Stanley Boclair v. Anthony Wills

Correctional Center. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants, and we affirm.

We recount the facts in the light most favorable to Boclair and draw all reasonable inferences in his favor. See Riley v. Waterman, 126 F.4th 1287, 1295 (7th Cir. 2025). Boclair developed a rash in the fall of 2020. He visited a nurse on November 18, 2020, who instructed him to apply hydrocortisone cream. Boclair visited sick call six additional times between November 24 and December 19. None of the notes from those visits mention the rash.

On December 23, Boclair visited the nurse again. The nurse noted that the rash had been present for six weeks and that Boclair was treating it with hydrocortisone cream. Boclair said that during the visit the nurse referred him to a doctor. In the progress note, however, the nurse circled "MD Referral if: [second nurse sick call]" in the "plans" section and wrote "none" under "MD Referral" in the "objective" notes section.

On January 14, 2021, Boclair showed the rash to his psychiatrist. In her progress notes, the psychiatrist noted that Boclair needed a medical referral for his worsening skin condition. Boclair attested that during this visit, his psychiatrist texted Angela Crain, the Health Care Unit Administrator, about his skin condition. Crain attested that she first learned of Boclair's condition three days later, on January 17. Boclair said that he needed Crain's approval to see an off-site dermatologist, but Crain attested that she did not make or approve outside referrals.

Boclair filed an emergency grievance on January 19, stating that Crain delayed medical treatment for his rash because of a lawsuit he filed against her. Anthony Wills, the Chief Administrative Officer, returned the grievance to Boclair on February 26, stating there was no emergency. Boclair says that he attempted to resubmit the grievance, but his counselor, Heather Price, destroyed it.

In early February, Boclair showed another prison official his rash during a daily COVID wellness check. The official told Boclair that he notified Crain that Boclair needed medical treatment.

A week later, Boclair saw Wills during another wellness check. Boclair showed Wills the rashes on his arms. Wills did not respond.

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Boclair saw a nurse again on February 19, and the nurse noticed scabbing on his arms, hands, and legs. Boclair reported a pain level of 7 or 8 out of 10, noting that the rubbing of his clothing irritated his skin. Boclair told the nurse that the hydrocortisone cream was ineffective and asked to see a doctor. In the progress note, the nurse circled

"MD Referral" under the "plans" section. On March 12, a nurse ordered a biopsy of dark, scaly patches on Boclair's skin and provided Boclair with a steroid-based ointment. The biopsy was consistent with eczema. Boclair received a referral to a dermatologist in July and saw the dermatologist in January 2022.

Boclair sued Crain, Price, Wills, and Rob Jeffreys, who was then the Director of the Illinois Department of Corrections. Boclair alleged that Crain, Price, and Wills violated the First Amendment by delaying his medical treatment in retaliation for a lawsuit and grievances he filed against them and that all defendants violated the Eighth Amendment by delaying medical treatment for his eczema from December 23, 2020, to March 12, 2021.¹

After a year of discovery, the district court issued a scheduling order setting a deadline of May 1, 2024, for the filing of any dispositive motion. On April 29, the defendants filed a motion for a three-week extension of the deadline because their lead attorney was sick. The court granted the motion the same day. Boclair challenged the court's ruling, but the court explained that counsel's illness was good cause for the extension, the ruling did not prejudice Boclair because no other deadlines or a trial date had yet been set, and Boclair had received several extensions of time for other filings. The defendants then moved for summary judgment, and the district court granted the motion. The court first determined that Boclair did not provide any direct or circumstantial evidence to support his First Amendment claim. On the Eighth Amendment claim, the court concluded that while eczema was a serious medical condition, the defendants were not deliberately indifferent to it because Boclair met

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with nurses multiple times and received treatments for his rash. The court continued that the defendants were not medical professionals, so they were allowed to rely on the treatment provided by the nurses.

On appeal, Boclair first argues that the court erred by extending the defendants' deadline for filing dispositive motions. Boclair states that there was not good cause to grant the motion because, despite lead counsel's illness, the defendants had two other attorneys who could have filed a dispositive motion.

We see no error. A district court may modify a scheduling order for good cause. F ED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(4). "The central consideration in assessing whether good cause exists is the diligence of the party seeking to" modify the scheduling order. Allen v. Brown Advisory, LLC, 41 F.4th 843, 852-53 (7th Cir. 2022). We review the court's ruling for abuse of discretion. See Blue v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 698 F.3d 587, 593 (7th Cir. 2012). Here, the court acted within its discretion when concluding that the defendants demonstrated good cause by acting diligently: they filed the motion to extend before the deadline expired, explained that the lead attorney was sick, and requested only a three-week extension. See Wheatley v. Factory Card & Party Outlet,

826 F.3d 412, 417 (7th Cir. 2016). Boclair argues that the court's ruling prejudiced him and reflected the court's bias against him. But the court's ruling on its own does not constitute proof of bias. See United States v. Martin, 21 F.4th 944, 945 (7th Cir. 2021). And Boclair does not explain how the three-week extension hindered his ability to respond to the motion for summary judgment or otherwise pursue his claims. Boclair next argues that the district court overlooked a material dispute of fact about whether Crain, Price, and Wills were deliberately indifferent by delaying treatment for his rash.²To defeat a motion for summary judgment as to his Eighth Amendment claim, Boclair must present evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that he suffered from an objectively serious medical condition and that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to it. Wilson v. Adams, 901 F.3d 816, 820 (7th Cir. 2018). Prison officials are deliberately indifferent if they actually "kn[o]w of and disregard[] a substantial risk of harm." McDaniel v. Syed, 115 F.4th 805, 832 (7th Cir. 2024) (quoting Petties v. Carter, 836 F.3d 722, 728 (7th Cir. 2016) (en banc)).

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Boclair asserts that the progress note from his December 23 visit reflects that the nurse referred him to a dermatologist, and that Crain knew about this referral but failed to act. We disagree. First, the progress note is ambiguous about whether the nurse intended to refer Boclair to an outside specialist. More importantly, Boclair admitted that Crain did not learn about his need for treatment until January 14. And he did not present any evidence disputing Crain's testimony that she did not have the authority to facilitate or approve off-site referrals during the relevant period. Moreover, by the time Crain learned of Boclair's condition in January, he was receiving ongoing treatment for his rash, and the progress notes did not reflect an obvious need for a specialist to intervene. See Pyles v. Fahim, 771 F.3d 403, 412 (7th Cir. 2014). Boclair next argues that the district court concluded incorrectly that Wills and Price were not deliberately indifferent when they learned about his rash but failed to act. Non-medical defendants are deliberately indifferent only where they have actual knowledge or reason to believe that medical professionals are mistreating or not providing treatment to an inmate. Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 755 (7th Cir. 2011). Boclair says that Wills should have intervened after Boclair filed his emergency grievance in January and again after Wills saw Boclair during the wellness check in February. As for Price, Boclair reasserts that she prevented him from resubmitting his emergency grievance in January. But Wills's and Price's knowledge of Boclair's rash alone is not sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude they were deliberately indifferent for failing to take corrective action. See id. at 756. To be sure, Boclair's testimony reflects that Wills and Price knew that Boclair had a rash and was requesting treatment. But he was seen by a nurse twice in February, and then again in March when the biopsy was performed. Nothing in the record suggests that Boclair's condition required immediate or emergency care or that Wills and Price should have intervened to secure additional medical treatment. See Holloway v. Delaware Cnty. Sheriff, 700 F.3d 1063, 1073 (7th Cir. 2012).

We have considered Boclair's remaining arguments, and none has merit.

AFFIRMED

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