United States v. Steven Stathas, Jr.

Between September and November 2021, Stathas sent a 15-year-old girl hundreds of sexually explicit photographs and messages via text, Snapchat, and Facebook Messenger. Police arrested Stathas in late November, after he absconded with the victim from Kentucky to Wisconsin. Police seized Stathas's car, searched it, and recovered his cellphone and wallet. Shortly after, police seized electronics from Stathas's home, including an Xbox, a PlayStation, a tablet, and hard drives. Stathas moved to suppress the evidence from the cellphone, arguing that the search of his car was unlawful. The district court denied the motion after finding that police had probable cause to arrest Stathas, search his car, and seize his phone. Stathas pleaded guilty in 2023 to enticing a minor to engage in unlawful sexual activity. See 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). In the plea agreement, Stathas waived his right to appeal "any pretrial issues, including but not limited to, the district court's denial of his suppression motion." The district court imposed 180 months' imprisonment and 10 years' supervised release. The court did not enter a forfeiture order. But see 18 U.S.C. § 2428(a)(1) (directing district court to order forfeiture of "any property, real or personal, that was used or intended to be used to commit or to facilitate the commission" of offense under § 2422).

After sentencing, Stathas petitioned under Rule 41(g) for the return of his seized property. The government agreed to return the car, wallet, and electronics to Stathas's mother. But Stathas's cellphone would need to be wiped before its return, the government explained, because it contained obscene, sexually explicit conversations between Stathas and the victim, as well as the victim's identifying information. In support, the government attached a police report that described the messages that police discovered on the phone. The report also relayed the victim's statements to police that she and Stathas communicated on multiple apps and that she had sent him photos of herself in her underwear. Stathas responded that although he did not object to the government deleting his conversations with the victim, other data on the phone should be preserved because it was meaningful to him personally or relevant to a possible civil lawsuit against the West Bend Police Department.

The court sided with the government, concluding that Stathas had no right to have his cellphone returned at all, much less to impose conditions on its return. Moreover, the court noted, the government's approach was "generous and reasonable,"

and "an efficient compromise" between the parties' interests.

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After the district court's ruling on the Rule 41(g) matter, Stathas moved to withdraw his guilty plea as involuntary and unknowing because he was not told that his cellphone would be wiped before its return. At the same time, he moved the court to reconsider the Rule 41(g) ruling. The court denied both motions. On appeal, Stathas contends that the district court erred in concluding that the government could wipe his cellphone before returning it. He concedes that the government may delete data related to the victim, but he maintains that wiping the phone is unreasonable under the circumstances. He proposes alternatives, including that the government delete the Snapchat app from his phone, provide him with a copy of the phone's data that does not include conversations with the victim, or permit an unspecified third party to recover evidence that he needs for future lawsuits. A criminal defendant whose property has been seized by the government may move for its return under Rule 41(g). United States v. Sims, 376 F.3d 705, 708 (7th Cir. 2004). The district court must then consider whether the government's retention of the property is reasonable under the circumstances. In re Search of Off. of Tylman, 245 F.3d 978, 980 (7th Cir. 2001). After a criminal investigation or prosecution has concluded, the government's "continued retention of the property would become unreasonable" if its

"legitimate interests can be satisfied even if the property is returned." Id. (quoting F^ED. R. CIV. P. Rule 41 advisory committee's note to 1989 amendment). We review the district court's denial of a motion under Rule 41(g) for abuse of discretion and its factual findings for clear error. United States v. Rachuy, 743 F.3d 205, 211 (7th Cir. 2014). We agree with the district court that the government's retention and destruction of the data on Stathas's cellphone is reasonable under the circumstances. The district court's finding that the phone was rife with "numerous sexually explicit messages and images" sent to the victim as well as "significant personally identifying information about her" is not clear error. The record reveals that these conversations occurred over multiple apps on the phone and that Stathas also received explicit photos of the minor. The court did not clearly err by crediting the government's assertion that "no procedure short of digitally wiping" the phone would eliminate all criminal or harmful material. Given the importance of the government's interest in ensuring none of this material remains on Stathas's phone, the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the government could delete the phone's data before returning it. Stathas's rejoinders on appeal are unpersuasive. He disputes that the cellphone contains any illegal material, but we see no clear error in the court's contrary conclusion. Moreover, the district court did not err in rejecting Stathas's proposed

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alternate solutions allowing him access to some of the data on the phone. Stathas does not provide any reason to believe that his alternatives would eradicate the extensive abusive material located across multiple apps, much less that these alternatives are feasible under the circumstances. See F ED. R. CIV. P. Rule 41 advisory committee's note to 2009 amendment ("A substantial amount of time can be involved in the forensic imaging and review of information. This is due to the sheer size of the storage capacity of media, difficulties created by encryption and booby traps, and the workload of the computer labs."). Stathas also suggests that wiping the phone is pointless because he was given access to the messages during discovery and because he could recover the messages by logging into Snapchat on another device. But accessing the messages by any means would violate the condition of Stathas's supervised release that he may not

"possess any visual or text material involving[,] depicting or describing … sexual conduct involving minors, nor shall he knowingly patronize any place, physical or virtual, where such material is available."

Stathas next reraises his argument that his cellphone was illegally seized. The government responds that Stathas waived any challenge to the seizure in his plea agreement and, alternatively, that the challenge is precluded by the district court's order denying the motion to suppress. Stathas did not file a reply brief to rebut the government's arguments, so he has waived any counterargument. See United States v. Ferguson, 184 F.4th 1002, 1009 (7th Cir. 2026).

Lastly, Stathas contends that his guilty plea was not knowing or voluntary because he was not told that the government would seek to wipe his cellphone before returning it to him. But, as the district court correctly concluded, his motion is untimely.

"After the court imposes sentence, the defendant may not withdraw a plea of guilty."

F ED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e). Rather, his plea can be "set aside only on direct appeal or collateral attack." See id. Stathas attempted both a direct appeal and a collateral attack under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, but neither was successful. See United States v. Stathas, No. 24-1001 (7th Cir. Dec. 3, 2024) (dismissing direct appeal); Stathas v. United States, Nos. 25-cv-0959-bhl (E.D. Wis. Sept. 9, 2025) (denying § 2255 motion), cert. of app. denied, No. 25-3257 (7th Cir. Apr. 1, 2026).

Finally, we note that the district court allowed Stathas to proceed with his motion under Rule 41(g), and with his appeal from the denial of that motion, without paying the filing and docketing fees. A postjudgment motion under Rule 41(g) is a civil action subject to the Prison Litigation Reform Act. See United States v. Stevens, 500 F.3d 625, 629 (7th Cir. 2007). We direct the clerk of the district to collect the appropriate

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appellate fees from Stathas's prison trust fund account using the mechanism of § 1915(b).

AFFIRMED

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