United States v. Lamone Lauderdale

responded to counsel's motion, so we limit our review to the subjects that counsel raises.¹See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014). Because Lauderdale has no arguable issues on appeal, we grant the motion and dismiss the appeal. In January 2022, Lauderdale was pulled over by Corporal Joshua Stutesman, a K-9 officer, for speeding. A second officer arrived at the scene and assisted with issuing a warning ticket after Stutesman's computer malfunctioned. Around ten minutes into the stop, Stutesman conducted a dog sniff, and the dog alerted to the odor of narcotics. Stutesman asked Lauderdale to exit his van, but Lauderdale fled, leading the officers on a high-speed chase. After Lauderdale ran over a median and popped a tire, he fled on foot while carrying a bag that he dropped during the chase. The officers eventually caught up to Lauderdale, arrested him, and found the bag along his route. The bag contained quantities of methamphetamine, fentanyl, and cocaine, along with a handgun, a loaded magazine, and drug paraphernalia. The officers found additional methamphetamine, a second handgun, and ammunition after searching the van. Lauderdale's DNA was found on both firearms.

A grand jury issued a superseding indictment charging Lauderdale with three counts of drug possession with intent to distribute under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and one count of carrying a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1).

Lauderdale moved to suppress the evidence from the traffic stop and search and requested a hearing. He contended first that the stop was not supported by probable cause because Stutesman did not corroborate an anonymous tip that initially led him to follow the van. Second, he asserted that Stutesman unlawfully prolonged the stop by waiting for a second officer to arrive before conducting the dog sniff. Considering Stutesman's affidavit and body-camera footage, the district court denied the motion after finding that Stutesman reasonably suspected a traffic violation when he saw Lauderdale driving 15 miles per hour over the speed limit. Because Stutesman had an adequate basis for the stop, the court concluded that the anonymous tip was irrelevant to the analysis. The court also determined that neither the dog sniff nor the malfunctioning equipment unnecessarily prolonged the stop because the officers never stopped working on issuing the warning ticket. Further, the K-9 unit alerted before the

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ticket was completed. Based on these conclusions the court determined that no evidentiary hearing was necessary.

Lauderdale agreed to plead guilty to one count of possession with intent to distribute more than 50 grams of methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and one count of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). The parties agreed that the district court could impose a sentence of no more than 248 months' imprisonment. The agreement included a general appellate waiver, through which Lauderdale waived his right to appeal "the conviction and sentence imposed in this case on any ground, including the right to appeal conferred by

18 U.S.C. § 3742." Lauderdale, however, reserved the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress.

After Lauderdale pleaded guilty, a probation officer prepared a presentence investigation report (PSR) that calculated a range of imprisonment of 248 to 295 months, based on a total offense level of 31 and criminal history category of VI. Key to the calculations were a 32-point base offense level, U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(4), a 2-level increase for creating a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury during his flight, id. § 3C1.2, and a 3-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, id. § 3E1.1(a)-(b). At the sentencing hearing, the district judge adopted the PSR's guidelines calculations. After considering Lauderdale's arguments in mitigation, including his difficult upbringing, health challenges, and struggles with substance abuse, the judge imposed a total sentence of 248 months' imprisonment and 5 years' supervised release. The court also imposed a fine of $800, forfeiture, and a special assessment. In her Anders brief, counsel first considers, but rightly rejects as frivolous, any challenge to the denial of Lauderdale's motion to suppress. We agree with counsel that there are no grounds for challenging the basis of the stop because Corporal Stutesman observed Lauderdale exceeding the speed limit by 15 miles per hour. See United States v. Smith, 32 F.4th 638, 641 (7th Cir. 2022) ("When officers reasonably believe they have witnessed a traffic violation, that provides reasonable suspicion justifying a traffic stop, even if the violation is quite minor."). Counsel also correctly rejects as frivolous any argument that the officers prolonged the stop to conduct the dog sniff. Cf. Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 350 (2015) (holding that a dog sniff prolonging a traffic stop beyond "the time needed to handle the matter for which the stop was made" violates

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the Fourth Amendment). The officers' testimony and body-camera footage²show that the K-9 unit was present from the beginning of the stop. Stutesman's computer malfunctioned and a second officer took over the task of writing the warning ticket, but the officers did not divert from their mission (issuing the warning) for the entire ten-minute duration of the stop. See United States v. Pennington, No. 23-3315, 2026 WL 2620435, at *8-9 (7th Cir. Sept. 4, 2026) (concluding dog sniff did not prolong stop where assisting officer wrote traffic warning while K-9 officer conducted sniff). And because the stop was lawful, Stutesman did not need additional justification for the dog sniff. See United States v. Banks, 179 F.4th 1085, 1090 (7th Cir. 2026). Finally, because there were no material factual disputes about the stop, we agree with counsel that there is no basis for challenging the judge's denial of an evidentiary hearing. See United States v. Dixon,

137 F.4th 592, 610 (7th Cir. 2025). Counsel next explains that she consulted with Lauderdale and confirmed that he does not wish to withdraw his guilty plea, so counsel properly omits discussion of potential arguments related to Lauderdale's plea or plea colloquy. See United States v. Larry, 104 F.4th 1020, 1022 (7th Cir. 2024).

Finally, counsel considers whether Lauderdale could plausibly challenge his sentence and correctly concludes that the appeal waiver in his plea agreement forecloses this challenge. Lauderdale's waiver of the right to appeal the forfeiture order stands with the guilty plea, see United States v. Zitt, 714 F.3d 511, 515 (7th Cir. 2013), and it would be frivolous to argue that enforcing it would result in a miscarriage of justice, see Hunter v. United States, 146 S. Ct. 1702, 1713 (2026). No other exception to the waiver applies because Lauderdale's sentence and terms of supervised release do not exceed the applicable statutory maximums, and nothing in the record suggests that the judge considered any constitutionally impermissible factors. See United States v. Edwards,

145 F.4th 774, 780 (7th Cir. 2025). We GRANT counsel's motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.

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