O R D E R
Nikki Houston pleaded guilty to one count of wire fraud, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 1346, and the district court imposed a below-guidelines sentence of twelve months' and one day imprisonment. On appeal, she argues that the district court failed to consider her arguments in mitigation and created an unwarranted sentencing disparity. We affirm.
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. APP. P. 32.1
1
Background
From 2016 to 2022, Houston and fifteen codefendants participated in a scheme to defraud the State of Illinois. One codefendant, who was an employee at the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (IDCFS), arranged for Houston and other codefendants to pose as foster parents to receive monthly funds from the state. Houston sent half of her earnings to the IDCFS codefendant as a bribe or kickback for arranging this system. Over the course of six years, Houston received a total of $495,802 in state funds.
A grand jury returned a superseding indictment charging the defendants with 44 counts of fraud, including Houston's three counts of wire fraud. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 1346. Houston pleaded guilty to one count.
Following Houston's guilty plea, a probation officer prepared a presentence investigation report, which calculated a guidelines range of 37 to 46 months' imprisonment, based on a total offense level of 21 and a criminal history category of I. The PSR discussed several mitigating factors, including, as relevant to this appeal, Houston's lupus, arthritis, high blood pressure, neuropathy, and mental health struggles. It also discussed care options for her eleven-year-old son, noting that multiple family members would be able to care for him.
Before sentencing, both parties submitted a sentencing memorandum. In her memorandum, Houston did not discuss any of her personal health issues. Instead, she focused on her son's mental-health struggles. Like the PSR, Houston stated that other family members could care for him in her absence, but she argued that she should be with him while he receives mental-health treatment.
At the sentencing hearing, the court adopted the PSR and imposed a below- guidelines sentence of twelve months' and one day imprisonment. Houston's argument and allocution to the court again did not mention her personal health struggles, and she focused instead on the health of her son. The court considered this argument in mitigation, as well as the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), namely: Houston's history and characteristics; the nature and circumstances of the offense; and the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities. In its explanation, the court compared Houston to a codefendant who had taken $200,000 less than Houston and been sentenced to 18 months' imprisonment, noting it would not be "very fair" to sentence Houston to less. Yet, the court acknowledged Houston's unique circumstances with her
2
son, imposed a lesser sentence, and delayed the start of her sentence by several months so that she could begin her term of incarceration after her son's school year started. Two months later, the court held the sentencing hearing for another of Houston's codefendants, Tahndrea Harper. Harper had taken about $3,000 more than Houston but suffered from several health conditions, including end-stage kidney failure, which required dialysis and resulted in her being hospitalized three times in the months before her sentencing. At the hearing, the court compared Harper to Houston, noting that they had taken a similar amount, but the court acknowledged that incarceration might exacerbate Harper's health conditions. The court continued the sentencing hearing for a few months to allow Harper time to gather medical records for the court to better evaluate her health condition.
Four months later, the court sentenced Harper to three years' probation. At the hearing, Harper informed the court that she was on the kidney transplant list and that if she were to go into custody, she would be removed from the list and placed on a different list at her facility. Because of Harper's rapidly declining health and a concern about the availability of a transplant, the court imposed a noncustodial sentence. Harper died three months later.
Analysis
On appeal, Houston challenges only her sentence. She first argues that the district court did not meaningfully consider her arguments in mitigation, namely her health issues and family circumstances. This court reviews de novo whether a district court procedurally erred at sentencing by failing to address a defendant's principal arguments in mitigation or explaining inadequately the § 3553(a) factors. See United States v. Castaneda, 77 F.4th 611, 616 (7th Cir. 2023).* Houston contends that the district court failed to meaningfully weigh the effect that her incarceration would have on her son. But the court is not required to "give any particular weight" to a defendant's family circumstances. See United States v. Sykes,
774 F.3d 1145, 1153 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Gary, 613 F.3d 706, 711 (7th Cir. 2010)). And the court acknowledged her son's mental health struggles, explaining that Houston is "such a good person" and that it is "really impressive" how * The district court did not ask Houston at the end of the sentencing hearing whether it had adequately addressed her main arguments in mitigation as this court has recommended. See United States v. Stephens, 986 F.3d 1004, 1009 (7th Cir. 2021).
3
she cares for him, before imposing a below-guidelines sentence. The court also agreed to delay Houston's reporting date until after her son's school year started. Next, Houston argues that the district court should have addressed her medical ailments before imposing sentence. But the parties disagree about whether Houston's medical condition was a principal argument in mitigation that the court was required to address. The district court is not required to respond to every mitigation argument, only principal mitigation arguments. See Castaneda, 77 F.4th at 616. Deciding whether a mitigation argument ranks as "principal" is a contextual inquiry, and the amount of time defense counsel devoted to one argument relative to others at the sentencing hearing is a key"although not dispositive"factor. See Stephens, 986 F.3d at 1010-11. Although the PSR detailed Houston's health issues, Houston did not explore them in her sentencing memorandum or at the sentencing hearing. See id. at 1011; see also United States v. Chapman, 694 F.3d 908, 914 (7th Cir. 2012) (argument not raised during sentencing hearing "cannot be characterized as a principal argument" in mitigation). Instead, Houston discussed primarily the need for her sentence to account for her caretaking responsibilities related to her son. Because Houston's health was not presented as a principal argument in mitigation, the court did not need to address it. See Castaneda, 77 F.4th at 616.
Houston next argues that the district court created an unwarranted and unexplained sentencing disparity between herself and Harper. She highlights that she took less money than Harper, but Harper received a noncustodial sentence while she received twelve months' and one day imprisonment. To the extent that Houston frames this argument as a procedural error, her argument lacks merit. Harper was sentenced months after Houston, so the court could not have explained a sentencing disparity that did not exist yet. See United States v. Guzman-Ramirez, 949 F.3d 1034, 1039 (7th Cir. 2020). Moreover, the court's explanation of Houston's sentence was "consistent with the sentencing factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)." United States v. Porraz, 943 F.3d 1099, 1104 (7th Cir. 2019). The court focused on the seriousness of Houston's offense, highlighting that the offense "went after the most vulnerable" and spanned six years; Houston's history and characteristics, noting that it was her first offense and acknowledging her role in raising her son; and the need to avoid sentencing disparities between Houston and her codefendants who already had been sentenced. To the extent that Houston contends that the sentencing disparity with Harper made her sentence substantively unreasonable, her argument also fails. A below- guidelines sentence "cannot be an unwarranted disparity." United States v. Gonzalez,
765 F.3d 732, 740 (7th Cir. 2014); see United States v. Power, 170 F.4th 640, 647 (7th Cir.
4
2026) ("An unwarranted-disparity challenge to a below-Guidelines sentence is a nonstarter." (internal quotation marks omitted)). The guidelines "are themselves an anti-disparity formula … [and] to base a sentence on a properly determined Guidelines range is to give adequate consideration to the relation between the defendant's sentence and those of other persons." United States v. Blagojevich, 854 F.3d 918, 921 (7th Cir. 2017). Finally, and with the benefit of hindsight, the disparity between Houston and Harper's sentences was warranted. Harper suffered from a rapidly declining health condition that would have been difficult to treat in prison because it required daily,
"life-sustaining dialysis." Moreover, incarceration could have delayed Harper's possible kidney transplant. Nothing in the PSR or in Houston's filings reflects that she suffered from any similarly serious or difficult-to-treat condition.
AFFIRMED
5