ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant Marlene Carney's ("Defendant") motion for extension of time to file a motion for attorney's fees and bill of costs. [ECF 116].1Plaintiff Steven Walker ("Plaintiff") opposes the motion. [ECF 117]. In accordance with LRCi 6.1(b)(4), the Court deems it appropriate to rule on the motion without the need for a reply brief. For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies the motion.
On June 22, 2026, Plaintiff filed a notice of voluntary dismissal without prejudice pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(i). [ECF 114]. That same day, this Court entered an order confirming the notice of dismissal without prejudice, which also rendered two previously pending motions moot. [ECF 115]. Defendant subsequently filed this motion for extension of time to file a motion
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for attorney's fees and bill of costs pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d). [ECF 116]. According to Defendant, courts routinely grant attorney's fees to the defendant as the "prevailing party" when
". . . a plaintiff voluntarily dismisses a suit without prejudice, since a dismissal without prejudice has the potential to cause defendant to have to defend again against the dismissed claims." Id. at 2, ¶ 3.2Moreover, Defendant requests an extension of 21 days to file a motion for attorney's fees
2 Defendant cites to In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 221 F.3d 449, 471 n.10 (3d Cir. 2000) in support of her argument that Courts routinely grant a defendant an award for attorney's fees when a plaintiff has voluntarily dismissed a suit without prejudice. The entire footnote provides:
We note that Cohen voluntarily dismissed his action well before Paoli I was
decided in 1990, and well before most of the Defendants' costs were even
incurred. To charge Cohen with costs incurred during the more than ten years in
which he had no part of the case might be inequitable, except perhaps insofar as
the Defendants briefly had to defend against his claim. Cohen also argues that
because his motion to voluntarily dismiss his case without prejudice was granted,
the Defendants were not the "prevailing party" for Rule 54(d)(1) purposes. This
argument runs contrary to the majority rule that defendants can be "prevailing
parties" when a plaintiff voluntarily dismisses his action without prejudice. See, e.g., AeroTech, Inc. v. Estes, 110 F.3d 1523, 1527 (10th Cir.1997).
221 F.3d 449, 471 n.10. However, upon review of In re Paoli, it is clear that it did not involve a notice of dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i). Rather, the Third Circuit's recitation of the factual background makes clear that the case proceeded to trial, where the defendants ultimately prevailed. See In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 221 F.3d 449, 454 (3d Cir. 2000) ("As we noted above, this case has been before this court a number of times. After some thirteen years of litigation, the Defendants ultimately prevailed at trial, and we affirmed the judgment entered on that verdict. See Paoli IV, 113 F.3d at 464. Thus, the federal case is at an end except for this costs award dispute."). In addition, the Court finds that the footnote in Paoli and its citation to AeroTech, Inc. v. Estes, 110 F.3d 1523, 1527 (10th Cir.1997) is taken out of context by Defendant. Although a defendant can qualify as a prevailing party in certain instances following a plaintiff's voluntary dismissal of an action, no majority rule holds that a defendant is automatically a prevailing party in every such case. This is especially true in cases involving a Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) notice of dismissal as no change in the legal relationship between the parties has occurred. See e.g. Lynch v. Bailey- Roka, 2024 WL 4802700, at *4 (D.V.I. Nov. 15, 2024) ([B]ecause the Lynches voluntarily dismissed their case without prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i), no judicially sanctioned change to the legal relationship of the parties has occurred.").
Further, in Aerotech, the early dismissal by plaintiff was sought pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2), and the Tenth Circuit noted that "[n]othing in Rule 54(d) or our case law suggests that we should penalize a party for prevailing early." However, in contrast to a 41(a)(1) dismissal, a Rule 41(a)(2) dismissal can still confer "prevailing party" status on a defendant. See e.g. Bricklayers & Allied Craftworkers v. ARB Constr., Inc., 2016 WL 4943254, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 15, 2016) ("As previously noted, unlike Rule 41(a)(1), dismissals pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2) require judicial approval. Given the nature of Rule 41(a)(2), I conclude that the voluntary dismissal in this case satisfies the "judicially sanctioned" element of the Buckhannon test for prevailing party status.") (citing Bryant v. MV Transp., Inc., 231 F.R.D. 480, 482 (E.D. Va.
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under Rule 54(d) ". . . given that plaintiff has voluntarily dismissed his lawsuit without prejudice, after a significant adverse ruling by the District Court . . ." Id. at 3, ¶ 4. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(2), "[a] claim for attorney's fees and related nontaxable expenses must be made by motion unless the substantive law requires those fees to be proved at trial as an element of damages." Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2). In addition, a motion for attorney's fees under Rule 54(d)(2) must "be filed no later than 14 days after the entry of judgment." Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2)(B)(i). The rule further provides that "[u]nless a federal statute, these rules, or a court order provides otherwise, costs--other than attorney's fees--should be allowed to the prevailing party." Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1).
This Court has previously touched upon whether an award of attorney's fees to a
"prevailing party" is permissible in the context of a Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) notice of dismissal without prejudice. See Lynch v. Bailey-Roka, 2024 WL 4802700, at *3 (D.V.I. Nov. 15, 2024). As discussed in Lynch, because the Plaintiff had ". . . voluntarily dismissed their case without prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i), no judicially sanctioned change to the legal relationship of the parties has occurred." Id. at *4 (citing Oscar v. Alaska Dep't of Educ. & Early Dev., 541 F.3d 978, 981 (9th Cir. 2008) ("[D]ismissal without prejudice does not alter the legal relationship of the parties because the defendant remains subject to the risk of re-filing.")). Thus, this Court determined that the defendants could not be considered "prevailing parties" under the statutory provisions they cited to in support of an award for attorney's fees. Id. (citing O.F. Mossberg & Sons, Inc. v. Timney Triggers, LLC, 955 F.3d 990, 993 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (affirming denial of attorney's fees to defendant because plaintiff's Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) voluntary dismissal without prejudice was not the necessary judicial imprimatur establishing a prevailing party)).
However, the Third Circuit has observed that in certain instances a judicially enforceable preliminary injunction can provide "prevailing party" status if said injunction grants a plaintiff
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"virtually all the relief they sought, thereby materially altering the legal relationship between the parties[.]" People Against Police Violence v. City of Pittsburgh, 520 F.3d 226, 233 (3d Cir. 2008). The Court notes that Defendant points out in her present motion that Plaintiff's urgent motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction was ultimately rejected by this Court. [ECF
116] at 1, ¶ 2. Indeed, Plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction was ultimately denied in this matter. See [ECF 67]. Nothing in the Third Circuit's decision confers "prevailing party" status on a party in the case of a denial of a preliminary injunction motion. See also Lynch, 2024 WL 4802700, at *3 (citing Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 605, 121 S.Ct. 1835) ("But when no judicial ruling has changed the parties' legal relationship, no "prevailing party" exists to receive an authorized award of attorney's fees."). Accordingly, the Defendant's assertion that this Court's denial of Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction constituted a "significant adverse ruling"3does not render Defendant a "prevailing party" for the purposes of receiving an award under Rule 54(d).4 Further, although the above cited decisions do not directly consider the application of Rule 54(d) in the context of a Rule 41(a)(1)(a)(i) dismissal, other district courts have addressed both rules together and extended the same reasoning. See Williams v. Spanish Trace of Orlando, Ltd., 2012 WL 1416413, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 4, 2012), report and recommendation adopted, 2012 WL 1415592 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 24, 2012). In that case, the Defendant also sought an award of costs under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d). Id. In addressing Rule 54(d), the court observed:
Defendant fails to cite or distinguish case law from the same
presiding District Judge in this case which found, based on Supreme
Court and Eleventh Circuit precedent, that "generally, voluntary
dismissals under Rule 41(a)(1) do not create a prevailing party" for the purpose of awarding costs. Harris v. Captiva Condominiums,
LLC, Case No. 6:08-cv-210-Orl-28KRS, 2008 WL 4911237 at *2
(M.D.Fla. Nov.14, 2008) (Antoon, J., adopting report and
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recommendation) (citing Buckhannon Board and Care Home, Inc.
v. West Virginia Dep't of Health and Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598, 604-05, 121 S.Ct. 1835, 149 L.Ed.2d 855 (2001) and Smalbein
v. City of Daytona Beach, 353 F.3d 901, 905 (11th Cir.2003)).
"Under the rule in Buckhannon and its progeny, a voluntary dismissal pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1) does not create a prevailing party because it did not require judicial approval, and thus the judicial imprimatur requirement is not met." Harris at *2 2012 WL 1416413, at *3.
Here, this matter ended once Plaintiff filed his Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) notice of dismissal without prejudice.5Further, Plaintiff's notice of dismissal in no way altered the legal relationship between the parties nor is it the appropriate type of judicial imprimatur to result in a "prevailing party." Finally, a judicially sanctioned "award of some relief" altering the relationship between the parties has not been entered in this matter. Thus, the Court concludes Defendant is not a "prevailing party" under Rule 54(d) for the purposes of receiving an award of costs and attorney's fees. Consequently, the Court need not consider the extension of time to file a motion for costs and attorney's fees pursuant to Rule 54(d).
The premises considered, it is hereby
ORDERED that the Court DENIES the motion for extension of time at [ECF 116].
ENTER:
Dated: July 8, 2026 /s/ G. Alan Teague
G. ALAN TEAGUE
U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE