THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST
DEPARTMENT.
ENTERED: October 13, 2026
Footnotes
Footnote 1 The cases cited by the dissent (see e.g.Jones v Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 666 F3d 955 [5th Cir 2012]; Scholes v Lehmann,
56 F3d 750 [7th Cir 1995], cert denied 516 US 1028; Javitch v Transamerica Occidental Life Ins. Co., 408 F Supp 2d 531 [ND Ohio 2006]) involve claims arising under other states' laws where in pari delicto is not enforced under certain circumstances not applicable here. The dissent cites no New York authority under which the receiver would be relieved of the in pari delicto defense under the circumstances of this case, and the holding of New York's highest court in Kirschner, as discussed below, undermines the dissent's conclusions.
Footnote 2
The dissent asserts that this case is inapposite because a SIPA trustee is similar to a bankruptcy trustee whereas here, the claims have been brought by an equity receiver. However, as noted herein, there is no significant difference between bankruptcy trustees and nonbankruptcy receivers for purposes of in pari delicto (see Caplin, 406 US at 429; Knauer, 348 F3d at 236).
Footnote 3
(see Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. v Wagoner, 944 F2d 114 [2d Cir 1991])
Footnote 4
1This lawsuit seeks recovery of only a portion of the more than $248 million in funds which Alexandre defrauded from his investors.
Footnote 5
The other case discussed in Kirschner (Kirschner v KPMG LLP, 590 F3d 186 [2d Cir 2009]) came to the Court of Appeals on a certified question from the Second Circuit regarding the adverse inference exception to the presumption that the acts of agents are imputed to their principals. That case was commenced by the litigation trustee appointed in a Chapter 11 Bankruptcy proceeding against the bankrupt corporation's senior leadership who had participated in a fraudulent scheme to hide uncollectible debt from the public and regulators, and against financial, law and accounting firms that had allegedly aided and abetted the company insiders in carrying out the fraud. In that case, the Second Circuit asked the Court to determine, among other things, "whether the adverse interest exception is satisfied by showing that the insiders intended to benefit themselves by their misconduct"; and "whether the exception is available only where the insiders' misconduct has harmed the corporation" (Kirschner, 590 F3d at 194-195). I do not address these certified questions because, as discussed further below, I do not find them relevant to this case, in which plaintiff, unlike a bankruptcy trustee, does not stand exclusively in the shoes of EminiFX.
Footnote 6
In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC (721 F3d 54, 58 [2d Cir 2013], cert dismissed in part Picard v JPMorgan Chase & Co., 573 US 901 [2014], cert deniedPicard v HSBC Bank PLC, 573 US 945 [2014]), cited by the majority in support of its argument that the bad acts of the corporation are imputed to its successors, is inapposite. That case held that a trustee appointed pursuant to the Securities Investor Protection Act (SIPA) was barred by "the doctrine of in pari delicto . . . from asserting claims against the [d]efendants on behalf of the estate for wrongdoing in which Madoff . . . participated." As the Second Circuit noted, the SIPA trustee "stands in Madoff's shoes" because, "[a]lthough SIPA liquidation is not a traditional bankruptcy, a SIPA trustee is vested with the same powers and title with respect to the debtor and the property of the debtor . . . as a trustee in a case under Title 11" (721 F3dat 58 [internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted]). Similarly, Bullmore v Ernst & Young Cayman Is. (20 Misc 3d 667, 669-671 [Sup Ct, NY County 2008]) was commenced by joint liquidators in a corporate winding up under Cayman Island law following the corporation's collapse as a result of corporate fraud. To the extent that it is applicable to this case at all, Bullmore is not binding on this Court.
Footnote 7
In Caplin, the U.S. Supreme Court noted that "nowhere in the statutory scheme is there any suggestion that the trustee in reorganization is to assume the responsibility of suing third parties on behalf of debenture holders" (408 US at 428). It further noted that the Bankruptcy Code permits the reorganization trustee to report to the reorganization court
"potential causes of action 'available to the estate'" and that his "task is simply to 'collect and reduce to money the property of the estates for which (he is trustee)'" (id. at 428-429 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). Since the reorganization trustee failed to show that the corporation could have brought the same claim and because, under the trustee's own theory, the corporation was as much at fault as the defendant, the Court concluded that the trustee lacked standing (id. at 429-430, 434).
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