PER CURIAM:
Scott Bixler appeals his 120-month sentence after pleading guilty to one count of failing to update his sex-offender registration. He argues that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable because the district court didn't address his non-frivolous mitigation arguments for a lower sentence. We agree that Bixler's sentence is procedurally unreasonable and thus vacate his sentence and remand for resentencing.
I.
Bixler must register as a sex offender for life following his 2010 conviction of possessing child pornography. Awaiting sentencing for his West Virginia conviction for failing to register in 2023, Bixler posted bond and fled to Mexico with his wife. There, the two met a prostitute and invited her to their hotel room. Bixler told her he wanted to "buy"
a seven- or eight-year-old child for $5,000. She later returned with another woman—who, unbeknownst to the Bixlers, was either an informant or an undercover law enforcement officer—and a young girl. Moments later, police arrived, arrested the Bixlers, and seized three phones, methamphetamine, air-powered pellet guns, a signal jammer, and $5,000. Bixler was extradited to West Virginia and pleaded guilty, without a plea agreement, to failing to update his sex-offender registration. See 18 U.S.C. § 2250. Bixler's presentence report ("PSR") calculated an advisory Guidelines range of 15 to 21 months. Although Bixler's conduct in Mexico (and other attempts to solicit child sexual abuse material) didn't affect that range, the PSR suggested that the district court consider that conduct when deciding whether to vary upward. Perhaps anticipating an upward variance,
3
Bixler filed a sentencing memorandum requesting a within-Guidelines sentence. See S.J.A. 162-83. In that memorandum, Bixler emphasized his traumatic upbringing, military and combat related injuries, and mental health conditions and offered supporting documentation.
The district court sentenced Bixler to the statutory maximum term in prison: 120 months. In doing so, the court primarily emphasized Bixler's conduct in Mexico and history of child-exploitation offenses. Other than acknowledging that it read Bixler's sentencing memorandum, the district court didn't discuss the arguments made therein. Bixler timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a); 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
II.
On appeal, Bixler argues that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable because the district court failed to address his nonfrivolous arguments for a within-Guidelines sentence. We agree.
Our review of sentences is for abuse of discretion. United States v. Davis, 130 F.4th 114, 120 (4th Cir. 2025) (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007)). "Under this deferential standard, we first review for procedural reasonableness. If the district court's decision is procedurally sound, we consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed." United States v. Blue, 877 F.3d 513, 517 (4th Cir. 2017) (citations omitted).
4
For a sentence to be procedurally reasonable, the district court must, among other things, "address or consider all non-frivolous reasons presented for imposing a different sentence and explain why [it] has rejected those arguments." United States v. Ross, 912 F.3d 740, 744 (4th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted). This requirement "focuses on the whole of a defendant's argument"; the district court need not separately "address every argument a defendant makes." United States v. Arbaugh, 951 F.3d 167, 174 (4th Cir. 2020). In practice, the court must address the defendant's "central thesis in mitigation," but not
"every specific claim made in support." Davis, 130 F.4th at 120 (citation omitted). Finally,
"[a]lthough the district court's explanation 'need not be elaborate or lengthy,' when a district court's chosen sentence varies from the Guidelines range, we must be convinced that it gave 'serious consideration' to the extent of the departure and 'adequately explain[ed] the chosen sentence to allow for meaningful appellate review and to promote the perception of fair sentencing.'" Id. at 121 (quoting United States v. King, 673 F.3d 274, 283 (4th Cir. 2012)).
Here, the district court failed to show that it considered and explained its rejection of Bixler's arguments supporting a within-Guidelines sentence. In his sentencing memorandum, Bixler argued that his personal history and characteristics made his case
"unique" and warranted a within-Guidelines sentence. S.J.A. 162. In support, he submitted medical, psychological, and military records documenting his upbringing, service-related injuries, and mental health history. And the record establishes that the district court reviewed those materials; it twice stated that it had reviewed Bixler's "detailed sentencing memo." J.A. 117-18. When imposing sentence, the district court said that the
5
memorandum did "a tremendous job of detailing Mr. Bixler's road to here: the good, the bad, the difficulties and the obstacles and the rest." J.A. 127. It continued, "there's other parts of that story," including his child-pornography offense and his conduct in Mexico. Id. The court discussed those circumstances and concluded that deterrence and protection of the public required a substantial upward variance.
The district court's explanation doesn't reveal whether it considered Bixler's mitigation arguments and, if it did, why it rejected them. The court referred generally to Bixler's "difficulties" and "obstacles," without discussing his traumatic upbringing, service-related injuries, or mental-health conditions, individually or collectively. Id. Its detailed treatment of the aggravating circumstances explains why it believed a substantial sentence was necessary, but it does not explain how it weighed those circumstances against Bixler's central mitigation theory. The record therefore lacks "enough context . . . for this Court to conduct a meaningful appellate review." Blue, 877 F.3d at 521. The Government's arguments otherwise aren't persuasive.
First, it contends that the district court's reference to Bixler's "road to here,"
followed by its observation that "there's other parts of that story," shows that it weighed his mitigating history against his propensity for child exploitation. Resp. Br. 14 (quoting J.A. 127). Perhaps it did. But the court's abstract reference to unspecified "difficulties" and
"obstacles" does not adequately reveal that reasoning for purposes of appellate review. Second, the Government's understanding of Bixler's "central thesis"—that his mental health mitigated his flight to Mexico—is too narrow. See Resp. Br. 15, 17. Rather, Bixler argued more broadly that his upbringing, military injuries, and mental health history
6
collectively diminished his general culpability. In any event, the district court addressed neither theory. Its observation that Bixler could plan and "overcome the obstacles" in his life does not reveal how it evaluated those mitigating circumstances in arriving at its sentencing decision. J.A. 129.
Third, the Government points to the district court's recommendation that Bixler receive a psychological evaluation and mental-health treatment as evidence that it considered and resolved Bixler's mitigation arguments. Such a recommendation may sometimes show that a court considered a defendant's mental-health history. But here the recommendation was not tied to Bixler's mitigation arguments or accompanied by any explanation of their bearing on the sentence. Cf. United States v. Nance, 957 F.3d 204, 213 (4th Cir. 2020).
Finally, the Government hasn't shown that the district court's procedural error was harmless. It bears the burden of proving that explicit consideration of Bixler's mitigation arguments would not have affected his sentence. United States v. Shields, 126 F.4th 356, 362 (4th Cir. 2025). The Government argues that further discussion cannot reasonably be expected to have produced a different result, relying on the court's review of the sentencing memorandum and emphatic assessment of Bixler's conduct. Resp. Br. 19. This argument, however, flips this standard on its head. Bixler need not show that proper consideration would have changed his sentence. Although the court explained why aggravating factors favored a long sentence, sentencing is "a matter of degree," and mitigating factors may still justify a somewhat shorter one. Shields, 126 F.4th at 363. Thus, we can't be assured that
7
Bixler's sentence wouldn't have been different had the district court addressed Bixler's mitigation arguments. So, the error isn't harmless.
* * *
The district court didn't need to say much, but it had to say something to show that it considered Bixler's central mitigation theory: his mental illness, PTSD, and other service-related injuries warranted a within-Guidelines sentence. Because the court didn't do so, we must conclude that Bixler's sentence is procedurally unreasonable.*So we vacate his sentence and remand for resentencing. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this Court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
VACATED AND
REMANDED
* Bixler also argues that his sentence is substantively unreasonably. Although our inquiry ends once we identify a procedural infirmity, we note that Bixler's 120-month sentence—even with a Guidelines range of 15 to 21 months—seems to be substantively reasonable under "the totality of the circumstances." United States v. McCain, 974 F.3d 506, 515 (4th Cir. 2020) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51). The district court thoroughly explained why the facts of this case weren't those of an ordinary failure-to-register case and why, based on the § 3553(a) factors, a significant upward variance was appropriate.
"Consideration of the record and the district court's lengthy sentencing explanation . . . make clear that the variance was well supported." United States v. McKinnie, 21 F.4th 283, 292 (4th Cir. 2021). That conclusion, however, doesn't change the fact that the district court failed to explain why it rejected Bixler's mitigation arguments for purposes of procedural reasonableness.