People v. Morrishaw

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CR-23-1421

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People v Morrishaw

2026 NY Slip Op 06173 October 22, 2026 Appellate Division, Third Department Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This decision is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports. The People of the State of New York, Respondent,

Christopher Morrishaw, Appellant.

Decided and Entered:October 22, 2026

CR-23-1421

Calendar Date: September 16, 2026

Before: Reynolds Fitzgerald, J.P., Fisher, Mcshan, Mackey And Corcoran, JJ. Brett M. Knowles, Albany, for appellant.

Andrew J. Wylie, District Attorney, Plattsburgh (Vivian Joo of counsel), for respondent. [*1]

Reynolds Fitzgerald, J.P.

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Clinton County (William Favreau, J.), rendered August 8, 2023, convicting defendant following a nonjury trial of the crimes of promoting prison contraband in the first degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree.

In 2007, defendant was convicted of murder in the second degree and sentenced to 15 years to life in prison. In October 2021, while serving that sentence at Clinton Correctional Facility, defendant was allegedly involved in a brawl with multiple inmates. An ensuing search of his person revealed a plastic shank, and defendant was charged by indictment with promoting prison contraband in the first degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree. After a bench trial, County Court found defendant guilty of both charges and sentenced him, as a second felony offender, to concurrent terms of 2Â½ to 5 years in prison on each count, to run consecutively to the term of incarceration that he was already serving. Defendant appeals, and we now affirm.

Initially, we reject defendant's contention that the verdict is not supported by legally sufficient evidence and is against the weight of the evidence. To assess the legal sufficiency of a verdict, we determine "whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the People, provides any valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences which could lead a rational person to the conclusion reached by the factfinder on the basis of the evidence at trial and as a matter of law satisfy the proof and burden requirements for every element of the crimes charged" (People v Gillespie, 205 AD3d 1212, 1213 [3d Dept 2022] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted], lv denied 39 NY3d 1072 [2023]; see People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 349 [2007]). Weight of the evidence review, in contrast, requires that we "first determine whether, based on all the credible evidence, a different finding would not have been unreasonable" (People v Brooks, 233 AD3d 1358, 1358-1359 [3d Dept 2024] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). If a different finding would not have been unreasonable, we must "weigh the relative probative force of conflicting testimony and the relative strength of conflicting inferences that may be drawn from the testimony" to determine whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence (id. at 1359 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see People v Bleakley,

69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]). We reject defendant's argument that the promoting prison contraband conviction is not supported by legally sufficient evidence because the People failed to prove that the plastic shank recovered from defendant was dangerous contraband.^FN1 As relevant here, an incarcerated individual "is guilty of promoting prison contraband in the first degree when . . . [they] knowingly and unlawfully make[ ], obtain[ ] or possess[ ] any dangerous contraband" (Penal Law § 205.25 [2]). For these purposes, "[c]ontraband[*2]" is defined as "any article or thing which a person confined in a detention facility is prohibited from obtaining or possessing by statute, rule, regulation or order" (Penal Law § 205.00 [3]). "Dangerous contraband," in turn, is defined as "contraband which is capable of such use as may endanger the safety or security of a detention facility or any person therein" (Penal Law § 205.00 [4]). "[T]he test for determining whether an item is dangerous contraband is whether its particular characteristics are such that there is a substantial probability that the item will be used in a manner that is likely to cause death or other serious injury, to facilitate an escape, or to bring about other major threats to a detention facility's institutional safety or security"(People v Finley, 10 NY3d 647, 657 [2008] [emphasis omitted]).

Here, two correction officers who assisted in the search that uncovered the plastic shank in question testified at trial that inmates are prohibited by prison rules and regulations from possessing dangerous contraband, including shanks.

They also both testified to their experience with inmates causing serious injuries to others using this type of weapon. Contrary to defendant's contention, this evidence satisfied the People's burden of proof as to the dangerous contraband element, despite the People's failure to introduce the specific prison rules and regulations precluding possession of a weapon (see People v Barzee, 190 AD3d 1016, 1018-1020 [3d Dept 2021], lv denied 36 NY3d 1094 [2021]; People v Andrade, 172 AD3d 1547, 1549-1551 [3d Dept 2019], lv denied 34 NY3d 928 [2019]; People v McPherson, 170 AD3d 1255, 1256 [3d Dept 2019], lv denied 33 NY3d 1071 [2019]; cf. People v Hodge, 290 AD2d 582, 584 [3d Dept 2002], lv denied 97 NY2d 755 [2002]).

Next, defendant argues that the criminal possession of a weapon conviction is not supported by legally sufficient evidence and is against the weight of the evidence because the People failed to demonstrate that defendant possessed the weapon with intent to use it unlawfully against another person (see Penal Law § 265.02 [1]; see also Penal Law §

265.01 [2]). This claim also fails. "The possession by any person of any . . . dangerous knife or any other weapon, [or] instrument . . . is presumptive evidence of intent to use the same unlawfully against another" (Penal Law § 265.15 [4]; see e.g. People v Hodge, 290 AD2d at 584). Here, defendant failed to rebut this presumption (see People v Duran, 6 AD3d 809, 811 [3d Dept 2004], lv denied 3 NY3d 639 [2004]). Moreover, although a different verdict would not have been unreasonable given defendant's testimony that he never possessed the shank, viewing the evidence in a neutral light and deferring to the factfinder's credibility determinations, we conclude that the verdict is not against the weight of the evidence (see People v Barzee, 190 AD3d at 1019-1020; People v Colon-Velazquez, 172 AD3d 1621, 1622 [3d Dept 2019], lv denied 34 NY3d 929 [2019[*3]]).

Defendant's remaining contentions are no more persuasive. First, we reject defendant's argument that County Court erred by not suppressing statements he made to a correction officer without Miranda warnings. During the suppression hearing, the correction officer in question testified that he was conducting a routine transfer of defendant to the hospital wing after he had been involved in an altercation. When they arrived in an exam room, the correction officer removed defendant's mechanical restraints and started a pat and frisk search. At this point, defendant volunteered â without the officer asking a question â that he had a weapon. The correction officer followed up, for safety purposes, by asking defendant where the weapon was hidden, and defendant responded that the weapon was concealed between his buttocks. Notably, the correction officer's testimony made clear that defendant was subjected to only standard facility protocols following an altercation and not any additional constraint "over and above that of ordinary confinement in a correctional facility" (People v Alls, 83 NY2d 94, 100 [1993], cert denied 511 US 1090 [1994]; see People v Andrade,

172 AD3d at 1552; People v Decker, 159 AD3d 1190, 1191 [3d Dept 2018], lv denied 31 NY3d 1116 [2018]; People v Ward, 241 AD2d 767, 768-769 [3d Dept 1997], lv denied 91 NY2d 837 [1997]; compare People v Barber, 251 AD3d 1405, 1407 [3d Dept 2026]). We also agree with County Court that defendant's admission was a spontaneous declaration that was "not the result of inducement, provocation, encouragement or acquiescence" (People v Maerling,

46 NY2d 289, 302-303 [1978]; see People v Ashe, 208 AD3d 1500, 1505-1506 [3d Dept 2022], lv denied 39 NY3d 961 [2022]; People v Dealma, 291 AD2d 207, 207 [1st Dept 2002], lv denied 97 NY2d 753 [2002]).^FN2 Next, we reject defendant's challenge to County Court's Sandoval ruling. We conclude that County Court did not abuse its discretion by crafting a compromise whereby the People could inquire into defendant's prior murder conviction, but not into his prior conviction for possessing an ice pick or other allegations of misconduct while he was incarcerated, including that he had possessed other weapons on multiple occasions (see People v Grady, 40 AD3d 1368, 1370-1371 [3d Dept 2007], lv denied 9 NY3d 923 [2007]). The murder conviction was probative of defendant's willingness to place his own interest over that of society and did not suggest a propensity to commit the crimes for which defendant was presently on trial (see People v Sandoval, 34 NY2d 371, 377 [1974]; People v Giddens, 161 AD3d 1191, 1192 [2d Dept 2018], lv denied 32 NY3d 937 [2018]; People v Warrington, 146 AD3d 1233, 1238-1239 [3d Dept 2017], lv denied 29 NY3d 1038 [2017]). Moreover, the temporal remoteness of the murder conviction was mitigated by the fact that defendant was still incarcerated for this same offense at the time he committed the crimes at bar (see People v Ruffin,

191 AD3d 1174, 1180 [3d [*4]Dept 2021], lv denied 37 NY3d 960 [2021]; People v Rosa, 47 AD3d 1009, 1010 [3d Dept 2008], lv denied 10 NY3d 816 [2008]).

We also reject defendant's claim that he was not afforded meaningful representation (see e.g. People v Baldi, 54 NY2d 137, 147 [1981]). Trial counsel presented a reasonable theory of the case, cross-examined witnesses to call into question the lack of video or forensic evidence tying defendant to the weapon, and presented cogent arguments both pretrial and in his opening and closing statements. Contrary to defendant's position, trial counsel was not required to make arguments that had "little or no chance of success" (People v Caban, 5 NY3d 143, 152 [2005] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]). We also decline defendant's request that we reduce his sentence in the interest of justice on the basis that it is unduly harsh and severe (see People v Infinger, 194 AD3d 1183, 1188 [3d Dept 2021], lv denied

37 NY3d 965 [2021]; People v Barzee, 190 AD3d at 1021-1022). Finally, defendant's challenge to the lack of a formal charge or charge conference is unpreserved and we decline to consider his argument, improperly raised for the first time in reply, that the lack of a formal charge or charge conference during this bench trial constituted a mode of proceedings error (see People v Tenace, 229 AD3d 908, 912 n 3 [3d Dept 2024]). Defendant's challenge to the predicate felony statement and his reliance on Erlinger v United States (602 US 821 [2024]) is also unpreserved as defendant failed to contest the contents of that statement before the sentencing court (see People v Hernandez, 43 NY3d 591, 597-598 [2025]; People v Terry, 240 AD3d 1128, 1133-1134 [3d Dept 2025], lv denied 44 NY3d 995 [2025]). Any remaining contentions that have not been specifically addressed have been reviewed and rejected as without merit. Fisher, McShan, Mackey and Corcoran, JJ., concur.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.

Footnotes

Footnote 1

Although defendant failed to preserve this argument in his motion for a trial order of dismissal, "we necessarily evaluate whether every element of each crime was proven beyond a reasonable doubt in the context of defendant's weight of the evidence challenge" (People v Coston, 238 AD3d 1341, 1342 [3d Dept 2025] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted], lv denied 44 NY3d 992 [2025]).

Footnote 2

Although defendant also argues that County Court should have suppressed an earlier statement during his walk to the exam room, in which he denied having a weapon, defendant's attorney did not seek suppression of this statement at the hearing and, therefore, this argument is unpreserved (see CPL 470.05 [2]).

People v. Morrishaw

People v. Morrishaw

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