New Covenant Dominion Federal Credit Union

This Opinion is not a Precedent of the TTAB Mailed: September 8, 2026

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

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Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

_____ In re New Covenant Dominion Federal Credit Union _____

Serial No. 98335921

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Scott L. Bittman of Crowell & Moring LLP for New Covenant Dominion Federal Credit Union. Natalie Kenealy, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 104, Zachary Cromer, Managing Attorney.

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Before Heasley, Elgin, and Casagrande,

Administrative Trademark Judges.

Opinion by Heasley, Administrative Trademark Judge:

New Covenant Dominion Federal Credit Union ("Applicant") seeks registration on the Principal Register of the composite mark

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(with "CREDIT UNION" disclaimed) for "Credit union services; banking services; credit, financing and loan services; credit union services provided by mobile telephone and internet connections; none of the aforementioned services related to mutual funds," in International Class 36.¹

The Trademark Examining Attorney has refused registration of Applicant's mark under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), on the ground of likelihood of confusion with the cited registered mark NEW COVENANT FUNDS (in standard characters, with "FUNDS" disclaimed) for "Mutual fund brokerage, investment and distribution services; and establishing mutual funds for others" in International Class 36^.2

When the refusal was made final, Applicant appealed and requested reconsideration. After the Examining Attorney denied the request for reconsideration, the appeal proceeded. The matter is fully briefed. We affirm the refusal to register.

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I. Likelihood of Confusion

Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act provides that a mark may be refused registration if it:

Consists of or comprises a mark which so resembles a mark registered in the Patent and Trademark Office, or a mark or trade name previously used in the United States by another and not abandoned, as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods [or services]of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive….

15 U.S.C. § 1052(d). To determine whether there is a likelihood of confusion between marks under Section 2(d), we analyze the evidence and arguments under the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (CCPA 1973) (the "DuPont factors"), cited in B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 575 U.S. 138, 145 (2015).

"The weight given to each factor depends on the circumstances of each case." In re Charger Ventures LLC, 64 F.4th 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2023). "The likelihood of confusion analysis considers all DuPont factors for which there is evidence of record but 'may focus … on dispositive factors, such as similarity of the marks and relatedness of the [services].'" Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1265 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (quoting Han Beauty, Inc. v. Alberto-Culver Co., 236 F.3d 1333, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2001)); see also Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Intrastate Dist., Inc.,

144 F.4th 1376, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2025).

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A. Similarity of the Marks

Under the first DuPont factor, we determine the similarity or dissimilarity of Applicant's and Registrant's marks in their entireties, taking into account their appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression. DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361. "Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar." In re Inn at St. John's, LLC, No. 87075988, 2018 WL 2734893, *5 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, No. 85497617, 2014 WL 2531200, *2 (TTAB 2014)), aff'd, 777 F. App'x 516 (Fed. Cir. 2019); Cecile Gagnon Co. v. Bourjois, Inc.,

223 F.2d 731, 733 (CCPA 1955) ("And with respect to sound, meaning, and appearance, substantial identity between the marks in any one or more of such attributes is, in of itself, fatal to the registration of his mark by an applicant."). "[T]he 'similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties' is a predominant inquiry."

Heil Co. v. Tripleye GmbH, No. 91277359, 2024 WL 4925901, *29 (TTAB 2024). Again, the cited registered mark is NEW COVENANT FUNDS with "FUNDS"

disclaimed, and Applicant's mark is

with "CREDIT UNION" disclaimed.

In Applicant's companion appeal, No. 98335916, we compared Applicant's standard- character mark NEW COVENANT DOMINION CREDIT UNION ("CREDIT

UNION" disclaimed) with the cited registered mark here and found the marks

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similar. In this case, we find that its additional design element, stylization, and slogan do not suffice to differentiate them.

The Examining Attorney observes that "[i]n this case, the entire source-indicating portion of the registrant's mark - NEW COVENANT - is encompassed in the applied- for mark …."³Applicant states that "[t]he shared phrase, 'NEW COVENANT,' refers to the covenant between God and the followers of Jesus Christ and connotes a plainly religious (in particular, Christian) association. Indeed, both Applicant and the registrant of the Cited Mark have a church-related background."⁴If anything, we find that the Christian cross depicted within the broken circle and scrolled lines in Applicant's design element confirms and emphasizes the religious significance of NEW COVENANT.⁵See Monster Energy Co. v. Lo, No. 91225050, 2023 WL 417620, *16 (TTAB 2023) (blue rectangle reinforces the term ICE). Thus, the shared words also possess an undenied religious commonality shared by the marks. We agree with the Examining Attorney that this shared wording, NEW COVENANT, with which both marks begin, is the most dominant, distinctive part of both marks. See, e.g., In re Detroit Athl. Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2018)

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("The identity of the marks' initial two words is particularly significant because consumers typically notice those words first.") (citations omitted); Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of Am., 970 F.2d 874, 876 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ("[U]pon encountering each mark, consumers must first notice this identical lead word."); Presto Prods., Inc. v. Nice-Pak Prods. Inc., No. 91074797, 1988 WL 252340, *3 (TTAB 1988) ("it is often the first part of a mark which is most likely to be impressed upon the mind of a purchaser and remembered"); In re Dare Foods Inc., No. 88758625, 2022 WL 970319, *6 (TTAB 2022) ("the term RAINCOAST appears first in both marks and as such, it is most likely to be impressed in purchasers' memories") (citation omitted). Applicant argues that DOMINION in its mark suffices to distinguish the marks:

"DOMINION" means "the power or right of governing and controlling; sovereign authority" or "rule; control." See January 30, 2025 Response to Office Action, TSDR Ex. D. The combination of the term "DOMINION"

with the phrase "NEW COVENANT," when used with Applicant's services, communicates that Applicant is a sanctuary of financial empowerment and consumers (specifically Christians) can exercise control over all aspects of their lives, including their financials.⁶

The Examining Attorney rejoins that "the added term DOMINION merely reinforces the importance of the shared 'new covenant' in the mind of a consumer."⁷ We note that if the dominant portion of both marks is the same, then the marks may be confusingly similar notwithstanding peripheral differences. See In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1347-48 (Fed. Cir. 2010). DOMINION is a peripheral difference that does nothing to meaningfully distinguish the marks. "[I]nclusion of a

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merely suggestive or descriptive element" to marks whose dominant terms are identical "is of much less significance in avoiding a likelihood of confusion." Wella Corp. v. Cal. Concept Corp., 558 F.2d 1019, 1022 (CCPA 1977). Despite Applicant's efforts to connect DOMINION with its particular sort of financial services, a mark's meaning is based on the impression actually created by the mark in the minds of consumers, not on the impression that applicant intends to convey. Fuente Mktg. Ltd.

v. Vaporous Techs., LLC, 172 F.4th 1337, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2026) (citing TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE (TMEP) § 808.02). And that impression tends to be general rather than specific. Shenzhen IVPS Tech. Co. v. Fancy Pants Prods., LLC, No. 91263919, 2022 WL 16646840, *18 (TTAB 2022). To this we add the noted penchant of consumers to shorten marks, which would tend to lead them in this case to disregard "DOMINION." In re Bay State Brewing Co., No. 85826258, 2016 WL 1045677, *3 (TTAB 2016). In short, we are unconvinced that the inclusion of DOMINION after the first two terms in Applicant's mark, NEW COVENANT, serves to differentiate the respective marks in consumers' minds. Applicant argues that the terms "FUNDS" and "CREDIT UNION," though disclaimed, nonetheless inform the meaning of each mark. CREDIT UNION is prominently displayed in Applicant's composite mark. "Because credit union services and mutual fund services occupy very distinct sectors of the financial industry…, these … terms convey fundamentally different commercial connotations," Applicant contends.⁸We address this comparison of financial services more thoroughly under

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the second DuPont factor. For our present purposes, though, the Examining Attorney emphasizes that since the marks begin with the identical wording, the additional wording is less dominant in creating the overall commercial impression of the marks.⁹ We agree with the Examining Attorney on this point. The nondistinctive terms FUNDS and CREDIT UNION do little to distinguish the marks from one another. Registrant's mark is NEW COVENANT FUNDS with "FUNDS" disclaimed, not

"MUTUAL FUNDS." The trailing disclaimed term "FUNDS" covers a broad range of financial services: "a: a sum of money or other resources whose principal or interest is set apart for a specific objective b: money on deposit on which checks or drafts can be drawn."¹⁰That broadly encompasses ordinary bank deposits of the sort offered by credit unions, among other banking institutions. The Federal Circuit's observation in Charger Ventures is apt here: "So, while the Board must consider the disclaimed term, an additional word or component may technically differentiate a mark but do little to alleviate confusion." 64 F.4th at 1382 (quoting Detroit Athl., 903 F.3d at 1304-05). The last element of Applicant's mark, the slogan BANKING TO BELIEVE IN, merely reinforces that credit unions provide banking services, such as checking and savings accounts, and emphasizes Applicant's religious background with its use of BELIEVE.¹¹In the next section of this opinion, under the second DuPont factor, we find that a number of banks provide mutual fund services of the sort provided by

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Registrant, and conclude that the respective services would be perceived by the relevant class of consumers as related. Aside from adding verbiage, then, the slogan does not dispel the similarity of the marks. In sum, neither the design element nor the slogan on Applicant's mark, fore and aft, distinguish its commercial impression from Registrant's mark.

The stylization of the literal portion of Applicant's composite mark fares no better in distinguishing it from the cited registered mark, as the cited mark is in standard characters. "The rights associated with a standard character mark reside in its wording, and not in any particular display and we must consider that [Registrant's] mark may be displayed in the same font, color and size that [Applicant] uses in its marks. Citigroup Inc. v. Cap. City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Trademark Manual Of Examining Procedure (TMEP) § 1207.01(c)(iii) (May 2024)." Look Cycle Int'l v. Kunshan Qiyue Outdoor Sports Goods Co., No. 92079409, 2024 WL 3739358, *9 (TTAB 2024). Registrant could thus adopt Applicant's stylization, consisting of san-serif lettering in various sizes, gradient, and bolding:

NEW COVENANT

FUNDS

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In short, the additions or changes in Applicant's composite mark from Applicant's applied-for standard character mark do not significantly distinguish it from the cited registered mark.

On the whole, then, we find the marks are similar, and that the first DuPont factor weighs in favor of finding a likelihood of confusion.

B. Relatedness of the Services

The second DuPont factor "considers '[t]he similarity or dissimilarity and nature of the goods or services as described in an application or registration …." Detroit Athl.,

903 F.3d at 1306. It "considers whether the consuming public may perceive the respective goods and services of the parties as related enough to cause confusion about the source or origin of the goods and services." Naterra Int'l, Inc. v. Bensalem,

92 F.4th 1113, 1117 (Fed. Cir. 2024) (citing In re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 752 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (cleaned up)).

"The relevant inquiry in an ex parte proceeding focuses on the goods and services described in the application and registration." Charger Ventures, 64 F.4th at 1383. In this case, we have Applicant's "Credit union services; banking services; credit, financing and loan services; credit union services provided by mobile telephone and internet connections; none of the aforementioned services related to mutual funds,"

and Registrant's "Mutual fund brokerage, investment and distribution services; and establishing mutual funds for others."

The Examining Attorney maintains that the services are related because it is common for the same entity to provide both banking services, including credit union

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services (as in Applicant's mark), and mutual fund services (as in the registered mark) under the same mark. For example:

• US Bank (Office Action of Nov. 18, 2025, at 5-9);

• HSBC (Office Action of Aug. 2, 2024, at 24-25) offering banking and mutual funds

• USAA (the evidence from USAA shows that they provide "banking" services and that their "investing" services include "mutual funds" with "access [to] professional managed, diversified portfolios" Id. at 26-27)

• Credit Union Provincial (Office Action of Apr. 9, 2025, at 18-20)

• Liberty Savings Federal Credit Union (Id. at 21-23)

• Heritage (Id. at 25-28)

• Kindred Credit Union (Id. at 29-33)

• North Carolina State Employees Credit Union (Id. at 34-42)

• Cedar Point Federal Credit Union (Id. at 44-50)

• Envista (Id. at 51-55)

• Fifth Third Bank (Office Action of Nov. 18, 2025, at 10-14; Drop-down menu for "Bank"; "Build your mutual fund portfolio with Fifth Third")

• PNC ("Mutual Funds offered through PNC Wealth Management"; banking offered under PNC Bank, N.A., Id. at 15-19)

• Redstone Federal Credit Union offering banking and mutual funds (Id. at 20-22)

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• Education First Federal Credit Union (Id.at 26-30)¹² Applicant argues that credit unions and mutual funds differ in kind and in clientele. A credit union is a member-owned nonprofit cooperative. A mutual fund is an investment fund that pools money from many investors to purchase securities.¹³ As such, Applicant argues, "credit union services are sought by individuals for personal banking and essential credit needs, whereas mutual fund services target investors seeking to manage surplus capital through complex market instruments."¹⁴ Applicant continues: "A consumer using community-based, daily banking services provided under Applicant's Mark would hardly use the sophisticated, high-end investment tool provided under the Cited Mark. Similarly, a wealthy individual seeking high investment return through the mutual fund services provided under the Cited Mark would not go to Applicant for credit union services."¹⁵Furthermore, Applicant argues, some of the third-party examples cited by the Examining Attorney, such as First National Bank, USAA and HSBC, are major banks, not credit unions.¹⁶ We agree with the Examining Attorney, however, that Applicant's recitation of services is not limited to credit union services. It identifies, in part, "Credit union services; banking services; credit, financing and loan services; …."¹⁷See In re

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Midwest Gaming & Entm't LLC, No. 85111552, 2013 WL 1442237, *4 (TTAB 2013) ("Under standard examination practice, a semicolon is used to separate distinct categories of goods or services."). Banking is thus a distinct category of services offered by Applicant, and the Examining Attorney's citation to third-party banks is therefore justified. Further, there is no evidence supporting Applicant's arguments about some of the third-party companies being "major" banks, and even if there were, we cannot assume that Applicant will not expand to become a "major bank." See, e.g., Can. Imperial Bank of Com. v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat'l Ass'n, 811 F.2d 1490, 1493 (Fed. Cir. 1987) ("[T]he application and the registration were not limited to 'electronic banking services to corporate and institutional customers' but covered 'banking services with no restrictions whatever.' It was Canadian Bank that sought to register its mark for the broad range of services, and it is on that basis that the Board correctly determined the likelihood-of-confusion issue.").

Applicant argues that its "explicit limitation excluding mutual-funds-related services clarifies that Applicant's services do not—even potentially—overlap with the mutual fund related services covered by the Cited Mark."¹⁸But "the general purchasing public … may well be unaware of the identification of [services] in either the application or registration and the restrictions are not controlling of public perception." In re Aquitaine Wine USA, LLC, No. 86928469, 2018 WL 1620989, *7 (TTAB 2018). As the Board has repeatedly stated, "[t]he issue, of course, is not whether purchasers would confuse the services, but rather whether there is a

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likelihood of confusion as to the source of the services." In re Binion, No. 76590702, 2009 WL 5194992, *4 (TTAB 2009); see also Hydra Mac, Inc. v. Mack Trucks, Inc.,

507 F.2d 1399, 1400 (CCPA 1975) ("[T]he confusion found to be likely is not as to the [services] but as to their source.") (citation omitted). The Federal Circuit and we have made clear:

[G]oods and/or services need not be identical or even

competitive in order to support a finding that confusion is

likely to result from the use of similar marks thereon, it

being sufficient for the purpose that the goods and/or

services are related in some manner and/or that the

circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that

they would likely be encountered by the same persons

under circumstances that could give rise to the mistaken

belief that they emanate from or are in some way

associated with the same source.

In re Mucky Duck Mustard Co., No. 73603019, 1988 WL 252484, * 2 (TTAB 1988) aff'd, 864 F.2d 149 (table), 1988 WL 120250 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (affirming "on the basis of the Board's opinion"); see also Apex Bank v. CC Serve Corp., 156 F.4th 1230, 1234 (Fed. Cir. 2025) ("The services need not be identical—the evidence need only establish that the respective products are related in some manner and/or that the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that they emanate from the same source.") (cleaned up; citation omitted).

Registrant's class of mutual fund customers are the very sort who would avail themselves of banking services. And the Examining Attorney's third-party evidence, showing that other banks, including credit unions, offer both services under the same

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mark on their websites, tends to show that customers will perceive the services as related. See, e.g., Naterra, 92 F.4th at 1117; Detroit Athl., 903 F.3d at 1306-07. Applicant further argues that, "[a]mong the thirteen entities that the Examining Attorney alleged to provide both services, six entities explicitly disclaim on their own website that they do not provide mutual funds services and the services are provided by third parties. This leaves the Examining Attorney only seven entities that arguably provide both services, and these entities are almost exclusively major banks."¹⁹

But as the Examining Attorney establishes, these banks/credit unions provide the service of establishing mutual funds.²⁰And evidence that "a single company sells the goods and services of both parties, if presented, is relevant to a relatedness analysis."

Hewlett-Packard, 281 F.3d at 1267; see also Detroit Athl., 903 F.3d at 1306-07 (evidence of "several" third-party retailers selling clothing bearing their own marks in addition to clothing bearing sports team names and logos sufficient to show consumers accustomed to seeing both offered under a single brand); In re Embiid, No. 88202890, 2021 WL 2285576, *14 (TTAB 2021) (webpages from three clothing companies that offer shoes, shirts, or sweat shirts under the same mark "is evidence that consumers are accustomed to seeing shoes and clothes sold under the same mark"). So while the seven banks/credit unions that provide mutual fund services

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themselves are more probative of the services' relatedness than the others, most of the Examining Attorney's third-party evidence nonetheless demonstrates that the respective services would be perceived as related.

The second DuPont factor accordingly weighs in favor of a likelihood of confusion.

C. Consumer Care and Sophistication

Under the fourth DuPont factor, we also consider purchaser care: "[t]he conditions under which … sales are made, i.e., 'impulse' vs. careful, sophisticated purchasing."

DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361.

Applicant argues that:

[B]oth the Applicant's services and the services of the Cited Mark involve significant financial decisions, for which

people tend to give a fair amount of consideration and

prudence. An individual does not simply rush into a credit

union to open an account and deposit their life savings

without conducting research into its reputation, terms, and stability. Consumers likewise would not invest in mutual

funds—a highly specialized investment tool that usually

involves a significant amount of money—without

extensive, thorough research and evaluation.²¹

We acknowledge that the nature of the financial services tends to encourage care.

"[I]n light of the inherent nature of the goods and services involved, some degree of purchasing care may be exercised by Applicant's potential or actual consumers." In re Info. Builders Inc., No. 87753964, 2020 WL 2094122, *6 (TTAB 2020), quoted in Heil, 2024 WL 4925901, at *36. But not sophistication. "Although the services recited in the application also encompass sophisticated investors, Board precedent requires

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the decision to be based on the least sophisticated potential purchasers." Stone Lion Cap. Partners, LP v. Lion Cap. LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Lincoln Nat'l Corp. v. Anderson, No. 91192939, 2014 WL 879506, *15 n.18 (TTAB 2014) (where relevant purchasers of banking, financial planning, and investment services consisted of both ordinary and knowledgeable and sophisticated consumers,

"this factor certainly would not weigh significantly in applicant's favor. At most, it is neutral in our overall likelihood of confusion determination based on all of the relevant duPont factors").

That the relevant class of customers may exercise care does not necessarily impose on that class the responsibility of distinguishing between similar trademarks for similar services, though. See, e.g., In re Rsch. and Trading Corp., 793 F.2d 1276, 1279 (Fed. Cir. 1986) ("That the relevant class of buyers may exercise care does not necessarily impose on that class the responsibility of distinguishing between similar trademarks for similar [services]."). Here, even if prospective investors and depositors are careful, they could still infer from Applicant's and Registrant's NEW COVENANT-formative marks that the respective services emanate from the same source, or from affiliated sources, as demonstrated by the Examining Attorney's third-party evidence. "[A]ny confusion made likely by a junior user's mark is cause for refusal; likelihood of confusion encompasses confusion of sponsorship, affiliation or connection." Hilson Rsch., Inc. v. Soc'y for Hum. Res. Mgmt., No. 91084491, 1993 WL 290669, *5 (TTAB 1993).

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Consequently, we have no reason to find that ordinary consumers would exercise more than a slightly elevated degree of care, which would weigh slightly against a likelihood of confusion.

D. Absence of Evidence of Actual Confusion

The eighth DuPont factor considers "the length of time during and conditions under which there has been concurrent use without evidence of actual confusion."

DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361.

Applicant argues that "[t]he Applicant's Mark and the Cited Mark have coexisted for almost 20 years with no evidence of actual confusion—a fact that strongly suggests that a future likelihood of confusion is unlikely."²²It bases this assertion on the declaration of its CEO, Rachel McCarthy, who avers, in pertinent part, that Applicant is not aware of any instances of actual confusion with Registrant, nor has it received inquiries from consumers or Registrant for nearly 20 years of coexistence, since Applicant was chartered in 2007.²³

The Examining Attorney points out that "[T]he relevant test is likelihood of confusion, not actual confusion."; "affidavits and declarations of an applicant's employees, officers, and attorneys are usually self-serving and entitled to little weight"; and "Applicant's assertion that no evidence of actual confusion has been

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provided does not overcome the evidence of record showing that the applied-for mark is similar to the registered mark and that the services are related."²⁴ The absence of any reported instances of confusion is meaningful only if the record indicates appreciable and continuous use by applicant of its mark for a significant period of time in the same markets as those served by opposer under its marks." Citigroup Inc. v. Cap. City Bank Grp., Inc., [No. 91177415, 2010 WL 595586, *17] (TTAB 2010), aff'd, 637 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2011) …. In other words, for the absence of actual confusion to be probative, there must have been a reasonable opportunity for confusion to have occurred. Barbara's Bakery Inc. v. Landesman, [No. 91157982, 2007 WL 196406, *5] (TTAB 2007).

Made in Nature, LLC v. Pharmavite LLC, No. 91223352, 2022 WL 2188890, *30

(TTAB 2022).

Here, the record is devoid of evidence of the extent of Applicant's and Registrant's transactions, with no evidence of overlap.

Accordingly, the eighth DuPont factor, gauging the length of time during and conditions under which there has been contemporaneous use of the marks without evidence of actual confusion, is neutral.

II. Conclusion

In sum, the relevant customers may exercise a slightly elevated degree of care, but that is outweighed by the similarity of the marks and the relatedness of the services. The remaining factor, absence of confusion during contemporaneous use, is neutral.

Decision: The refusal to register Applicant's mark is affirmed.