PER CURIAM:
Thomas Pepe appeals the district court's dismissal of his amended civil complaint as an impermissible shotgun pleading. He argues on appeal that the dismissal violated due process because he
"was not afforded an opportunity to respond, amend, or clarify his claims." He also argues for the first time on appeal that Magistrate Judge Dudek ("Judge Dudek") should have recused himself because he was named in recusal motions in other related federal cases filed by Pepe.1
I. Background
In 2025, Pepe filed a pro se civil complaint against seven defendants asserting "civil RICO violations, fraud, elder abuse, civil rights violations, and intentional infliction of emotional distress"
stemming from "a real estate transaction involving . . . estate property." The complaint contained vague and conclusory assertions and did not set forth separate counts or causes of action or connect any of the alleged violations with specific defendants. As relief, Pepe sought $75 million in compensatory damages and $125 million in punitive damages.
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25-13560 Opinion of the Court 3 Judge Dudek sua sponte dismissed the complaint, pursuant to the screening requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e),2as an impermissible shotgun pleading and for failure to state a claim. The magistrate judge explained the deficiencies and what Pepe needed to do to cure them, and he permitted Pepe to file an amended complaint.
Pepe then filed an amended complaint. Upon review, Judge Dudek issued a report and recommendation ("R&R") recommending that the amended complaint be dismissed with prejudice because the complaint was still an impermissible shotgun pleading and failed to state a claim.3The district court adopted the R&R over Pepe's objections and dismissed the case with prejudice. This appeal followed.
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II. Discussion
A. Dismissal of the amended complaint Pepe argues that the dismissal of his amended complaint violated due process because he "was not afforded an opportunity to respond, amend, or clarify his claims."4
Where a pro se party files a shotgun pleading or a pleading that fails to state a claim, the district court should dismiss the complaint, explain the deficiencies, and provide the opportunity for the plaintiff to amend. See Jackson v. Bank of Am., 898 F.3d 1348, 1357-58 (11th Cir. 2018) (explaining that, when faced with a shotgun pleading, "the district court should strike the pleading and instruct [the party] to replead the case" (quotations omitted)); Woldeab v. DeKalb Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 885 F.3d 1289, 1291-92 (11th Cir. 2018) (explaining that generally, where a more carefully
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25-13560 Opinion of the Court 5 drafted complaint might state a claim, the district court abuses its discretion if it does not provide a pro se plaintiff at least one opportunity to amend before the court dismisses with prejudice). We review the district court's dismissal of a complaint on shotgun pleading grounds for abuse of discretion. Vibe Micro, Inc. v. Shabanets, 878 F.3d 1291, 1294 (11th Cir. 2018). Here, the magistrate judge afforded Pepe one opportunity to amend his complaint as required. Once Pepe filed his amended complaint, nothing compelled the district court to offer Pepe additional opportunities to further amend his complaint prior to dismissal. See Jackson v. Bank of Am., N.A., 898 F.3d 1348, 1358-59 (11th Cir. 2018) (explaining that where the plaintiff is provided "fair notice of the defects [in his complaint] and a meaningful chance to fix" it but fails to correct the defects, the district court does not abuse its discretion by subsequently dismissing with prejudice on shotgun pleading grounds). Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the amended complaint without giving Pepe an additional opportunity to respond or amend. B. Recusal of Judge Dudek
Pepe argues for the first time on appeal that Judge Dudek should have recused himself under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a)5because he
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6 Opinion of the Court 25-13560 was the subject of recusal motions in Pepe's other related federal cases, which created an "[a]ppearance of bias."6 Because Pepe did not file a motion to recuse Judge Dudek in the district court proceedings, we review Judge Dudek's decision not to sua sponte recuse himself for plain error only. Hamm v. Members of Bd. of Regents of Fla., 708 F.2d 647, 651 (11th Cir. 1983). Section 455 sets forth a general rule that a judge shall
"disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned," and lists several specific situations in which a judge must recuse. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(a)-(b). The question for purposes of § 455(a) "is whether an objective, disinterested, lay observer fully informed of the facts underlying the grounds on which recusal was sought would entertain a significant doubt about the judge's impartiality, and any doubts must be resolved in favor of recusal." United States v. Patti, 337 F.3d 1317, 1321 (11th Cir. 2003) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
Simply being the subject of a recusal motion in Pepe's other federal cases would not cause an objective, disinterested lay observer to question Judge Dudek's impartiality in the instant case. See id. Furthermore, there is nothing in the record that indicates any impartiality, bias, or prejudice on the part of Judge Dudek.7
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25-13560 Opinion of the Court 7 Accordingly, Judge Dudek did not plainly err in failing to sua sponte recuse himself in this case.
AFFIRMED.
and dismissed those actions as well, his argument is unpersuasive. Simply ruling against Pepe in other cases is not evidence of bias or prejudice. See McWhorter v. City of Birmingham, 906 F.2d 674, 678 (11th Cir. 1990) (explaining that "a judge's rulings in the same or a related case may not serve as the basis for a recusal motion."); Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994) ("[O]pinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of the current . . . [or] prior proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.").
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