O R D E R
In 2023, Washington sued several law firms, attorneys from those firms, the City of Chicago, city departments, and city employees alleging that they violated her constitutional rights related to a 2014 car accident and subsequent state-court lawsuit. See 42 U.S.C §§ 1983, 1985, 1986. The district court dismissed her claims because they * We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. APP. P. 32.1
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were not timely. For her part, Washington contends that her claims are timely under various accrual and tolling doctrines. We disagree and affirm. We accept as true the factual allegations in Washington's amended complaint and briefs in opposition to the motions to dismiss, drawing all reasonable inferences in her favor and liberally construing her pro se complaint. See Wilson v. Castaneda,
143 F.4th 814, 817 (7th Cir. 2025); Smith v. Dart, 803 F.3d 304, 311 (7th Cir. 2015). In August 2014, Washington's two minor sons and their friend were involved in a car accident that left them seriously injured. On behalf of her children and represented by the law firm Corboy & Demetrio, she filed a suit in the Circuit Court of Cook County against the two occupants of the other car involved in the accident. Her sons' friend filed a separate lawsuit against the same defendants.
In the present lawsuit, Washington claims that Corboy & Demetrio did not let her participate in court proceedings and failed to update her on key developments. In December 2014, the attorneys for her sons' friend moved to consolidate the two cases without Washington's knowledge. Washington's attorneys then permitted that firm and other firms to represent her without her knowledge or consent. In April 2017, Corboy & Demetrio told Washington that they were withdrawing from the case. She alleged that she searched for years afterward to find new counsel but was forced to proceed pro se. Washington's dealings with the City of Chicago in the years following the accident also caused her emotional distress. Shortly after the accident, Washington read in the news that the car that caused the accident was fleeing Chicago police, but the police denied that a chase occurred. During criminal proceedings against the driver, the Cook County State's Attorney invited her sons' friend to attend a hearing but did not extend a similar offer to Washington or to her sons. And in June 2017, in response to Washington's request for documents under the Freedom of Information Act, a city employee mistakenly expressed condolences for the loss of Washington's sons and sent her a morgue report, even though her children had survived.
After Washington filed this federal lawsuit, the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint as untimely. Washington amended her complaint and responded to the motions to dismiss. She argued that the statute of limitations was tolled because she was under a legal disability when her claims accrued and because the private defendants fraudulently concealed material facts by consolidating the state-court lawsuit without her knowledge. She also said that the private defendants had denied her access to the courts and violated her rights to due process and equal protection, see id. § 1985(2), in part because she is Black.
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The district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice after finding that it was untimely, noting that Washington's allegations concerned events that took place between 2014 and 2017, well outside the applicable statutes of limitations. It also concluded that she had forfeited her argument that she was legally disabled and, in any event, that she had not offered a reason to believe that her purported disability would justify tolling. Lastly, the court determined that the state-court filings in the public record were not concealed, and Washington's pleadings established that she was aware of any purported concealment by 2017.
On appeal, Washington reprises her arguments that her claims are timely. First, she argues that her claims did not accrue until after 2017. Alternatively, she contends that the statute of limitations should be tolled because she was legally disabled and because the private defendants fraudulently concealed her cause of action. Dismissal under the statute of limitations is proper only if the allegations in Washington's complaint clearly establish that her claims are untimely. See Cielak v. Nicolet Union High Sch. Dist., 112 F.4th 472, 477 (7th Cir. 2024). Under federal law, a claim accrues when the plaintiff "knows the fact and the cause of an injury." Id. (quoting Amin Ijbara Equity Corp. v. Village of Oak Lawn, 860 F.3d 489, 493 (7th Cir. 2017)). A claim under § 1986 must be brought within a year of accrual, see 42 U.S.C. § 1986, but claims under § 1983 and § 1985 borrow the statute of limitations for personal-injury actions in the state in which the cause of action arose, see Cielak, 112 F.4th at 477. Illinois law allows two years to bring such a claim. 735 ILCS 5/13-202.
Washington's claims accrued—at the latest—in 2017, six years before she filed her suit in federal court. Washington admits that she discovered irregularities in her state-court proceedings in 2017. She also alleges that she learned that the Chicago police were involved within days of the 2014 car accident. Washington counters that her claims did not accrue until she realized the legal significance of her injuries. But even if Washington did not realize until later that the defendants' conduct was unlawful, her
"ignorance of [her] legal rights does not affect the accrual of [her] claim[s] for statute of limitations purposes." Tobey v. Chibucos, 890 F.3d 634, 646 (7th Cir. 2018). The district court concluded correctly that Washington failed to plausibly allege that the statute of limitations should be tolled because she was under a legal disability. In Illinois, a plaintiff who is under a legal disability when her action accrues may bring the action up to two years after the disability is removed, or if the legal disability arose after the injury but before the limitation period expired, the period is stayed until the disability is removed. See 735 ILCS 5/13-211. For tolling purposes, a person is legally
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disabled only if her disability renders her "entirely without understanding or capacity to make or communicate decisions regarding [her] person and totally unable to manage [her] estate or financial affairs." In re Doe, 703 N.E.2d 413, 416 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998). Although Washington alleges that she had an unspecified mental-health impairment, her pleadings establish that her disability does not meet the high bar set by Illinois law. Throughout the limitations period, she communicated with her lawyers, filed FOIA requests, and represented herself in state court. Washington urges that the extent of her disability can only be established through discovery, but dismissal is appropriate where—as here—the plaintiff pleads herself out of court and the complaint "plainly reveal[s] that the action is untimely." Cielak, 112 F.4th at 478 (quoting Chi. Bldg. Design, P.C. v. Mongolian House, Inc., 770 F.3d 610, 614 (7th Cir. 2014) (alteration in original)). Washington's fraudulent concealment argument similarly fails. Illinois's fraudulent concealment statute tolls the limitations period for five years after the discovery of a cause of action "if a person liable to an action fraudulently conceals the cause of such action from the knowledge of the person entitled thereto." 735 ILCS 5/13-215. A fiduciary's silence regarding the facts giving rise to a cause of action may amount to fraudulent concealment. Doe v. Boy Scouts of Am., 66 N.E.3d 433, 456 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016). But even if we assume that the statute applies to Washington's claims, her lawsuit is untimely. She discovered that she had a cause of action in 2017 but did not bring her claims until 2023—one year after the tolling period expired. Lastly, Washington argues that the district court abused its discretion by dismissing her complaint with prejudice and without a chance to cure its deficiencies. But when the defendants moved to dismiss Washington's original complaint, the court permitted Washington to amend it and respond to the motions to dismiss. If that were not sufficient opportunity to address the shortcomings raised by the defendants, Washington could have moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) or 60(b) for another chance to amend or explained on appeal which allegations she would include in a second amended complaint. See Cielak, 112 F.4th at 481. She did not, so we see no reason to doubt the district court's finding that any amendment would be futile.
AFFIRMED
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