Logan Dyjak v. Melanie Kluzek

confinement and violated Dyjak's rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments by refusing to provide a nutritious, kosher diet. We affirm.¹

I.

We construe all facts and draw all reasonable inferences in Dyjak's favor, as the non-moving party. See Lee v. Milwaukee Cnty., 175 F.4th 877, 881 (7th Cir. 2026). Dyjak was transferred to McFarland in August 2018. Shortly after arriving, Dyjak began meeting with Melanie Kluzek, a licensed registered dietician who worked at McFarland. At their first meeting, Dyjak told Kluzek that Dyjak "tried to be 'orthodox kosher' as much as possible," and preferred to avoid eggs and dairy but would eat dairy if necessary to ensure adequate nutrition. Dyjak also expressed concern that McFarland's kosher entrees would be insufficiently nutritious. Dyjak had lost significant weight and experienced nutrient deficiencies at Dyjak's previous hospital, so Kluzek and Dyjak agreed that a high-calorie, high-protein vegan diet would be best, supplemented by snacks and additional beans and tofu at meals. Kluzek later attested that the diet was calculated to meet or exceed nutritional standards developed by the federal government.

Over the next several months, Dyjak requested multiple changes to the diet. At a meeting in September 2018, Dyjak informed Kluzek that the cafeteria was sometimes out of vegan options, and the two agreed that a vegetarian, high-calorie, high-protein diet would better accommodate Dyjak's dietary needs and preferences. When Dyjak expressed interest in eating fish, Kluzek informed Dyjak that the hospital could not guarantee that the fish was kosher, so Dyjak agreed to seek a vegan alternative when fish was on the menu. After one meeting in September, Kluzek noted that Dyjak had restrictive eating habits and that Dyjak's request for a kosher diet "doesn't appear to be [due to] religious preference."

Dyjak displayed other restrictive eating behaviors. In October 2018, Dyjak reported to Kluzek that they believed the soy products in the vegetarian diet were making them ill, so Dyjak had stopped eating foods with soy. Kluzek advised that eliminating soy would significantly restrict Dyjak's calories, protein, and nutrients.

2

Over the coming months, Dyjak refused other foods. In response, Kluzek recommended in March 2019 that Dyjak be given the dietary supplement Ensure twice a day. Kluzek stopped working as McFarland's dietician soon after.

Meanwhile, the cafeteria sometimes ran out of Dyjak's prescribed meals and began restricting the number of snacks Dyjak was given following a hospital-wide policy change. Dana Wilkerson was McFarland's hospital administrator when the policy was announced. In early 2020, problems with food availability worsened. McFarland closed its cafeteria because of the Covid-19 pandemic, and Dyjak reported that their meals often lacked components of the prescribed diet. During this time, Dana Carlson, McFarland's dietary manager, was responsible for ordering food. Dyjak began buying food from outside McFarland, including kosher entrees and nutritional supplements, but hospital staff confiscated some of the food pursuant to a policy that banned certain aluminum and foil products as contraband. Dyjak filed a grievance. Lana Miller, McFarland's new hospital administrator, responded to Dyjak's grievance, explaining that the policy prohibited the packaging used for some—but not all—of the food.

Dyjak sued Kluzek, Wilkerson, Carlson, and Miller, bringing two claims under

42 U.S.C. § 1983. First, Dyjak alleged that their conditions of confinement—specifically an inadequate diet—violated Dyjak's right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. Second, Dyjak alleged that the defendants' refusal to provide a kosher diet violated their right to free exercise of religion under the First Amendment. During discovery, the district court granted Dyjak's motion to compel production of documents related to McFarland's nutritional spreadsheets and food expenditures. When the defendants did not produce all the requested documents, Dyjak moved for sanctions. The district court determined that sanctions were not appropriate but ordered the defendants to respond. The defendants produced some of the requested documents and explained that others no longer existed.

The defendants moved for summary judgment, contending that Kluzek was not deliberately indifferent to Dyjak's conditions of confinement and that Wilkerson, Carlson, and Miller were not personally involved in managing the diet. The defendants also argued that there was no evidence that Dyjak's request for a kosher diet was due to a sincere religious belief, and the defendants had not burdened any of Dyjak's beliefs because Dyjak agreed to accept a vegetarian diet in lieu of a kosher diet. Alternatively, the defendants raised qualified immunity. Dyjak responded with a declaration of

3

religious beliefs, explaining that a kosher diet was necessary to prevent spiritual uncleanliness.

The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants. The court first concluded that there was no record evidence that Miller, Wilkerson, or Carlson were personally involved in providing Dyjak's diet and could not be subject to liability under § 1983. And although Kluzek was responsible for monitoring Dyjak's diet, the court concluded that there was no evidence that Kluzek responded unreasonably. As for Dyjak's First Amendment claims, the court concluded that the defendants could not have reasonably understood Dyjak's requests for a kosher diet to be related to a sincerely held religious belief.

After the Illinois Department of Human Services moved for an award of costs under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1), the district court amended the judgment to award $292.05 in costs. Dyjak separately appealed both the award of summary judgment and the award of costs.

II.

A.

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees civil and pretrial detainees their "basic human needs," including "food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable safety." Hardeman v. Curran, 933 F.3d 816, 825 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989)); see also Echols v. Johnson, 105 F.4th 973, 977 (7th Cir. 2024) (civil detainees, like pretrial detainees, have a protected liberty interest in reasonably safe conditions of confinement). Like similar claims brought by prisoners under the Eighth Amendment, we look to both the objective seriousness of the detainee's conditions of confinement and the officer's response to those conditions. See Hardeman, 933 F.3d at 821-22. Unlike an Eighth Amendment claim, a detainee's due-process claim turns on the objective reasonableness of the officer's intended conduct, not the officer's subjective awareness of risk or intent to punish.²See Pittman v. Madison Cnty., 108 F.4th 561,

4

571-72 (7th Cir. 2024) (relying on Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389 (2015)), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1154 (2025). An officer's conduct is objectively unreasonable if it is not rationally related to a legitimate, nonpunitive governmental purpose or if it is excessive in relation to that purpose. Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 398. An officer's response is also objectively unreasonable if, from the perspective of a reasonable officer, it is insufficient to abate a risk of serious harm. Lee, 175 F.4th at 885. Here, the defendants do not address Dyjak's conditions of confinement, so we consider only the objective reasonableness of the defendants' conduct.

Dyjak contends that Kluzek's response to the inadequacies of Dyjak's diet was objectively unreasonable. But Kluzek recommended a high-calorie, high-protein diet to avoid the weight loss and nutritional deficits that Dyjak had experienced in the past, adjusted the diet when Dyjak requested access to more foods, warned Dyjak of the consequences of restricting Dyjak's diet against medical advice, and prescribed a dietary supplement when she learned that Dyjak was restricting their food intake anyway. On this record, a jury could not conclude that Kluzek's response was objectively unreasonable. See Williams v. Ortiz, 937 F.3d 936, 943 (7th Cir. 2019) (officials not objectively unreasonable when they repeatedly modified treatment plan to address detainee's complaints even if they did not accommodate each request). Dyjak next argues that the district court overlooked evidence that Miller, Wilkerson, and Carlson denied Dyjak a nutritious diet. Liability under § 1983 requires the defendant to be personally responsible for the asserted deprivation. Zemlick v. Burkhart, 164 F.4th 1004, 1011 (7th Cir. 2026). Carlson was responsible for ordering food and planning menus, but Dyjak adduced no evidence that she was responsible for any problems with McFarland's food supply in early 2020. Likewise, Dyjak did not present evidence that the hospital administrators Wilkerson or Miller were personally responsible for any deficiencies. Supervisory officers face liability if they "know about the conduct and facilitate it, approve it, condone it, or turn a blind eye for fear of what they might see." Id. (citation omitted). But both Wilkerson and Miller asserted that they believed that Dyjak's diet was nutritionally sound because McFarland's dieticians Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 396 (2015) (suggesting officer would not be liable for excessive force if Taser discharged accidentally).

5

followed federal dietary guidelines, and nonmedical officials are entitled to rely on the expertise of medical staff. See id. at 1012.

B.

We turn next to Dyjak's claim that the defendants violated Dyjak's right to free exercise by failing to provide a sufficiently nutritious kosher diet. Dyjak contends that there is a genuine dispute of material fact regarding the sincerity of Dyjak's beliefs and that the defendants burdened those beliefs when Kluzek denied Dyjak an adequate kosher diet, Carlson and Wilkerson restricted access to kosher snacks, and Miller confiscated meals ordered from outside McFarland. To prevail, Dyjak must come forward with evidence "that the defendants personally and unjustifiably placed a substantial burden on [their] religious practices." Thompson v. Holm, 809 F.3d 376, 379 (7th Cir. 2016).

Kluzek contends that even if genuine disputes of material fact remain, she is protected by qualified immunity. Officers are entitled to qualified immunity "unless (1) they violated a federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the unlawfulness of their conduct was clearly established at the time." District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 62-63 (2018) (citation modified). The law must be "sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would understand that what he is doing is unlawful." Id. at 63 (citation modified).

"We have repeatedly held that forcing an inmate to choose between daily nutrition and religious practice is a substantial burden." Thompson, 809 F.3d at 380. But only sincerely held religious beliefs must be accommodated. Vinning-El v. Evans,

657 F.3d 591, 593 (7th Cir. 2011). Officials may ensure that there is a genuine religious belief underlying a request for a specific diet, "rather than a preference for the way a given diet tastes, a belief that the preferred diet is less painful for animals, or a prisoner's desire to make a pest of himself and cause trouble for his captors." Id. at 594. A defendant who believes the plaintiff's request for a religious diet is insincere would be entitled to qualified immunity. Id.

Here, Kluzek noted that she did not believe Dyjak had a religious motivation for requesting a kosher diet but that Dyjak had restrictive eating habits. Moreover, Dyjak agreed with Kluzek that a vegetarian or vegan diet was the best way to accommodate Dyjak's various preferences, including for a kosher diet. Given what the record reveals about Dyjak's conversations with Kluzek, we cannot say that every reasonable officer

6

would have understood herself to be placing a substantial burden on Dyjak's sincerely held religious beliefs.

Moreover, there is no evidence in the record that Wilkerson, Carlson, or Miller were personally responsible for denying Dyjak a kosher diet. See Vinning-El, 657 F.3d at 592 (warden not liable where there was no suggestion that he "made or ratified" any decisions about the prisoner's diet). Dyjak also suggests that Miller was personally responsible for confiscating Dyjak's kosher meals, but the evidence in the record indicates only that she responded to Dyjak's grievance, not that she decided to enforce the policy against Dyjak.

C.

We turn to Dyjak's remaining arguments related to discovery sanctions and the award of costs. Dyjak first argues that the district court was required to award reasonable expenses incurred when Dyjak moved to compel discovery and abused its discretion in failing to award sanctions. If a motion to compel is granted, "the court must, after giving an opportunity to be heard" require the other party to "pay the movant's reasonable expenses incurred in making the motion, including attorney's fees." F ED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(5)(A). The court may also order reasonable expenses and attorney's fees as a sanction for disobeying a discovery order. See id. 37(b)(2)(C). But Dyjak has not identified any expenses incurred—other than time spent preparing the motion as a pro se litigant—or which other sanctions would have been appropriate, so we cannot say that the district court erred.

Dyjak also contests the district court's award of costs to the defendants, a decision we review for abuse of discretion.³See Lange v. City of Oconto, 28 F.4th 825, 845 (7th Cir. 2022). Dyjak contends that the defendants were barred from receiving costs by a settlement agreement in a previous case. In that settlement, the Illinois Department of Human Services agreed not to recover the costs of confinement or services relating to Dyjak's confinement from the settlement proceeds. On appeal, Dyjak asserts that the settlement means that Dyjak cannot be required to pay money to the Department. But

7

nothing in the agreement prevents the Department from pursuing costs of litigating future cases against Dyjak, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding costs.

AFFIRMED

8