PER CURIAM
In this civil-rights case, Ryan Castaneira appeals pro se from the District Court's decision denying, on the merits, his motion for a preliminary injunction.1For the reasons that follow, we will vacate that decision and remand with instructions to deny that motion as moot.
I.
In 2009, Castaneira was convicted in Georgia state court of attempted child molestation and other offenses. The trial court sentenced him to 10 years in prison, to be followed by 20 years of probation. Castaneira's probation term began in 2019. That year, the supervision of his probation was transferred from the State of Georgia to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania pursuant to the Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision. In 2022, after Castaneira was charged with summary harassment, one or more Commonwealth officials added a no-contact condition to Castaneira's probation supervision. That condition prohibited Castaneira from having "any contact with anyone under the age of 18 years old without the prior written approval of probation/parole supervision staff and if applicable, in agreement with [his] treatment provider." Dist. Ct. Mem. entered Oct. 15, 2025, at 4 (quoting Second Am. Compl.).
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Castaneira subsequently initiated this pro se civil-rights action in the District Court against the chairperson of the Pennsylvania Parole Board (formerly the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole) and several Pennsylvania state parole agents, raising several claims under the United States Constitution. In June 2025, Castaneira moved for a preliminary injunction with respect to two claims, both of which alleged violations of his due-process rights. In doing so, Castaneira sought to enjoin the defendants (hereinafter "Appellees") from enforcing the no-contact provision and certain other conditions of his probation. In October 2025, the District Court denied Castaneira's motion, concluding that he had failed to show that the two claims in question were likely to succeed. Castaneira then filed this interlocutory appeal, challenging that decision.2
II.
On appeal, Appellees have submitted extra-record evidence about material events that took place while Castaneira's motion for a preliminary injunction was pending before the District Court. See 3d Cir. Dkt. No. 11. This unrefuted evidence establishes the following. In July 2025, the Georgia state court that had sentenced Castaneira modified the terms of his probation, placing him on non-reporting status. See id. at ECF p. 6. Later that month, the Commonwealth, in response to that modification order,
"close[d] interest" in Castaneira's probation. Id. at ECF p. 4; see id. at ECF pp. 3-4. In
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other words, in view of the modification order, the Commonwealth's supervision of Castaneira's probation was terminated. See id. at ECF p. 8. And with the Commonwealth's supervision terminated, there was no longer a need to preliminarily enjoin Appellees (all Commonwealth officials) from enforcing any probation conditions. It appears that the parties did not provide this evidence to the District Court or otherwise apprise the District Court of the material developments reflected by this evidence. It is unclear why the parties failed to do so. In any event, we may consider this evidence for the first time on appeal. See In re Application of Adan, 437 F.3d 381, 388 n.3 (3d Cir. 2006) (indicating that we may consider new evidence on appeal in exceptional circumstances, "such as those that render the case moot or alter the appropriateness of injunctive relief"), abrogated on other grounds by Golan v. Saada,
596 U.S. 666 (2022).3So considered, it is clear that Castaneira's motion for a preliminary injunction was rendered moot before the District Court ruled on it. See generally Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 698-99 (3d Cir. 1996) ("If developments occur during the course of adjudication that . . . prevent a court from being able to grant the requested relief, the case must be dismissed as moot.").4Accordingly,
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we will (1) vacate the District Court's decision denying Castaneira's motion for a preliminary injunction on the merits, and (2) remand the matter so that the District Court can deny that motion as moot.5Castaneira's request for oral argument is denied.
"the challenged action is in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to cessation or expiration." Lara v. Comm'r Pa. State Police, 125 F.4th 428, 446 (3d Cir. 2025) (citation to quoted case omitted). But that situation is not present here. As Castaneira acknowledges, his probation term does not end until 2039. So even if, in the near future,
(1) the Georgia state court were to reimpose a supervision requirement, (2) the Commonwealth were to recommence supervision over his probation, and (3) Appellees were to once again enforce the conditions that have been the subject of this case, there would be ample time to fully litigate any injunctive-based challenges to those conditions. We also note that the voluntary-cessation exception to the mootness doctrine does not apply here either, for the cessation of Castaneira's probation-supervision conditions stemmed from the Georgia state court's modification order, not some unilateral act on the part of Appellees. See Hartnett v. Pa. State Educ. Ass'n, 963 F.3d 301, 307 (3d Cir. 2020) (explaining that this exception's "focus is on whether the defendant made th[e] change unilaterally"); cf. United States v. Grape, 549 F.3d 591, 597 (3d Cir. 2008) (indicating that this exception applies if the defendant "may resume [the allegedly offending action] at any time").