ORDERED that the amended judgments are affirmed, with one bill of costs awarded to the respondents appearing separately and filing separate briefs.
The plaintiff, individually and as executor of the estate of the decedent, commenced this action, inter alia, to recover damages for medical malpractice and wrongful death. Subsequently, the defendants Azra Raza and New York and Presbyterian Hospital, sued herein as Columbia University Medical Center, the defendants Asaf Asi Gave, Jorg J. Ruhe, Vladimir Rubinshteyn, and Beth Israel Medical Center, and the defendants Frederick Rapoport, William Mandell, Marie Dy-Guillaume, and Jason M. Bratcher (hereinafter collectively the moving defendants) separately moved pursuant to CPLR 3126 to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against each of them for the plaintiff's failure to comply with the Supreme Court's orders and to respond to the moving defendants' separate discovery demands. In an order dated March 25, 2021, the Supreme Court, among other things, granted the moving defendants' separate motions. The plaintiff moved for leave to renew and reargue her opposition to the moving defendants' separate prior motions pursuant to CPLR 3126 to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against each of them. In an order dated October 25, 2021, the court, inter alia, denied that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was for leave to renew and, in effect, granted reargument and, upon reargument, in effect, adhered to its original determination in the order dated March 25, 2021, granting the moving defendants' separate prior motions.
Thereafter, an amended judgment dated November 19, 2021, upon the orders dated March 25, 2021, and October 25, 2021, was entered in favor of Raza and New York and Presbyterian Hospital, sued herein as Columbia University Medical Center, and against the plaintiff dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against Raza and New York and Presbyterian Hospital, sued herein as Columbia University Medical Center. An amended judgment dated November 22, 2021, upon the orders, was entered in favor of Gave, Ruhe, Rubinshteyn, and Beth Israel Medical Center and against the plaintiff dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against Gave, Ruhe, Rubinshteyn, and Beth Israel Medical Center. An amended judgment dated January 13, 2022, upon the orders, was entered in favor of Rapoport, Mandell, Dy- Guillaume, and Bratcher and against the plaintiff dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against Rapoport, Mandell, Dy-Guillaume, and Bratcher. The plaintiff appeals.
A motion for leave to renew "shall be based upon new facts not offered on the prior motion that would change the prior determination" (CPLR 2221[e][2]) and "shall contain reasonable justification for the failure to present such facts on the prior motion" (id. § 2221[e][3]). "Although the requirement that a motion for renewal must be based on new facts is a flexible one, a motion to renew is not a second chance freely given to parties who have not exercised due diligence in making their first factual presentation" (Mooklal v Clermont Farm Corp., 187 AD3d 740, 741 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Polak v MTA Long Is. R.R., 230 AD3d 500, 503). [*3]"Moreover, the Supreme Court has the discretion to grant renewal upon facts known to the movant at the time of the original motion, provided that the movant offers a reasonable justification for the failure to submit the additional facts on the original motion" (Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Sylvestre, 238 AD3d 980, 983 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Castor v Cuevas, 137 AD3d 734,
734). "What constitutes a reasonable justification . . . is within the discretion of the Supreme Court" (JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A. v EY Bay Ridge, LLC, 212 AD3d 794, 795; see Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Sylvestre, 238 AD3d at 983). However, "[t]he Supreme Court has no discretion to grant renewal where the moving party omits a reasonable justification for the failure to present the new facts on the original motion" (Neeman v Smith, 227 AD3d 818, 820; see Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Sylvestre, 238 AD3d at 983). Here, the plaintiff did not offer a reasonable justification for failing to offer the purported new facts in her opposition to the moving defendants' separate prior motions pursuant to CPLR 3126 to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against each of them (see Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Sylvestre, 238 AD3d at 983; Neeman v Smith, 227 AD3d at 820). Moreover, consideration of the purported new facts would not have changed the Supreme Court's original determination granting the moving defendants' separate prior motions pursuant to CPLR 3126 to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against each of them (see Matter of Dziubkowski, 179 AD3d 918, 919). Accordingly, the court properly denied that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was for leave to renew.
A motion for leave to reargue "shall be based upon matters of fact or law allegedly overlooked or misapprehended by the court in determining the prior motion, but shall not include any matters of fact not offered on the prior motion"
(CPLR 2221[d][2]). No appeal lies from an order denying reargument (see Rivera v Sik Leung Kei, 235 AD3d 916, 918; Hart v Hart, 224 AD3d 671, 672). However, once the court reviews the merits of the movant's arguments, the court, by doing so, has granted reargument, and must determine whether to adhere to the original determination, or alter the original determination (see Matter of SRW Equities, LLC v Nussen, 221 AD3d 607, 608). An order granting reargument and adhering to the original determination supersedes the order making the original determination (see Maher v WP Galleria Realty, LP, 241 AD3d 813, 814; Henegar v Freudenheim, 40 AD2d 825, 826) and is appealable (see Matter of SRW Equities, LLC v Nussen, 221 AD3d at 608; Matter of Mattie M. v Administration for Children's Servs., 48 AD3d
392, 393).
Here, as the Supreme Court reviewed the merits of the plaintiff's contentions on her motion, among other things, for leave to reargue, the court, in effect, granted reargument and, upon reargument, in effect, adhered to its original determination granting the moving defendants' separate prior motions pursuant to CPLR 3126 to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against each of them (see Matter of SRW Equities, LLC v Nussen, 221 AD3d at 608). Notably, the plaintiff was represented by an attorney, who made the motion, inter alia, for leave to reargue. The order dated October 25, 2021, wherein the court, among other things, in effect, granted reargument and, upon reargument, in effect, adhered to that original determination, superseded the order dated March 25, 2021 (see Maher v WP Galleria Realty, LP, 241 AD3d at 814; Henegar v Freudenheim, 40 AD2d at 826). Thus, the plaintiff's contention, raised for the first time on appeal, that the court erred in deciding the moving defendants' separate prior motions because the plaintiff, in her capacity as the executor of the estate of the decedent, was pro se because her counsel was relieved of representing the estate after the moving defendants filed their respective motions and before her opposition was filed (see generally Martins v Liu, 216 AD3d 762), is without merit because the plaintiff was represented by counsel on the motion, inter
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