In the Matter of Fiame Michelle Simpson

2

her violations require the imposition of serious discipline. However, because of the mitigating factors in this case—including that these are Simpson's first, and apparently only, disciplinary infractions in almost two decades of practicing law; that no client has complained about, or appears to have lost money or been deprived of promised services as the result of, Simpson's behavior; and that Simpson has taken steps to better understand the trust accounting rules so that she can avoid violations in the future—disbarment is not warranted. Accordingly, we conclude that a three-year suspension is the appropriate level of discipline under the specific facts of this case.

1. Procedural History In July 2021, the Bar filed a Formal Complaint against Simpson, alleging that in 2017 and 2018, she misused one of her trust accounts to pay operating expenses for her business as well as personal expenses, ultimately overdrawing the trust account, and that, when confronted about the matter, she obfuscated and presented heavily redacted documents in an effort to conceal her wrongdoing. As the result of these actions, the Bar filed a Formal

3

Complaint charging Simpson, who has been a member of the Georgia Bar since 2006, with violating Rules 1.15(I)(a),¹1.15(II)(a)² and (b),³and 8.4(a)(4)⁴of the GRPC. Simpson acknowledged service of the Formal Complaint and filed a petition for voluntary discipline,

4

admitting only the alleged Rule 1.15 violations and suggesting that a public reprimand was the appropriate discipline. The State Bar objected to Simpson's petition and, following a hearing, the Special Master denied the petition. The Bar moved for partial summary judgment as to all of the Rule violations, and Simpson responded by generally conceding all Rule violations with which she was charged. The Special Master granted the Bar's motion, concluding that Simpson had violated all of the Rules alleged in the Formal Complaint. Simpson then filed an amended petition for voluntary discipline suggesting that a suspension of 12 to 24 months was the appropriate discipline given her circumstances. The Bar objected, arguing that the proper level of discipline was disbarment. The Special Master ultimately agreed with the Bar as to the level of discipline, as did the Review Board. Simpson then filed exceptions to the Review Board's Report and Recommendation, asserting various enumerations of error and arguing that a suspension of between two and three years is a more appropriate sanction for her

5

misconduct. The Bar has responded, urging that the facts and circumstances warrant disbarment.

2. The Special Master's Report and Recommendation

(a) Factual Findings The Special Master found, in relevant part, that Simpson was admitted to practice law in Georgia in 2006. She practiced mostly as a solo practitioner in the areas of entertainment law, real estate law, and some business transactional law. At all relevant times, Simpson maintained, at J.P. Morgan Chase Bank ("Chase"), an operating account (Acct. No. xxxxx0552) and an IOLTA account (Acct. No. xxxxx0522) that she considered to be her "general" IOLTA account in which she held any unearned client fees.⁵When testifying as to the usage of her general IOLTA and operating accounts, Simpson

6

admitted she "wasn't diligent" in handling those accounts, "wasn't paying attention to the right account numbers," was "using them both simul[taneously], [with no] clear distinction . . . between those two accounts," and did not always transfer the funds from her IOLTA account to her business account as soon as they became earned funds and before using them to pay personal bills.⁶ From 2017 through 2018, Simpson became unable to fulfill her financial obligations in a timely manner, and, as a result, she occasionally used funds from her general IOLTA account to pay for personal obligations. She testified that most of the work she did was transactional and that she typically earned the fees shortly after obtaining them but that she was using those earned fees to pay bills

7

from the general IOLTA account without first transferring the funds into the operating account. She testified that she believed that she only used funds that she had earned to pay those bills but that, because "they should have been transferred out of [the IOLTA] account" before she used them, "everything [she] did with that [IOLTA] account was in violation of the rules." When asked if she commingled personal unearned funds with client funds, in violation of Rule 1.15, Simpson admitted, "Yes, I violated that."

In early November 2017, Simpson tried to pay a personal cell phone bill from her general IOLTA account, but Chase declined to process the charge due to insufficient funds in the account and notified the State Bar's Overdraft Coordinator. In response, the Overdraft Coordinator sent Simpson multiple inquiries that included requests for Simpson's bank records for the relevant IOLTA account, but Simpson failed to provide the records, instead engaging in an extended email exchange with the Bar as to why the records were needed. Eventually, in March 2018, the Bar initiated a

8

grievance against Simpson,⁷who thereafter submitted bank statements for the relevant IOLTA account. But the bank statements that she submitted had been redacted and

"electronically manipulated" so that sections of the account information, bank statement page numbers, and images of account deposit and withdrawal slips were removed from the statements.⁸In addition, Simpson disregarded the requests for copies of cancelled checks, deposit slips, and withdrawal items. The State Bar then

9

mailed Simpson a Notice of Investigation to which she failed to respond.

In the end, the Bar subpoenaed the full records for Simpson's general IOLTA account from January 1, 2017, through August 31, 2018. The Special Master concluded that those records revealed that, on multiple occasions and over many months in 2017, Simpson failed to keep client funds separate from her personal funds; she deposited personal funds into her IOLTA account; and she withdrew funds from her IOLTA account for personal use.⁹Simpson

10

acknowledged that she kept no detailed records for the general IOLTA account and that failing to do so was error on her part. She admitted that what happened here was the natural consequence of her lack of diligence in handling the funds in the accounts, but she insisted that she was not intentionally misappropriating client funds;¹⁰that no client lost money; and that no client ever expressed dissatisfaction with her or with her work.

much, explaining that she treated the two accounts interchangeably and was not "keeping track" of the money — a practice which she admitted may have led to the withdrawal of fees that "[m]ay not have" been earned but that she did not "do what [she] needed to do to prove whether or not they were," and that she "may have been" converting client funds to her own but could not say for certain because she "wasn't keeping accurate records."

11

(b) Rules Violations The Special Master determined that Simpson violated Rule 1.15(I)(a) by depositing personal funds via check and cash into her general IOLTA account; by using funds in her IOLTA account for personal obligations; and by failing to keep complete records of the funds contained within the general IOLTA account. The Special Master concluded that Simpson violated Rule 1.15(II)(a) by failing to hold and properly administer client funds from her general IOLTA account; Rule 1.15(II)(b) by repeatedly depositing and holding personal funds in her general IOLTA account, withdrawing trust account funds for personal use on multiple occasions, and failing to maintain adequate records of her IOLTA account; and Rule 8.4(a)(4) by submitting to the Bar documents that were redacted in ways that demonstrated an effort to conceal information.

(c) Recommended Discipline In her final Report and Recommendation, the Special Master correctly noted that this Court relies on the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (1992) ("ABA Standards") for guidance

12

in determining the appropriate punishment in disciplinary cases. See In the Matter of Morse, 265 Ga. 353, 354 (1995) (disciplinary authority should consider (a) the duty violated, (b) the lawyer's mental state, (c) the potential or actual injury caused by the misconduct, and (d) aggravating and mitigating factors). The Special Master concluded generally that Simpson had admitted that she failed to uphold "the duties expected of a lawyer" by committing the rule violations established herein and noted that Simpson's violations of the trust accounting rules implicated ABA Standard

4.11 (failure to preserve property of a client or third party), while her violations of Rule 8.4(a)(4) implicated ABA Standard 5.11 (failure to maintain personal integrity).

Turning to Simpson's mental state, the Special Master acknowledged Simpson's contention that she should be given some consideration because she lacked the intent to violate (or even contemporaneous knowledge that she was violating) Rules 1.15(I) and (II), but the Special Master concluded that her contention was

"without merit" for two reasons: first, because neither of those rules

13

requires any proof of personal knowledge or intent or other subjective component, see In the Matter of Eddings, 300 Ga. 419, 423 (2016) (Rules 1.15(I) and (II)(b) can be violated regardless of whether the attorney has knowledge of the violations); see also In the Matter of Howard, 292 Ga. 413 (2013) (imposing discipline for violations of Rules 1.15(I) and 1.15(II) resulting from a mistake); and second, because Simpson had been admitted to practice in 2006 after graduating from Harvard Law School.¹¹The Special Master did not expressly address Simpson's mental state as to her Rule 8.4(a)(4)

14

violation, but her citation to ABA Standard 5.11(b) (disbarment appropriate where lawyer engages in "intentional conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation that seriously adversely reflects on [her] fitness to practice") strongly suggests that she determined that Simpson acted knowingly and intentionally in violating Rule 8.4(a)(4).

The Special Master then noted Simpson's argument that her misconduct caused no actual injury to any of her clients and concluded that Simpson's argument ignored both the ABA Standards' definition of injury — which encompasses not only harm to a client but also harm to the public, the legal system, and the profession, see ABA Standards, III, Definitions — and the ABA Standards' explanation that the extent of the injury is determined

"by the type of duty violated and the extent of actual or potential harm." Id., II, Theoretical Framework (emphasis added). The Special Master noted that Simpson had admitted the potential for harm; that there was no evidence in this case to establish whether any of the funds belonging to Simpson's clients were negatively

15

impacted by her actions; and that Simpson's poor recordkeeping rendered it impossible to do a full accounting of the funds in her IOLTA account. The Special Master stressed the "potential injury that could have occurred," as a result of the violations of Rules 1.15(I) and (II). And, although the Special Master made no specific determination as to the harm that resulted from Simpson's violation of Rule 8.4(a)(4), we note that those violations caused, at a minimum, potential harm to the Bar, these disciplinary proceedings, and to the profession, generally. Ultimately, the Special Master concluded that disbarment was the presumptive discipline to be applied here, noting that each violation of the trust account rules can warrant disbarment on its own.

In aggravation of discipline, the Special Master concluded that, even if Simpson's commingling and misappropriation of client funds was inadvertent, her dishonest and selfish motive was demonstrated by her effort to "cover up" her malfeasance through her initial failure to cooperate with the Bar and her later misrepresentation and concealment of the contents of her general

16

IOLTA account by heavily redacting the bank statements she produced to the Bar. See ABA Standard 9.22(b). The Special Master further found in aggravation that Simpson had substantial experience in the practice of law and a "Harvard education," which should have rendered her knowledgeable as to the GRPC and as to the resources available to her through the Bar, which she failed to utilize.¹²See ABA Standard 9.22(i). Further, Simpson committed multiple offenses, having repeatedly violated Rules 1.15(I) and (II) between 2017 and 2018, see ABA Standards 9.22(d); and she failed to cooperate with the Bar and engaged in deceptive practices during the disciplinary proceedings.¹³See ABA Standards 9.22(e) and (f).

17

In terms of mitigating factors, the Special Master noted that Simpson had no prior disciplinary history;¹⁴that she had "personal problems" at the time of the offenses;¹⁵and that she had Here, Simpson's deceptive conduct formed the basis for the Rule 8.4(a)(4) violation. Nevertheless, the facts show that, aside from her submission of the manipulated documents, Simpson initially tried to stall the Bar's investigation and otherwise failed to cooperate during these discipline proceedings.

18

demonstrated remorse.¹⁶See ABA Standards 9.32(a), (c), and (l). Finally, the Special Master found Simpson's character and reputation to be a mitigating factor, see ABA Standards 9.32(g), acknowledging that Simpson had presented witnesses (three lawyers and her mother) to testify as to her character. The Special Master stated, however, that, while she had no reason to doubt the (concluding that Veach's allegation that he was suffering personal and emotional problems should weigh in mitigation of his punishment). Further, we note that the financial stress Simpson claimed to have been suffering in 2017 and 2018 was not the consequence of any disciplinary-related suspension, as was the case in Polk, but, rather, was the result of, among other factors, a potential eviction and dissolution of her law practice due to inability to make payments on time and the late fees that followed. See In the Matter of Topmiller, 293 Ga. 667, 668 (2013) (recognizing stress from financial difficulties in mitigation of discipline where those difficulties did not result from any discipline imposed for prior misconduct).

Further, although Simpson has not provided any documentary support for the personal or emotional stress she was experiencing, see ABA Standard 9.32(c), her claim is not one of a mental disability, see ABA Standard 9.32(i), which would require such evidence, and her testimony in the record was also corroborated by the testimony of her mother. Cf. In the Matter of Greene, 320 Ga. 527, 531 n.8 (2024) ("The [Review] Board considered in mitigation that [the attorney] provided documented proof of a prior mental health diagnosis. . . . [h]owever, no such documents are in the record before us, and so we decline to consider [this] as a mitigating factor."). Accordingly, we conclude that Simpson's personal, emotional, or financial stress could be given some weight as a mitigating factor. See Melnick, 319 Ga. at 738.

19

sincerity of Simpson's character witnesses, the weight of their testimony was diminished by the fact that most of their opinions as to Simpson's character remained unchanged even after they were told that Simpson had admitted to the Rules violations.¹⁷ Ultimately, the Special Master decided that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors and recommended that Simpson be disbarred for her violations of the GRPC, citing ABA Standard

4.12 ("Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knows or should know that [s]he is dealing improperly with client property and causes injury or potential injury to a client." However,

"[s]uspension should be reserved for lawyers who engage in misconduct that does not amount to misappropriation or conversion….").

20

Simpson requested review by the Review Board, asserting generally that the Special Master had failed to give full weight and consideration to all of the mitigating factors presented; failed to apply the appropriate legal standards to the facts of this case; and failed to recommend the appropriate discipline in light of this Court's prior precedents, instead judging Simpson more harshly because she attended Harvard Law School. She requested that the Review Board consider recommending a two-to-three-year suspension for her violations. In its report and recommendation, the Review Board questioned only two aspects of the Special Master's Report: (1) her repeated references to the law school from which Simpson graduated and (2) her "puzzling" treatment of the character witnesses (i.e., finding their testimony to be of diminished value). The Review Board ultimately concluded, as to the former issue, that the overriding factor in those references to her education was the fact that Simpson was admitted to the practice of law in 2006 (such that she had substantial experience in the practice of law), and, as to the Special Master's treatment of the character

21

witnesses, the Review Board concluded that the weighing of mitigating and aggravating factors was not affected by the Special Master's finding about the character witnesses. Ultimately, the Review Board voted to adopt the Special Master's recommendation that disbarment was the appropriate discipline for Simpson's violations of the GRPC, noting that, in making its recommendation, it had heavily weighed the fact that Simpson's actions went unchanged for a period of time after being alerted to the issues with the trust account, her deceptive practices, and her lack of cooperation with the State Bar during the disciplinary process. Simpson timely filed exceptions to the Review Board's Report and Recommendation, asserting various enumerations of error and arguing that a suspension of between two and three years is the appropriate sanction for her misconduct. The Bar timely responded to Simpson's exceptions, asserting that they were the same exceptions argued to, and rejected by, the Review Board and that this Court should also reject them.

3. Analysis and Conclusion

22

"The primary purpose of a disciplinary action is to protect the public from attorneys who are not qualified to practice law due to incompetence or unprofessional conduct, but this Court is also concerned with the public's confidence in the profession generally."

In the Matter of Cook, 311 Ga. 206, 213 (2021). The sanction imposed for disciplinary infractions, therefore, should be sufficient not only to penalize the offender for her wrongdoing and deter other attorneys from engaging in similar behavior, but also to indicate to the general public that the courts will maintain the ethics of the profession. See id. In Tuggle, we explained:

because this Court recognizes that the Special Master is in the best position to determine the witnesses'

credibility, it generally defers to the factual findings and credibility determinations made by the Special Master unless those findings are clearly erroneous. Thus, if factual findings "are supported by the record," we will generally not disturb them.

In the Matter of Tuggle, 317 Ga. 255, 258 (2023) (citations omitted). But "we review de novo the conclusions of law reached below on what rules were violated and what level of discipline is appropriate." Id. Similarly, the question of whether facts found by the Special Master

23

actually constitute an aggravating or mitigating factor is a matter we consider de novo. See In the Matter of Melnick, 319 Ga. 730, 738

(2024).

We have reviewed the record in this case and we conclude that the Special Master committed no error in finding that Simpson violated Rules 1.15(I)(a) and (II)(a) and (b) by paying personal bills from her general IOLTA account and comingling funds in her IOLTA account or in finding that she violated Rule 8.4(a)(4) by redacting bank statements in an effort to mask the extent of her misconduct from the Bar.¹⁸As noted throughout the discussion above, we accept the Special Master's conclusions that Simpson acted intentionally with respect to the Rule 8.4(a)(4) violation; that the violations of Rules 1.15(I) and (II) at issue herein require no proof of knowledge or intent, see In the Matter of Eddings, 300 Ga. 419, 423 (2016) (Rules 1.15 (I) and (II) (b) "make no reference to the attorney's

24

knowledge or lack thereof with respect to activities of others relating to the attorney's trust account"); and that Simpson's violations of Rules 1.15(I) and (II) and 8.4(a)(4) had at least the potential to harm her clients, the profession, and the Bar. Further, we agree with the Special Master and the Review Board that, in aggravation, Simpson acted dishonestly in redacting her bank records; that she had substantial experience in the practice of law; and that this case involves multiple rule violations. See ABA Standards 9.22(b), (i), and (d).

In mitigation, we agree with the Special Master that Simpson had no prior disciplinary history; that, notwithstanding these lapses in judgment, she has a good character and reputation; and that she is remorseful. ABA Standards 9.32(a), (g), and (l). Additionally, evidence was presented that Simpson was suffering from emotional and "personal problems" at the time of the offenses. See ABA Standard 9.32(c). Importantly, the record reflects that the personal problems were related to financial stress that Simpson was suffering in 2017 and 2018 that was not the consequence of any disciplinary-

25

related suspension, but rather, was related to a potential eviction and dissolution of her law practice due to inability to make payments on time and the late fees that followed. See In the Matter of Topmiller, 293 Ga. 667, 668 (2013) (accepting as mitigation financial stress that that did not result from any prior discipline for prior misconduct); cf. In the Matter of Polk, 303 Ga. 675, 677 (2018) (rejecting as mitigation stress that resulted from financial difficulties that followed a disciplinary sanction imposed for Polk's prior misconduct). Additionally, although the Special Master did not consider it as a factor in mitigation, the record also reflects that, in the time since Simpson's conduct at issue in these proceedings, Simpson has taken steps to prevent such offenses from happening again in the future, including her completion of Continuing Legal Education courses related to her misconduct and the Georgia Bar Law Practice Management Program Assessment. See ABA Standard 9.32(k). Further, Simpson switched her IOLTA account to a different bank from all of her other accounts to ensure that this does not happen again.

26

In terms of the discipline to be imposed, we respect and agree with the opinions of the Special Master and the Review Board that Simpson's violations are serious and carry the potential of significant harm. In particular, we acknowledge the repeated nature of her violations of Rules 1.15(I) and (II), involving the mishandling of funds in her IOLTA account, and the gravity of Simpson's Rule 8.4(a) violation, involving her submitting to the State Bar documents that were redacted in ways that demonstrated an effort to conceal information — rule violations which authorize this Court to disbar Simpson. Nevertheless, we exercise our discretion to impose a three-year suspension under the specific circumstances of this case.

Our decision to impose a suspension is due, in large part, to the facts that Simpson does not have any prior disciplinary history despite decades of practice; that, although her actions caused some harm to the legal system writ large, the record does not suggest that her actions resulted in any client claiming to have been deprived of any right to pursue legal relief or any services promised by, or money

27

provided to, Simpson; and because the record contains evidence that Simpson has taken steps to avoid repeating her violations of Rules 1.15(I) and (II).¹⁹

Indeed, this case is similar to In the Matter of Favors, 283 Ga. 588 (2008), where an attorney deposited settlement funds into her escrow account and falsely advised her client that she had used some of those funds to pay a third party on the client's behalf, when she actually had used those funds for her own benefit. After the Bar began its investigation, Favors made false statements to the Bar that she had twice mailed the payment to the third party and did not know why it had not been received; she submitted to the Bar a copy of an altered bank statement, which she had affirmatively falsified; and she subsequently submitted to the third party a check that was returned for insufficient funds. She then lied to the Bar

28

about why the check had been returned, asserting that it resulted from her failure to pay routine bank service charges when she actually knew her account had been overdrawn for several months due to the fact that she had been comingling her personal funds in the account and using client funds for her own benefit. It was not until years into the Bar's investigation that Favors finally admitted her actions to the Bar. Although we concluded that Favors violated Rules 1.15(I)(a) and (b), 1.15(II)(b), 8.1(a), and 8.4(a)(4), this Court imposed a three-year suspension based on various mitigating factors, including that she ultimately showed remorse, repaid the funds, had no prior disciplinary history, and was suffering personal and emotional factors that may have contributed to her behavior. Favors, 283 Ga. at 589. See also, e.g., In the Matter of Dansby, 274 Ga. 393, 394-95 (2001) (three-year suspension for an attorney who violated the predecessor of Rules 1.15(I) and (II) by commingling personal funds and client funds, where "the root cause of [his] misconduct . . . was not avarice or an intent to cheat a client, but poor judgment. . ."); In the Matter of Hood, 320 Ga. 440 (2024) (two-

29

year suspension for an attorney with a prior disciplinary history, who violated, in relevant part, Rules 8.4(a)(4) and 8.1 based on knowingly making false statements to opposing counsel and courtroom personnel in one client matter and by knowingly submitting false statements and documentation to the Bar related to two different client matters, where his actions caused actual harm to his clients, the courts, and the public); In the Matter of Morgan,

303 Ga. 678, 679-80 (2018) (two-year suspension with conditions on reinstatement for an attorney with no prior discipline, who during a time of personal and emotional hardship violated Rules 1.15(I), 1.15 (II)(b), and 8.4(a)(4) by withdrawing $77,000 from client's estate and depositing it for his personal use, but who made a good faith effort at restitution); In the Matter of Ballard, 279 Ga. 663 (2005) (two- year suspension for attorney with no prior disciplinary history, who during a time of personal hardship, violated Rules 1.15(I) and 1.15 (II)(b), by repeatedly withdrawing non-earned fees from a client's funds which were being held in the attorney's IOLTA account, where his client ultimately suffered no legal or financial injury); In the

30

Matter of Veach, 310 Ga. 470 (2020) (18-month suspension for attorney with no prior disciplinary history, who during a time of personal and financial hardship violated Rules 1.15(I)(b), 1.15(II)(b), and 8.4(a)(4) by using client funds held in his IOLTA account for his own personal use for more than three years). Compare In the Matter of David-Vega, 318 Ga. 600, 605-08 (2024) (disbarment rather than suspension for attorney with prior disciplinary history who violated various Rules, including Rules 8.1 and 8.4(a)(4), by abandoning a client to his significant detriment, failing to respond to discovery in the malpractice lawsuit the client subsequently filed against her, making untruthful statements to the court, and fabricating and submitting falsified emails and texts to the Bar to conceal the misconduct); In the Matter of Stephens, 318 Ga. 375, 379 (2024) (disbarment where attorney, with no prior disciplinary history, violated Rules 1.15(I)(a) and 1.15 (II)(a) by negligently overdrawing her trust account, violated Rules 3.3(a)(1) and 8.4(a)(4) in a separate manner by repeatedly lying to a court and later to the Bar with the intent to deceive both, causing actual and serious injury to a party

31

who sued her client and having a serious adverse effect on the underlying legal proceedings).

Accordingly, we hereby order that Simpson be suspended from the practice of law in this State for three years. Because there are no conditions on Simpson's reinstatement other than the passage of time, there is no need for her to take any action either through the State Bar or through this Court to effectuate her return to the practice of law. Instead, the suspension arising from this opinion will take effect as of the date this opinion is issued and will expire by its own terms three years later. Simpson is reminded of her duties pursuant to former Bar Rule 4-219(c), now found at Bar Rule 4- 219(b).

Three-year suspension. All the Justices concur.