O R D E R
Emad Ayad seeks review of a removal order issued by the Board of Immigration Appeals (the Board) affirming the Immigration Judge's (IJ) denial of his applications for asylum, withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA),
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withholding of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), and deferral of removal under the CAT. The Board deemed the first three applications waived because Ayad had not "meaningfully challenged the [IJ's] findings that his [criminal] convictions" made him statutorily ineligible for asylum, withholding of removal under the INA, and withholding of removal under the CAT. The Board also denied Ayad's request for deferral of removal under the CAT because he failed to show that it was more likely than not he would be tortured if returned to Egypt. Because Ayad has failed to challenge the Board's decision on waiver, we deny the first three applications on exhaustion grounds. As for the fourth application regarding deferral of removal under the CAT, we find substantial evidence supported the Board's denial of his application. Accordingly, we deny Ayad's petition for review.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
Emad Ayad is a citizen of Egypt and a Coptic Christian. Between 2007 and 2018, he worked in Qatar but occasionally returned to Egypt twice a year for two months to visit his family.
In 2012, while visiting Egypt, Ayad experienced problems relating to tensions surrounding the then-upcoming 2013 coup which ousted President Mohamed Morsi and resulted in Abdel Fattah El-Sisi's rise to power. On one occasion, his neighbors, who were members of the Muslim Brotherhood, slapped him, injuring his ear, and attacked his wife. Ayad believed they did so because of his religion. After the assault, Ayad and his wife went to the police station and reported the attack. Officers took the report, but Ayad felt pressured by members of the community and the sheriff to drop the charges against his neighbors. He was told that it was in his best interest to drop the case and not cause an escalation of religious violence between Muslims and Christians. At the same time, Ayad understood that in instances of religious violence, Egyptian police often ask the parties to do a "reconciliation," and that is what happened in this case.
Due to concerns for their personal safety, Ayad and his family left their home in Algeria Village and moved to an apartment in Cairo, Egypt in 2015. Not long after, in 2016, Ayad began receiving harassing phone calls urging him to sell his family home in Algeria Village. He did not. Later, however, Ayad received a call from one of the harassers informing him that his house had burned down. Ayad visited the house, witnessed that it was burned, and filed another police report. The police took the report and inspected the property. Ayad believed four of his neighbors, who were members of
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the Muslim Brotherhood, were responsible for the harassing phone calls and arson. While he provided the names of them to the police, he did not think the police held them accountable. Yet, Ayad recognized that the police, and another branch of law enforcement called the security forces, investigated his case and attempted to arrest the four men. The men fled, however, and the officers were unable to find them. Ayad did not receive any more threats or phone calls after his house burned down.
B. Procedural History
Ayad was admitted to the United States on or about February 10, 2018, as a lawful permanent resident. On November 1, 2022, Ayad was convicted of two counts of criminal confinement while armed with a deadly weapon, I ND. CODE § 35-42-3-3(a), armed robbery, IND. CODE § 35-42-5-1(a)(1), and sexual battery, IND. CODE § 35-42-4- 8(a)(1)(A). As a result, Ayad was sentenced to: (a) 48 months' imprisonment for one count of criminal confinement while armed with a deadly weapon to run concurrently with another four years' imprisonment for the second count of criminal confinement while armed with a deadly weapon; (b) 48 months' imprisonment to run consecutively to the term of imprisonment for the two counts of criminal confinement while armed with a deadly weapon; and (c) 48 months' imprisonment for sexual battery to run consecutively to the sentence on the other counts, but the state court suspended 24 months of the sentence.
The Department of Homeland Security then initiated removal proceedings on September 20, 2023, by serving Ayad with a Notice to Appear. The notice charged that Ayad was subject to removal: (1) under Section 237(a)(2)(A)(i) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i), because he had been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude;
(2) under Section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), because he had been convicted of the aggravated felony of sexual battery; and (3) under Section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), because he had been convicted of an aggravated felony relating to a theft. On November 2, 2023, Ayad appeared before an IJ where he admitted the factual allegations contained in the Notice to Appear and conceded that he was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude but objected to removability on the grounds that he committed aggravated felonies. After reviewing the documentary evidence, however, the IJ found Ayad was also removable because of his aggravated felony convictions.
In response, Ayad, through counsel, filed an application for asylum, withholding of removal under the INA and the CAT, and deferral of removal under the CAT.
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The IJ held hearings on Ayad's applications on January 3, 2024, and February 1, 2024, during which, Ayad testified in support of his applications along with his wife, his cousin, and a priest. Ayad's wife corroborated Ayad's account and believed that Christians do not receive representation, rights, or help from the Egyptian government. She also testified that in 2021 she and her children travelled to Egypt for two months and did not encounter any issues during their trip.
Ayad's cousin, Reda, a Coptic Christian who left Egypt for the United States also testified. He similarly believed the Egyptian government was unable to protect Coptic Christians because the government, in his view, is supported by Muslim extremists. Still, Reda testified that he returned to Egypt in 2013, 2016, and 2023—and was even married in a Coptic Christian ceremony in his wife's village in Egypt—and did not experience any problems. Reda also recognized that President El-Sisi had become strict with the Muslim Brotherhood after he became President.
Priest Estafanous, a Coptic Christian priest living in Samalut, Egypt who knows Ayad well, also testified in support of Ayad's claims. Priest Estafanous thought Ayad experienced problems with his Muslim Brotherhood neighbors because of his religion. While Priest Estafanous did not personally witness the accounts of harassment and assault that Ayad described, he believed that, if returned to Egypt, Ayad would be harmed because of the "personal dispute" between Ayad and his neighbors. In Priest Estafanous's view, religious extremism still exists in Egypt, although "not as it used to be." Priest Estafanous also compared the conflict between Ayad and his neighbors to a family dispute. He further explained that the neighbors who harmed Ayad were five siblings and three were currently incarcerated because the Egyptian government considered them to be terrorists.
In addition to hearing witness testimony, the IJ considered documents entered into the record, including Ayad's criminal conviction records, copies of the Egyptian police reports, and various country reports.
The IJ denied Ayad's applications for asylum and withholding of removal under the INA and the CAT. Under the INA and the CAT, an individual convicted of a
"particularly serious crime" is ineligible for asylum or withholding of removal. See Lopez v. Lynch, 810 F.3d 484, 488 (7th Cir. 2016); Estrada-Martinez v. Lynch, 809 F.3d 886, 889 (7th Cir. 2015); 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii) (asylum); 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii) (withholding of removal under the INA); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(d)(2) (withholding of removal under the CAT). The IJ concluded that Ayad's convictions for armed robbery and sexual battery were either "per se" particularly serious crimes or the nature of the convictions made them particularly serious, statutorily barring him from asylum and
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withholding of removal. See 8 U.S.C § 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii), (b)(2)(B)(i); 8 U.S.C § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii); 8 C.F.R § 1208.16(d)(2).
Second, the IJ decided Ayad did not establish eligibility for deferral of removal under the CAT because he did not establish that he faces a substantial risk of torture if he returned to Egypt. The IJ found Ayad's claims rested on the fact that his prior neighbors and other unknown people were members of a Muslim extremist group and that they would harm him because he is Christian. In the IJ's view, though, the past harm Ayad experienced fell short of torture because Ayad received medical treatment for any injury he sustained and Egyptian authorities investigated each event. Moreover, the IJ continued, the record showed Egypt's government under President El-Sisi had been willing to protect Christians—including the fact that the government had actively arrested, prosecuted, and sentenced those who harmed Christians within Egypt. Ayad's reliance on various news articles and country reports describing that Egypt was affected by discrimination, religious violence, and civil strife to support his fear of future torture did not persuade the IJ because evidence supporting generalized violence or danger was not enough to show that Ayad, specifically, would be tortured if returned to Egypt. Ayad appealed the IJ's decision to the Board, which affirmed. As an initial matter, the Board upheld the IJ's finding that Ayad's convictions constituted particularly serious crimes, rendering him ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal under either the INA or the CAT because Ayad had "not meaningfully challenged" the IJ's conclusion. Finding waiver on this issue, the Board next focused on whether the IJ's denial of Ayad's deferral for removal was proper. The Board found that Ayad's assertions of generalized evidence of human rights violations and the alleged ineffectiveness of the Egyptian government did not demonstrate any clear factual or legal error in the IJ's determination that Ayad did not establish that he is more likely than not to be tortured if returned to Egypt. The Board also concluded that Ayad had failed to demonstrate that the Egyptian government, a public official, or some other individual acting in an official capacity would instigate, consent, or acquiesce to any potential torture by the Muslim Brotherhood upon his return to Egypt. Ayad now petitions this Court for review.
II. DISCUSSION
Ayad's petition presents two issues. First, we must decide whether Ayad has waived review of his applications for asylum and withholding of removal under the INA and the CAT. Second, we must evaluate whether substantial evidence supported the denial of Ayad's application for deferral of removal under the CAT.
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Where, as here, the Board adopts the IJ's decision and provides more reasoning, we review both opinions. Cui v. Garland, 71 F.4th 592, 599 (7th Cir. 2023). "We 'consider not only those aspects of the immigration judge's decision that the Board chose to emphasize but also those findings that the Board implicitly endorsed.'" Id. (quoting Cojocari v. Sessions, 863 F.3d 616, 621 n.2 (7th Cir. 2017)).
A. Waiver
Ayad's petition before this Court states that he seeks review of the Board's
"holding that he is statutorily ineligible for asylum, withholding of removal under the [INA], and withholding of removal under the [CAT]" because the IJ found he had committed particularly serious crimes. We will review the issue only if he properly exhausted it before the Board. Munoz-Rivera v. Garland, 81 F.4th 681, 687 (7th Cir. 2023). That's because a noncitizen seeking review of a final order of removal must exhaust "all administrative remedies available to the alien as of right," which "includes the obligation first to present to the Board any arguments that lie within its power to address." Id. (citation modified). A petitioner exhausts a claim when he "argue[s] it specifically and with enough detail to put the Board on notice that [he] is trying to challenge the [IJ's] decision based on that argument." Id. at 687-88. Otherwise, we deem the petitioner to have failed to exhaust his remedies, resulting in waiver of the argument or claim. Kithongo v. Garland, 33 F.4th 451, 458 (7th Cir. 2022) ("Not raising these issues before the Board constitutes a failure to exhaust. As a result, [the petitioner] has waived his arguments for relief under the CAT, and we need not consider their merits.").
In his brief on appeal to the Board, the only issue Ayad presented was
"[w]hether the IJ erred in determining it was more likely than not that [Ayad] would not be tortured if forced to return to his native Egypt." Because Ayad did not argue before the Board that the IJ erred in concluding his convictions for sexual battery and armed robbery constituted particularly serious crimes rendering him ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal under the INA and the CAT, he failed to exhaust the issue and has waived it before us. See Munoz-Rivera, 81 F.4th at 687-88; Kithongo, 33 F.4th at 458. Therefore, we need not reach the merits of the IJ's particularly serious crime determinations and resultant denial of Ayad's applications for asylum and withholding of removal under the INA and the CAT. See Kithongo, 33 F.4th at 458.
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B. Ayad's Application for Deferral of Removal
We turn now to Ayad's argument that he qualifies for deferral of removal under the CAT because, in his view, he has shown that he would be tortured if returned to Egypt.
The CAT forbids the return of "a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture." Rodriguez-Molinero v. Lynch, 808 F.3d 1134, 1135 (7th Cir. 2015) (citation modified). Deferral of removal under the CAT provides a noncitizen the opportunity
"to remain in the United States upon a showing of 'a substantial risk' that she 'will be tortured if removed.'" Menghistab v. Garland, 37 F.4th 1240, 1245 (7th Cir. 2022) (quoting Rodriguez-Molinero, 808 F.3d at 1136). To obtain deferral of removal, the petitioner has the burden of establishing that it is more likely than not that he would be tortured by the government or with the government's acquiescence in the proposed country of removal. Bernard v. Sessions, 881 F.3d 1042, 1047 (7th Cir. 2018) (per curiam). To evaluate whether the petitioner has carried his burden, the IJ "must address various factors such as evidence of past torture, ability to relocate within the country, evidence of grave human rights violations or other relevant country conditions." Id. (quoting Orellana- Arias v. Sessions, 865 F.3d 476, 489 (7th Cir. 2017)); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3)(i)-(iv). We review the denial of deferral of removal "'under the highly deferential substantial evidence test' and will reverse 'only if the record evidence compels a contrary conclusion.'" Bernard, 881 F.3d at 1047 (emphasis in original) (quoting Lopez, 810 F.3d at
492).
In this case, substantial evidence supported the IJ's decision. First, the IJ weighed the facts underlying Ayad's experiences with his neighbors. Even assuming the injuries, harassment, and arson on account of Ayad's religion amounted to the requisite level of severity, the IJ correctly concluded Ayad failed to show any torture would be inflicted by, or with the acquiescence of, government officials given private actors perpetrated the harm he experienced. Fiddler v. Bondi, 147 F.4th 757, 763 (7th Cir. 2025) ("To the degree that [the petitioner] fears violence from private individuals, that violence must be done with the acquiescence of public officials to qualify as torture under the CAT."). Indeed, regarding the 2012 assault and 2016 arson, police took criminal reports and actively investigated the crimes, including an attempt to arrest the arsonists. And according to Priest Estafanous, three of Ayad's former neighbors who harmed him are now in prison because of their membership in the Muslim Brotherhood—a group the Egyptian government now considers a terrorist organization. To be sure, regarding the 2012 assault, the sheriff and community members encouraged Ayad to reconcile with
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his attackers and drop the charges. But Ayad recognized that reconciliation attempts in Egypt are common to avoid escalations in religious violence. Plus, there was no evidence that the sheriff possessed an improper motive to encourage Ayad to participate in the practice after he reported the attack, and there is nothing suggesting the police would have dropped the case but for Ayad's decision to engage in the reconciliation process. Put simply, Ayad has not put forth any evidence showing that Egyptian authorities would "turn a blind eye" if the Muslim Brotherhood tried to torture him upon his return. Cabrera-Ruiz v. Garland, 37 F.4th 395, 400 (7th Cir. 2022) (citation modified); see also Fiddler, 147 F.4th at 763-64 (denying petition seeking deferral of removal because, inter alia, petitioner failed to show acquiescence of government officials to any alleged torture petitioner might experience upon his return to Jamaica). Resisting this conclusion, Ayad contends the Board and the IJ overstated the actions taken by President El-Sisi to combat persecution of Christians without considering that any actions by the President are "superficial" and do not reflect the reality "on the ground." Ayad further contends that the Egyptian government has shown no interest in holding those who harm Christians accountable as shown in the events Ayad went through. In his view, various country reports and news articles documenting violence towards Christians in Egypt support his fear of future torture if returned.
But we have continually held that "[e]vidence of generalized violence is not enough; the IJ must conclude that there is a substantial risk that the petitioner will be targeted specifically." Bernard, 881 F.3d at 1047. In that vein, country reports, articles, and studies indicating violence or torture against certain groups do not provide evidence that "the Petitioner is more likely than not to face such violence." Lopez, 810 F.3d at 493 (emphasis in original); see also Lenjinac v. Holder, 780 F.3d 852, 856 (7th Cir. 2015) ("[R]eports that torture occurs in a foreign country ... are insufficient bases for relief without evidence that the petitioner will be tortured if he returns." (emphasis in original)); Jan v. Holder, 576 F.3d 455, 458 (7th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) ("[T]he country reports and news articles on police corruption in Pakistan are too general and vague to suggest that [the petitioner] in particular would face torture."). Ayad has not made that particularized showing here.
Second, as the IJ found, the same reports Ayad relies on provide that Egypt has taken steps to combat radical Islamic groups, including the Muslim Brotherhood. The Egyptian government has banned those groups and continues to arrest their members, prosecute them, and sentence them to prison. The Egyptian government has also implemented nationwide states of emergencies in response to attacks against Christians.
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And while Ayad points to evidence in the reports regarding Islamic militants' attacks on Coptic Christians in Egypt, there is a dearth of evidence that the Egyptian government acquiesced to or participated in the attacks.
Third, the IJ concluded Ayad could successfully relocate within Egypt to avoid any persecution, and he does not challenge that on appeal. In fact, for the two years he lived in Cairo after his home was set on fire, he reported experiencing no threats. See Ayala v. Garland, 854 F. App'x 50, 54 (7th Cir. 2021) ("[The assailants] did not pursue [the petitioner] when he moved to a nearby town, which is substantial evidence that [the petitioner] would be able to avoid danger from [the assailants] by relocating."). Additionally, the IJ recognized that two provinces within Egypt are governed by Christians, and Priest Estafanous testified that in Samalut, his Christian church serves approximately 3,000 members, the city has approximately 68 churches, and he has seen no apparent violence occurring against Christians in his community. These findings are supported by substantial evidence and undermine Ayad's claim for deferral of removal. Here, the IJ considered the relevant factors and supported its decision with substantial evidence. See Bernard, 881 F.3d at 1048. Ayad failed to carry his burden to show that it was more likely than not that he would be tortured upon his return to Egypt. Thus, the Board properly affirmed the IJ's decision.
III. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, we deny the petition for review.
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