Filed 9/30/26 In re D.B. CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re D.B., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
B339350
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, v.
D.B.,
Defendant and Appellant. (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. KJ41667-
100322)
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Steven E. Ipson, Judge. Dismissed. Courtney M. Selan, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and Nikhil Cooper, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. _______________________
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Defendant D.B.1appeals the juvenile court's order transferring his case to criminal court. While this appeal was pending, D.B. was released from prison on parole. We dismiss the appeal as moot.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 1998, when D.B. was 16 years old, he and several codefendants committed multiple crimes in Los Angeles. D.B. and a fellow gang member provided the group with guns. They carjacked one victim at gunpoint and stole her purse. The group attempted another carjacking, during which D.B. shot at the car before the group left the scene.2
The group later robbed Gilbert Rivas and three other pedestrians at gunpoint. A codefendant punched a female pedestrian when she resisted, and Rivas told that codefendant not to hurt her or disrespect them. D.B. shot Rivas in the stomach. After Rivas fell to the ground, another codefendant shot him in the back and head. Rivas died of his injuries. Shortly thereafter, a Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition was filed against D.B. in juvenile court. The juvenile court transferred D.B. to criminal court to stand trial. (See § 707.)
D.B. was convicted by jury of one count of murder with robbery and attempted robbery special circumstances, two counts of second degree robbery, three counts of attempted second degree robbery, and one count of carjacking. Various gang and
1 We refer to Defendant by his initials. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.401(a)(2).)
2 D.B. was not charged in this incident, but the evidence was admitted at trial to establish intent and motive.
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firearm enhancements were found true, and D.B. was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole (LWOP), plus 29 years four months. In 2001, the judgment was affirmed on direct appeal, as modified to stay the sentence imposed for one robbery count. (Case No. B135322.)
In 2015, the criminal court granted D.B.'s petition for a writ of habeas corpus to recall and resentence him. (See Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460, 477, 479-480 [court must consider certain factors before imposing a LWOP sentence on a juvenile offender].)
In September 2022, the criminal court conditionally recalled D.B.'s sentence and granted his motion to transfer/remand his case to juvenile court pursuant to Proposition 57, the Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016. (People v. Superior Court (Lara) (2018) 4 Cal.5th 299, 303-304.) It asked the juvenile court to decide "if it would have transferred the case to adult criminal court had it originally been filed in juvenile court in accordance with the current law."
In October 2022, the People filed a new Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition, essentially realleging the crimes of which D.B. had been convicted. That same day, the People moved to transfer D.B. to criminal court. (See § 707, subds. (a)(1) & (b).) D.B. opposed transfer.
By the time the transfer hearing was held in 2024, D.B. was 42 years old. After a multi-day hearing in which many witnesses testified for both sides, the juvenile court found "by clear and convincing evidence that [D.B.] is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court."
Among its findings were that housing in the juvenile system was not available for D.B. because the juvenile facility houses youth
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in their teens and 20's, not men in their 40's; thus, D.B. would likely be immediately released if he remained in the juvenile system. It dismissed the 2022 petition without prejudice and returned the case to criminal court.
D.B. timely appealed. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.770(g)(1).)
According to D.B., the criminal court then re-imposed his LWOP sentence. But both parties agree D.B. was thereafter found suitable for parole on March 5, 2025, under the youth offender parole statute. (See Pen. Code, § 3051.) D.B.'s previous appellate counsel informed us he was released from prison on August 8, 2025.
DISCUSSION
D.B. argues the juvenile court abused its discretion in transferring his case to criminal court by applying an incorrect standard, and in the alternative, because its order was not supported by substantial evidence. He acknowledges, however, his release from prison may have mooted his appeal. We agree this appeal is moot, and we decline to exercise our discretion to consider the merits.
Courts are " ' "not to give opinions upon moot questions or
. . . declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue." ' " (In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 276.) " '[A] case becomes moot when a court ruling can have no practical effect or cannot provide the parties with effective relief.' " (People
v. Armas (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 350, 353; see also People v. DeLeon (2017) 3 Cal.5th 640, 645 (DeLeon).) In order "[f]or relief to be 'effective,' " there must be "an ongoing harm" that is
"redressable or capable of being rectified by the outcome the [party] seeks." (In re D.P., at p. 276.)
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In light of his release from prison, D.B. has not pointed to any ongoing harm, let alone a practical impact of a potential ruling in his favor. On the contrary, D.B. concedes his "[c]laim is [n]o [l]onger [a]ctive" because "there may be no direct impact on [him] or his incarceration status." Because D.B. has not shown "a specific legal or practical consequence that will be averted upon reversal," his appeal is moot. (In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 283; see also Pfeifer v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (2012)
211 Cal.App.4th 1250, 1282.) Without diminishing the serious repercussions of a transfer to criminal court, D.B. has already obtained a better result in his release from incarceration than he sought at his transfer hearing.
In his reply brief, D.B. argues " 'the appeal affords the opportunity to erase' certain stigmas associated with his case."
(Quoting People v. Nolan (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1210, 1213.) Not only is the argument forfeited (People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 408), but also D.B. has not specified such stigmas, let alone explained how they "support the conclusion that a legally sufficient controversy exists." (DeLeon, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 646, fn. 2; see also In re D.P., supra,
14 Cal.5th at p. 277 [in dependency court, "complaining of 'stigma' alone is insufficient to sustain an appeal"].) Nonetheless, even when an appeal is moot, we retain discretion to consider the merits in certain circumstances. (See, e.g., Cucamongans United for Reasonable Expansion v. City of Rancho Cucamonga (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 473, 479-480.) D.B. argues we should exercise our discretion here because his issues are "likely to recur" and are "of general public concern." We decline his request.
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First, even if D.B.'s challenge to the standard applied by the juvenile court may recur in future cases, we do not agree it is appropriate to review now. D.B. does not argue—and we do not perceive—that issue will regularly evade review. (Cf. Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission (1911) 219 U.S. 498, 515 [issues on appeal were "continuing" and should not be "defeated . . . by short term orders, capable of repetition, yet evading review," affording the parties no chance of redress]; Moore v. Ogilvie (1969) 394 U.S. 814, 816 [challenge to election procedure was " 'capable of repetition, yet evading review' "].) The severity of D.B.'s charged crimes and the length of his sentence indeed point to the opposite conclusion. Thus, the issue can be appropriately considered in a nonmoot appeal. (See Cerletti v. Newsom (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 760, 767 [declining to exercise discretion where issue would not regularly evade review].) Second, D.B. argues his appeal involves an issue of general public concern, relying upon cases involving due process violations. (See, e.g., In re Sodersten (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1163, 1217-1219 [prosecution's suppression of material evidence favorable to the defense "compromise[d] the core of [the justice] system"]; John A. v. San Bernardino City Unified School Dist. (1982) 33 Cal.3d 301, 307-308 [student facing expulsion from public school based on written declarations instead of oral testimony].) But while D.B. conclusorily asserts the transfer implicates due process, he has not argued the transfer hearing
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In light of these circumstances and the parties' consensus the appeal is moot, we decline to exercise our discretion to consider D.B.'s appeal.
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed.
RICHARDSON, J.
WE CONCUR:
LUI, P. J.
CHAVEZ, J.
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