POSTJUDGMENT SUBJECT MATTER
JURISDICITON
The remaining question, which is the focal point of my disagreement with the majority, is whether the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate Doe's motion to redact her name from the official court tran- script under § 54-86e after final judgment was rendered. Before addressing in detail what I find lacking in the majority's analysis, it will be useful to review the prec- edent that casts light on the existence and parameters of a trial court's postjudgment subject matter jurisdiction in a criminal case. Although the general principles are well established, the precise contours of a trial court's subject matter jurisdiction after judgment are nuanced and multifaceted.
Connecticut's trial courts are courts of general jurisdic- tion, and, "[i]n the absence of statutory or constitutional provisions, the limits of [their] jurisdiction are delineated by the common law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
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State v. Butler, 348 Conn. 51, 67, 300 A.3d 1145 (2023). Under the common law, a trial court generally lacks jurisdiction to open or modify a criminal judgment after it has become final. See, e.g., id., 72 ("[w]hen the infor- mation, which contains the charges and establishes the jurisdiction of the trial court, is dismissed, the court's jurisdiction is extinguished because there is then no valid charging document pending before the court to confer jurisdiction on it"); State v. Richardson, 291 Conn. 426, 429, 432, 969 A.2d 166 (2009) (trial court lacked juris- diction to rule on motion to dismiss filed after entry of nolle prosequi); State v. Waterman, supra, 264 Conn. 491 ("[t]he jurisdiction of the sentencing court terminates when the sentence is put into effect, and that court may no longer take any action affecting the sentence unless it has been expressly authorized to act" (emphasis in origi- nal; internal quotation marks omitted)). The rendering of a judgment of acquittal is a final judgment. See State
v. Paolella, 210 Conn. 110, 120, 554 A.2d 702 (1989) (judgment of acquittal is final judgment that "concludes the rights of the parties regarding the charges of which the defendant has been acquitted" and "achieves the same finality as the imposition of a sentence since it terminates the prosecution of the charges to which it applies and negates the possibility of an imposition of a sentence"). There are some important exceptions to the general rule regarding the termination of a trial court's subject matter jurisdiction after the execution of a criminal judgment. "For example, the legislature has authorized the court to modify the terms of probation, even after a sentence is imposed; see General Statutes §§ 53a-29 (c), 53a-30 (c) and 53a-32 (d); and to hear a petition for a new trial filed following sentencing. See General Stat- utes § 52-270 (a)." State v. Butler, supra, 348 Conn. 69. Under the common law, trial courts also have continuing jurisdiction to correct an illegal sentence or a sentence that was imposed in an illegal manner. See, e.g., State
v. Parker, 295 Conn. 825, 835, 992 A.2d 1103 (2010) (expiration of trial court's jurisdiction after imposition of sentence "presupposes a valid sentence, [and] it long
13
has been understood that, if a court imposes an invalid sentence, it retains jurisdiction to substitute a valid sentence" (emphasis in original)); State v. Lawrence,
281 Conn. 147, 155, 913 A.2d 428 (2007) ("for the trial court to have jurisdiction to consider [a] claim of an illegal sentence, the claim must fall into one of the categories of claims that, under the common law, the court has jurisdiction to review").
Another exception to the general rule is that trial courts retain jurisdiction to enter certain postjudgment orders that do not affect the judgment or the sentence imposed. For example, trial courts can correct clerical errors in the judgment, sentence, or record at any time. See, e.g., State v. Grant, 286 Conn. 499, 502 n.1, 944 A.2d 947 ("a clerical error in a judgment may be corrected at any time"), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 916, 129 S. Ct. 271,
172 L. Ed. 2d 200 (2008); State v. Dayton, 176 Conn. App. 858, 871-72, 171 A.3d 482 (2017) ("a court retains the inherent authority to correct, sua sponte, a clerical error in the judgment at any time" because "[a] clerical error does not challenge the court's ability to reach the conclusion that it did reach, but involves the failure to preserve or correctly represent in the record the actual decision of the court" (internal quotation marks omit- ted)). The court's jurisdiction in this respect is "separate and distinct" from its jurisdiction to open or modify the judgment; Tyler v. Aspinwall, 73 Conn. 493, 496, 47 A. 755 (1901); because "the record is a history of the court proceedings, [and] the power to make it speak truthfully is one of necessity belonging to every court of record, and may be exercised" at any time, even after judgment is rendered, so long as "notice [is provided] to the adverse party." Id., 496-97.
Trial courts also have continuing jurisdiction to effec- tuate nonpunitive statutory provisions that do not affect the original judgment or the sentence imposed. In State
v. Waterman, supra, 264 Conn. 484, this court consid- ered whether, after the execution of the defendant's sentence, the trial court had lost jurisdiction to make
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the factual findings necessary to trigger mandatory sex offender registration under General Statutes § 54-251, a provision in the statutory scheme commonly referred to as Megan's Law. See id., 485-86. The defendant in that case claimed that the trial court lost subject matter jurisdiction after the rendering of final judgment; id., 488-89; and the state responded that the trial court did not need to open or modify the judgment or sentence to
"[effectuate] the regulatory purpose of Megan's Law."
Id., 489. This court agreed with the state, explaining that registration under Megan's Law is nonpunitive under the two part test adopted in State v. Kelly, 256 Conn. 23, 92-94, 770 A.2d 908 (2001), which examines whether (1) "the legislature had intended the statute to be criminal or civil, in other words, 'punitive in law' "; State v. Waterman, supra, 492-93; and (2) "even if not punitive in law, the statute was nevertheless 'punitive in fact,' that is, whether the statute was so punitive in fact that it could not be seen as civil in nature." Id.,
493. Under this test, the court in Waterman held that Megan's Law was not punitive in law or fact because it was not enacted with punitive intent and did not imple- ment a punitive regime. Id., 493-98. Instead, it was a civil regulatory requirement, the purpose of which was to protect public safety. Id., 492. Because "the [trial] court merely was effectuating the regulatory purpose of Megan's law" and "the defendant's sentence was not affected by the . . . court's factual finding" regarding sex offender registration; id., 497; "the trial court retain[ed] jurisdiction, even after judgment [was] rendered . . . ."
Id., 498.
Pursuant to Waterman, this court has held that trial courts have continuing jurisdiction after final judg- ment is rendered in criminal actions to enter orders (1) granting the state permission to use reasonable force as a means of obtaining a criminal defendant's DNA sample under General Statutes § 54-102g; see State v. Banks,
321 Conn. 821, 830-36, 146 A.3d 1 (2016); (2) modify- ing a condition of probation to add a requirement that the defendant pay restitution to the victim pursuant
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General Statutes § 53a-30 (a); see State v. Fowlkes, 283 Conn. 735, 736-45, 930 A.2d 644 (2007); and (3) impos- ing a standing criminal restraining order pursuant to General Statutes § 53a-40e. See State v. Alexander,
269 Conn. 107, 111-19, 847 A.2d 970 (2004); see also State v. Mieles, 351 Conn. 765, 778, 333 A.3d 1096 (2025) ("a standing criminal protective order is non- punitive and may be issued postsentencing"). In each of these cases, the trial court retained jurisdiction to effectuate the nonpunitive intent, purpose, and effect of the statutory provision at issue because the court's exercise of jurisdiction did not affect its judgment or any sentence imposed. See State v. Banks, supra, 837 (trial court retained jurisdiction to grant state permission to use reasonable force to obtain DNA sample pursuant to § 54-102g because "the statute is neither punitive in law or in fact and therefore does not affect the defendant's original sentences"); State v. Fowlkes, supra, 743, 744 (trial court retained jurisdiction to modify conditions of probation to order restitution because "probation is not punitive" and "[r]estitution simply serves the state's rehabilitative interest in having a defendant take responsibility for his conduct through the act of making the victim whole"); State v. Alexander, supra, 117, 119 (trial court retained jurisdiction to issue restraining order under § 53a-40e because intent, purpose, and effect of statute was "to protect victims from further abuse and not to punish the defendant" (internal quotation marks omitted)). In short, the trial court has continuing jurisdiction to implement statutory provisions that are essentially regulatory or civil in nature.6 Applying the foregoing legal principles to this case, I am convinced that the trial court had subject matter
16
jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of Doe's motion seeking the redaction of her name from the official court transcript. Section 54-86e, which codifies a default rule that the names, addresses, and identifying information of victims of sexual assault shall be kept confidential unless there is a court order directing otherwise, is a civil, administrative, or regulatory statute that is nonpunitive in both law and fact. Section 54-86e is not punitive in law because its text reveals that the purpose of the statute is not to punish the offender, but to protect the victim. See, e.g., State v. Banks, supra, 321 Conn. 832-33 (examin- ing statutory text to ascertain legislative purpose); see also General Statutes § 1-2z. Section 54-86e provides in relevant part that "[t]he name and address of the victim of a sexual assault . . . and such other identifying infor- mation pertaining to such victim as determined by the court, shall be confidential and shall be disclosed only upon order of the Superior Court . . . ." As the Appellate Court has observed, the statute "aims to protect victims of sexual assault by reducing unnecessary harassment and embarrassment in court, and by encouraging the disclosure of sexual assaults." State v. Bennett-Gibson, supra, 84 Conn. App. 69.
It also is clear that § 54-86e is not punitive in fact. A statute is punitive in fact "if the punitive effect of the statute is so substantial that it swallows the regulatory or civil purpose of the statute." State v. Banks, supra,
321 Conn. 834. The inquiry is guided by asking "whether the challenged action has historically been regarded as punishment, whether it comes into play only on a jurisdiction to modify a defendant's conditions of probation to order restitution under § 53a-30 (a), even though the statute did not explicitly authorize the trial court "to impose a condition of probation subsequent to the initial sentencing and prior to the defendant's commencement of his period of probation." Id., 745. Likewise, in State v. Waterman, supra, 264 Conn. 497-98, State v. Alexander, supra, 269 Conn. 117, 119, and State v. Banks, supra, 321 Conn. 837, this court held that the trial court in each case had continuing jurisdiction to implement nonpunitive statutory provisions after final judgment was rendered, despite the absence of an express grant of legislative authority to act postjudgment. See General Statutes §§ 53a-40e, 54-102g and 54-251.
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finding of scienter, whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment—retribution and deterrence, whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime, whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alterna- tive purpose assigned . . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 835. None of these factors indicates that § 54-86e has a punitive effect. The statute implements a wholly nonpunitive remedy that "serves the purpose of protecting the victim." State v. Alexander, supra,
269 Conn. 118. The name by which a victim is identified in the tran- script is a collateral issue that does not impact the crimi- nal judgment or any sentence that may be imposed. A defendant, like Khan, who has been found not guilty of the crimes with which he was charged will remain not guilty of those offenses regardless of whether the vic- tim's name is redacted from the official court transcript and substituted with a pseudonym, initials, the notation
"name omitted," or a black box. A postjudgment order protecting the confidentiality of a victim's name under § 54-86e will not alter the trial court's judgment, modify the jury's factual findings, or expose a criminal defendant to punishment.7Because redaction of a victim's name, address, and identifying information under § 54-86e is
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nonpunitive, the trial court had continuing jurisdiction to rule on Doe's motion.
I recognize that Doe titled her motion an "Emergency Motion To Open Case for Limited Purpose and for Order,"
but courts "are not bound by the label affixed to [a party's] pleading . . . ." BNY Western Trust v. Roman, 295 Conn. 194, 210, 990 A.2d 853 (2010). In ascertaining the nature of a motion, courts must "look to the substance of the relief sought by the motion rather than the form." In re Haley B., 262 Conn. 406, 413, 815 A.2d 113 (2003). The substance of the relief sought in Doe's motion was clear—she requested "an order instructing the court reporter to redact [her] name from the transcript in this case by replacing all references to [her] first name with 'Jane,' all references to [her] last name with 'Doe,' and all references to [her] full name with 'Jane Doe.' " To the extent that any ambiguity regarding the relief requested existed, Doe urged the trial court to disregard the title of her motion, stating that she "does not believe the court needs to open anything to grant her request" and that she is seeking only "[a]n order concerning the transcript." It
"would exalt form over substance" to conclude that the title of Doe's motion divested the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction. In re Haley B., supra, 415. I find further support for my conclusion in the well established principle that "courts retain supervisory authority over documents in their possession"; Rosado
v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 276 Conn. 168, 216, 884 A.2d 981 (2005); and in General Statutes § 51-36, which governs the retention, reproduction, destruction, and disposal of court records. Section 51-36
(b) provides in relevant part that "any judge of the Supe- rior Court may order that official records of evidence or judicial proceedings in said court . . . including official notes and tapes of evidence or judicial proceedings con- cerning title to land, taken more than seven years prior to the date of such order by any stenographer or official court reporter, be destroyed by the person having the custody thereof." The term " 'official records of evidence
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or judicial proceedings' includes . . . the transcripts of all proceedings held in the matter, including voir dire."
General Statutes § 51-36 (e) (3); see also General Statutes § 51-36 (c) (3) (providing for destruction or disposal of all exhibits "[i]n any case in which a person has been found not guilty . . . upon the expiration of ninety days from the date of final disposition of such case"); cf. General Statutes § 54-142a (a) (providing for erasure of court records "in any criminal case . . . [in which] the accused, by a final judgment, is found not guilty of the charge or the charge is dismissed"); Practice Book § 7-13 (f) ("[i]n cases in which there has been neither a conviction nor the payment of a fine on any charge, the file shall be destroyed upon the expiration of three years from the date of dis- position"). Given that trial courts have subject matter jurisdiction to order the destruction of an official court transcript after final judgment is rendered, I perceive no reason why they lack subject matter jurisdiction to order the redaction of victims' names, addresses, and identifying information from an official court transcript after final judgment is rendered.8
The majority does not analyze whether a postjudg- ment order under § 54-86e is punitive in nature or will affect the judgment of the trial court. Instead, the majority concludes that, although a trial court has con- tinuing jurisdiction to implement nonpunitive civil,
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administrative, or regulatory statutes following the rendering of a final judgment of conviction, it lacks jurisdiction to do so following the rendering of a final judgment of acquittal.9See part I of the majority opinion. I find no persuasive force to this distinction in the current context, and the majority offers no reasoning beyond the declarative statement that the court's juris- diction disappears once its judgment has become final. In particular, the majority provides no reason why the outcome of a criminal trial should be determinative of the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction. I have found no Connecticut authority, and the majority cites none, to support its assertion that a trial court has continuing jurisdiction to implement nonpunitive civil, administra- tive, or regulatory statutes "only after the conviction of a defendant, not an acquittal."10Id.
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In the absence of applicable Connecticut precedent, I find persuasive out-of-state authority addressing the scope of a trial court's subject matter jurisdiction to implement nonpunitive civil, administrative, or regula- tory statutes following the rendering of a judgment of acquittal. In State v. Brawley, 171 N.H. 333, 335-36,
195 A.3d 113 (2018), the Supreme Court of New Hamp- shire considered whether a trial court had continuing jurisdiction, after a judgment of acquittal was rendered, to require a defendant to reimburse the costs of his public defense under N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 604-A:9 (2001). The defendant in that case claimed that, "in light of his acquittal, [he] was 'unconditionally discharged' from the criminal case," and the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. State v. Brawley, supra, 336. The court rejected this argument, holding that § 604-A:9 con- ferred continuing jurisdiction on trial courts to recoup a criminal defendant's "costs and expenses after the disposition of an action without regard to the nature of the disposition, i.e., conviction, acquittal, or dismissal."
Id., 338. Likewise, I would hold that § 54-86e confers continuing jurisdiction on the trial courts to protect the names, addresses, and identifying information of victims of sexual assault, regardless of the nature of the disposition, i.e., conviction, acquittal, or dismissal. present case. See part I of the majority opinion. In Butler, this court held that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to open and vacate a judgment of dismissal and to reinstate criminal charges against the defendant, even though the dismissal was premised on factually inaccurate and erroneous information. See id., 54-55, 74. Consistent with the well established general principles discussed in the body of this opinion, this court held that a trial court is divested of jurisdic- tion to open and substantively change the outcome of a final judgment in a criminal case without a basis for continuing jurisdiction. See id., 69-71. In arriving at its conclusion, the court in Butler recognized that there were exceptions to the well established general principles, none of which was applicable. Id., 73. Because Butler did not address, much less foreswear, a trial court's continuing jurisdiction to implement nonpunitive civil, administrative, or regulatory statutes that do not necessitate any alteration, modification, or opening of a final judgment of acquittal, the majority's reliance on it is misplaced.
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III
COLLATERAL ATTACK ON THE JUDGMENT
Although the majority's conclusion in part I of its opinion is dispositive of the present writ of error, it proceeds to conclude in part II that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Doe's motion to redact her name from the official court transcript for an addi- tional reason, namely, because the posttrial court, Vitale, J., lacked the authority to reverse or modify the prior order of the trial court, B. Fischer, J., after that order had become final and appealable.11The majority's conclu- sion is fundamentally flawed for several reasons. The precise basis for the majority's jurisdictional hold- ing is unclear, but the majority appears to conclude that Doe's motion is a collateral attack on Judge Fischer's prior order.12Although the majority does not use the
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term collateral attack or cite our collateral attack juris- prudence, the public policy concerns on which the major- ity relies—finality, appealability, and our hierarchical court system—are the same principles that animate our collateral attack jurisprudence. I therefore analyze the majority's holding using the collateral attack framework. Our courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to adju- dicate a collateral attack on a final judgment. See, e.g., Sousa v. Sousa, 322 Conn. 757, 771, 143 A.3d 578 (2016). The reason for the prohibition against collateral attacks is that "[t]he law aims to invest judicial trans- actions with the utmost permanency consistent with justice. . . . Public policy requires that a term be put to litigation and that judgments, as solemn records [on] which valuable rights rest, should not lightly be disturbed or overthrown." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. A party who "deems himself wronged by the court's decision" may challenge that decision, for example, by way of appeal or a writ of error, and, "[i]f he omits or neglects to test the soundness of the judgment by these or other direct methods available for that purpose, he is in no position to urge its defective or erroneous character when it is pleaded or produced in evidence against him in subsequent proceedings. Unless it is entirely invalid omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Wheeler v. Beachcroft, LLC, supra, 166-67. The state and the victim in a criminal action are not in privity because they do "not share the same legal interests or rights . . . ." Virzi v. Berger, Superior Court, judicial district of Ansonia-Milford at Derby, Docket No. CV-17-6023430-S (October 31, 2018) (67 Conn. L. Rptr. 299, 299). In a criminal action, the state does not represent the legal interests of the victim; the state represents the legal interests of the people of the state of Connecticut. See, e.g., State
v. Gault, 304 Conn. 330, 342-43, 39 A.3d 1105 (2012) ("It is a basic tenet of the criminal justice system that prosecutions are undertaken and punishments are sought by the state on behalf of the citizens of the state, and not on behalf of particular victims or complaining witnesses.
. . . A criminal prosecution is a public matter and not a contest between the defendant and his victims, or their relatives." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)). Because Doe's legal interests and rights were not represented by the state in the underlying criminal action, it would be inequitable to bar her request for relief under the doctrine of res judicata.
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and that fact is disclosed by an inspection of the record itself the judgment is invulnerable to indirect assaults [on] it." (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
There are two types of collateral attacks. "First, [a] collateral attack is an attack [on] a judgment, decree or order offered in an action or proceeding other than that in which it was obtained, in support of the contentions of an adversary in the action or proceeding . . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bank of New York Mellon v. Tope, 345 Conn. 662, 672, 286 A.3d 891 (2022). Second, a collateral attack may occur within the same action or proceeding if the judgment has become final and the court lacks continuing jurisdiction to modify the chal- lenged order or to open the final judgment. Id.; see, e.g., Tanzman v. Meurer, 309 Conn. 105, 118 n.7, 70 A.3d 13 (2013) (trial courts have continuing jurisdiction to modify alimony orders under General Statutes § 46b-86
(a) "upon proof of a substantial change in circumstances after the date of the original order"); Valvo v. Freedom of Information Commission, 294 Conn. 534, 543-44,
985 A.2d 1052 (2010) ("[o]ur jurisprudence concerning the trial court's authority to overturn or to modify a ruling in a particular case assumes, as a proposition so basic that it requires no citation of authority, that any such action will be taken only by the trial court with continuing jurisdiction over the case, and that the only court with continuing jurisdiction is the court that origi- nally [issued] the ruling"); Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., supra, 276 Conn. 220 ("the trial court . . . ha[s] inherent power to vacate or to modify the protective orders in [a] withdrawn [case]"). Doe's motion plainly is not the first type of collat- eral attack because it was filed in the same action or proceeding in which Judge Fischer issued his original order. Resolution of the issue therefore turns on whether Doe's motion is the second type of collateral attack, that is, whether the trial court had continuing jurisdiction to modify Judge Fischer's order or to open the final
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judgment of acquittal. As explained in part II of this opinion, Doe's motion did not challenge the final judg- ment of acquittal, and the trial court was not required to open or modify the final judgment of acquittal to grant Doe the relief she requested. The issue presented is therefore further limited to a single narrow question:
Did the trial court have continuing jurisdiction to modify Judge Fischer's order denying the state's request to shield Doe's name from public disclosure?
Before addressing the merits of that question, it is worth noting, as a predicate matter, that, at trial, it was the prosecutor who requested that Doe be permitted to proceed without using her full name on the record and who failed to provide Judge Fischer with the statutory authority required to support that request. As a seques- tered witness, Doe was not present in the courtroom when Judge Fischer issued his order and, therefore, was not in a position to object to the ruling. Although the prosecutor indicated that he wanted to inform Doe of Judge Fischer's ruling, the record does not reflect whether he did so. In her postjudgment motion to redact her name from the official court transcript, Doe states that she "believed her name was not publicly available through the transcript"
until she discovered otherwise during the course of the federal litigation. It is therefore unclear whether Doe, as a nonparty to the criminal action, was aware of Judge Fischer's order or had an opportunity to challenge it by way of a writ of error prior to the filing of her postjudg- ment motion. See footnote 12 of this opinion. Without explaining its reasoning, the majority sug- gests in a footnote that Doe's use of the terms "error"
and "mistake" in her motion to describe Judge Fischer's order somehow deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to grant Doe the relief she requested.13See footnote 11
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of the majority opinion. This assertion is flawed for two reasons. First, as a legal matter, the majority takes its eye off the jurisdictional ball by fixating exclusively on the motion's characterization of Judge Fischer's ruling rather than looking to the relief sought by the motion, which was an order to redact the transcript to shield Doe's name from public disclosure under § 54-86e in light of Khan's alleged campaign of harassment after final judgment was rendered. The trial court's jurisdiction is defined by reference to the relief sought in Doe's motion. See In re Haley B., supra, 262 Conn. 413. Second, the majority's conclusion is also incorrect as a factual mat- ter because, as explained hereinafter, the relief sought in Doe's motion was not premised exclusively on Judge Fischer's alleged trial error, but also on the postjudgment events that the motion set forth as grounds for the relief requested under § 54-86e.
An order under § 54-86e is a type of protective or seal- ing order that shields from public disclosure confiden- tial information (i.e., sexual assault victims' names, addresses, and identifying information) contained in judicial documents in the custody and control of the court. Cf. Practice Book § 42-49A (sealing or limiting disclosure of documents in criminal cases). It is well settled that trial courts have inherent continuing juris- diction after a judgment is rendered "to revisit protective orders" regarding judicial documents "when a change in circumstances or pertinent law makes it equitable to do so . . . ." Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., supra, 276 Conn. 216; see also United States v. Morales, 807 F.3d 717, 719, 721 (5th Cir. 2015) (review- ing lower court's ruling on motion to modify protective order filed eleven years after judgment was rendered in criminal case and observing that such motions "are not a part of the trial and punishment process that is criminal law" (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States
v. Dornsbach, 730 F. Supp. 3d 897, 903-904 (D. Minn. 2024) (exercising inherent authority to rule on motion to the trial level . . . by statute, the name should have been protected. . . . For whatever reason, that didn't happen."
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modify protective order filed after rendering of judgment of acquittal); United States v. Craigue, 573 F. Supp. 3d 584, 596 (D.N.H. 2021) (granting postjudgment motion to modify protective order because courts have inherent power over protective orders, "even after judgment" is rendered (internal quotation marks omitted)). Control over "the entry or modification of a protective order . . . is a matter falling peculiarly within the discretion of the [trial] court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) United States v. Bulger, 283 F.R.D. 46, 53 (D. Mass. 2012). In her motion, Doe alleged that, after the entry of Judge Fischer's order, "Khan ha[d] embarked on a lengthy campaign to harass [Doe] by disseminating her name." Following the judgment of acquittal, Khan sued Doe, Yale University, and several of its employees in federal court. See generally Khan v. Yale Univer- sity, 511 F. Supp. 3d 213 (D. Conn. 2021), vacated in part, 85 F.4th 86 (2d Cir. 2023). In her motion, Doe alleged that she had been granted permission to pro- ceed pseudonymously in the federal action and that Khan had been ordered not to disclose her name pub- licly. "[T]hrough discovery in the [federal action], [Doe] obtained an email that . . . Khan had written in which . . . Khan stated that he would do everything [he could] to get [Doe] to break, including 'spend[ing] thousands of dollars to keep [news] articles [containing Doe's name] circulating on the Internet for years . . . ." (Internal quo- tation marks omitted.) The concerns expressed by Doe in her motion filed in the present matter were confirmed by the judge presiding over the federal action. United States District Court Judge Kari A. Dooley stated that she was concerned about "the tenor and tone" of Khan's social media posts because they "feel less like his plan is to have his rights vindicated as it is to exact retribution, and that is not the purpose of the use of our courts . . .
. [T]here is a sense of an intent to intimidate. There is a sense of an intent to harass. The idea of sort of mobiliz- ing the Internet—I mean, this is borderline doxing,14and
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it's very concerning." (Footnote added.) Doe's motion further alleged that "Khan's harassment . . . has exposed her to a risk of retaliatory harm. For example, after . . . Khan posted [Doe's] real name and commented on her ethnicity on social media on [December 25, 2023], a third party posted [Doe's] real name and information about where she works on a forum for extremists that has a swastika embedded in its logo."15The gravity of these factual allegations certainly warranted consideration of whether the change in circumstances since the judgment of acquittal had altered the balance of interests under § 54-86e such that Doe's name should be shielded from public disclosure.
The foregoing analysis explains why the majority is incorrect when it states that, when Doe sought a rul- ing vacating or modifying Judge Fischer's order, "she functionally asked Judge Vitale to exercise appellate authority over Judge Fischer's appealable order." Part II of the majority opinion. Doe was not asking the trial court to exercise appellate authority; she was asking the trial court to exercise its continuing jurisdiction to modify or vacate an order denying a request to protect the name of a sexual assault victim from public disclosure under § 54-86e. Because trial courts have continuing jurisdiction to enter nonpunitive sealing or protective orders after judgment is rendered, Doe's motion did not offend our hierarchical court system or constitute a col- lateral attack over which the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., State v. Mieles, supra, 351 Conn. 781-82 (standing criminal protective order may be issued postjudgment if, inter alia, there is "additional evidence, not presented to the sentencing court, [which]
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indicates that a standing criminal protective order will best serve the interest of the victim and the public").16 Lastly, the majority's concern regarding judge shop- ping is wholly unfounded. See part II of the majority opinion. Doe filed her postjudgment motion in the same underlying action or proceeding in which Judge Fisch- er's order was issued—the same case, parties, docket number, and judicial district. The assignment of Doe's motion to Judge Vitale, instead of Judge Fischer, was an internal court management decision over which Doe had no control.17The record does not support the major- ity's assertion that, absent dismissal of Doe's motion for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, litigants will be
"encourage[d] . . . to seek review by '[j]udge shopping' within the same court . . . ." Id.; see Skakel v. Commis- sioner of Correction, 329 Conn. 1, 28, 188 A.3d 1 (2018) (rejecting notion that litigant engaged in "judge shop-
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ping" by filing timely motion to reconsider in same case after retirement of justice on prior panel), cert. denied,
586 U.S. 1068, 139 S. Ct. 788, 202 L. Ed. 2d 569 (2019); cf. Holcombe v. Holcombe, 22 Conn. App. 363, 365, 576 A.2d 1317 (1990) ("[t]here is no requirement that the same judge rule on all matters arising after a dissolu- tion judgment").
IV
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, I conclude that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to consider the merits of Doe's motion to redact the official court tran- script to protect her name from public disclosure under § 54-86e. As with most common-law rules, there are exceptions to the jurisdictional principles on which the majority relies precisely because cases often arise involv- ing subtle factual variations, and the judiciary requires flexibility to resolve these disputes in a fair and just manner. The present case illustrates the adaptability of our common law, which is flexible enough to facili- tate compliance with the legislative policy expressed in § 54-86e by permitting the trial court to entertain Doe's postjudgment motion to redact her name from the official court transcript, while simultaneously safeguarding the finality of the underlying judgment in all substantive respects, doing no harm to the rights of either party. Although Khan raises various arguments pertaining to the prejudice he would suffer if Doe's motion were to be granted, namely, the importance of preserving the historical accuracy of the record, the constitutionality of § 54-86e, and the defense of laches, these arguments pertain to the merits of Doe's motion to redact the offi- cial court transcript, rather than the trial court's sub- ject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate that motion. The trial court did not reach the merits of Doe's motion, and I express no opinion on whether the motion should be granted. I conclude only that the final judgment of acquittal did not deprive the trial court of subject matter
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jurisdiction over Doe's motion to redact her name from the official court transcript under § 54-86e. Because I would grant the writ of error and order further proceed- ings on Doe's motion, I respectfully dissent.
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