O R D E R
Emilio Padilla, a Wisconsin prisoner, challenges the dismissal of his suit alleging that a correctional officer failed to timely send him to the health services unit for flu-like symptoms, in violation of his rights under the Eighth Amendment. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. * The appellee was not served with process and is not participating in this appeal. We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the brief and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
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The magistrate judge dismissed Padilla's complaint for failure to state a claim. We affirm.
According to the allegations in Padilla's complaint, which we take as true at the pleading stage, see Schillinger v. Kiley, 954 F.3d 990, 994 (7th Cir. 2020), he began experiencing a fever, shakes, and chills one morning in December 2023. Padilla, confined at the Racine Correctional Institution, complained of these symptoms to correctional officer Matthew Taskonis and asked to be sent to the health services unit. Taskonis instead instructed Padilla on how to complete a health services request form, which Padilla completed and submitted. Around 24 hours later, Padilla was called to the health services unit and examined by medical staff. A nurse, finding that he had a mild fever and cloudy urine sample, sent him to the hospital. There, he was diagnosed with a blood infection and sepsis.
Padilla later brought this § 1983 suit raising Eighth Amendment claims against Taskonis. He alleged that Taskonis deliberately prolonged his pain by not sending him sooner to the health services unit in circumstances that were obviously a medical emergency.
A magistrate judge, presiding with Padilla's consent, screened the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and dismissed it for failure to state a claim. The judge explained that although delays in treatment may amount to deliberate indifference where the delay prolonged a prisoner's pain, Padilla's alleged symptoms—a fever, shakes, and chills—were not so serious that Taskonis would have known that Padilla had sepsis or another condition requiring emergency treatment. Moreover, Padilla failed to allege that he suffered any injury because of Taskonis's actions or that his pain was unnecessarily prolonged. Finally, the judge concluded that allowing Padilla to amend the complaint would be futile because the complaint was thorough in its recitation of the facts and it could not be salvaged by additional allegations. Padilla then submitted several post-judgment filings, including two proposed amended complaints that did not include accompanying motions for leave to amend. Later, Padilla moved for leave to file a third amended complaint, but the judge denied the motion because the case was closed and Padilla had not filed a valid motion for reconsideration.
On appeal, Padilla first challenges the magistrate judge's conclusion that it would have been futile to allow him to amend his complaint. He emphasizes that
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plaintiffs are generally entitled to amend their complaint once as a matter of right, FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a), and that his pro se status afforded him additional dispensation. But Padilla does not engage with the judge's determination regarding the futility of amendment. He continues to recount the nature of his symptoms but does not hint at how additional allegations of this sort would support a claim under the Eighth Amendment. We agree with the magistrate judge that further allegations would not enable Padilla to state a claim. See O'Boyle v. Real Time Resols., Inc., 910 F.3d 338, 346-47 (7th Cir. 2018).
Padilla also contends that the magistrate judge failed to consider the proposed amended complaint that he filed after the case was dismissed. But we see no abuse of discretion. "Once final judgment has been entered in a case, 'the district court lacks jurisdiction to entertain a motion for leave to amend the complaint unless the plaintiff also moves for relief from the judgment.'" See Foster v. DeLuca, 545 F.3d 582, 584 (7th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). Here, Padilla did not move for leave to amend until more than six months after the final judgment issued and even then did not formally seek post-judgment relief under Rule 59(e) or 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
We have considered Padilla's other arguments, and none requires discussion.
AFFIRMED
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