Brenda Core

This Opinion is Not a Precedent of the TTAB Mailed: September 8, 2026

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

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Trademark Trial and Appeal Board _____

In re Brenda Core

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Serial No. 97608134

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Scott L. Nielson of Law Office of Scott L. Nielson, for Brenda Core.

Robert Clark, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 101, Zachary Sparer, Managing Attorney.

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Before Goodman, Pologeorgis and Allard,

Administrative Trademark Judges.

Opinion by Goodman, Administrative Trademark Judge:

Brenda Core ("Applicant") seeks registration on the Principal Register of the mark KARDASHIAN-JENNER (in standard characters) for "Providing information, news, and commentary in the field of current events via the Internet; Providing current event news via a global computer network" in International Class 41.¹

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The Trademark Examining Attorney has refused registration of Applicant's mark under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), based on a likelihood of confusion with the mark KARDASHIAN JENNER PRODUCTIONS (in standard characters, PRODUCTIONS disclaimed) for "Entertainment services, namely, multimedia production services; production of audio and video recordings; creation, development and production of entertainment and pop culture content" in International Class 41.²

Registration also was refused under Trademark Act § 2(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a), on the basis that the mark falsely suggests a connection with the Kardashian-Jenner family.

When the refusal was made final, Applicant appealed and requested reconsideration. After the Examining Attorney denied the request for reconsideration, the appeal was resumed. Both Applicant and the Examining Attorney filed briefs.³We affirm the refusal to register under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act.

I. Likelihood of Confusion Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act prohibits registration of a mark that so resembles a registered mark as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the Page references to the application record are to the online database of the USPTO's Trademark Status & Document Retrieval (TSDR) system. References to the briefs on appeal refer to the Board's TTABVUE docket system.

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goods or services of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive. Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d). Our determination of likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d) is based on an analysis of all probative facts in the record that are relevant to the likelihood of confusion factors set forth in In re E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (CCPA 1973) ("DuPont"). See also In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2003). We consider each DuPont factor for which there is evidence and argument. See, e.g., In re Guild Mortg. Co., 912 F.3d 1376, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2019); In re Country Oven, Inc., No. 87354443, 2019 TTAB LEXIS 381, at *2.

In every Section 2(d) case, two key factors are the similarity or dissimilarity of the marks and the goods or services. See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Herbko Int'l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 544 F.2d 1098, 1103 (CCPA 1976) ("The fundamental inquiry mandated by § 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks."). These factors, and others, are discussed below.

A. Similarity or Dissimilarity of the Services, Channels of Trade, and Classes of Purchasers

The second DuPont factor considers "[t]he similarity or dissimilarity and nature of the goods [or services] as described in an application or registration." DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361. The third DuPont factor concerns the similarity or dissimilarity of established, likely-to-continue trade channels." Id.

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In determining the similarity or dissimilarity of the services, we must focus on the services as they are identified in the involved application and the cited registration.⁴ See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1327; Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Octocom Sys., Inc. v. Houston Comp. Servs. Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 942 (Fed. Cir. 1990).

It is sufficient for a finding of likelihood of confusion if relatedness is established for any service encompassed by the identification of services within a particular class in the application or registration. See Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp.,

648 F.2d 1335, 1336 (CCPA 1981). To reiterate, Applicant's services are "providing information, news, and commentary in the field of current events via the Internet; providing current event news via a global computer network" and Registrant's services are "entertainment services, namely, multimedia production services; production of audio and video recordings; creation, development and production of entertainment and pop culture content."

The Examining Attorney argues that the services are related, relying on the evidence in the record. 14 TTABVUE 7.

Applicant argues that her services and the cited registration's entertainment services "do not intersect and are not directly overlapping or related." 12 TTABVUE

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10. Applicant submits that her services are "specific and limited," "distinctive from those of the cited registration," and that the cited registration's multimedia content

"cannot be mistaken with providing current event news information and content."12 TTABVUE 6-7. Applicant also points out that there is no per se rule that holds that Class 41 services are related merely because they are connected by the same classification type.⁵12 TTABVUE 10.

Although Applicant argues that her services are specific and not overlapping with the cited registration, the services need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion. On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2000). They need only be "related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that they emanate from the same source." Coach Servs. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, No. 91117739, 2007 TTAB LEXIS 58, at *28-29).

The Examining Attorney provided use-based third-party registration evidence to show relatedness of the cited registration's multimedia production services and Applicant's services of providing information, news, and commentary in the field of

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current events.⁶The Examining Attorney also provided internet evidence from Buzzfeed and Vice Media showing the offering of information on current events as well as information relating to culture under the same mark.⁷August 8, 2024 Office Action at TSDR 13-16.

Evidence that a single company offers the services of both parties is relevant to a relatedness analysis." Hewlett-Packard Co., 281 F.3d at 1267; see also In re Embiid, No. 88202890, 2021 TTAB LEXIS 168, at *39 (evidence of third-parties offering goods of both applicant and registrant pertinent to relatedness of the goods). Third-party registrations are relevant to our relatedness determination to the extent that they suggest the listed services are of a type that may emanate from a single source. In re Albert Trostel & Sons Co., No. 74186695, 1993 TTAB LEXIS 36, at *7. Internet evidence showing goods or services emanating from the same source under the same mark is relevant evidence of relatedness. In re Davey Prods. Pty, No. 77029776, 2009 TTAB LEXIS 524, at *14-15.

We find the third-party registration evidence supports a finding of relatedness in connection with Applicant's current event information and news services and the

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cited registration's multimedia production services. The BuzzFeed and Vice Media internet evidence shows that current news and pop culture information and content are offered under the same mark on the same website.⁸The relatedness of the services favors a finding of likelihood of confusion.

Turning to the trade channels, there are no restrictions in Applicant's identification or the cited registration as to trade channels or classes of consumer. Absent an explicit restriction in the application or registration, the identified services must be presumed to move in all channels of trade that would be normal for such services and to be offered to all usual prospective consumers for services of that type. DeVivo v. Ortiz, Opp. No. 91242863, 2020 TTAB LEXIS 15, at *40. The consumer of Applicant's and Registrant's services are those consumers who consume news and pop culture information and media and are interested in news and entertainment.

Although the Examining Attorney included a section heading stating that the trade channels overlapped, he provided no specific argument nor did he reference any particular evidence to support this position. Because the services are related and not legally identical, there is no presumption of trade channel overlap. We find this DuPont factor is neutral.

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B. Similarity or Dissimilarity of the Marks Under the first DuPont factor, we consider the similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties as to appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression. Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee en 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361). Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar. In re Davia, No. 85497617, 2014 TTAB LEXIS 214, at *4. The similarity or dissimilarity of the marks is determined based on the marks in their entireties; the analysis cannot be predicated on dissecting the marks into their various components. In re Nat'l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 1985). On the other hand, different features may be analyzed to determine whether the marks are similar. Id. There is nothing improper in giving more or less weight to a particular feature of a mark, provided the ultimate conclusion rests on a consideration of the marks in their entireties. Id.

The focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who normally retains a general, rather than specific, impression of trademarks. See Inter IKEA Sys. B.V. v. Akea, LLC, No. 91196527, 2014 TTAB LEXIS 166, at *17; Sealed Air Corp. v. Scott Paper Co., No. 91055167, 1975 TTAB LEXIS 236, at *6. The test, under the first DuPont factor, is not whether the marks can be distinguished when subjected to a side-by-side comparison, but rather whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their overall commercial impression that confusion as to the source of the

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services offered under the respective marks is likely to result. Coach Servs., 668 F.3d at 1368.

Applicant's mark is KARDASHIAN-JENNER and the cited mark is

KARDASHIAN JENNER PRODUCTIONS.

Applicant argues that "the use of identical words or lettering does not automatically mean the marks are similar enough to cause confusion - even if the identical words are also dominant elements." 12 TTABVUE 9. Applicant submits that the overall impression of her mark and the cited mark is different, especially when used with what she submits are dissimilar services. 12 TTABVUE 7. As to the cited mark, the dominant portion is KARDASHIAN JENNER because the disclaimed wording PRODUCTIONS is at least descriptive of the services and subordinate in nature. Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp., 222 F.3d 943, 947 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ("descriptive component of a mark may be given little weight in reaching a conclusion on likelihood of confusion") (quoting In re Nat'l Data Corp., 753 F.2d at 1058); In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (dominant portion of THE DELTA CAFÉ and design mark is DELTA as the generic term CAFÉ has been disclaimed). In addition, KARDASHIAN JENNER are the first two terms in the cited mark and most likely to be impressed on consumers and remembered. See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2018) ("The identity of the marks' initial two words is particularly significant because consumers typically notice those words first."); Presto Prods. Inc. v. Nice-Pak Prods., Inc., No. 91074797, 1988 TTAB

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LEXIS 60 at *8 ("it is often the first part of a mark which is most likely to be impressed upon the mind of a purchaser and remembered"). While there is no rule that marks are automatically considered similar where one mark encompasses the entirety of another, the fact that Applicant's KARDASHIAN- JENNER mark is subsumed within the cited mark KARDASHIAN JENNER PRODUCTIONS increases the similarity between them. See, e.g., In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1347-48 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (applicant's mark ML is similar to registrant's mark ML MARK LEES); DowntownDC Bus. Improvement Dist. v. Clarke, No. 91275100, 2024 TTAB LEXIS 412, at *67-68 (DOWNTOWNDC DISTRICT OF FASHION similar to DISTRICT OF FASHION); Hunter Indus., Inc. v. Toro Co., No. 91203612, 2014 TTAB LEXIS 105, at *33 (PRECISION mark confusingly similar to PRECISION DISTRIBUTION CONTROL mark) (citations omitted). Applicant's mark and the dominant portion of the cited mark are nearly identical, and the hyphen in Applicant's mark does not distinguish them. Mag Instrument, Inc.

v. Brinkmann Corp., No. 91163534, 2010 TTAB LEXIS 322, at *29. We recognize that the marks ultimately must be compared in their entireties, including any disclaimed words. When this comparison is made, we find that Applicant's mark is very similar to Registrant's mark in sound, appearance and meaning. Because of these similarities, Applicant's and Registrant's marks engender similar overall commercial impressions.

This DuPont factor favors a finding of likelihood of confusion.

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C. Conditions of Sale Under the fourth DuPont factor we consider "[t]he conditions under which and buyers to whom sales are made, i.e. 'impulse' vs. careful, sophisticated purchasing."

DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361.

Purchaser sophistication or degree of care may tend to minimize likelihood of confusion. Conversely, impulse purchases of inexpensive items may tend to have the opposite effect. Palm Bay Imps., Inc. 396 F.3d at 1376. We must make our determination based on the least sophisticated consumer. Stone Lion, 746 F.3d at

1325.

Applicant argues "that the average consumer when seeking entertainment services will not accidently[sic] get their news from the cited registration and they will not think they are getting a pop culture reality show experience from Applicant."

12 TTABVUE 10. The Examining Attorney argues that "[e]ven if consumers of the compared services could be considered sophisticated and discriminating, 'even sophisticated purchasers are not immune from source confusion.'" 14 TTABVUE 9. Because there is no evidence in the record regarding purchasing conditions, and this is mere argument by Applicant and the Examining Attorney, we find this factor neutral. Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 424 F.3d 1276, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2005). ("Attorney argument is no substitute for evidence.").

II. Conclusion as to Likelihood of Confusion As a final step, we "weigh the DuPont factors used in [our] analysis and explain the results of that weighing." In re Charger Ventures, 64 F.4th 1375, 1384 (Fed. Cir.

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2023) (emphasis omitted). The similarity of the marks and the relatedness of the services weigh in favor of a finding of likelihood of confusion. The trade channels and conditions of sale are neutral. We find confusion likely.

Decision: The Section 2(d) refusal to register Applicant's mark KARDASHIAN- JENNER is affirmed.⁹