Richard D. Pomeroy v. State of Alaska

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A14675

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This is a summary disposition issued under Alaska Appellate Rule 214(a). Summary dispositions of this Court do not create legal precedent. See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d).

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ALASKA

RICHARD D. POMEROY,

Appellant,

STATE OF ALASKA,

Appellee.

Court of Appeals No. A-14675 Trial Court No. 3AN-02-10469CR

SUMMARY DISPOSITION

No. 0485 — June 3, 2026 Appeal from the Superior Court, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, Kevin M. Saxby, Judge.

Appearances: Richard D. Pomeroy, in propria persona, Anchorage, Appellant. Eric A. Ringsmuth, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Stephen J. Cox, Acting Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee. Before: Allard, Chief Judge, and Wollenberg and Beach, Judges.

In March 2003, Richard D. Pomeroy was indicted on two counts of first- degree sexual abuse of a minor and two counts of second-degree sexual abuse of a minor.¹Two years later, to resolve this case, Pomeroy pleaded no contest to a reduced charge of third-degree assault.²Since entering his plea, Pomeroy has filed five post-

1 AS 1 1 .41 .434(a)(1 ) and AS 1 1 .41 .436(a)(2), respectively.

2 Former AS 11.41.2 2 0(a)(1)(C)(ii) (2 002 ); Pomeroy v. State, 2 58 P.3d 12 5, 12 6 (Alaska App. 2011).

conviction relief applications challenging his conviction on various grounds.³Pomeroy has also filed numerous challenges to his conviction in federal court.⁴ In 2024, Pomeroy filed a motion to vacate his conviction, arguing that his conviction was unconstitutional because (according to Pomeroy) he was not indicted on the third-degree assault charge and he did not waive his indictment as part of his no contest plea. The superior court summarily denied the motion. After Pomeroy moved for clarification of the superior court's denial, the superior court held a hearing. At the hearing, the State argued that the motion was untimely. The superior court agreed and indicated that it was denying Pomeroy's requested relief on various grounds, including timeliness.

Pomeroy now appeals, arguing that the superior court should have granted his motion and vacated his conviction. As an initial matter, we note that Pomeroy's motion to vacate is properly viewed as a sixth application for post-conviction relief.⁵

3 Pomeroy v. State (Pomeroy II), 2015 WL 1285700, at *1 (Alaska App. Mar. 18, 2015) (unpublished) (explaining that Pomeroy filed his first post-conviction relief application in 2007, appealed but later dismissed this appeal, and filed a second post- conviction relief application at "about the same time"; he then filed a third post-conviction relief application in 2011). Pomeroy appealed the dismissal of his fourth post-conviction relief application in 2017. Pomeroy v. State (Pomeroy III), 2017 WL 4872453, at *1 (Alaska App. Oct. 25, 2017) (unpublished). He filed another post-conviction relief application in 2017, "styled a petition for 'writ of error coram nobis.'" Pomeroy v. State (Pomeroy IV), 2018 WL 3933508, at *1 (Alaska App. Aug. 15, 2018) (unpublished).

4 See Pomeroy v. Alaska, 2018 WL 94 9034 5, at *2 (D. Alaska Sept. 19, 2018) (unpublished) ("Mr. Pomeroy has also attempted to challenge his state court criminal case numerous times in this Court."); see also Pomeroy v. Alaska, 785 F. App'x 470 (9^thCir. 2019) (unpublished) (affirming denial of petition for writ of error coram nobis).

5 See Alaska R. Crim. P. 35 .1(b); cf. Alaska R. Civ. P. 86(m) (requiring the trial court to treat petitions for writ of habeas corpus as applications for post-conviction relief under Criminal Rule 35.1); Fisher v. State, 315 P.3d 686, 687 (Alaska App. 2013) (discussing Criminal Rule 35.1 and Civil Rule 86(m)). We note that the superior court denied Pomeroy's motion without stating whether it was considering the motion as an application for post-conviction relief, although the State's comments and the court's responses to the

We also note that Pomeroy previously raised the same issue in his fourth post- conviction relief application. That application was dismissed on procedural grounds, and we affirmed the dismissal on appeal.⁶

We likewise affirm the dismissal of this sixth post-conviction relief application on procedural grounds.⁷Pomeroy's application is not timely. Final judgment in Pomeroy's criminal case was entered in 2005 and he filed his motion in 2024 — well outside of the window for timely filing a post-conviction relief application.⁸Pomeroy provides no explanation for the untimeliness of his application or argument that the timeliness requirement should not apply. We accordingly conclude that the superior court correctly dismissed his application on this ground.⁹ The judgment of the superior court is AFFIRMED.

State's comments at the March 12, 2025 hearing where the motion was denied indicate that the court was treating the motion as an application for post-conviction relief.

Pomeroy III, 2017 WL 4872453, at *1.

AS 12.72.020(d).

AS 12.72.020(a)(3)(A).

9 In his reply brief, Pomeroy contends that the State waived any argument that his claim was untimely because the State did not present this argument to the superior court. But at the March 12, 2025 hearing, the State specifically asserted that Pomeroy's application should be denied because it was not timely.

Richard D. Pomeroy v. State of Alaska

Richard D. Pomeroy v. State of Alaska

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