Jesse Sandlin

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This matter is before the Court on the Plaintiff's Motion for the Bankruptcy Court to Decline Jurisdiction Over State Law Claims [DE 50] and the Defendants' Response [DE 66] filed in opposition to the Motion. The Court held a hearing on May 20, 2026, and heard the arguments of the parties and the statements of counsel, and took this matter under advisement. This decision constitutes the Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law under FED. R. CIV. P. 52, made applicable to this contested matter by FED. R. BANKR. P. 7052. Regardless of whether specifically referred to in this decision, the Court has examined the submitted materials, considered statements of counsel and the parties, considered all the evidence and reviewed the entire record of the case. Based upon that review, and for the following reasons, the Court hereby determines that Plaintiff's Motion for the Bankruptcy Court to Decline Jurisdiction Over State Law Claims is granted, that this adversary proceeding is accordingly dismissed and that Defendants shall be awarded sanctions in the amount of their attorney fees incurred for defense of this adversary proceeding.

DISCUSSION OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THIS

ADVERSARY PROCEEDING

The facts regarding the procedural history of this case remain undisputed. The Plaintiff filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy case in this Court on May 14, 2009 which proceeded to discharge on July 25, 2014, after the Plaintiff completed all payments due under his Chapter 13 Plan. [Bankr. Case DE 149] During the course of the bankruptcy case and for years thereafter, however, some issues arose with Plaintiff's mortgagees and their counsel, now the Defendants herein, which resulted in protracted litigation in several different courts. The Chapter 13 bankruptcy trustee, however, filed his Final Report and Account on June 25, 2015, and the bankruptcy case was accordingly closed. [Bankr. Case DE 165]

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For almost 10 years, the bankruptcy case sat dormant until Plaintiff filed a Motion to reopen the case to enforce a settlement/loan modification agreement with the Defendants [Bankr. Case DE 168] and the case was then reopened on July 18, 2025. Soon thereafter Plaintiff commenced this adversary proceeding and filed his First Amended Complaint on September 25, 2026 [DE 7] alleging the following claims against the Defendants:

Claim 1 : Breach of Court-Approved Settlement Agreement as to CitiMortgage, Inc.

In this claim the Plaintiff alleges that Defendant CitiMortgage breached the parties' settlement agreement by failing to apply payments, and thus declaring the mortgage in default, for periods 2015 - April 1, 2019 at which time the mortgage was transferred to Defendant Cenlar.

Claim 2: Breach of Contract as to CitiMortgage, Inc.

Plaintiff alleges that CitiMortgage breached the parties' mortgage contract by failing to apply mortgage payments to the note as set forth in the mortgage agreement, and instead held the payments in a suspense and/or unapplied account for five years.

Claim 3: Fraudulent Misrepresentation/Acceleration of Deed of Trust and Mortgage Default as to CitiMortgage, Inc., Cenlar, Garry Grooms, Richard Keller

The third claim alleges that Defendant CitiMortgage made negligent misrepresentations as to Plaintiff's default on the mortgage, as the default was due to missed mortgage payments when in fact, the mortgage payments made by Plaintiff were being held in a suspense account and not being appropriately applied to the mortgage account, resulting in the wrongful commencement of a foreclosure in violation of Tennessee law.

Plaintiff further alleges in this Count that Defendants knew or should have known that the mortgage arrearages were cured in Plaintiff's bankruptcy case, and Defendants CitiMortgage and Cenlar refused to accept Plaintiff's mortgage payments and held funds in suspense instead of applying them to the mortgage account thereby falsely claiming a mortgage default. Further

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Defendants CitiMortgage, Inc., Cenlar, Garry Groom and Richard Keller violated the bankruptcy discharge injunction by attempting to collect a discharged debt. In addition, Defendants CitiMortgage and Cenlar improperly force-placed insurance on Plaintiff's home, when in fact the property was adequately insured by Plaintiff.

Claim 4: Violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practice Act as to CitiMortgage, Inc., Cenlar, Garry Grooms, Richard Keller

In a nutshell, Plaintiff claims in Count 4 that the alleged conduct asserted in Counts 1, 2 and 3 also constituted a violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practice Act as set forth in several subsections of 15 U.S.C. § 1692.

Claim 5: Violation of Discharge Injunction as to CitiMortgage, Inc., Cenlar, Garry Grooms, Richard Keller

This Count alleges that Defendants took various adverse actions in an attempt to collect amounts that were paid, cured or discharged in Plaintiff's Chapter 13 case in willful violation of the discharge injunction.

Claim 6: Civil Contempt & Sanctions as to CitiMortgage, Inc., Cenlar, Garry Grooms, Richard Keller

This Claim is based on the Defendants' alleged non-compliance with FHA (Federal Housing Authority)/ VA (Veteran's Administration)/ HUD (Housing and Urban Development) regulations pertaining to a foreclosure action of an FHA/VA mortgage loan.

Claim 7: Tortious Interference with Contract and Business Relationship Related to Court- Approved Settlement Agreement as to Cenlar, Garry Grooms, Richard Keller

Claim 7 alleges that Defendants Cenlar, Groom and Keller tortiously interfered with Plaintiff's business relationship and contractual agreement with Defendant CitiMortgage.

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Claim 8: Tortious Interference with Economic Relationship Related to Court Approved Settlement Agreement as to Cenlar, Garry Grooms, Richard Keller

This Claim alleges that Defendants Cenlar, Groom and Keller intentionally, willfully and improperly interfered with Plaintiff's contractual settlement agreement with Defendant CitiMortgage, resulting in economic and non-economic damages to Plaintiff.

Claim 9: Conspiracy & Collusion Interference with Contract as to CitiMortgage, Inc., Cenlar, Garry Grooms, Richard Keller

This Count alleges Defendant Cenlar's negligence in the management of Plaintiff's mortgage account, and non-compliance on the part of both Cenlar and CitiMortgage with the terms of the mortgage contract as modified by the Plaintiff's settlement agreement with CitiMortgage. Further, Plaintiff alleges Defendants Grooms and Keller provided substantial assistance in carrying out the alleged non-compliance, with their conduct rising to the point of fraud and misrepresentation.

Claim 10: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress as to CitiMortgage, Inc., Cenlar, Garry Grooms, Richard Keller

This Claim alleges that Plaintiff has spent the last 15 years consumed with the prospect of losing his home and repeatedly frustrated by the actions of the Defendants.

Claim 11: Fraud-Procurement of Judgment as to Garry Grooms, Richard Keller

Claim 11 alleges that Defendants Grooms and Keller misrepresented facts to the state court in a foreclosure proceeding and thereby obtained a judgment against Plaintiff by fraud.

Claim 12: Violation of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act ("RESPA") as to CitiMortgage, Inc., Cenlar

This Count alleges that Defendants CitiMortgage and Cenlar failed to timely and thoroughly investigate and reply to Plaintiff's Qualified Written Request, and failed to act to

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correct the inaccuracies identified by Plaintiff in his correspondence to Defendants. This inaction, along with other alleged conduct, constitutes violations of RESPA on the part of these Defendants. The Complaint's Prayer for Relief seeks an injunction against further attempted collection of a discharged debt, compensatory and punitive damages and attorney's fees and costs. It should also be noted that Paragraph 1 of the Amended Complaint asserts: "This Court has jurisdiction over this adversary proceeding pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105, 524 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 157 and 1334, Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9020, 11 U.S.C. §§ 350(a) and §§ [sic] 350(b) and 11 U.S.C. § 1322; 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., as well as the laws of the State of Tennessee and other applicable federal laws."¹

Contrary to this assertion, Plaintiff's Motion now advances a new position that this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to decide this adversary proceeding and/or alternatively that the Court should abstain from hearing this case on the merits. Defendants contend that this adversary proceeding arises from claims that the Defendants have acted in violation of this Court's Amended Agreed Order Resolving Pending Contested Matters and Approving Loan Modification [Bankr. Case DE 137] entered on August 13, 2012, which was revisited and enforced by the Court in its Memorandum and Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and Denying Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment [ Adv. Proc. No. 13-00439, DE 31] in a prior adversary proceeding filed by Plaintiff against mortgagee CitiMortgage based on many facts and allegations which are indistinguishable from or correlative to the allegations in the adversary proceeding at bar.

The Court now turns its focus and analysis to the Motion and Response at hand.

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LAW AND ANALYSIS

1. Jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court

Congress has established that a bankruptcy court has jurisdiction over any civil proceeding

(1) "arising under Title 11," such as proceedings to enforce rights created by the Bankruptcy Code,

(2) "arising in" a bankruptcy case, known as a "core proceeding" or one that would not exist but- for the bankruptcy, such as case administration, and (3) "related to" a bankruptcy case, meaning any proceeding which could have an effect on the bankruptcy estate. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334(b) and 157; McConnell v. Grewal (In re HVI Cat Canyon, Inc.), 658 B.R. 558, 565 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2024) (collecting cases). "The bankruptcy judge shall determine, on the judge's own motion or on timely motion of a party, whether a proceeding is a core proceeding under this subsection or is a proceeding that is otherwise related to a case under title 11." 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(3); see also Elam

v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC (In re Elam), No. 11-21571, Adv. No. 21-00098 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. May 4, 2022). The Court turns to whether the Plaintiff's claims asserted in the Amended Complaint constitute a core proceeding or a non-core proceeding which nevertheless qualifies as a "related to" proceeding.

Core Proceedings

Core proceedings involve rights created by the Bankruptcy Code (i.e. the proceeding relies on the Bankruptcy Code for its existence). 28 U.S.C. 157(b)(2); see Amedisys, Inc. v. Nat'l Century Fin. Enter., Inc. (In re Nat'l Century Fin. Enter., Inc.), 423 F3d 567 (6th Cir. 2005); In re Elam, No. 11-21571, Adv. No. 21-00098. Plaintiff has alleged, among other things, that Defendants' post- bankruptcy actions constitute a violation of the discharge injunction. The entry of a debtor's discharge triggers the discharge injunction, which "operates as an injunction against the commencement or continuation of . . . an act, to collect, recover or offset

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any . . . debt as a personal liability of the debtor . . . ." See Perry v. EMC Mortg. Corp. (In re Perry), 288 B.R. 330, 335 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2008), quoting 11 U.S.C. § 524(c)(2). "The purpose of such an injunction is to protect the debtor from suits to collect debts that have been discharged in bankruptcy." Id., quoting Hendrix v. Page (In re Hendrix), 986 F.2d 195, 199 (7^thCir. 1993). As a general rule, enforcement of the discharge injunction is a core proceeding, giving the bankruptcy court the authority to hear and determine post-discharge motions to enforce the injunction. In re Daly, 666 B.R. 810, 819 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2025); Murray v. Dinsmore & Shohl, LLP (In re Murray Energy Holdings Co.), 662 B.R. 604, (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2024); Simpkins v. Booker, No. 25-cv-3814-ABA, 2026 WL 962108 *3 (D. MD. April 9, 2026) (citation omitted). However, the discharge injunction is applicable only to debts that are actually discharged. In re Perry, 288 B.R. at 336.

Bankruptcy Code § 1328 provides, in pertinent part, that "as soon as practicable after completion by the debtor of all payments under the plan . . . the court shall grant the debtor a discharge of all debts provided for by the plan . . . , except any debt . . . provided for under section 1322(b)(5)." 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a)(1) (emphasis added). Accordingly, § 1322(b)(5) sets forth the contents of the Chapter 13 plan, and provides that "the plan may . . . provide for the curing of any default within a reasonable time and maintenance of payments while the case is pending on any .

. . secured claim on which the last payment is due after the date on which the final payment under the plan is due." 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5) (emphasis added). Plaintiff's mortgage debt falls under § 1328 as his final mortgage payment was not due during the life of this Chapter 13 plan; therefore, in rem liability remains. Because his mortgage debt was not discharged in Plaintiff's bankruptcy case, the discharge injunction does not apply.

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Furthermore, the Debtor's Discharge Order entered in the Chapter 13 case provides, in pertinent part and in accordance with the Bankruptcy Code, that "a creditor may have the right to enforce a valid lien, such as a mortgage or security interest, against the debtor's property after the granting of the discharge, if that lien was not avoided or otherwise eliminated in the chapter 13 case." [Bankr. Case DE 149]

Thus, for the reasons set forth above, this Court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff's allegations of a discharge injunction violation pertaining to his mortgage obligation.² In addition to the allegations regarding violations of the discharge injunction, many of the claims in the Amended Complaint relate to alleged violations of this Court's Amended Agreed Order Resolving Pending Contested Matters and Approving Loan Modification [DE 137] entered on August 13, 2012. It is well-established that the bankruptcy court "plainly ha[s] jurisdiction to interpret and enforce its own prior orders. . . ." Rubottom v. Freedom Mortg. Corp., No. CV-25- 03199-PHX-DJH, 2026 WL 980531 *4 (D. Ariz. April 13, 2026), quoting Travelers Indem. Co. v. Bailey, 557 U.S. 137 (2009). Plaintiff previously filed an adversary proceeding in this Court alleging many of the same claims that he has asserted in the case at bar —— namely, that certain home mortgage loan payments and related escrow charges for years 2012 and 2013 were not properly accounted by Defendant CitiMortgage. See Sandlin v. CitiMortgage, Inc., No. 09-25231, Adv. Proc. No. 13-00439 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn.). During that litigation, this Court revisited and enforced the parties' Agreed Order in its Memorandum and Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and Denying Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment [ Adv. Proc.

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No. 13-00439, DE 31]. The Court at that time determined that summary judgment in favor of Defendant CitiMortgage was warranted, stating as follows:

Based on the record as a whole and statements at the May 1, 2014 hearing, the court is convinced that Mr. Sandlin essentially is attempting to relitigate claims that were previously settled and thereby recover funds from CitiMortgage that were released in the settlement. Res judicata prohibits this court (and other courts) from relitigating these claims. Furthermore, Mr. Sandlin seeks to disallow CitiMortgage's escrow account claim that arose post-settlement for real property taxes. In accordance with section 5 of the Modified Loan Agreement, CitiMortgage is entitled to pay Mr. Sandlin's

unpaid home property taxes and seek repayment from Mr. Sandlin. Therefore, Mr. Sandlin is due and owes to CitiMortgage for the latter's payment of the 2012 and 2013 real property taxes. Although the parties have an honest difference of opinion regarding the outcome here, nonetheless there are no genuine facts in substantial dispute as contemplated pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7056.

Adv. Proc. No. 13-00439, DE 31. Inasmuch as Plaintiff is attempting in this case to relitigate matters the parties' accounting dispute addressed in his prior adversary proceeding 13-00439, this Court has already adjudicated those matters and issued its Order, and this Court will give effect to its prior Order and will not now relitigate those claims.

Many of Plaintiff's claims are related to alleged conduct on the part of the Defendants that occurred post-discharge and post-bankruptcy, and therefore post-termination of the automatic stay. This Court does not have jurisdiction over any post-discharge dispute over the Debtor's long-term mortgage debt. In re Perry, 388 B.R. at 337.

In addition, when the Court examines the claims asserted in the Amended Complaint, given the fact that the Order confirming the Plaintiff's Chapter 13 Plan provided that the bankruptcy estate assets "shall revest in the debtor . . . upon discharge pursuant to § 1328(a) . . ." [Bankr. Case DE 22], there is no bankruptcy estate in existence at this point and "any potential impact or monetary recovery that may result will inure solely to the Plaintiff's benefit." In re Elam, citing

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Maxwell v. HSBC Mortg. Corp. (USA) (In re Maxwell), Adv. No. 12-5284, 2012 WL 3678609 at *3 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Aug. 22, 2012). Aside from the allegations of violations of the discharge injunction which the Court finds inapplicable to the mortgage obligation at issue, and the Court's interest in enforcing its own orders, there are no remaining claims asserted that do not exist "but- for" the bankruptcy.

For these reasons, the Court finds that the allegations asserted in Plaintiff's Amended Complaint fall outside the parameters of a core proceeding. The Court now examines whether it may exercise its "related-to" jurisdiction over this proceeding.

Related-to Jurisdiction

The bankruptcy court may also hear non-core proceedings that are nonetheless "related to"

bankruptcy proceedings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(c). Proceedings are "related to" bankruptcy proceedings if "the outcome of the proceeding could conceivably have any effect on the estate being administered in bankruptcy." Robinson v. Mich. Consol. Gas Co., Inc., 918 F.2d 579, 583 (6^thCir. 1990) (quoting In re Pacor, Inc., 743 F.2d 984, 994 (3^rdCir. 1984)). "An action is related to bankruptcy if the outcome could alter the debtor's rights, liabilities, options, or freedom of action (either positively or negatively) and which in any way impacts upon the handling and administration of the bankrupt estate." Id. (emphasis added).

There are four factors that courts consider when making a "related to" determination: (1) judicial economy, (2) convenience of the parties, (3) fairness and (4) comity. In re Palmetto Interstate Dev. II, Inc., 653 B.R. 230, 245 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2023).

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Judicial Economy

It is apparent to the Court that the parties have expended considerable time and resources over the past decade litigating in other forums the issues now before this Court, which would require extensive time and effort to bring this Court up to speed before a trial could be scheduled. The parties have not engaged in any pretrial discovery in this Court, and the Court has not yet invested significant time nor effort in the merits of the parties' dispute. The parties have for years litigated these issues in District Court, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals and the State court, and there would be minimum expenditure of judicial resources if the parties continue their claims and defenses in other courts. Further, it is this Court's understanding that a state court proceeding — now removed to District Court — is still pending³but has been apparently stayed due to the reopening of the bankruptcy case. [DE 18] Judicial economy weighs in favor of permitting the parties to continue their litigation in another court.

Convenience of the Parties

Restarting the parties' 10-year history of litigation from scratch serves neither the parties nor the purpose of the Bankruptcy Code and weighs against a finding of "related to" jurisdiction. The Court's dismissal of this adversary proceeding would result in little inconvenience to the parties, given the procedural posture of this litigation in its early stages, and the lack of difficulty in continuing on with the action currently pending in the District Court. This factor also weighs against continuing this dispute in the Bankruptcy Court.

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Fairness

As the Court has already established, there is no bankruptcy estate remaining for administration by this Court and therefore, the outcome of the parties' dispute will have no effect on the bankruptcy estate. See Robinson v. Mich. Consol. Gas Co., Inc., 918 F.2d at 583. In addition, given the litigious history between the parties, neither Plaintiff nor Defendant will be prejudiced if this adversary proceeding is dismissed in its infancy, and the parties can proceed with their litigation efforts already pending in the District Court. Thus, this Court will not exercise its

"related-to" jurisdiction based on consideration of fairness to the parties and the lack of prejudice to the bankruptcy estate, which has long ago revested in the Plaintiff.

Comity

The Court now considers whether the claims and defenses asserted in this litigation would best be adjudicated by another court. Plaintiff completed all payments under his Chapter 13 Plan and received his discharge. The parties' settlement agreement provided for maintenance of the mortgage obligation outside of the Chapter 13 Plan. The Discharge Order was entered and the bankruptcy case remained closed for ten years while the parties litigated — in other courts, both state and federal — the issues now brought before this Court in what appears to be an exhausted second bite at the apple before a different bankruptcy Judge. In a nutshell, the bankruptcy estate has been fully and completely administered. The claims and defenses brought by the parties are not unique to bankruptcy, and the expertise of the bankruptcy court is unnecessary at this point in the parties' dispute. Especially in light of the fact that the parties have utilized other forums seeking a resolution for the past decade. For these reasons, the comity factor weighs in favor of dismissal of this adversary proceeding to permit the parties to continue their pending litigation in a non- bankruptcy court.

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The Court finds that (1) judicial economy, (2) convenience of the parties, (3) fairness and

(4) comity are all best served by and dictate allowing the parties' dispute to be resolved by other courts that have already considered and heard many of the arguments and issues at bar. Accordingly, the Court finds that the dispute between the Plaintiff and Defendants as set forth in the Amended Complaint does not arise under Title 11 and is not related to Plaintiff's bankruptcy case. This Court therefore determines that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over this adversary proceeding.

Permissive Abstention

Because Plaintiff's Motion requests, as an alternative remedy, abstention by the Court, the Court also finds that even if it did find subject-matter jurisdiction over this adversary proceeding, permissive abstention by the Court is warranted under the facts of this case. Bankruptcy courts can permissively abstain from hearing proceedings arising under Title 11 or arising in or related to cases under Title 11 "in the interest of justice, or in the interest of comity with State courts or respect for State law. . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1).

Courts have considered a list of factors to determine whether permissive abstention is appropriate, including the following:

(1) the effect or lack of effect on the efficient administration the estate if a court abstains, (2) the extent to which state law issues predominate over bankruptcy issues, (3) the difficulty or unsettled nature of the applicable state law, (4) the presence of a related proceeding commenced in state court or other non-bankruptcy court,

(5) the jurisdictional basis, if any, other than 28 U.S.C. § 1334, (6) the degree of relatedness or remoteness of the proceeding to the main bankruptcy case, (7) the substance rather than form of an asserted core proceeding, (8) the feasibility of severing state law claims from core bankruptcy matters to allow judgments to be entered in state court with enforcement left to the bankruptcy court,

(9) the burden on this court's docket, (10) the likelihood that the commencement of the proceeding in bankruptcy court involves forum shopping by one of the parties, (11) the existence of a right

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to a jury trial, (12) the presence in the proceeding of nondebtor parties and (13) any unusual or other factors. Junk v. CitiMortgage, Inc. (In re Junk), 512 B.R. 584, 616 - 17 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2014) (quoting Meritage Homes Corp. v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 474 B.R. 526, 573 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2012)). The test "is a multifactor balancing test, not a rule in which every element must be satisfied; not all factors need to weigh in favor of permissive abstention in order for it to be appropriate."

Id. at 617, quoting Johnston v. City of Middletown (In re Johnston), 484 B.R. 698, 714 - 15 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2012).

As discussed above, in this case there is no bankruptcy estate in existence for administration by this Court as the bankruptcy estate has been fully administered, and the Court finds that, accordingly, the first factor — the effect on efficient administration of the bankruptcy estate — compellingly weighs in favor of abstention.

Further, state law issues predominate over any bankruptcy issues presented in this case, and the State of Tennessee has a strong interest in deciding a foreclosure dispute. In re Junk, 512 B.R. at 618, citing Blake v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 917 F. Supp.2d 732,738 (S.D. Ohio 2013) ("[A] state foreclosure matter implicates important state interests.") and Whittington v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n., No. 4:12-CV-03167, 2013 WL 2285943, at *12 (D.S.C. May 23, 2013) ("[T]here is undoubtedly an important state interest in adjudicating foreclosure matters pertaining to real property located within a state."). The second factor also weighs in favor of abstention. Factors three and four also weigh in favor of abstention, as the claims alleged are not difficult or unsettled and other courts are well-fitted to decide such matters. In fact, pertaining to factor four, there was a state court action commenced by Plaintiff, which was removed to District Court but is still pending, alleging many of the same claims as the Amended Complaint in the

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adversary proceeding now before this Court, which do not arise from Plaintiff's bankruptcy. [DE

18]

The fifth and sixth factors also weigh in favor of abstention, because as the Court has discussed above, the outcome of the adversary proceeding will have no effect on Plaintiff's bankruptcy estate which terminated upon Plaintiff's Chapter 13 discharge more than twelve years ago.

In addition, a trial on this Court's docket would place a needless burden on the Court as well as the parties, essentially requiring them to begin from scratch with discovery and pretrial motions, and to bring this Court up to speed on the protracted course of the litigation that the parties have endured in other courts over the past decade. Factor nine further tilts the scales in the direction of abstention.

The Court also considers in its determination that the expertise of the bankruptcy court is unnecessary to decide the matters presented by this adversary proceeding, and also that "the plaintiff's choice of forum should rarely be disturbed." Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947). In this case, the Plaintiff is the party who has moved for the Court's abstention. These considerations also weigh in favor of permissive abstention.

As set forth above, the Court finds that permissive abstention is proper and in the best interests of judicial economy under the circumstances of this case.

Award of Attorneys' Fees and Expenses in favor of Defendants

The Court is mindful of the fact that the Plaintiff reopened his bankruptcy case and commenced this adversary proceeding against the Defendants, alleging in his Amended Complaint that "[t]his Court has jurisdiction over this adversary proceeding pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105, 524 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 157 and 1334, Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9020, 11 U.S.C. §§ 350(a) and §§ [sic]

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350(b) and 11 U.S.C. § 1322; 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., as well as the laws of the State of Tennessee and other applicable federal laws," and Plaintiff now asserts a contrary position, asking this Court to decline jurisdiction and/or to abstain from hearing this adversary proceeding. The Amended Complaint was met with a Motion to Dismiss filed by the Defendants, along with other pleadings, briefs and court appearances to both defend and prosecute the Defendants' positions as necessary over the past year that this adversary proceeding has been pending.

For these reasons and in the interest of justice and to deter abuse of the bankruptcy judicial process, based on its inherent authority pursuant to 11 U.S.C § 105(a), the Court finds that Plaintiff shall be responsible for paying Defendants' reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses incurred in its defense of this adversary proceeding. Defendants' counsel shall submit an itemized application for attorneys' fees and expenses associated with this adversary proceeding within 14 days of entry of this Opinion and Order, and Plaintiff shall have an additional 14 days after the fee application is filed to submit any response. The Court will set the attorneys' fee application for a hearing and a separate order will be entered by the Court with its determination of reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, the Court finds that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to determine the allegations and claims before it, and alternatively that permissive abstention from hearing this adversary proceeding is appropriate. In addition, the Court finds that Defendants are entitled to recover their reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses from Plaintiff in an amount to be determined at a later date. This adversary proceeding shall be dismissed upon the Court's final order regarding an award of attorneys' fees.

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The Bankruptcy Court Clerk is directed to serve a copy of this Opinion and Order on the interested parties listed below.

cc:

Mr. Jesse Sandlin

4743 Kassell Cove

Memphis, TN 38116

CitiMortgage, Inc.

c/o CT Corporation

120 S. Central Avenue, Suite 400 St. Louis, MO 63105

Mr. Garry K. Grooms, Esq. Mr. David W. Houston, IV, Esq. Mr. Charles E. Nugent, Esq. Burr & Forman LLP

222 Second Avenue South, Suite 2000 Nashville, TN 37201

Mr. Richard Carlton Keller, Esq. Burr & Forman LLP

420 N. 20^thStreet, Suite 3400 Birmingham, AL 35203

Ms. Jennifer K. Cruseturner, Esq. Chapter 13 Trustee

5350 Poplar Avenue, Suite 500 Memphis, TN 38119

United States Trustee

Office of the United States Trustee

200 Jefferson Avenue, Suite 400 Memphis, TN 38103