 1087. A court abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily, without conscientious judgment, or exceeds the bounds of reason resulting in substantial injustice. In re Estate of Thomas, 2026 MT 66, ¶ 14, 427 Mont. 291, 586 P.3d 791. We review de novo for correctness questions concerning the meaning of the statutory hearing requirements, the scope of probate jurisdiction, and the court's statutory authority to impose an account freeze. In re Estate of Thomas, ¶ 14. We review the exercise of any available statutory discretion to grant protective relief for abuse of discretion. In re Estate of Thomas, ¶¶ 14, 36. A court also abuses its discretion when an erroneous view of the law governs its decision. City of Missoula v. Girard, 2013 MT 168, ¶ 10, 370 Mont. 443, 303 P.3d 1283. Whether a party has standing likewise presents a question of law that we review for correctness. In re Estate of Lawlor, 2015 MT 54, ¶ 13, 378 Mont. 281, 343 P.3d 577.
DISCUSSION
¶14 1. Whether the District Court abused its discretion by removing Purtle as personal representative without the hearing required by § 72-3-526, MCA. ¶15 Purtle argues that the District Court violated § 72-3-526, MCA, by removing her without first holding a hearing and determining whether cause existed. Section 72-3-526(1), MCA, permits a person interested in an estate to petition for removal for cause and directs the court, upon filing of the petition, to "fix a time and place for hearing." The petitioner must give notice to the personal representative and to any other
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persons the court directs. Section 72-3-526(1), MCA. Cause exists when removal would serve the best interests of the estate or when the representative intentionally misrepresented material facts leading to appointment, disregarded a court order, became incapable of discharging the duties of the office, mismanaged the estate, or failed to perform an official duty. Section 72-3-526(2), MCA. The petitioner bears the burden of establishing grounds for removal, and the record must support those grounds. In re Estate of Robbin, 230 Mont. 30, 33-34, 747 P.2d 869, 871 (1987).
¶16 The May 30 order revoked Purtle's letters and directed her replacement. It did not merely restrict particular acts pending a hearing on whether she should remain in office. The court thus granted the requested removal on the day the Bateses filed their counter-petition, before Purtle responded and without the hearing § 72-3-526(1), MCA, requires. Its general reference to "good cause" neither identified facts establishing a statutory ground for removal nor supplied the opportunity to contest those grounds at a hearing. The power to remove a representative in the best interests of the estate does not eliminate the notice-and-hearing requirements that govern that decision. Section 72-3-526(1)-(2), MCA.
¶17 The Bateses defend the removal on the alternative theory that their counter-petition and the will itself established Bradford's incapacity, defeated the will, and eliminated Purtle's priority to serve. They argue that a person who described a deceased husband as living and failed to identify two living sons could not have understood the objects of her bounty. This argument confuses evidence supporting a will contest with a judicial determination resolving it. Informal probate remains conclusive until an order in a formal
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testacy proceeding supersedes it. Section 72-3-215(2), MCA. Section 72-3-310, MCA, assigns contestants the burden of establishing lack of capacity, undue influence, and the other grounds for invalidity specified there. The May 30 order neither determined those issues nor superseded the informal probate of Bradford's will. ¶18 The challenged provisions may bear on Bradford's capacity and intentions, but the Bateses' interpretation of them did not relieve the court of its duty to hear the dispute before deciding it. The formal testacy provisions themselves require the court to set a hearing and the petitioner to give notice to the persons the statute identifies. Section 72-3-305(1)-(2), MCA. Verification of the counter-petition did not convert disputed allegations and inferences into judicial findings. The court instead set a scheduling conference, and the parties later obtained deadlines for discovery and trial on the unresolved claims. We do not decide what weight the will or other evidence should receive. We hold that the asserted strength of the contest did not authorize the court to remove Purtle before conducting the hearing required by § 72-3-526(1), MCA.
¶19 Recognizing that the May 30 order contains no findings resolving capacity, the Bateses ask us to apply the doctrine of implied findings and affirm on the premise that the District Court found the will invalid. Under that doctrine, a reviewing court may imply a necessary finding when the record supports it, and it does not conflict with the court's express findings. When an express statutory requirement is at issue, specific evidence referenced in other express findings must clearly support the implied finding. Sayler v. Sun, 2023 MT 175, ¶ 43, 413 Mont. 303, 536 P.3d 399. Here, the court identified no evidence establishing incapacity and left the will contest for later proceedings. The Bateses
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seek more than recognition of an omitted finding supporting an adjudication the court made; they ask us to supply the adjudication itself. The doctrine does not permit that result or excuse the hearing required by § 72-3-526(1), MCA.
¶20 The Probate Code also answers the concern that the estate might need protection while a removal petition awaits decision. After receiving notice of removal proceedings, a personal representative may act only to account, correct maladministration, or preserve the estate, except as the court otherwise orders under § 72-3-617, MCA. Section 72-3-526(1), MCA. These restrictions preserve assets while the court determines whether statutory grounds warrant removal. They do not terminate the appointment. Unlike § 72-3-701(2), MCA, which expressly allows emergency appointment of a special administrator without notice, § 72-3-526, MCA, contains no corresponding exception allowing removal for cause without the required hearing. The court therefore could protect the estate without deciding the removal request first and hearing it later. ¶21 The Bateses' reliance in their District Court reply on § 72-3-304, MCA, does not change that conclusion. They argued that the court had only suspended Purtle's authority during a formal testacy proceeding. Section 72-3-304, MCA, permits restrictions on the powers of an acting representative and a request for a special administrator; it does not transform an express revocation of letters into a temporary restriction. Whatever authority the court had to restrain Purtle pending the contest, it exercised a different power when it terminated her appointment. Because the court granted removal for cause without the hearing and determination that § 72-3-526(1)-(2), MCA, require, it abused its discretion. We therefore reverse the removal ruling.
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¶22 2. Whether the Bateses have standing to seek Purtle's removal for cause or interim protection before resolution of their will contest.
¶23 Purtle also seeks a ruling that the Bateses lack standing to obtain her removal or appointment of a special administrator unless they first prevail in their will contest. The Bateses respond that they already defeated the will, that Purtle admitted their status as devisees in her application, and that their improper-disinheritance count gives them an independent claim against the estate. These arguments require us to distinguish the interests necessary for removal for cause from those sufficient to request protection during a will contest. The statutory definition of "interested person" expressly directs that inquiry:
its meaning varies with the particular purpose and matter involved in the proceeding. Section 72-1-103(25), MCA.
¶24 In In re Estate of Lawlor, we held that standing to contest a will did not itself establish standing to seek removal for cause under § 72-3-526, MCA. In re Estate of Lawlor, ¶¶ 16-17, 20, 27. An heir who would gain from a successful contest qualified to challenge the will, but her prospective inheritance did not establish a present property right while the probated will remained effective. In re Estate of Lawlor, ¶¶ 16-17, 20, 27. For removal for cause, the petitioner needed a property right in the estate, a claim against it, or priority for appointment. In re Estate of Lawlor, ¶¶ 25-31. We expressly confined that analysis to removal for cause and distinguished appointment proceedings associated with a change in testacy. In re Estate of Lawlor, ¶ 21. The decision therefore does not make success in a will contest a prerequisite to every form of relief the Probate Code authorizes during that contest.
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¶25 The Bateses cannot establish a present intestate interest by treating the will as already invalid; no order has resolved that issue. Section 72-3-215(2), MCA; In re Estate of Lawlor, ¶ 27. We also reject the Bateses' argument that Purtle admitted their status as devisees in her application for informal probate. The application grouped the three children under a heading identifying "heirs and devisees" and described the Bateses as sons. Section 72-3-202(2), MCA, requires an applicant to identify the spouse, children, heirs, and devisees. Compliance with that disclosure requirement does not establish that every listed person belongs to every category. A devisee is a person whom a will designates to receive a devise. Section 72-1-103(12), MCA. The application establishes the family relationships and identifies persons relevant to probate; it does not itself resolve who receives property under the will.
¶26 The Bateses separately argue that Count I, which they labeled "improper disinheritance," supplies the claim against the estate that In re Estate of Lawlor requires even if the will remains valid. They invoke the omitted-child statute, § 72-2-332, MCA, and contend that their demand for a share differs from their claims seeking to invalidate the will. That distinction does not make the demand a "claim" merely because they pleaded it as a separate count. Section 72-1-103(6)(a), MCA, defines claims in terms of liabilities of the decedent or estate, including contractual and tort liabilities, funeral expenses, and administration expenses. A demand to inherit does not, without more, assert such a liability. In re Estate of Lawlor, ¶ 26. A legally supported entitlement to a share may instead bear on whether the claimant has a property right under § 72-1-103(25), MCA. The
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relevant inquiry concerns the legal basis of the asserted entitlement, not the title of the count.
¶27 Purtle responds that § 72-2-332, MCA, cannot provide that basis because the Bateses were adults when Bradford executed the will. Her reading is incomplete. Although § 72-2-332(1), MCA, addresses after-born and after-adopted children, § 72-2-332(3), MCA, also addresses a living child omitted solely because the testator believed the child dead. The Bateses' contrary assumption—that every unnamed child receives a share unless the proponent proves an intentional omission—is also too broad. Section 72-2-332(1)-(3), MCA, identifies circumstances in which an omitted child may take; omission alone does not establish them. We do not decide whether the Bateses have alleged or can prove an entitlement under § 72-2-332(3), MCA. Neither do we construe the provisions concerning children, the residue, intentional omissions, and the separate gift to Purtle to determine whether they receive a devise. Those unresolved questions prevent the categorical declaration Purtle requests that the Bateses can acquire an interest only by invalidating the will.
¶28 A separate statutory provision answers whether the Bateses may request interim protection while they pursue the contest. Section 72-3-304, MCA, expressly permits a petitioner who seeks a different personal representative in a formal proceeding to request an order restraining the acting representative's powers and appointment of a special administrator. That authority operates during the proceeding. Requiring the petitioner to prevail first would eliminate the protection the statute provides while the dispute remains unresolved. Section 72-3-319(1), MCA, likewise restricts administration, except
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preservation of the estate or as the court otherwise orders, after an informally appointed representative receives notice of a formal proceeding concerning appointment priority or qualification. These provisions distinguish preserving an estate during litigation from deciding who ultimately should administer it.
¶29 That distinction applies here. The Bateses requested a determination of intestacy, appointment of a different representative, and protection of assets pending resolution of their challenge. They expressly invoked § 72-3-304, MCA, in their District Court reply. Purtle does not dispute their standing to contest the will as heirs who would benefit from a successful challenge. Their ability to pursue that formal proceeding permits them to request the interim protection § 72-3-304, MCA, expressly provides. It does not establish their entitlement to that protection or to removal for cause under § 72-3-526, MCA. Applying each statute to the particular relief requested follows the distinction recognized in In re Estate of Lawlor, ¶¶ 20-21, rather than extending will-contest standing to every dispute concerning the estate.
¶30 We therefore reject both the assumption that filing the will contest established standing for removal for cause and Purtle's broader assertion that the Bateses could request no interim protection until they prevailed. The District Court must evaluate any asserted independent basis for removal standing under § 72-1-103(25), MCA, and In re Estate of Lawlor, ¶¶ 25-31. It may not treat a combined disclosure heading or the label of a count as conclusive. At the same time, § 72-3-304, MCA, permits the Bateses to request interim relief during their formal proceeding. That provision does not dispense with the notice,
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hearing, and necessity requirements for appointment of a special administrator under § 72-3-701(2), MCA. We turn to those requirements.
¶31 3. Whether the District Court abused its discretion by appointing a special administrator without the hearing required by § 72-3-701(2), MCA, and whether the assigned investigation improperly shifted the burden of proof in the will contest.
¶32 Purtle argues that the special-administrator appointment violated § 72-3-701(2), MCA, because the District Court held no hearing and did not establish an emergency permitting it to dispense with one. The statute authorizes appointment on an interested person's petition after notice and a hearing, upon a finding that appointment is necessary to preserve the estate or secure its proper administration, including when a general personal representative cannot or should not act. Section 72-3-701(2), MCA. It then provides an exception: if an emergency appears to the court, it may order appointment without notice. Section 72-3-701(2), MCA. The Bateses maintain that the court invoked that exception by finding "immediate preservation measures" necessary. They argue that the statute does not require the court to use the word "emergency."
¶33 We agree that § 72-3-701(2), MCA, does not require the court to use the words "an emergency exists." But the substance of the emergency determination matters. The first sentence authorizes an appointment when necessary to preserve the estate or secure proper administration and requires notice and a hearing before that decision. Section 72-3-701(2), MCA. The second permits departure from that requirement when an emergency appears. Section 72-3-701(2), MCA. A general need for a neutral administrator therefore does not, by itself, establish the circumstances needed to appoint one before a hearing. The order
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and record must show why an apparent emergency requires appointment before the court can hold the hearing the statute requires. Merely describing the appointment as
"immediate" does not explain why the court must act before providing that opportunity. Section 72-3-701(2), MCA.
¶34 The December 3 order did not make that distinction. It recited the Bateses' allegations concerning incapacity, undue influence, exploitation, and the preparation of the will. It identified accounts Purtle claimed individually and the limited financial records she had produced. But it did not identify threatened conduct or an administrative need that required appointment before a hearing. A dispute over disclosure or ownership may justify further inquiry and may support an appointment after a hearing. Reciting that dispute and the requested relief, however, does not establish why an emergency permits the court to dispense with the hearing required by § 72-3-701(2), MCA.
¶35 The Bateses contend that the bank records supply the missing urgency because Purtle spent or withdrew more than $37,000 during the month Bradford died. Their amended motion also describes a $10,000 in-person withdrawal as occurring the day after Bradford's death. The exhibits do not establish the alleged timing of the $10,000 withdrawal. The statement period ran from December 25, 2024, through January 24, 2025, and the aggregate debits include transfers between the identified accounts and a returned Social Security payment. Both the transaction list and the withdrawal image date the $10,000 withdrawal on January 7, 2025, two days before Bradford's January 9 death. The debit total therefore does not establish that Purtle took that amount from the estate after
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death, and the records do not explain why appointment without a hearing became necessary in December 2025, almost eleven months after the alleged post-death transfer. ¶36 These limitations do not establish that Purtle acted properly. Conduct before Bradford's death may bear on the exploitation claim, and the court may need further evidence concerning the purpose and ownership of the transactions. An emergency appointment does not require the court to resolve that claim first. Section 72-3-701(2), MCA. But the question here is not whether the exhibits warrant investigation; it is whether they establish circumstances permitting the court to forgo a hearing before appointing the investigator. The court made no finding connecting the months-old transactions to a threatened loss or administrative harm that required appointment without a hearing. The unresolved need to investigate cannot, standing alone, satisfy both the necessity requirement and the distinct emergency exception in § 72-3-701(2), MCA. The Bateses also emphasize that the estate had lacked an authorized general representative for more than six months after the May 30, 2025 revocation. That vacancy may have supported appointment to secure proper administration, but it did not automatically supply an emergency under § 72-3-701(2), MCA. The court identified no impending obligation, transaction, or other circumstance requiring it to appoint a fiduciary before a hearing. It directed the Bateses to submit nominees and selected Blades on January 15, 2026, more than six weeks after granting the amended motion, without an intervening hearing or additional emergency findings. Delay does not categorically disprove an emergency. Here, however, neither order nor the record explains why the court could omit the statutory hearing while the appointment remained pending.
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¶37 Purtle opposed appointment and quoted the notice-and-hearing requirement in § 72-3-701(2), MCA. Her notice that briefing was complete did not authorize the court's earlier omission: she filed that notice on December 4, after the court granted the amended motion. The January 15 order appointing Blades as fiduciary added only the identity of the administrator and reaffirmed the December 3 directives. The District Court abused its discretion by making the appointment without the hearing required by § 72-3-701(2), MCA, when neither its findings nor the record adequately supported application of the statutory emergency exception. We therefore reverse the appointment. On remand, the court may consider a renewed request under that statute, but it must hold the required hearing unless the circumstances support an emergency appointment. ¶38 Purtle separately argues that assigning an administrator to investigate the counter-petition unlawfully shifts the Bateses' burden of proving their will contest. The Bateses answer that a special administrator may investigate and pursue estate claims. Section 72-3-704, MCA, supports the latter proposition: it gives a court-appointed special administrator the powers of a general personal representative, subject to the duties and limits in the appointment order. In In re Estate of Sauter, 189 Mont. 244, 245, 250-51, 615 P.2d 875, 876, 878-79 (1980), we directed appointment of a special administrator to handle an estate claim when the general personal representative's law partner had represented the defendants. We allowed the general personal representative to continue other administration. In re Estate of Sauter, 189 Mont. at 250-51, 615 P.2d at 878-79. Thus, a disputed estate claim may require independent administration before the
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court resolves its merits; the mere assignment of an investigation does not make the appointment unlawful.
¶39 The necessary distinction concerns whose interests the administrator serves and who must prove the pending claims. A will proponent must establish prima facie proof of due execution; contestants must establish the grounds for invalidity assigned to them by § 72-3-310, MCA. Obtaining records or investigating a potential estate claim does not itself change those burdens. A court-appointed administrator's authority under § 72-3-704, MCA, does not, however, replace the parties' obligations under § 72-3-310, MCA, or the court's responsibility to decide the contest. Because the appointment fails under § 72-3-701(2), MCA, we need not decide the permissible scope of every task the December 3 order assigned. Any renewed appointment must satisfy § 72-3-701(2), MCA. In prescribing duties under § 72-3-704, MCA, the court must distinguish estate administration from the proponents' and contestants' burdens in the will contest under § 72-3-310, MCA.
¶40 4. Whether the District Court exceeded its statutory authority or abused its discretion by freezing all financial accounts in which Bradford held an interest at death, including accounts Purtle claimed through nonprobate transfer. ¶41 Purtle challenges the account freeze on the ground that the accounts passed to her outside probate and therefore lie beyond the court's probate jurisdiction. The Bateses respond that their financial-exploitation claim invokes § 72-2-813, MCA, which may revoke benefits and sever survivorship interests in nonprobate property. They contend that freezing the accounts was necessary to preserve property potentially subject to that relief. Neither argument fully distinguishes authority to adjudicate a statutory claim affecting
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nonprobate benefits from authority to impose this particular restraint before adjudication. The former does not automatically supply the latter.
¶42 Section 72-1-202(1)(a), MCA, grants the court jurisdiction over matters relating to decedents' estates, including construction of wills and determination of heirs and successors. Section 72-1-202(2), MCA, authorizes action necessary and proper to administer justice in those matters. These provisions do not give a court sitting in probate every remedy available in an ordinary civil action. In re Estate of Cooney, 2019 MT 293, ¶¶ 6-7, 11-16, 398 Mont. 166, 454 P.3d 1190. In In re Estate of Thomas, ¶¶ 30-34, we applied that distinction to provisional relief: § 72-3-617, MCA, specifically authorizes restraints on a personal representative's conduct, whereas the preliminary-injunction provisions of Title 27, chapter 19, MCA, govern civil actions. The restraint must fall within a power the Probate Code expressly grants or a power necessary to carry out an authorized probate function. Section 72-1-202(2), MCA; In re Estate of Cooney, ¶ 7. Principles of law and equity supplement the Code unless a particular provision displaces them. Section 72-1-104, MCA. The absence of an expressly named remedy therefore does not end the inquiry; the court still must determine whether the requested restraint is necessary and proper to exercise an authorized probate power. ¶43 Purtle correctly identifies a distinction between estate property and property that passes through a nonprobate transfer. A provision for transfer on death in an account agreement or individual retirement plan is nontestamentary. Section 72-6-111(1), MCA. Subject to the statutory exceptions, sums in a multiple-party account belong to the surviving party or parties; account terms that exclude survivorship produce a different
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result. Section 72-6-212(1), (3), MCA. A survivorship transfer takes effect through the account terms and governing statutes rather than through the will. Section 72-6-214, MCA. We do not decide whether every account Purtle identified qualifies as nonprobate property. These provisions nevertheless foreclose treating Bradford's interest at death, without further analysis, as sufficient to subject every account to estate administration. ¶44 Purtle goes too far, however, when she argues that a nonprobate designation defeats any probate inquiry. Section 72-2-813(3)(a), MCA, revokes specified revocable dispositions, powers, and fiduciary nominations benefiting an abuser. Section 72-2-813(3)(b), MCA, severs the interests of the decedent and abuser in property they held as joint tenants with survivorship rights at the time of the exploitation and converts those interests to tenancies in common. In the absence of a qualifying conviction, the court must determine, on an interested person's petition and under the preponderance standard, whether the individual would be criminally accountable for financially exploiting the decedent. Section 72-2-813(7), MCA. The statute therefore supplies authority to determine the effect of exploitation on covered nonprobate benefits. We do not resolve whether the Bateses can establish the facts necessary for that relief. ¶45 The Bateses argue that the freeze was incidental to that authorized determination, not independent equitable relief of the kind disallowed in In re Estate of Cooney. A probate court may decide an equitable question when necessary to exercise a power the statutes expressly grant. In re Day's Estate, 119 Mont. 547, 551-52, 177 P.2d 862, 865 (1947). Even assuming § 72-1-202(2), MCA, permits a restraint necessary to preserve relief available on the pending exploitation claim, that authority does not sustain this order. The
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court used Bradford's former interest in an account—not the nature and extent of the interests potentially affected by the statutory claim—to define the property restrained. It prohibited every withdrawal, transfer, closure, and beneficiary change absent court or administrator authorization, without distinguishing benefits subject to revocation, survivorship interests subject to severance, or any separate ownership interests that would remain unaffected by that relief. Section 72-2-813(3), MCA. It then left the freeze in effect until further order while suspending the case schedule pending a report due 120 days after the administrator's appointment. The court did not need to resolve exploitation or ownership before considering protection. But its recitals of disputed ownership, incomplete disclosure, and possible dissipation did not explain why this categorical control over all covered accounts was necessary for that scope and duration. On this record, the court did not establish that the blanket restraint was necessary and proper to carry out its authority under § 72-2-813, MCA. Section 72-1-202(2), MCA.
¶46 Purtle's reply nevertheless overstates the absence of statutory protection when it asserts that § 72-2-813, MCA, operates only after a final exploitation determination. Section 72-2-813(8)(a)-(b), MCA, expressly addresses disputed property before adjudication. A claimant may give a payor or third party the prescribed written notice identifying the decedent, the claimant, the property, and the asserted forfeiture or revocation. Section 72-2-813(8)(a)-(b), MCA. The statute limits potential liability under this provision to actions taken two or more business days after actual receipt of written notice served as § 72-2-813(8)(b), MCA, requires. Section 72-2-813(8)(a), MCA. The payor or third party may deposit the disputed property with the probate court, which must
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hold it pending a determination. Section 72-2-813(8)(b), MCA. This procedure provides a means to preserve disputed property held by a payor or third party without treating the asserted forfeiture as established. The December 3 order did not direct the court to hold property deposited under that procedure; it commanded financial institutions to freeze covered accounts and authorized the administrator to permit transactions. Subsection (8) does not itself authorize that directive. Section 72-2-813(8)(a)-(b), MCA. We do not, however, treat its notice-and-deposit procedure as the exclusive source of protective authority. The Bateses' broader argument depends on the court's authority under § 72-1-202(2), MCA, which does not sustain this blanket restraint for the reasons just explained.
¶47 The decisions the Bateses invoke do not authorize a broader result. In In re Estate of Thomas, the court restrained the representative's use and distribution of estate funds after a hearing; the requested relief concerned the exercise of her fiduciary office. In re Estate of Thomas, ¶¶ 9-11, 28, 30-34. Section 72-3-617(1), MCA, also permits other orders securing proper performance of a personal representative's duties and permits persons with whom the representative may transact business to become parties. Those provisions remain tied to estate administration; they do not confer a general power to restrain a person's use of property merely because that person serves as personal representative. In re Estate of Thomas, ¶ 34. Here, the court did not confine the challenged restraint to Purtle's fiduciary conduct. It froze disputed accounts and directed financial institutions to honor the prohibition on transactions. It also failed to set the hearing within ten days after entering the restraint, as § 72-3-617(2), MCA, requires unless the parties
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otherwise agree. Instead, it deferred further scheduling until after the administrator's report. Section 72-3-617, MCA, therefore, does not sustain the order as entered. In re Estate of Ronan, 2023 MT 197, ¶¶ 21-22, 28-29, 413 Mont. 468, 537 P.3d 868, likewise concerned distribution of insurance proceeds in accordance with a testamentary disposition and settlement agreement, not a provisional freeze of disputed personal accounts. Neither decision allows a court to replace the applicable statutory requirements with a general assertion that preserving the status quo would help resolve the estate. ¶48 We reverse the blanket freeze. The order does not satisfy § 72-3-617, MCA; and § 72-2-813(8), MCA, does not itself authorize the directive. Even assuming § 72-1-202(2), MCA, permits a restraint necessary to preserve relief on the exploitation claim, the court abused its discretion by imposing this categorical freeze without a sufficient basis for its scope and continuing operation. In re Estate of Thomas, ¶ 14; § 72-1-202(2), MCA. We do not decide whether § 72-1-202(2), MCA, would support a narrower protective order on a different record. This holding does not validate Purtle's claimed transfers, prevent discovery relevant to the exploitation claim, or immunize disputed property from a remedy the governing law authorizes. It requires the District Court to distinguish control of estate administration from control of property Purtle claims individually and to identify the statutory basis and required showing for any provisional relief. The parties remain free to pursue the protection expressly available under § 72-2-813(8), MCA, and other relief for which they establish the applicable statutory prerequisites.
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CONCLUSION
¶49 The District Court violated § 72-3-526(1)-(2), MCA, by granting removal for cause without the required hearing and determination. Its appointment of a special administrator also failed to satisfy § 72-3-701(2), MCA, because it held no hearing and did not adequately establish the emergency exception. The District Court also abused its discretion by imposing the blanket account freeze without adequately justifying its scope and continuing operation, even assuming that § 72-1-202(2), MCA, authorizes some provisional protection. We therefore reverse the removal and replacement directives in the May 30, 2025 order, the special-administrator and account-freeze rulings in the December 3, 2025 order, and the January 15, 2026 appointment order.
¶50 On remand, the District Court shall restore Purtle's appointment, subject to the restrictions that apply during the pending formal proceeding. Reinstatement does not authorize distributions that § 72-3-304, MCA, prohibits or other administration that § 72-3-319(1), MCA, restricts. The court may consider requests for interim protection under the applicable statutes, including §§ 72-3-304, -617, and -701(2), MCA, but must apply the requirements governing the particular relief. If necessary, it shall direct an orderly accounting and transfer of estate records and property held by the special administrator. It also shall establish an appropriate schedule for resolving the pending claims rather than reinstate expired deadlines. The District Court shall lift the account freeze imposed by the December 3 order. To the extent the May 30 stay would continue that same blanket restraint, the court shall modify the stay consistently with this Opinion.
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¶51 The Bateses' standing to contest the will does not alone establish standing to obtain removal for cause, but they need not prevail in that contest before requesting the interim protection § 72-3-304, MCA, permits. We leave any unresolved independent basis for removal standing to the District Court under § 72-1-103(25), MCA, and In re Estate of Lawlor, ¶¶ 25-31. We express no opinion on the validity or construction of the will, whether financial exploitation occurred, ownership of the accounts, or ultimate entitlement to estate property. We also do not foreclose appointment of a neutral fiduciary upon satisfaction of § 72-3-701(2), MCA.
¶52 Reversed and remanded.
/S/ KATHERINE M. BIDEGARAY
We Concur:
/S/ CORY J. SWANSON
/S/ LAURIE McKINNON
/S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON
/S/ JIM RICE