ORDERED. AS AMENDED. Any notice of default shall require cure of said default within fifteen (15) days after the mailing of said notice, as per the terms stated on the record at the hearing held on February 9, 2026. All other terms were agreed to on the record by the Debtor.
Bankruptcy Case ECF 54.
This appeal followed on March 4, 2026.
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II. Legal Standard
This court has jurisdiction to hear appeals from final orders of the bankruptcy court, and acts as an appellate court in such circumstances. 28 U.S.C. § 158; see also In re Johnson, 960 F.2d 396, 399 (4th Cir. 1992). A bankruptcy court's decision on a stay relief motion constitutes such a
"final order." See Ritzen Group, Inc. v. Jackson Masonry, LLC, 589 U.S. 35, 47 (2020). The standard of review of a bankruptcy case in district court generally mirrors that of an appellate court reviewing a district court ruling. See 18 U.S.C. § 158(c)(2) (stating that a bankruptcy appeal "shall be taken in the same manner as appeals in civil proceedings generally are taken to the courts of appeals from the district courts"). This Court therefore reviews the bankruptcy court's findings of fact for clear error. See In re Taneja, 743 F. 3d 423, 429 (4th Cir. 2014). Clear error is established where the record demonstrates to the reviewing court that a
"mistake has been committed." United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948). And it reviews the decision to lift an automatic stay for abuse of discretion. See In re Robbins, 964 F.2d 342, 345 (4th Cir. 1992) ("A decision to lift the automatic stay under section 362 of the Code is within the discretion of the bankruptcy judge and this decision may be overturned on appeal only for abuse of discretion."), as amended (May 27, 1992). "At its immovable core, the abuse of discretion standard requires a reviewing court to show enough deference to a primary decision- maker's judgment that the court does not reverse merely because it would have come to a different result in the first instance." Evans v. Eaton Corp. Long Term Disability Plan, 514 F.3d 315, 322 (4th Cir. 2008). An abuse of discretion occurs where a court "(1) acts 'arbitrarily, as if neither by rule nor discretion,' (2) fails to 'adequately . . . take into account judicially recognized factors constraining its exercise' of discretion, or (3) rests its decision on 'erroneous factual or legal
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premises.'" United States v. Alvarado, 840 F.3d 184, 189 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting James v. Jacobson, 6 F.3d 233, 239 (4th Cir. 1993)).
This Court has liberally construed Appellant's filings, because she appears in this matter pro se. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). This Court notes, however, that Appellant once held a law license. See Attorney Grievance Commission v. Mitzi Elaine Dailey, AG No. 6, September Term, 2020 (Getty, J.) (finding violations of multiple rules of professional conduct and Maryland Rules).
III. Analysis
Appellant argues that the "Consent Order should not have been granted without the consent of the Appellant, as evidenced by her signature."1ECF 8 at 9. But a contract need not be in writing, and the Bankruptcy Court personally witnessed the parties' meeting of the minds when Appellant agreed, on the record, to the terms reviewed by NewRez's counsel and later incorporated by reference in the Consent Order. ECF 5. There can be no question, based on the transcript of the February 9, 2026 hearing, that Appellant consented to the terms announced in open court. There is also no question that the Bankruptcy Court's ordered terms are the same as those to which the parties agreed on the record at the hearing. In fact, rather than restating the terms, it simply makes reference to "the terms stated on the record at the hearing held on February 9, 2026."
Bankruptcy Case ECF 54. The Consent Order specified that the notice of default should require cure "within fifteen (15) days after the mailing of said notice," whereas, in court, NewRez's
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counsel simply stated that the Debtor would have "15 days to oppose that notice." But that minor clarification does not alter the terms to which Appellant consented. This Court therefore finds no clear error or abuse of discretion in the Bankruptcy Court's determination that Appellant had consented to the terms of the Consent Order it entered.
The remaining question is whether the Bankruptcy Court abused its discretion in granting in rem relief. Section 362(d) authorizes a bankruptcy court to lift an automatic stay "for cause." 11 U.S.C. § 362(d). In this case, cause can be found in the parties' binding agreement, in court on February 9, 2026, that the stay should be lifted should Appellant (1) default by failing to make the required payments and (2) fail to cure her default after notice. And the Bankruptcy Court's decision to enter the Consent Order without obtaining an executed version is not an abuse of discretion, given what appears to have been gamesmanship on the part of Appellant to twice agree to terms on the record to forestall imminent evidentiary hearings. A court cannot be expected to engage in an endless cycle of scheduling hearings, only to have a litigant purport to resolve the matter and force postponement of the evidentiary hearing to a new date. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) expressly permits bankruptcy judges to exercise equitable authority to "prevent an abuse of process."
In sum, the Bankruptcy Court's entry of the Consent Order following the parties' in-court expression of consent was not arbitrary, did not violate any constraints on its lawful exercise of discretion, and did not rest on any erroneous factual or legal premise. The Consent Order is therefore affirmed.
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IV. Conclusion
For the reasons explained above, this Court will deny the appeal and affirm the Bankruptcy Court's Consent Order. A separate Order follows.
Dated: July 6, 2026 /s/
Stephanie A. Gallagher
United States District Judge