James Kruger v. Tristan Retzlaff

We take the following facts from the evidence presented at summary judgment, drawing reasonable inferences in favor of Kruger, the non-moving party. Lisle v. Welborn, 933 F.3d 705, 716 (7th Cir. 2019). Between April 2017 and September 2018, Kruger was incarcerated at Green Bay Correctional Institution and was at various times in its restricted housing unit (RHU). In his verified complaint, Kruger alleged generally that during mealtimes in the RHU, correctional officers would verbally harass him by making comments like, "Eat your poison," and "Don't you want your poison?" when handing him his food tray.

Kruger alleged only two specific instances of harassment. First, on September 29, 2017, he alleged that while responding to an incident in his cell, Officer Suzanne Stank told him, "We are giving you strychnine," and that Officer Alejandra Meija told him that he would "be dead soon." Second, Kruger alleged that on July 10, 2018, Officer Tristan Retzlaff handed Kruger his lunch tray and said, "I thought you didn't eat this poison." Kruger also alleged that Retzlaff verbally harassed him throughout his time in the RHU and Officer Joshua Gomm threatened him during mealtimes in the RHU, but Kruger did not provide specific dates. Kruger alleged that, because of the officers' harassment, he feared eating his food, did not eat for 42 days, and lost 130 pounds. Kruger sued Gomm, Stank, Meija, and Retzlaff for violating the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court screened the complaint and permitted Kruger to proceed on his constitutional claims that officers verbally harassed him in violation of the Eighth Amendment. A magistrate judge then entered a scheduling order that advised Kruger that he must follow court rules and included the text of Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Local Rule 56, and Local Rule 7. Relevant here, Rule 56(c) requires that assertions made in opposition to a motion for summary judgment must be supported with citations to "particular parts of materials in the record." F ED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1)(A); see also E.D. W IS. CIV. L.R. 56(b)(2) (requiring references to parts of the record). And Local Rule 7 requires parties to file a motion requesting leave to file any papers not otherwise authorized by the federal or local rules. E.D. WIS. CIV. L.R. 7(i). The defendants moved for summary judgment. The officers denied making any of the alleged statements to Kruger. Although Meija and Retzlaff were at work on the dates of the alleged harassment, Meija did not respond to the incident in Kruger's cell on September 29, where the alleged comment was made, and Retzlaff denied making the comment on July 10. Stank was on vacation both days. They argued that Kruger suffered from a host of mental health conditions, including paranoid delusions, and that he had been diagnosed as a pathological liar. Defendants' exhibits included Kruger's psychological and health records, an incident report from September 29, 2017, and a

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declaration from a psychologist employed by the Wisconsin Department of Corrections. The psychologist explained that examining providers had not reached a consensus as to Kruger's diagnosis.

Kruger opposed the motion and reasserted that the officers poisoned his food and harassed him. He submitted psychological services requests reflecting his fear that he was being poisoned and reporting physical symptoms of poisoning, medication changes, and thoughts of self-harm. Because Kruger's complaint was verified, it could be construed as an affidavit to which the district court could look for Kruger's assertion of the evidence. Ford v. Wilson, 90 F.3d 245, 247 (7th Cir. 1996). But once the defendants came forward with their own evidence contradicting Kruger's claims, Kruger was required to—but did not—identify specific facts in the record demonstrating that there remained a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,

324 (1986).

Kruger did submit a flash drive containing a video of the September 29 incident. He insisted that the video was edited, though he did not say by whom, and stated that the video is available online.^†The video shows prison employees removing Kruger from his cell and transporting him to the health services unit (HSU). While Kruger recounts several alleged instances of recent poisoning, including a "muffin of death"

that contained cyanide and other food tainted by hemlock, officers remind him that he was not poisoned. Once he arrives at the HSU, Kruger tells the nurse that he has been poisoned. She examines him and medically clears him.

After the defendants filed a reply, the court granted Kruger leave to file a sur- reply. Kruger later submitted additional materials but did not seek leave to do so. A magistrate judge, proceeding with the parties' consent under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), entered summary judgment for the defendants. The court first determined that it would not consider the materials Kruger filed after his sur-reply or the exhibits attached to his opposition because they did not comply with local rules. See E.D. W^IS. CIV. L.R. 7(i), 56(b)(2). The court did, however, consider the video from September 29 and concluded that it established only Kruger's belief that he was poisoned, not that any defendant harassed him. Moreover, after the defendants came forward with sworn statements that they were not at the prison or not involved in the events on September 29 or July 10, Kruger failed to present evidence contradicting the defendants' evidence. Finally, the district court concluded that Kruger's other vague allegations of † Video posted by @JamesKruger9091, YOUTUBE, James Kruger (July 21, 2019), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CWAzPxfExYI (last visited Aug. 11, 2026).

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poisoning were insufficient for a jury to conclude that the defendants violated his constitutional rights.

On appeal, Kruger first argues that the court erred by failing to consider all of the materials he submitted, including those filed after his sur-reply. We review the decision of a district court to enforce its local rules for abuse of discretion. See McDaniel v. Syed,

115 F.4th 805, 814 (7th Cir. 2024). We give substantial deference to a district court's decision to strictly enforce local rules, even against pro se litigants. See McCurry v. Kenco Logistics Servs., LLC, 942 F.3d 783, 787 & n.2 (7th Cir. 2019).

We see no abuse of discretion here. The court's scheduling order identified the relevant local and federal rules of procedure and advised Kruger that he must comply with them. Kruger did not follow Local Rule 7(i) when he filed materials after his sur- reply. Kruger's submissions were "papers … not authorized by" the federal or local rules, so he was required to file a motion seeking leave to file them, and he did not. The district court also acted within its discretion to disregard allegations in Kruger's opposition to summary judgment that were not supported by citations to the record, as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)(1)(A) and Local Rule 56(b)(2). Moreover, on appeal, Kruger does not point to any specific exhibit or document that the district court overlooked that would support his allegations. Kruger next insists that the video corroborates his allegation that officers harassed him on September 29, 2017. "The Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishments that involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain." Lisle,

933 F.3d at 716. Verbal harassment may rise to the level of a constitutional violation in extreme cases. Id. at 718. To survive summary judgment, Kruger needed to present evidence from which a jury could conclude that the officers exploited a known vulnerability to cause him psychological anguish. Id. at 719.

We agree with the court's assessment that the video does not support Kruger's allegations. The video is evidence only that Kruger believed he was poisoned by food containing strychnine and was suffering symptoms like numbness in his legs. Though it is undisputed that Kruger believes his food was being poisoned, without more record evidence from Kruger, a reasonable jury could not conclude that defendants caused or exploited that belief by telling him his food was poisoned. See Lisle, 933 F.3d at 718. Moreover, the video, along with the corresponding incident report, confirms that the employees involved that day were not the named defendants, so the video cannot be evidence of the defendants' harassment of or cruelty toward Kruger. Next, the district court concluded correctly that Kruger's general allegations of harassment were not specific enough to thwart summary judgment. Kruger did not

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provide additional sworn statements or other evidence to support his allegations of harassment on unknown days, and he did not name any other defendants who may have harassed him. Though Kruger's general allegations were sufficient to survive screening, see Diedrich v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 839 F.3d 583, 588 (7th Cir. 2016), at summary judgment, "generalized and unsupported allegations cannot create a genuine dispute." Anderson v. Mott Street, 104 F.4th 646, 651 (7th Cir. 2024). Finally, we recognize that Kruger disputes the defendants' assertions that he is a pathological liar or is taking certain medications for his mental health conditions. But the district court's reasoning properly did not depend on resolving this dispute, so we do not address it further.

AFFIRMED

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