PER CURIAM:
Angelo Addie Reid, who had previously been convicted of a felony, pleaded guilty to a charge of unlawful possession of a firearm, see 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and was sentenced to 180 months' imprisonment. Reid appeals, challenging only his sentence. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
I.
A.
On August 14, 2024, Reid was inside a mall in Winston-Salem with his girlfriend, Sonya Perkins. Reid was sitting on a bench while Perkins used a wall outlet to charge her cell phone. Victor Banks, another mall patron, approached Perkins and asked her where the bathroom was located. Reid got up from the bench and, in an aggressive manner, told Banks that Perkins did not know where the bathroom was. According to Banks, Reid
"bucked" at him, J.A. 126, and Banks responded by punching Reid in the chest, which caused Reid to stumble backwards. Reid immediately pulled a gun out of his jacket and fired a shot at Banks. The shot missed Banks and went into a jewelry store where people were working and shopping. Banks fled, running towards the exit, and Reid chased after him. When Banks was just outside the mall, Reid fired another shot, which hit Banks in the back. Banks fell to the ground. Reid stood over Banks, pistol-whipped him, and then fled with Perkins. See J.A. 124. Mall security video of the incident shows that approximately six seconds elapsed between the first and second shots. See J.A. 71. Banks was taken to a hospital, where he underwent surgery. The bullet, which nicked two vertebrae in Banks' lower spine, could not be safely removed and remains
3
lodged in his back. Banks was in the hospital for a month and then spent another three weeks in an in-patient rehabilitation facility. Banks continues to suffer from the effects of the shooting. His "right arm is very weak," his "right leg is constantly numb," and his lower back "is always burning." J.A. 64. He cannot stand for very long "without collapsing," and sitting for any length of time causes a burning sensation. J.A. 64. He requires a cane to keep his balance when walking and must wear a knee brace "to keep [his] knee in line."
J.A. 64-65. Because of his injuries, Banks can no longer work or pursue his interests, such as working on his car and playing basketball.
B.
Reid was indicted on a single count of possessing a firearm after a felony conviction, see 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and he pleaded guilty to the charge under a written plea agreement. The statutory maximum sentence for Reid's offense is 15 years. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(8).
Sentencing for § 922 offenses is governed by § 2K2.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines, which establishes a base offense level of 20 if the defendant "committed any part of the instant offense subsequent to sustaining one felony conviction of . . . a crime of violence."
U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A). However, "[i]f the defendant used or possessed any firearm or ammunition cited in the offense of conviction in connection with the . . . attempted commission of another offense," the district court is directed to apply "§ 2X1.1 (Attempt, Solicitation, or Conspiracy) in respect to that other offense, if the resulting offense level is greater than that determined above." U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(c)(1)(A); see United States v. Lynn,
912 F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 2019) ("In the event of a conviction for illegal possession of a
4
firearm, USSG § 2K2.1 (c) authorizes a district court to substitute the offense level for any criminal offense that the defendant committed or attempted to commit in connection with the possession of the firearm.") (cleaned up). For its part, § 2X1.1 calls for application of the "base offense level from the guideline for the substantive offense, plus any adjustments from such guideline for any intended offense conduct that can be established with reasonable certainty." U.S.S.G. 2X1.1(a).
Concluding that Reid's conduct amounted to attempted first-degree murder, the probation agent preparing Reid's presentence report (PSR) cross-referenced U.S.S.G. § 2A2.1, which set Reid's base-offense level at 33. See U.S.S.G. § 2A2.1(a)(2) (setting base offense level of 33 "if the object of the offense would have constituted first degree murder"). The PSR also applied a four-level enhancement because Banks sustained permanent bodily injury. See U.S.S.G. § 2A2.1(b)(1)(A) ("If . . . the victim sustained permanent or life-threatening bodily injury, increase by 4 levels . . . ."). After application of a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, Reid's total offense level under the PSR was 34. See J.A. 128. That offense level, combined with Reid's Category V criminal history, yielded an advisory sentencing range of 235-293 months. However, because the 180-month statutory maximum sentence was "less than the minimum of the applicable guideline range," the advisory guideline sentence was 180 months. U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(a).
Reid objected to the PSR, challenging the cross-reference to the attempted murder guideline and the enhancement for permanent injuries. At sentencing, the district court
5
overruled Reid's objections and imposed the statutory maximum sentence of 180 months. See J.A. 92. This appeal followed.
II.
On appeal, Reid challenges only the district court's application of the attempted- murder cross-reference. "We review the factual findings underlying a district court's application of a Guidelines cross-reference for clear error and the court's legal conclusions de novo." Lynn, 912 F.3d at 216. Under the clear error standard, we will reverse a district court's factual findings only "if we are left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." United States v. Gross, 90 F.4th 715, 722 (4th Cir. 2024) (cleaned up).
Whether a criminal defendant acted with a particular intent is a question of fact. See e.g., United States v. Robinson, 855 F.3d 265, 269 (4th Cir. 2017). The district court observed that Reid had "a pretty decent argument" that the first shot, which happened immediately after Banks punched Reid, did not establish a specific intent to kill. J.A. 75. Nonetheless, the district court concluded that there was sufficient time between the first and second shots to show premeditation:
It is when you get to that second shot. It wasn't just in the moment. He shoots at Mr. Banks. Mr. Banks runs, turns and runs. Mr. Reid also, you know, puts his arm down, as the prosecutor says, turned, chases him. We don't have evidence of distance here but, you know, I saw the video, and I've been in a mall, you know, a number of yards out the door into the covered entryway, and sees other people running and raises his arm and shoots directly at Mr. Banks again and hits him in the back. To me, that passage of time and those actions, where you've got a shot directly at somebody, a chase and another shot directly at somebody that hits him in the back, over the course of several seconds, shows specific intent to kill.
6
So that takes us to premeditation. So I think you have malice. Whether the test is a reckless and wanton act or acts or specific intent to kill. Certainly you have it as to that second shot. You might really have it as to the first, but I don't have to find that here, because it is the second shot, really, when you take the first and the second shot together and the intervening action, it is pretty clear to me that there was specific intent to kill. As to premeditation, the cases require, you know, time to form a conscious intent. And here, I think the same things I've already talked about with the specific intent to kill apply. You've got the passage of several seconds. You've got two shots with time in between. It is not a case where you have a shot, a pause, and a shot. You have a shot, a chase and another shot, and that seems to me to show there was time to form that intent, that conscious intent, and that intent was formed.
So all of that together shows that there is the attempted first degree murder, and I'll find that by a preponderance of the evidence, and apply the guidelines as calculated in the presentence report, overruling the objection. J.A. 75-76.
Reid insists that the cross-reference was improper because he acted in the heat of passion and thus without the malice and premeditation required for attempted first-degree murder. See United States v. Ashford, 718 F.3d 377, 384 (4th Cir. 2013) ("Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought . . . . First-degree murder requires proof of premeditation . . . ."). Reid contends that the lack of malice and premeditation is established by the fact that when Banks was on the ground, Reid pistol- whipped him but did not fire another shot. Because he "had the opportunity to fire a lethal shot at [Banks] but declined," Brief of Appellant at 9, Reid argues that the evidence shows that he lacked the intent to kill.
While Reid's view of the evidence is plausible, so is the district court's view. As the district court noted, there is no specific period of reflection before which premeditation
7
may be found; "premeditation exists when a person has a fully formed conscious purpose to kill, even for a moment." United States v. Ball, 18 F.4th 445, 456 (4th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up). "In other words, the mental state required for premeditation must exist only for such time as will allow the accused to be conscious of the nature of the act he was about to commit and the probable result of that act." Id. at 456-57 (cleaned up). Because the district court made no legal error and its view of the evidence is plausible, our deferential standard of review requires us to reject Reid's challenge to the application of the cross-reference. See United States v. Jones, 166 F.4th 428, 437 (4th Cir.) ("When there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder's choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.") (cleaned up), cert. denied, No. 25-7351, 2026 WL 1780200 (U.S. June 22, 2026).
III.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we hereby affirm Reid's sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid our decision- making process.
AFFIRMED