Jackson Fed of Tchr v. Fitch

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United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ____________

No. 25-60496

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Jackson Federation of Teachers; Barbara Phillips, Individually and on behalf of a class of all others similarly situated; James Thomas, Individually and as next friend to minor children, and on behalf of a class of all others similarly situated; Dawn Zimmerer, Individually and on behalf of a class of all others similarly situated; L.E. Jibol, Individually and as next friend to minor children, and on behalf of a class of all others similarly situated; United Campus Workers Southeast Local 3821;

Madisyn Donley, Individually and on behalf of a class of all others similarly situated; Alexis Cobbs, Individually and on behalf of a class of all others similarly situated; Karen Aderer, Individually and on behalf of a class of all others similarly situated; Fostering LGBTQ+ Advocacy, Resources, and Environments; Women in Science and

Engineering; Joy Parikha, Individually and as next friend to minor children, and on behalf of a class of all others similarly situated; Greg Powell, Individually and as next friend to minor children, and on behalf of a class of all others similarly situated; Jakob Clark, Individually and as next friend to minor children, and on behalf of a class of all others similarly situated; Ashley Rogers, Individually and as next friend to minor children, and on behalf of a class of all others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs—Appellees,

versus

Lynn Fitch, in her official capacity as Attorney General of Mississippi; Gee Ogletree, in their official capacity as President of the Board of Trustees of State Institutions of Higher Learning; Steven

Cunningham, in their official capacities as Members of the Board of Trustees of State Institutions of Higher Learning; Amy

Arrington, in their official capacities as Members of the Board of Trustees of United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

October 22, 2026 Thomas B. Plunkett, III Clerk

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State Institutions of Higher Learning; Donald Clark, Jr., in their official capacities as Members of the Board of Trustees of State Institutions of Higher Learning; Et al.,

Defendants—Appellants.

______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Mississippi

USDC No. 3:25-CV-417

______________________________

Before Smith, Haynes, and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges.

Jerry E. Smith, Circuit Judge:

The district judge issued a preliminary injunction barring enforce- ment of a new state law regarding diversity, equity, and inclusion. We vacate the injunction and remand for reassignment to a different district judge. * * * * *

In April 2025, Mississippi enacted House Bill 1193 (H.B. 1193), a law designed to keep Mississippi public education funds from being spent on diversity, equity, and inclusion ("DEI") initiatives and similar controversial programs. The law prevents government-run institutions from requiring activities such as diversity training or pushing DEI ideology, so defined, in the course of government-funded business.

H.B. 1193 does four main things. First, it prevents educational institu- tions from mandating DEI programs and diversity trainings in a variety of contexts. Second, it stops public educational institutions from punishing stu- dents for their views on DEI. Third, it prohibits regulated institutions from endorsing or promoting DEI through course materials. Finally, it prevents institutions and their educators from otherwise engaging in DEI methods or actions, preventing bad actors from circumventing prohibitions and frustrat- ing its purposes. The statute also creates an administrative process to handle

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claims that a given educational institution is not in compliance. H.B. 1193 excepts several activities from its sweep, including scholarly work, the activ- ities of students and their groups, and creative engagement. Plaintiffs, a smattering of teachers, professors, students, parents, and activist organizations, filed a pre-enforcement facial challenge, claiming the law violates the First Amendment, unconstitutionally contravenes the void- for-vagueness doctrine, and otherwise violates various Fourteenth Amend- ment doctrines.

The proceedings in the district court were a botch job, to say the least. Judge Henry Wingate issued a temporary restraining order ("TRO") enjoin- ing enforcement of H.B. 1193 that contained several factual assertions nowhere to be found in the record, or indeed, in any proceeding of the case. Those included mention of plaintiffs and defendants not in the complaint, supposed "declarations" from non-existent or never-present individuals, false quotations purporting to be taken from the text of H.B. 1193, and several erroneous claims that the law had already led to the demise of apparently fictitious programs.

After this came to light, Judge Wingate replaced the TRO without explaining.

Forging forward despite the bungled TRO, Judge Wingate issued a pre-enforcement preliminary injunction. The various state defendants appeal.

At oral argument in this court, it was discovered that even the "cor- rected" TRO—which was incorporated by reference into the preliminary injunction order—still contained hallucinated information (namely, a cita- tion to a purported Fourth Circuit case, "Cousins v. School Bd. of City of Norfolk," that does not exist).

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This district judge carelessly exercised his Article III power by issuing sloppy edicts based on falsehoods and fabrications. Upon discovering some of these falsehoods, Judge Wingate dug in his heels and claimed that the hal- lucinated claims had no bearing on its reasoning; he offered no explanation as to why he included such apparently irrelevant material in the original TRO or why the TRO nevertheless was justified in its absence. Moreover, the district court got the law wrong. The TRO and prelim- inary injunction order rested on impoverished legal analysis that barely paid lip-service to the precedents of the Supreme Court or this court, seeming at times purposely to misconstrue the law by manipulating the words of statutes and cases, without regard to their texts' meaning as a whole.¹The district court—or perhaps, being charitable, its AI agent—ignored and manipulated governing law, apparently to satisfy a policy agenda. Because of the extraordinarily grave errors by the district court, we vacate and remand for assignment to a different district judge. Per the Supreme Court's decision in Moody, we instruct the new judge to conduct proceedings consistent with federal law as interpreted by the Supreme Court and this circuit.

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I.

A. Procedural History Plaintiffs are a teachers' group, a campus union, two student groups, professors, teachers, college students, and parents of K-12 students. Sets of plaintiffs propose to represent putative classes of Mississippi teachers, pro- fessors, students, and parents or guardians of minor students. In June 2025, they filed a pre-enforcement suit two months after the passage of H.B. 1193, naming several state officials charged with enforcing the act as defendants. On July 20, 2025, Judge Wingate entered the TRO. Two days later, defendants filed a motion to clarify or correct the order, pointing out several factual inaccuracies. Later that same day, the district court removed the orig- inal TRO from the docket and replaced it with a seemingly corrected version backdated to July 20.

The court denied defendants' request to restore the original TRO to the docket as a superseded order, claiming that the hallucinated parties, hear- ings, and facts were merely "clerical." After accusations that AI had been used in the original TRO made national headlines, Judge Wingate admitted to having used AI to prepare the TRO and blamed the errors on his law clerk's employment of AI in drafting it.

On August 18, 2025, Judge Wingate granted the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, claiming that H.B. 1193 facially violated the First Amendment and was void for vagueness.

On September 16, 2025, defendants timely appealed.

B. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review

Plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Because there is a federal cause of action, the district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331,

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and this court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C § 1292(a)(1).² We review a preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion. Atchafa- laya Basinkeeper v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 894 F.3d 692, 696 (5th Cir. 2018). Questions of law within the analysis are reviewed de novo, factual determinations for clear error. Id. A district court that grants a preliminary injunction based on incorrect legal principles "[b]y definition" abuses its discretion. Little v. Llano County, 138 F.4th 834, 842 n.7 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 886 (2025).

II. This Case Must Be Reassigned on Remand. The details of the district judge's orders frame our holding that re- assignment is necessary to do justice.

A. The District Judge's Actions

1. The TROs The original TRO—the one actually issued on July 20, 2025—named as plaintiffs eleven individuals and organizations who had never been party to the case³; named as defendants two officials who were not actually sued⁴; claimed, without evidence, that three post-secondary institutions had already cancelled DEI initiatives or programming because of the act⁵; further de- clared, again without evidence, that staff at another school had been told not _____________________

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to discuss certain topics, including "historical interpretations involving sys- temic racism"⁶; misquoted H.B. 1193 as applying to "race or sex stereo- typing," "race or sex scapegoating," "critical race theory," and "institu- tional bias," despite none of these terms' appearing in the act's text; and ref- erenced purported declarations of four individuals who do not appear in the record at all and may not even exist.

On July 22, 2025, defendants filed a motion to clarify, pointing out these errors. ECF 54. In response, the court, without explanation, replaced the original TRO with a seemingly corrected version. Though that document was docketed on July 22, it was backdated to July 20. ECF 58 at 2; see also ECF 58-2. Defendants requested that the original order be restored to the docket to keep the record whole and requested that the court explain the inaccuracies in the original order. The district court denied that motion, claiming the factual inaccuracies were merely "clerical."⁷ In response, U.S. Senator Chuck Grassley accused the district court of using artificial Intelligence ("AI") to prepare the TRO, with the substan- tive errors' arising from AI-generated hallucinations.⁸Fifteen days later, Judge Wingate admitted the errors, claiming that a law clerk had used AI to assist drafting an earlier version of the TRO that was docketed by mistake.⁹ His letter stated that he had removed the original TRO from the docket to avoid confusion and that the errors were clerical, in his view, because they _____________________

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did not relate to "core legal reasoning or the ultimate judgment on the merits" but instead to "failure to confirm the accuracy of certain information."¹⁰

The seemingly corrected TRO did not explain how or why the factual inaccuracies were not necessary to the reasoning of the original TRO. The merits analysis failed to cite a binding authority from after the year 2000.¹¹It claims that H.B. 1193 constitutes viewpoint discrimination, without any anal- ysis whatsoever of a state government's authority to regulate its own speech.¹²And the document did not correct all of the errors: At Fifth Circuit oral argument, it was discovered that the doctored TRO cited to "Cousins v. School Bd. of City of Norfolk, 503 F.2d 422, 426-27 (4th Cir. 1974)." ECF 51 at 2-3. That case does not even exist; it is an apparent AI hallucination.¹³

2. The Preliminary Injunction The order granting the preliminary injunction likewise lacks thor- oughness.¹⁴For example, defendants explained that, because of the facial _____________________

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posture of this case, the regulation only "theoretically" may apply to the plaintiffs; Judge Wingate took that as proof that the "regulations . . . almost assuredly would spill over to the public." ECF 74 at18. The district court's holding as regards the facial First Amendment challenge, meanwhile, cites only two cases (only one from the last two decades)¹⁵and instead focuses on things such as what "[o]ne witness wondered" and what one parent

"thought . . . could be considered" excised by the State of Mississippi's regulation. ECF 74 at 18-21. The court referenced Moody v. NetChoice,

603 U.S. 707 (2024), only to circumvent it. Indeed, the district court's conclusory analysis claims that Moody's framework is only "supposedly"

required:

Essentially, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have not made the show- ing supposedly necessary under Moody v. NetChoice. This Court dis- agrees. Plaintiffs, through declarations, testimony, and logical argu- mentation, have identified many concrete examples of [materials and programs] that are arguably on the chopping block should HB 1193's content-based restrictions be enforced. Plaintiffs affirmatively stated that they could think of no constitutional applications of the chal- lenged provisions. Defendants, on the other hand, while they carry no burden, did not offer competent evidence and argument as to consti- tutional applications adequately to rebut Plaintiffs' showing. ECF 74 at 20-21.

The district court brushes off the Moody framework as a "supposed"

formality that was satisfied merely because plaintiffs identified programs and books that, in their view, are "arguably on the chopping block." That does not come close to satisfying the inquiry demanded by Moody. It is egregious _____________________

arguably part of the shoddy reasoning of the preliminary injunction, too.

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for the district court just to assume that plaintiffs' assertions that certain materials are "on the chopping block" must mean a constitutional violation has occurred, without any independent legal analysis whatsoever.¹⁶ It is even worse for the court merely to take the plaintiffs' claims as true, with barely a glance at the arguments of the defendants. That is legal analysis so poor that it hardly deserves the label. The order defends its analy- sis by claiming that the plaintiffs "do not seek to challenge HB 1193's prohi- bitions on unlawful discrimination," ignoring the fact that several of the challenged portions arguably do nothing more than prohibit unlawful dis- crimination.¹⁷ECF 74 at 9.

Moody demands that a plaintiff raising a facial First Amendment chal- lenge show that the law's "unconstitutional applications substantially out- weigh its constitutional ones." Moody, 603 U.S. at 724. A facial challenge may succeed only by following Moody's two-step process: first, establish the scope of the law, i.e., which activities and which parties the law regulates; second, determine which would and would not be constitutional and "com- pare the two sets" to see whether there is a "sphere of [constitutional] appli- cations" that can defeat the facial claim. Id. at 724-25, 726. The key inquiry of the second step, our circuit has held, is whether the plaintiff can meet the

"rigorous" standard by showing that "the ratio of unlawful-to-lawful appli- cations" is so "lopsided" as substantially to outweigh the lawful reach of the _____________________

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law.¹⁸ That Judge Wingate twice refers to the Moody framework as "suppos- edly" required calls into question whether he even tried in good faith to fol- low the law.¹⁹ECF 74 at 15, 20. Inferior courts must perform the Moody analysis exactly "in the way . . . described" in order properly to rule on a First Amendment facial challenge. Moody, 603 U.S. at 726. The district court's laxity in observing the binding authority of the Supreme Court is yet another reason to doom the preliminary injunction.

The district court's remaining substantive reasoning is poor at best. Judge Wingate cites a couple of parents who were allegedly worried about the law's impact, ECF 74 at 18-19; the fact that defendants are "loudly noncom- mittal," something bordering on paradoxical that has nothing to do with legal analysis, id. at 19; and, on vagueness, the passing thought that "if [H.B. 1193] lives down to the fears it has generated, has a mouthful of sharp teeth which could inflict deep bites," id. at 21.

More subtle, but still deeply troubling, are the legal basis for, and scope of, the preliminary injunction. Citing the fact that defendants admitted that the law of university academic publication freedom "remains unclear,"

Judge Wingate wrote that "Defendants' recognition, alone, at this time, preaches that an injunction should issue when a key consideration is yet un- determined. This Court should pause when faced with an unsettled area with such dire possible consequences." ECF 74 at 19.

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That gets the entire law of injunctive relief completely backwards. Maybe Judge Wingate thinks that preliminary injunctions are not extra- ordinary relief that interrupt the normal function of a democratically elected legislature and executive, but instead are a way for courts to "pause" in the face of "an unsettled area" of law. ECF 74 at19. Under U.S. law, however, things are different. The law forbids district courts from "pausing" if the outcome is totally uncertain. To impose preliminary injunctive relief, a court must find that the party requesting it is likely to succeed on the merits. Planned Parenthood v. Kauffman, 981 F.3d 347, 353 (5th Cir. 2020) (en banc). And the burden is on that party—in this case, the plaintiffs—because injunctive relief is, by its nature, an extraordinary remedy requiring a high bar. Id. A preliminary injunction cannot stand just because there is a possi- bility of success on the merits. The authorizing judge may justify injunctive relief only by ruling that there is likelihood of success. Finally, the scope of the preliminary injunction is impermissibly broad. The order badly misunderstands Trump v. CASA, Inc., 145 S. Ct. 2540

(2025).

Judge Wingate cites CASA's holding that injunctive relief should be scoped as is "necessary to provide complete relief to each plaintiff," id. at 2562-63 (2025), for the proposition that "[i]n this Court's eye, injunctions of this type should be all-or-nothing renditions," ECF 74 at 16. That is almost exactly the opposite of what CASA says. The quoted portion was the Supreme Court's cautioning against overbroad relief and urging judges to tailor relief to what is absolutely necessary and nothing more: In other words, the Court rejects precisely the notion that injunctions "should be all-or- nothing renditions."²⁰The Court instructs inferior courts to avoid the kind _____________________

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of hand-waving that presumes injunctions should issue broadly merely because the stakes are high or the legal issues are complex. The district court later gestures toward putative class certification to establish a statewide scope, but its misunderstanding of CASA tainted its decision to issue such a broad injunction. Indeed, CASA flatly rejects the idea that class actions may be used to circumvent the prohibition on universal injunctions: The whole point of its ruling was that class actions are more constrained and more fair than universal injunctions.²¹A district court that took CASA and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 seriously would never grant such sweeping relief to such putative and dubious classes. B. Our Circuit Precedent Demands Reassignment on Remand. This court may reassign any case on remand when necessary for jus- tice, per our supervisory power over the district courts.²²Admittedly, how- ever, reassignment on remand is an "extraordinary" and "rarely invoked"

power; indeed, this power is so sparingly exercised that our court has not settled on which of two "independent"²³tests it uses to determine whether the circumstances demand reassignment in the interest of justice. Willey, _____________________

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27 F.4th at 1137. The first way to determine whether reassignment is warranted con- siders (1) whether the original judge would, on remand, "reasonably be expected . . . to have substantial difficulty in putting out of his or her mind previously-expressed views or findings determined to be erroneous or based on evidence that must be rejected"; (2) "whether reassignment is advisable to preserve the appearance of justice"; and (3) whether any "waste and duplication" caused by reassignment would disproportionately outweigh

"any gain in preserving the appearance of fairness." Id. (quoting DaimlerChrysler, 294 F.3d at 700-01).

The second test asks whether the facts and circumstances of the pro- ceedings "might reasonably cause an objective observer to question the judge's impartiality." Id. (quoting DaimlerChrysler, 294 F.3d at 701). Thus, the second test is a simplified one that essentially collapses the more complex test's first two factors and recognizes that satisfaction of those almost cer- tainly means that the third is satisfied except, perhaps, in the most compli- cated, fact-intensive cases.²⁴

This case easily calls for reassignment. We begin with the first test. On the first factor, the fact that the district court merely excised the AI- hallucinated "facts" from its original TRO—without explaining why the order should still stand even without the false evidence to support it—may already evince a "substantial difficulty" in setting aside views based on _____________________

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"findings determined to be erroneous."²⁵Given the embarrassment of the AI hallucinations and mistakes of law in the two TROs and the preliminary injunction, it would be an understandable—though obviously unjust—temp- tation for the judge to want to find a way to prove that, even with correct law and fact, his initial view should prevail. The judge would therefore reason- ably be expected to have substantial difficulty in setting aside previous views and unfounded "findings."

From there, the second and third factors are easily met. On the for- mer, the public esteem for the judiciary would be diminished by sending this case back to the same judge for judgment on facts and law entirely different from those upon which he supported his initial TRO. As for the latter factor, the benefit to the rule of law will handily outweigh the costs of process under a new judge—especially because our holding clarifies the scope of H.B. 1193 and lays out the law for the new judge to apply to each circumstance within his or her sweep, per the Supreme Court's instructions in Moody. And,

"regrettably," the waste of the tainted proceedings is "already on the bal- ance sheet." Latiolais v. Cravins, 574 F. App'x 429, 436 (5th Cir. 2014). The second test is also satisfied. We are confident that an objective observer might question the impartiality of the proceedings, for the reasons stated above, and therefore might further question later proceedings run by the same judge.

We now turn to the proper scope of H.B. 1193 and the correct law to apply on remand.

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III. Instructions for the District Court on Remand Moody recognized that, in constitutional facial challenges to laws implicating the First Amendment, it is often "necessary to say more" about the factual sweep of the underlying law and how the law of our constitution relates to it, "to ensure that the facial analysis proceeds on the right path in the courts below." Moody, 603 U.S. at 726. The Moody Court provided the inferior courts with an explication of the constitutional law to apply on remand, id. at 727-33, as well as a detailed outline of the underlying state statutory scheme to bind the factual analysis, id. at 736-40. This circuit fol- lowed that scheme on remand after Moody.²⁶

A.

"The first step in the proper facial analysis is to assess the state [law's] scope." Moody, 603 U.S. at 724. To give shape to the district court's pro- ceedings on remand, we lay out the law and clarify its scope. In particular, there were differences of opinion at oral argument concerning to whom the law applies and what exactly it prohibits regulated parties from doing. We write to clarify.

H.B. 1193 regulates public schools and public colleges, including teachers, professors, and other educators, §§ 1, 2(f), (g); it does not regulate students.²⁷Regulated parties are prohibited from engaging in certain DEI- _____________________

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related activities unless the engagement is for the purposes of "scholarly research" or "creative work[s] by students, faculty, employee[s,] or staff,"

§ 5(b); unless it occurs under the auspices of extracurricular organizations and their guests not funded as agents of the state, § 5(c); or unless lack of such nondiscriminatory engagement would form part of a "policy to limit or restrict freedom of speech . . . that undermines the duty of a public school"

to "protect academic course instruction, intellectual diversity and true expression," § 5(d). Additionally excepted are policies necessary to comply with "academic accreditation standards or requirements," § 5(j); actions against a student, teacher, or other regulated party to comply with state or federal law, § 5(h); and certain educational methods related to students with disabilities, § 5(i).

The Act explicitly lists the DEI-related activities it prohibits, which fall into five main categories:

1. Taking action against a student for disagreement with iden- tified DEI concepts,²⁸§ 3 (h);

_____________________ analysis:

The primary rule of construction is to ascertain the intent of the legislature from the statute as a whole and from the language used therein. Where the statute is plain and unambiguous there is no room for construction, but where it is ambiguous the court, in determining the legislative intent, may look not only to the language used but also to its historical background, its subject matter, and the purposes and objects to be accomplished. DePriest v. Barber, 798 So. 2d 456, 458 (Miss. 2001) (quoting Clark v. State ex rel. Miss. State Med. Ass'n, 382 So. 2d 1046, 1048 (Miss. 1980)). Cf. Stanford ex rel. Phillips v. Brandon Nursing & Rehab. Ctr., L.L.C., 160 F.4th 118, 121 (5th Cir. 2025) (citing DePriest's rule of construction for Mississippi state law).

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2. Maintaining programs "including academic programs or courses" "offices," or programs that promote or otherwise

"endorse" the listed DEI concepts or "concepts promoting transgender ideology, gender-neutral pronouns, deconstruc- tion of heteronormativity, gender theory, sexual privilege or any related formulation of these concepts," § 3(f);

3. Giving racial or sexual preference in employment or con- tracts, § 3(e), or requiring DEI training or diversity statements as a condition of enrollment, employment, or contracting, § 3(g), (d);

4. Requiring "any 'diversity training,'" § 3(i), defined in § 2(d) as required activities like seminars, workshops, or pro- grams "that focus on increasing awareness or understanding of _____________________

appropriate as an exercise of reading the law well. These "divisive" DEI concepts are as follows:

- The notion that a given "race, sex, color, or national origin is inher- ently superior to another," § 2(e)(i);

- Asserting that an individual "is inherently racist, sexist, or oppres- sive" "by virtue of his or her race, sex, color, [or] national origin,"

§ 2(e)(ii);

- Teaching that individuals must be "discriminated against or treated adversely" solely because of race, sex, and so on, § 2(e)(iii); - Teaching that one cannot and should not strive for equal treatment

"without respect to" race, color, sex, national origin, "gender iden- tity," or "sexual orientation," § 2(e)(iv);

- Teaching that an individual's moral character is determined by or is personally responsible for past actions committed by his or her race, color, sex, or national origin, § 2(e)(v-vi);

- Asserting that individuals should feel guilt, discomfort, anguish, "or any other form of psychological distress on account of his or her race, color, sex, or national origin," § 2(e)(vii); and

- The view that meritocracy, "hard work ethic," or other "traits" "are racist or sexist, or were created by a particular class to oppress another class," § 2(e)(viii).

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issues related to race, sex, color, gender identity, sexual orien- tation[,] or national origin"; or

5. Otherwise "engaging in" DEI ideology or diversity training, § 3(b).

Sections 7 through 9 detail how complaints of violations of the Act are handled. State agencies hear assertions of violations by students, parents, employees, or faculty; regulated parties receive 25 days to cure a violation before a complainant can seek an injunction. § 7. If a school is formally ad- judicated to have violated the act twice and the first violation is not yet cured after 30 days, the state will withhold funds from the school until it demon- strates full compliance. § 8. Finally, a person may notify the Attorney Gen- eral of Mississippi if an agency rules adversely to his complaint, and if the violation is not cured in 30 days, the AG may seek a writ of mandamus for compliance. § 9(1). Relief of that kind may be either injunctive or actual damages. § 9(2).

Thus, the Act would prevent an action against a student for his or her disagreement with DEI concepts, except in cases where federal law might demand such action. §§ 3(d), (e), (h), 5(h). It would prevent a school from, say, mandating DEI training (so defined) or diversity training aimed at

"awareness or understanding of" certain social justice issues. § 3(g), (i). It would also apply to school curricula, including courses, that "promote" DEI or the related gender theory concepts spelled out in § 3(f), except insofar as those curricula include such content via faculty or student creative work or scholarly research, or to comply with accreditation requirements.²⁹§§ 3(f), _____________________

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5(b), (j). And, per the residual clause, schools, teachers, and professors may not otherwise "engage[] in" DEI concepts or diversity training through their public work.³⁰

For all of the above, the Act would not apply to the activities of student organizations except when state funds are used³¹; so, presumably, a student organization may invite a speaker who promotes DEI unless the school is using the organization as its organ via use of school funds. § 5(c). As defendants assert, many of these provisions bar activities and con- cepts that would already seem to constitute unlawful discrimination. But others—e.g., training to increase "awareness or understanding," § 3(i), and the views described in §§ 2(e)(iv) and (viii)—do not seem on their face to _____________________

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