SHM Ventures, LLC

This opinion is not a precedent of the TTAB Mailed: August 5, 2026

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

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Trademark Trial and Appeal Board _____

In re SHM Ventures, LLC

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Serial No. 99019667

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SHM Ventures, LLC, pro se (by Sonam Makharia, President). Jennifer Shannon, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 105, Jennifer Williston, Managing Attorney.

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Before Larkin, Casagrande, and Stanley, Administrative Trademark Judges. Opinion by Casagrande, Administrative Trademark Judge:

Applicant SHM Ventures, LLC, applied to register the mark THE SKIN MIXOLOGY (in standard-character format, SKIN disclaimed) on the Principal Register for goods ultimately identified as "Non-medicated skin care preparations, namely, facial and body moisturizers, serums, and toners; none of the foregoing being bath salts, non-medicated body soaks, bath milk; and none of the foregoing being custom-blended aromatherapy creams, lotions, oils, massage oils, or exfoliating body scrubs; and none of the foregoing relating to electric hair styling tools," in

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International Class 3.¹Registration was refused under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), due to likelihood of confusion with two standard-character marks, owned by different companies:²MIXOLOGY (in standard-character format) for goods identified as "Custom-blended aromatherapy bath and body products, namely, creams, lotions, oils, massage oil, exfoliating body scrubs" in International Class 3;³and THE BATH MIXOLOGIST (in standard-character format, "BATH"

disclaimed) for goods identified as "Bath and body products, namely, bath salts, non- medicated body soaks and bath milk" in International Class 3.⁴ After final refusal, Applicant appealed.⁵Briefs were filed,⁶and the appeal is now ready for decision. For the reasons explained below, we affirm the refusal to register.

EVIDENTIARY MATTER

Before we assess the merits of the appeal, we need to resolve an evidentiary issue. Applicant's brief contains an appendix with exhibits comprising screenshots of

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several webpages.⁷The Examining Attorney objects because Applicant did not place these screenshots in the record during examination.⁸

We are generally more flexible about evidence in appeals than in our trial cases. See, e.g., In re I-Coat Co., No. 86802467, 2018 WL 2753196, at *3 (TTAB 2018); TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD MANUAL OF PROCEDURE (TBMP) § 1208 (2026). One core, anchoring rule in appeals, however, is this: "The record should be complete prior to the filing of an appeal. Evidence should not be filed with the Board after the filing of a notice of appeal." Trademark Rule 2.142(d), 37 C.F.R. § 2.142(d). If, as here, a valid objection is lodged on that basis, we won't consider the untimely evidence. See, e.g., In re Info. Builders Inc., No. 87753964, 2020 WL 2094122, at *2 (TTAB 2020); In re Fallon, No. 86882668, 2020 WL 6255423, at *2 (TTAB 2020). Applicant could have requested suspension of the appeal and a remand to submit additional evidence, based on a showing of good cause. See, e.g., Info. Builders, 2020 WL 2094122, at *2 n.5; Fallon, 2020 WL 6255423, at *2; In re Holiday Inns, Inc., 1984 WL 62814, at *3 n.3 (TTAB 1984). But Applicant did not do that. We therefore sustain the Examining Attorney's objection and will not consider this late-submitted evidence.⁹

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ANALYSIS

The likelihood-of-confusion refusal was based on two different registrations. We'll start with Registration No. 3803922 for MIXOLOGY. If necessary, we'll then turn to the other registration.

I. Section 2(d) generally

Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act prohibits registration of a mark that "so resembles a mark registered in the Patent and Trademark Office … as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive." 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d). We determine whether confusion is likely by analyzing all probative facts properly in evidence that are relevant to the likelihood-of-confusion factors listed in In re E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (CCPA 1973). See, e.g., In re Charger Ventures LLC, 64 F.4th 1375, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2023). We don't address all thirteen factors listed in du Pont by rote, but rather focus on those factors addressed in the briefs and on which there is relevant evidence in the record. See, e.g., Dollar Fin. Grp., Inc. v. Brittex Fin., Inc., 132 F.4th 1363, 1371-72 (Fed. Cir. 2025); Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp., 222 F.3d 943, 946- 47 (Fed. Cir. 2000). We then weigh our findings on these factors to determine if, on balance, confusion is likely. See, e.g., Charger Ventures, 64 F.4th at 1381; In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2003).

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II. Applicant's argument that the mark in the cited registration is weak

Applicant addresses the sixth du Pont factor first. The sixth factor is "[t]he number and nature of similar marks in use on similar goods." 476 F.2d at 1361. This factor "is a measure of the extent to which other marks weaken the [registered] mark." Spireon, Inc. v. Flex Ltd., 71 F.4th 1355, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (citation omitted). "The weaker [the senior] mark, the closer an applicant's mark can come without causing a likelihood of confusion … ." In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). Applicant argues that the term "mixology" is

"a conceptually weak and diluted term" in the "beauty field" or "skincare industry."¹⁰ Due to this alleged weakness, Applicant urges us to find that consumers will "look to the remaining elements of [the] mark"—like the term SKIN—to identify and distinguish the source of the goods.¹¹

This argument, however, is based entirely on the untimely evidence that Applicant submitted in its appeal brief.¹²But because we sustained the Examining Attorney's objection to this late-submitted evidence, there is no supporting evidence properly of record. We therefore find this factor to be neutral. See, e.g., Keystone Consol. Indus., Inc. v. Franklin Inv. Corp., No. 92066927, 2024 WL 3771168, at *17-

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18 (TTAB 2024) (holding that the sixth factor is neutral where there is no evidence of record to support a finding of weakness).¹³

III. Comparison of the marks

The only other likelihood-of-confusion factor Applicant addresses is the first du Pont factor: "[t]he similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties as to appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression." du Pont, 476 F.2d at 1361. Because the comparison of the marks is always an important inquiry, see, e.g., Herbko Int'l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 544 F.2d 1098, 1103 (CCPA 1976), we next set forth the parameters governing how we compare the marks. We assess marks on the basis of their "appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression." Juice Generation, Inc. v. GS Enters. LLC, 794 F.3d 1334, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citation omitted); accord i.am.symbolic, 866 F.3d at 1324. Similarity in all aspects is not required, however. This factor supports refusal "if the similarity in either form, spelling or sound alone is likely to cause confusion." Krim- Ko Corp. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 390 F.2d 728, 732 (CCPA 1968) (citation omitted); see also Hancock v. Am. Steel & Wire Co., 203 F.2d 737, 740 (CCPA 1953) ("it is proper

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to consider [the marks'] appearance, sound and meaning … but a combination of all three factors need not necessarily exist") (cleaned up; citations omitted). We do not compare the marks side-by-side, as though in a laboratory. Rather, we keep in mind both that consumers depend on their recollection of marks to which they've previously been exposed and that their memories are fallible. See, e.g., In re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 751 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Franklin Mint Corp. v. Master Mfg. Co., 667 F.2d 1005, 1007 (CCPA 1981).

While we compare marks in their entireties, see, e.g., Oakville Hills Cellar, Inc. v. Georgallis Holdings, LLC, 826 F.3d 1376, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2016), sometimes "one feature of a mark may be more significant than another, and it is not improper to give more weight to this dominant feature in determining the commercial impression created by the mark." Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citations omitted).

Finally, "[s]imilarity is not a binary factor but is a matter of degree." St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d at 752 (citation omitted). "The proper test is … whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression such that persons who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection between the parties." i.am.symbolic, 866 F.3d at 1323 (citation omitted); see also Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Knox Indus. Corp., 277 F.2d 945, 947 (CCPA 1960) ("The issue is whether the marks are confusingly similar, not whether they are identical.") (citation omitted).

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Here, the mark in the cited registration is MIXOLOGY in standard characters. Applicant's mark is THE SKIN MIXOLOGY, also in standard characters, and Applicant disclaimed any rights in the term SKIN after the Examining Attorney found that the term is merely descriptive as to Applicant's goods (skin care preparations).¹⁴Generally, words that do not inherently identify source due their descriptive nature play a lesser role in the commercial impression consumers take away from the mark as a whole. See, e.g., In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2018) ("[T]he non-source identifying nature of the words 'Co.' and 'Club' and the disclaimers thereof constitute rational reasons for giving those terms less weight in the analysis."); Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ("Given the descriptive nature of the disclaimed word 'Technologies,' the Board correctly found that the word 'Packard' is the dominant and distinguishing element of PACKARD TECHNOLOGIES."); see also Sabhnani v. Mirage Brands, LLC, No. 92068086, 2021 WL 6072822, at *18 (TTAB 2021) (observing the "penchant of consumers to shorten marks and drop the non-source- identifying word") (cleaned up; citations omitted). So while SKIN creates a visual and sound difference, we find it plays a relatively small role in the overall commercial impression of the mark THE SKIN MIXOLOGY. The dominant element in the mark—the element that drives its overall impression—is MIXOLOGY.

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Applicant resists this notion, arguing that, because it believes that the shared term (MIXOLOGY) is weak, consumers will indeed differentiate the marks based on the additional term SKIN in Applicant's mark.¹⁵Applicant's theory is that the term SKIN "materially anchors [its] mark in the field of skincare," but MIXOLOGY, appearing alone in the registered mark, has no skin care connotation.¹⁶The main problem with this argument is that, like Applicant's goods, the registrant's goods are in the skin care field, too. And we have to assess the connotation of the terms in marks in the context of the goods or services at issue. See, e.g., Presto Prods. Inc. v. Nice-Pak Prods. Inc., No. 91074797, 1988 WL 252340, at *3 (TTAB 1988) ("It is obvious … that the significance of a mark must be determined not in the abstract, but rather in relation to the goods or services to which it is applied, and the context in which it is used, because that is how the mark is encountered by purchasers.") (citations omitted); see also St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d at 751 (assessing connotation of the shared term in the context of the respective goods and services at issue); Coach Servs.,

668 F.3d 1356 at 1369 (same). So adding SKIN to the term MIXOLOGY wouldn't make the connotation of the registered mark different from that of the same term in Applicant's mark.¹⁷We note as well that Applicant's theory that MIXOLOGY has

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different connotation in the marks to consumers is unsupported by any evidence.¹⁸ See, e.g., Acomb v. Polywood Plastics Corp., No. 91054738, 1975 WL 21253, at *3 (TTAB 1975) ("Speculation and surmise is no substitute for evidence."); see also In re Finlay Fine Jewelry Corp., No. 74517872, 1996 WL 754046, at *3 (TTAB 1996) (rejecting the "unsupported hypothesis that only consumers on the east coast of the United States are likely to recognize NY [in the mark] as an abbreviation for New York").

Thus, while the marks are not identical, we find them to be very similar overall in that the term MIXOLOGY, which is the entirety of the registered mark, is the dominant element in creating the overall commercial impression of Applicant's mark.

IV. Comparison of the goods

The second likelihood-of-confusion factor assesses "[t]he similarity or dissimilarity and nature of the goods or services as described in an application or registration." du Pont, 476 F.2d at 1361. This, along with the comparison of the marks, is a key consideration. Federated Foods, 544 F.2d at 1103 ("The fundamental inquiry mandated by § 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods and differences in the marks."). The Examining Attorney argues that the goods are closely related.¹⁹Applicant's brief does not address this factor.

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We compare the goods or services as they are set forth in the application and cited registration, see, e.g., Detroit Athl., 903 F.3d at 1307; i.am.symbolic, 866 F.3d at 1325, focusing on how consumers perceive the respective goods/services. See, e.g., St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d at 752 (the second factor "considers whether the consuming public may perceive the respective goods and services of the parties as related enough to cause confusion about the source or origin of the goods and services") (cleaned up; citations omitted).

The first stop in any comparison of the goods/services is the identifications in the application and the registration. The application originally identified "Non-medicated skin care preparations" broadly and, as such, the Examining Attorney found that it encompassed the more narrowly-identified goods in the registration: "Custom- blended aromatherapy … body products, namely, creams, lotions, oils, massage oil, exfoliating body scrubs."²⁰That meant Applicant's goods, as originally identified, were legally identical in part to the goods in the cited registration for MIXOLOGY. See, e.g., Fat Boys, 2016 WL 3915986, at *10 ("Inasmuch as Registrant's goods are encompassed within the scope of Applicant's goods, the respective goods are legally identical in part."); In re Aquamar, Inc., No. 85861533, 2015 WL 4269973, at *4 (TTAB 2015) ("turning first to the goods and channels of trade, they are in part identical, as Applicant and Registrant both offer "frozen fish," and Registrant's "non- live fish" encompasses Applicant's fresh processed fish.").

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In response, Applicant amended the application to try to carve out the goods identified in the registration by limiting its non-medicated skin care preparations to

"facial and body moisturizers, serums, and toners" and adding the exclusionary language "none of the foregoing being custom-blended aromatherapy creams, lotions, oils, massage oils, or exfoliating body scrubs."²¹

Despite the amendment, we find that the goods identified in the application and the registration, as amended, still overlap. That's because, while the application might exclude "custom-blended aromatherapy" versions of skin-care moisturizers, the product category "moisturizers" in the amended application covers moisturizers in any physical form, including cream form, lotion form, and oil form, so long as they are not "custom-blended aromatherapy" versions of those products. And the evidence of record shows that other skin care companies offer moisturizers (as in the application) in the form of creams, lotions, and oils (as in the registration).²² Applicant does not point to any evidence in the record that the exclusion of

"custom-blended aromatherapy" versions of its products changes basic physical nature and moisturizing purpose of the products or renders them non-competitive with custom-blended aromatherapy versions. Nor does our review reveal any such

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evidence. Skin care products in the form of oils, lotions, and creams encompass moisturizers. Applicant's attempted carve-out of "custom-blended aromatherapy"

types of moisturizing products does not fully exclude non-custom-blended "creams, lotion, [and] oils" used to moisturize skin.

Beyond the legal identity in part of the respective identified goods, there is evidence that the goods are closely related. Specifically, the record contains evidence that several companies offer the goods identified in the application (facial and body moisturizers) and the goods identified in the cited registration (body creams, lotions, oils, and scrubs) under the same mark (sometimes combined in the same product).²³ This is evidence that consumers perceive the respective goods as related. See, e.g., Naterra Int'l, Inc. v. Bensalem, 92 F.4th 1113, 1117 (Fed. Cir. 2024); Detroit Athl.,

903 F.3d at 1306; Hewlett-Packard, 281 F.3d at 1267. The more consumers are exposed to companies offering good X and good Y under one mark, the more they tend to see those goods as related in the trademark sense (i.e., that they emanate from a single source).

We find that the goods are legally identical in part. At minimum, they are closely related.

V. Comparison of the channels of trade and classes of customers

Two more factors that can bear on whether confusion is likely are "[t]he similarity or dissimilarity of established, likely-to-continue trade channels" and "buyers to

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whom sales are made." du Pont, 476 F.2d at 1361; In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 1993) ("It is relevant to consider the degree of overlap of consumers exposed to the respective services … ."). Where goods and/or services are "deemed legally identical in part … , they must also be presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same classes of consumers." Nazon v. Ghiorse, No. 91216729, 2016 WL 3876810, at *9 (TTAB 2016) (citation omitted); accord Stone Lion Cap. Partners, L.P. v. Lion Cap. LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2014); In re Medline Indus., Inc., No. 87680078, 2020 WL 1485709, at *5 (TTAB 2020); In re Solid State Design Inc., No. 87269041, 2018 WL 287909, at *7 (TTAB 2018). This presumption is bolstered by the third-party use evidence discussed in the preceding subsection, which shows that several companies sell moisturizers and other creams, oils, lotions, and scrubs together on their skin care-product websites.

When it comes to the final weighing and balancing of the factors, these two factors, while typically not as important as similarities in the marks and goods, will lend additional support to a conclusion that confusion is likely.

VI. Weighing the findings on the relevant factors together

Having made findings on each of the relevant likelihood-of-confusion factors, our final step is to consider those findings together to determine if they indicate that confusion is likely. See, e.g., Charger Ventures, 64 F.4th at 1384. In this case, the marks are very similar and the goods are legally identical or, at bare minimum, closely related. These are two key confusion factors. See, e.g., Federated Foods, 544 F.2d at 1103 ("The fundamental inquiry mandated by § 2(d)

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goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods and differences in the marks."); In re Max Cap. Grp. Ltd., No. 77186166, 2010 WL 22358, at *1 (TTAB 2010) ("In any likelihood of confusion analysis, two key considerations are the similarities between the marks and the similarities between the goods and/or services.") (citations omitted). Here, these two key factors both support a conclusion that confusion is likely. Further, the classes of customers and trade channels overlap, further supporting a conclusion that confusion is likely. The sixth du Pont factor is neutral because there is no evidence properly of record to tip this factor in Applicant's favor. And no factor supports the opposite conclusion. On the record in this case, we have no difficulty concluding that confusion is likely as between the mark in the application and that in the cited registration. Thus, registration must be refused under Section 2(d) in view of Registration No. 3803922 for MIXOLOGY. Accordingly, there is no need to assess whether refusal is also appropriate in view of Registration No. 3816216 for the mark THE BATH MIXOLOGIST. See, e.g., Max Cap. Grp., 2010 WL 22358, at *7.

Decision: We affirm the refusal.