O R D E R
Alexia Knox sued her former employer, the Wisconsin Department of Transportation (WDOT), under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, after it terminated her employment as a communications specialist because her disability * We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. APP. P. 32.1
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prevented her from being on call outside of normal business hours. The district court entered summary judgment for WDOT. We affirm.
WDOT hired Knox as a senior communications specialist in November 2021. Upon her hiring, Knox signed WDOT's position summary describing the role. The position summary stated that a communications specialist may be required to occasionally work outside normal business hours when there are "major traffic incidents and severe weather events … to support communication with the media and traveling public." It also stated that a communications specialist may be placed in
"on-call status with limited or no notice" and may require a "24/7 work schedule"
during those events.
Anne Reshadi-Nezhad supervised Knox at WDOT. Knox attested that during a two-hour meeting on December 2, 2021, Reshadi-Nezhad yelled at her. Knox also stated that, during this meeting, Reshadi-Nezhad called her "frustrated" and "insubordinate,"
and accused her of "having an attitude." Additionally, at some point in the meeting, Knox informed Reshadi-Nezhad that she had an anxiety disorder. Shortly after the meeting, Reshadi-Nezhad sent Knox a list of tasks to complete within a few days. Knox believed Reshadi-Nezhad sent them to trigger her anxiety.
Knox then began missing work. After requesting part of the day off on Friday, December 3, Knox failed to show up to work the following Monday, December 6. Knox did not tell Reshadi-Nezhad she would not be there, despite being told to inform Reshadi-Nezhad of any absences. Reshadi-Nezhad called and messaged Knox multiple times that day to inquire about her whereabouts. Knox then requested a leave of absence from December 8 to 10 because of her disability. Knox's medical providers requested further absences for Knox in December, and WDOT placed Knox on indefinite unpaid leave.
In January 2022, Knox's medical provider sent documentation to a WDOT human resources specialist stating that because of Knox's mental health impairment, she could not work on call outside of normal business hours or be on a 24/7 schedule. Knox's schedule also needed to be flexible when she suffered mental health flare-ups. Knox further required an office located away from Reshadi-Nezhad's and the ability to take breaks at her discretion.
Reshadi-Nezhad and other WDOT employees reviewed Knox's requirements and determined that the requested accommodations were inconsistent with the
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communication specialist position. The WDOT managers concluded that working outside business hours on occasion and working a 24/7 schedule during major events were essential functions of the role. Because the accommodations Knox needed would require substantial changes to the department's operations, they concluded that Knox could not work as a communications specialist. WDOT and Knox were unable to agree upon an alternate position that met Knox's skills and restrictions. WDOT terminated Knox's employment in May 2022 and Knox sued WDOT under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794. She alleged that WDOT discriminated against her by failing to provide her with reasonable accommodations and wrongfully terminated her employment because of her disability. She also claimed that WDOT maintained a hostile work environment.
After both parties moved for summary judgment, Knox moved to supplement the record with new evidence. She attached emails to the motion and stated that these documents were material. The district court denied Knox's motion because Knox did not explain why the new evidence was relevant.
The district court granted WDOT's motion for summary judgment and denied Knox's. It concluded that Knox's discrimination and reasonable accommodation claims failed as a matter of law because Knox was not a qualified individual within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act. The court determined that being on call was an essential function of Knox's position and Knox did not provide evidence that a reasonable accommodation would allow her to fulfill this function. As to Knox's hostile work environment claim, the court concluded that to the extent the Rehabilitation Act provides for such claims, Knox did not show that Reshadi-Nezhad's behavior was based on Knox's disability.
On appeal, Knox appears to argue that the district court wrongly granted WDOT summary judgment on an incomplete record because WDOT did not answer her second interrogatory. But in her motion to supplement the record, she stated that WDOT had responded to that interrogatory. To the extent Knox challenges the district court's denial of her motion to supplement the record with documents she received in response to that second interrogatory, Knox failed to explain why the emails she attached to that motion were relevant. Accordingly, the court did not abuse its discretion by denying her motion to supplement. See Vance v. Ball State Univ., 646 F.3d 461, 469 (7th Cir. 2011).
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Turning to the merits, Knox argues that being on call is not an essential function of the communications specialist role. We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, McHale v. McDonough, 41 F.4th 866, 869 (7th Cir. 2022), and because the standards for the Rehabilitation Act are the same as those for the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, we rely on case law applicable to either statute, Smithson v. Austin, 86 F.4th 815, 820 (7th Cir. 2023). At summary judgment, Knox must show that during the relevant period she was a "qualified individual" with a disability. Vargas v. DeJoy, 980 F.3d 1184, 1188 (7th Cir. 2020). Whether she was a qualified individual turns on whether she could perform the essential functions of the communications specialist role with or without reasonable accommodations. Id. Essential functions are "the fundamental job duties of the employment position." Id.
"Whether a function is essential to the position is a question of fact, resolved by considering the employer's judgment, including written job descriptions, as evidence."
Id. (citation modified). We also look to the consequences of excusing the employee from performing the function. Tonyan v. Dunham's Athleisure Corp., 966 F.3d 681, 688 (7th Cir.
2020).
The undisputed record supports the district court's conclusion that working on call is an essential function of the communications specialist position. In WDOT's judgment—to which we defer—being on call is essential. See id. at 687-88. Additionally, WDOT's position summary for the communications specialist position twice mentions being on call and working outside normal hours. Knox argues that she was expected to work on call only occasionally, but that does not make that aspect of the position non-essential. See Vargas, 980 F.3d at 1189. Knox's role required her to be on call for severe weather events and major traffic incidents, which can happen at all hours of the day or night. Accordingly, the record demonstrates that being available outside of normal working hours is an essential function. See Tate v. Dart, 51 F.4th 789, 796 (7th Cir.
2022).
The district court also correctly concluded that Knox's request to work only during business hours was not a reasonable accommodation. The undisputed record shows that other employees would have to cover the communications specialists' on-call duties if Knox were excused from performing them. But WDOT is not required to "reshuffle staff and resources" to accommodate Knox. Vargas, 980 F.3d at 1189. Because the evidence shows that being on call is an essential function and that no reasonable accommodation would allow Knox to perform that function, the court correctly concluded that she was not a qualified individual. See id. at 1190. The court
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therefore properly granted WDOT summary judgment on Knox's discrimination claims.
Knox finally argues that the district court erred by concluding there was no evidence to support her hostile work environment claim. We assume without deciding that a hostile workplace claim is cognizable under the Rehabilitation Act. See Shiba v. Mullin, 174 F.4th 1025, 1037 n.2 (7th Cir. 2026). A hostile workplace claim "requires evidence of an objectively and subjectively offensive work environment plagued by severe or pervasive harassment." Id. at 1037 (citation modified). The harassment must be based on the employee's disability. Ford v. Marion Cnty. Sheriff's Off., 942 F.3d 839, 856 (7th Cir. 2019). Knox's hostile work environment claim rests largely on Reshadi- Nezhad's behavior at their December 2 meeting. But Knox concedes in her brief to this court that "this initial conduct was not tied to her disability." Knox asserts that Reshadi-Nezhad's conduct escalated after the meeting, stating that Reshadi-Nezhad immediately sent Knox assignments to complete. She also states that Reshadi-Nezhad called Knox repeatedly and emailed her when she was absent on December 6, but she does not dispute that Reshadi-Nezhad was trying to establish where she was and why she was absent. Thus the evidence is insufficient to establish, objectively or subjectively, that she experienced "severe or pervasive" harassment based on her disability at the hands of her supervisor. See Yochim v. Carson, 935 F.3d 586, 593 (7th Cir. 2019). We have considered Knox's remaining arguments, and none has merit.
AFFIRMED
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