Hoie v. Lee

1 II. DISCUSSION¹

2 Petitioner is requesting a total amount of $166,882.72, under 22 U.S.C. § 9007(b)(3). See

3 Bonderud Aff. at 2, ECF No. 61; and Berman Aff. at 4, ECF No. 59. This amount consists of 4 attorney fees for Andrew M. Bonderud (lead counsel), Daron J. Berman (local counsel), and IPG

5 Legal (Korean law firm); and costs for On the QT (private investigator), and transportation and 6 lodging expenses for both the Petitioner and the lead counsel for their travels to Guam to attend 7 court proceedings, as well as transportation costs for Petitioner and the minor child for their 8 return to Norway.

9 Respondent objects to the motion and puts forth the following arguments: (1) Petitioner 10 should have only hired one attorney and that attorney should have been someone from Guam to 11 reduce expenses; (2) Petitioner's off-island counsel should not be compensated for his customary 12 hourly rate of $500 but rather, he should be compensated for a Guam attorney's customary 13 hourly rate of $350; (3) the only travel expenses that should be reimbursed are that of the return 14 of the minor child to Norway; (4) the Korean law firm attorney's fees and the private investigator 15 services do not fall under the allowable expenses under 22 U.S.C. § 9007(b)(3); and (5) the 16 business-class airfares for Petitioner and the child should be rejected, particularly because they 17 were paid under a corporate account. See Opp'n, ECF No. 62.

18 A. Entitlement to Attorney Fees

19 This civil action deals with the return of a minor child to her country of habitual 20 residence, under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction 21 ("Convention") and the International Child Abduction Remedies Act ("ICARA"). Pet., ECF No. 22 1. This court determined that the Respondent had not met her burden in proving her asserted 23 exceptions to removal under Articles 12, 13, or 13(b) of the Convention. As such, the court

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1 found for the Petitioner and ordered the Respondent to return the minor child to her country of 2 habitual residence. Order, ECF No. 55.

3 The federal statute entitling Petitioner to receive attorney fees and necessary expenses 4 can be found in 22 U.S.C. § 9007. Under that section, it states that "[a]ny court ordering the 5 return of a child pursuant to an action brought under section 9003 of this title shall order the 6 respondent to pay necessary expenses incurred by or on behalf of the petitioner, including court 7 costs, legal fees, foster home or other care during the course of proceedings in the action, and 8 transportation costs related to the return of the child, unless the respondent establishes that such 9 order would be clearly inappropriate." 22 U.S.C. § 9007(b)(3).

10 B. Standard

11 The lodestar method is used in ICARA cases. See Salazar v. Maimon, 750 F.3d 514, 523 12 (5th Cir. 2014). The Supreme Court has found that "[t]he most useful starting point for 13 determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on the 14 litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate." Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 15 (1983). This is known as the "lodestar figure," which is a "presumptively reasonable fee."

16 Gonzalez v. City of Maywood, 729 F.3d 1196, 1202 (9th Cir. 2013). And as the Supreme Court 17 has previously held, the presumption is a "strong" one. Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559

18 U.S. 542, 552 (2010). The court may then adjust the lodestar figure upward or downward based 19 on the factors set forth in Kerr that are not subsumed in the lodestar calculation.

2 Gonzalez, 729

20

21 2 The Kerr factors are as follows: (1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions; (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due 22 to acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience, 23 reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the "undesirability" of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases. Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526

24 F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 950 (1976).

3

1 F.3d at 1202.

2 The party applying for fees "bears the burden of establishing entitlement to an award and 3 documenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly rates." Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437. The 4 party opposing the fees "has a burden of rebuttal that requires submission of evidence to the 5 district court challenging the accuracy and reasonableness of the hours charged or the facts 6 asserted by the prevailing party in its submitted affidavits." Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 7 1397-98 (9th Cir. 1992).

8 C. Reasonable Rates

9 An established standard for determining a reasonable hourly rate is the "rate prevailing in 10 the community for similar work performed by attorneys of comparable skill, experience, and 11 reputation." Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 979 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation 12 omitted). The general rule is that the relevant community is the forum in which the district court 13 sits. Id. However, rates from outside the forum may be used if local counsel was "unwilling or 14 unable to perform because they lack the degree of experience, expertise, or specialization 15 required to handle properly the case." Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1405 (9th Cir. 1992).

16 Petitioner seeks a rate of $250 for his local counsel on Guam, Daron J. Berman; and a 17 rate of $500 for his lead counsel based in Florida, Andrew M. Bonderud. See Berman Aff. at 2,

18 ECF No. 59; Bonderud Aff. at 2, ECF No. 61. Local counsel's rate is not at issue here. What is at 19 issue is Florida-based lead counsel's rate.

20 Respondent argues that the relevant community is Guam so Guam rates should be applied 21 for Petitioner's Florida-based attorney. Opp'n at 3, ECF No. 62. Respondent argues that 22 experienced Guam attorney rates are between $300 and $350, and therefore, Bonderud's rate 23 should be reduced to $350. Id.; Cook Decl. at 1, ECF No. 63.

24 Petitioner contacted 14 Guam attorneys, which he found through the online Guam Bar

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1 directory. Høie Decl. at 1, ECF No. 68. Out of the 14 Guam attorneys he emailed,³only one 2 attorney responded and that was his local counsel, Daron Berman. Id. at 1-2. Berman informed 3 him, however, that he had never handled a Hague Convention abduction case. Id. at 2; Berman

4 Decl, at 1, ECF No. 69. The court also notes that this is the first Hague Convention petition filed 5 in the District Court of Guam (see Order at 1, ECF No. 55) and is unaware of any Guam bar 6 members having previously handled a Hague Convention petition.

7 Based on the foregoing, the court finds that Petitioner made reasonable efforts to find 8 local counsel but was faced with the unwillingness of Guam attorneys to represent him as 13 9 attorneys did not respond to him. When Petitioner was finally able to find local counsel willing 10 to take the case, the local counsel lacked the degree of experience, expertise, or specialization 11 required to handle the case properly. See id. The court agrees with Petitioner that retaining 12 counsel that has legal experience on the subject matter was necessary as bringing his daughter 13 home was of great importance to any parent in an international child abduction case.

14 Accordingly, because of the unavailability of local counsel either because they were unwilling or 15 unable to perform, this court will depart from the forum-rate rule. The question now is what 16 hourly rate to apply for Petitioner's Florida-based attorney.

17 Bonderud is the managing partner of The Bonderud Law Firm, P.A., and has been 18 practicing law in Florida since March 2013. Bonderud Aff. at 1, ECF No. 61. Bonderud filed an 19 affidavit indicating that his customary rate is $500 per hour. Id. at 2. Berman filed a declaration 20 indicating that his "legal research supports both $500 and $425 hourly rates for experienced 21 attorneys litigating Hague Convention cases before District Courts across America." Berman

22 Decl. at 1, ECF No. 68. In Petitioner's Reply, he directs the court to Homer and Harvey, both of 23 which are ICARA cases. In Homer v. Homer, the court found that an hourly rate of $500 is

24

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1 "within the range of prevailing market rates in the Southern District of Texas." 2022 WL 2 4290465, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 16, 2022). In Harvey, the court found that an hourly rate of $525 3 "is consistent with rates for experienced appellate counsel in complex federal litigation in the

4 Seattle market." Harvey v. Means, 2025 WL 2443151, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 25, 2025) 5 (emphasis added). Both of these cases were based on the prevailing market rates in their 6 respective communities, Southern District of Texas and Western District of Washington.

7 Petitioner has not provided evidence of the prevailing market rate in Florida for similar services 8 by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation. In fact, other than 9 counsel's affidavit that he has been practicing law in Florida since March 2013 and that he is 10 admitted to practice in several courts, the affidavit did not contain any other information on 11 counsel's skills or experience or areas of practice.⁴

12 Petitioner argues that in the alternative, if the court is not inclined to grant an hourly rate 13 of $500, then it should grant an hourly rate of $425, citing to several ICARA cases out of the

14 Southern District of New York. See Reply at 4-5, ECF No. 67. The court declines to apply the 15 prevailing market rates in the Southern District of New York. Bonderud is a practicing attorney 16 in Jacksonville, Florida. See Pet. for PHV Admission, ECF No. 4. Accordingly, the court 17 reviewed hourly rates in ICARA cases in the Middle District of Florida and finds that an hourly 18 rate of $320 is reasonable. The court bases its decision on the hourly rate decided in

19 Neiuwenhoven v. Pisani. 2023 WL 3794568 (M.D. Fla. May 18, 2023), report and 20 recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 3791463 (M.D. Fla. June 2, 2023). In that ICARA case, the 21 court awarded counsel who has 13 years of experience an hourly rate of $300. Id. at *9.

22 Bonderud has approximately the same years of experience as counsel in Neiuwenhoven.

23

6

1 However, taking into account inflation, $300 in 2023 is worth approximately $320 in August 2 2025.⁵See https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm (last viewed June 19, 2026).

3 Accordingly, the court will reduce Bonderud's $500 per hour rate to $320.

4 D. Reasonable Hours

5 Time is reasonably expended on the litigation when it is "useful and of a type ordinarily 6 necessary to secure the final result obtained from the litigation." Webb v. Bd. Of Educ. of Dyer

7 County, 471 U.S. 234, 242 (1985). Counsel has the burden to demonstrate that the number of 8 hours spent was reasonably necessary to the litigation. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437. Further, counsel 9 bears the burden of submitting detailed time records justifying the hours claimed to have been 10 expended. Id. The court may reduce hours where documentation of the hours is inadequate; if the 11 case was overstaffed and hours are duplicated; if the hours expended are deemed excessive or 12 otherwise unnecessary. Id. at 433-34. The court may also reduce hours unreasonably spent, or 13 where excessive time is spent on a particular task, or where there is redundant and/or ambiguity 14 in the billing. Id.

15 Respondent argues that it was "inappropriate" to have two attorneys handle this case "for 16 what one attorney could have very well handled." Opp'n at 3, ECF No. 62. Respondent argues 17 that the work is duplicative (id. at 6, Attach. to Lee Decl. at 1, ECF No. 64-1) but fails to cite 18 specifically which itemized work is duplicative between Berman and Bonderud.

6 Respondent 19 moves the court to strike the hours performed by Berman in its entirety. Opp'n at 6, ECF No. 62.

20 The court declines to strike the billable hours requested by Berman. As discussed supra, 21 out of the 14 Guam bar members that Petitioner contacted, only one responded to him. And that 22 one attorney lacked the degree of experience, expertise, or specialization in handling a Hague

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1 Convention petition. Bonderud, on the other hand, has had experience in Hague Convention 2 abduction cases. See Høie Decl. at 2, ECF No. 68. However, Bonderud is not admitted to 3 practice in Guam. Under this court's general rules, Bonderud may be temporarily admitted to 4 practice provided he has designated local counsel. GNLR 17.1(d)-(e). Further, the local counsel 5 "shall at all times meaningfully participate in the preparation and trial of the case with the 6 authority and responsibility to act as attorney of record for all purposes." GNLR 17.1(e). The 7 existence of both attorneys in this case was necessary.

8 The court will review the hours for reasonableness. 9 1. Andrew Michael Bonderud's billable hours

10 Andrew Michael Bonderud is claiming a total of 114.75 hours at $500 per hour for work 11 performed in the case, plus 96 hours of travel time at one half of counsel's customary hourly 12 rate. Bonderud Aff. at 2, ECF No. 61. The total attorney fees requested is $81,375. Id. 13 a. Work Performed in the Case

The court will reduce the following entries based on the court's review of the docket

14

entries and the court's finding that these could have been reasonably reviewed in less time.

15

20 The court will reduce the following entry to zero based on the court's finding that the task 21 is clerical in nature and could have easily been performed by the law firm's administrative staff.

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1 The court does not find redundant or vague entries nor inflated trial hour entries as 2 argued by Respondent (see Attach. to Lee Decl. at 6, ECF No. 64-1).

3 Based on the reductions, the court approves a total of 113.70 hours. Based on the 4 approved rate of $320, the approved amount for the work performed by Bonderud in this case is 5 $36,384.00.

6 b. Travel Time

7 Respondent objects to Bonderud's billed travel time. Opp'n at 3, ECF No. 62.

8 The touchstone in determining whether hours have been properly claimed is 9 reasonableness. The assessment of reasonableness is made by reference to standards established 10 in dealings between paying clients and the private bar. See Suzuki v. Yuen, 678 F.2d 761, 764 11 (9th Cir. 1982). "When a lawyer travels for one client he incurs an opportunity cost that is equal 12 to the fee he would have charged that or another client if he had not been traveling. That is why 13 lawyers invariably charge their clients for travel time, and usually at the same rate they charge 14 for other time[.]" Henry v. Webermeier, 738 F.2d 188, 194 (7th Cir. 1984).

15 In an ICARA case, the court found that "[a] prevailing party ordinarily may not recover a 16 fee for an attorney's travel time unless no local counsel can capably represent the party." Rath v.

17 Marcoski, 2018 WL 446651, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 17, 2018), aff'd, 898 F.3d 1306 (11th Cir. 18 2018) (emphasis added). That is the case here. As discussed supra, local counsel has never 19 handled a Hague Convention petition. Additionally, in another ICARA case, the court found that 20 counsel's travel time was compensable but reduced the travel time by fifty percent, since the 21 "time spent did not require any legal skill or experience, and there is no assertion that productive 22 work was done during the travel time that was not otherwise billed." Neiuwenhoven, 2023 WL 23 3794568, at *8.

24 Here, counsel is requesting for a total of 96 hours of travel time at one half of counsel's

9

1 customary hourly rate, which is the same as requesting for fifty percent of travel time at 2 counsel's full hourly rate. Ex. A to Bonderud Aff. at 1, ECF No. 61-1. The court will approve 3 fifty percent of counsel's travel time, which is 48 hours, at the court's approved hourly rate of 4 $320.

10 Based on the reductions, the court approves a total of 48 hours of travel time. Based on 11 the approved rate of $320, the approved amount for counsel's travel time is $15,360. 12 c. Total Attorney Fees for Bonderud

15 travel time $320 48 TOTAL 161.70

16

The total attorney fees awarded to Bonderud is $51,744.

17

18 2. Daron J. Berman

19 Daron J. Berman is claiming a total of 48.40 hours at $250 hourly rate, for a total of 20 $12,100 in attorney fees. Berman Aff. at 2, ECF No. 59.

21 a. Administrative/Clerical Work

22 Counsel block billed tasks that were both clerical and non-clerical work. Some of the 23 tasks listed were legal work that are compensable, such as reviewing the TRO or communicating 24 with cocounsel. However, counsel lumped these tasks with clerical work such as communicating

10

1 with the court clerk's office regarding required wet signature, coordinating service of summons 2 and other documents, resubmitting documents due to a missing page—all of which are best 3 handled by administrative staff. Non-legal work is not compensable at attorney rates. See

4 Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 288 n.10 (1989). Because these clerical tasks are block-billed 5 with compensable legal work, the court will reduce the following entries by 50 percent.

21

22 See Ex. 1 to Berman Aff., ECF No. 59-1. 23 b. Outside the Scope of 22 U.S.C. § 9007(b)(3)

24 The court will reduce the following entry to zero based on the court's finding that the task

11

1 is not related to the return of the minor child to Norway. See 22 U.S.C. § 9007(b)(3).⁷

6

c. Total Attorney Fees for Berman

7

The total reduction for Berman's billable hours is 2.50. Therefore, the total attorney fees

8

awarded to Berman is $11,600. This is the sum of 46.40 approved hours multiplied by an hourly

9

rate of $250.

10

3. IPG Legal: Petitioner's Attorneys in Korea

11

Petitioner seeks a total amount of $20,812.90 for IPG Legal. Berman Aff. at 2-3, ECF

12

No. 59. These are attorney fees incurred in Korea in a separate court proceeding in Korea. Reply

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at 6, ECF No. 67. Respondent opposes these attorney fees because they were not incurred as part

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of the proceedings in Guam. Opp'n at 4, ECF No. 62. The court agrees. The ICARA is clear:

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only an action brought under 22 U.S.C. § 9003 is compensable under 22 U.S.C. § 9007(b)(3).

16

The attorney fees incurred in Korea were not brought under 22 U.S.C. § 9003. Therefore, said

17

fees are not compensable under 22 U.S.C. § 9007(b)(3). See Adkins v. Adkins, 2020 WL

18

6508616, at * 2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2020) (ICARA provides for attorney fees brought under

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Section 9003 of the Hague Convention and "[t]he statute does not authorize the Court to award

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fees and costs in ancillary matters litigated in other fora[.]")

21

The request for an award of $20,812.90 for IPG Legal is denied.

22

23⁷In Neiuwenhover, instead of striking the time spent preparing for fee petition, the court reduced the hourly rate across the board. See 2023 WL 3794568, at *8; see also Aldinger v. Segler, 338 F. Supp. 2d 296, 298 (D.P.R. 2004), 24 aff'd, 157 F. App'x 317 (1st Cir. 2005) (reducing attorney fees by 50% across the board for various reasons, including the court's decision not to consider billable hours for matters occurring after the children were returned to their country of habitual residence). The court declines to impose an across-the-board fee reduction.

12

1 4. Lodestar Adjustment

2 After the determination of the lodestar figure, the court may then adjust the figure upward 3 or downward based on the factors set forth in Kerr that are not subsumed in the lodestar 4 calculation. Gonzalez, 729 F.3d at 1202.

5 The court has already considered several of the Kerr factors in calculating the lodestar 6 figure, such as the time and labor required; the undesirability of the case for local attorneys as it 7 is novel for them; the experience of the off-island attorney; the difficulty of the case; the results 8 obtained; and the attorney fee awards in similar cases. As such, the court finds no reason to 9 depart or adjust the lodestar figure.

10 E. Necessary Expenses

Petitioner requests for the following expenses: Bonderud's travel and lodging expenses,

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court fees and other litigation costs, private investigator fees, Petitioner's travel and lodging

12

expenses, and the minor child's return travel expenses. See Ex. 4 to Ex. 12 to Berman Aff., ECF

13

Nos. 59-4 to 59-12; Ex. B to Bonderud Aff., ECF No. 61-2.

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1. Bonderud's Travel Expenses

15

Respondent objects to counsel's travel and lodging expenses. Opp'n at 6, ECF No. 62.

16

Bonderud is requesting travel costs in the amount of $16,923.24. Bonderud Aff. at 2, ECF No.

17

61. This amount consists of the following expenses (see Ex. B to Bonderud Aff., ECF No. 61-2):

18

23

8

24 This was paid using partial miles and partial cash ($2,491.00 in cash). 10 This was paid with 335,664 points.

13

4

5

The Ninth Circuit allows for reasonable transportation and lodging expenses for counsel

6

in a Hague Convention case. Cuellar v. Joyce, 603 F.3d 1142, 1143-44 (9th Cir. 2010). Here, the

7

court finds that business class airfares are not reasonable and necessary expense. Accordingly,

8

the court will reduce the cost of the airfare by fifty percent, from $11,724 to $5,862. From the

9

court's firsthand experience, it notes that the average cost of a roundtrip economy ticket from

10

Jacksonville, Florida to Guam ranges between $2,500 and $3,300.

11

The court also finds that lodging in a luxury hotel was not a reasonable and necessary

12

expense. Accordingly, the court will apply the federal lodging per diem rate for Guam that was

13

in effect in June-August 2025, which was $179. See

14

https://www.defensetravel.dod.mil/neorates/report/index.php (last viewed June 21, 2026).

15

Lodging was for 11 nights.¹¹Thus, the approved total lodging cost is $1,969, plus 11% hotel

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room and occupancy taxes and fees¹²for 11 nights, which brings the total amount to $2,185.59.

17

The court grants counsel's travel and lodging expenses in the amount of $8,047.59. This

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is the sum of $5,862 (airfare) and $2,185.59 (11 nights of lodging, plus 11% taxes and fees).

19

2. Court Fees and Other Litigation Costs

20

Petitioner seeks an award of necessary costs in the amount of $1,945.37, incurred by the

21

22⁹Amount paid for a different departure date due to extended trial.

11 See infra re discussion on additional days of lodging prior to the hearing and trial dates. The same analysis applies 23 here, and the court finds them reasonable. For the preliminary injunction hearing held on July 2, 2025, counsel arrived on Guam on June 29, 2025, at 9:45 p.m. (see Ex. B at 2, ECF No. 61-2). Additionally, counsel arrived on

24 Guam for the trial set for August 4, 2025, on August 2, 2025, at 6:05 pm (see Ex. B at 18, ECF No. 61-2). 12 The 11% hotel room and occupancy taxes and fees were based on the court's calculation from Exhibit B of Bonderud's Affidavit. See Ex. B at 10 and 31, ECF No. 61-2.

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1 Berman law firm. Ex. 1 to Berman Aff. at 6, ECF No. 59-1. This amount consists of court fees, 2 process server fee, and photocopying costs. Respondent does not object to this amount, and the 3 court finds that these are necessary litigation costs under 22 U.S.C. § 9007(b)(3). Accordingly, 4 the court approves the amount of $1,945.37.

5 3. Private Investigator, On the QT

6 Petitioner is requesting the amount of $23,952.96 for investigator services rendered by

7 On the QT. Berman Aff. at 3, ECF No. 59; Ex. 4 to Berman Aff. at 1-7, ECF No. 59-4.

8 Respondent objects to this request and relies on Hulsh v. Hulsh. Opp'n at 5, ECF No. 62. In that 9 case, the district court denied the requested investigator fees and noted that the respondent has 10 provided caselaw that "indicates [the investigator fee] is not recoverable under the statute" and 11 cited to cases where private investigator fees were not recoverable under 28 U.S.C. § 1920.

12 Hulsh v. Hulsh, 2021 WL 963770, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 15, 2021). Section 1920 of Title 28,

13 United States Code, is different and separate from the applicable statute here, which is 22 U.S.C. 14 § 9007(b)(3). Additionally, in Hulsh, it appears that the investigator was not successful in that 15 the court noted "attempts to locate" the abducted children. 2021 WL 963770, at *9. Here, the 16 investigator successfully located the child. Petitioner argued that "[t]estimony at trial proved that

17 Petitioner's investigators played a vital role in locating the Respondent and A.L.H. in Guam, a 18 remote island to the parties, that neither one nor their child had ever visited prior to Respondent's 19 decision to relocate [in Guam]." Reply at 6, ECF No. 67. Petitioner emphasized that "[b]ut for 20 the investigators and their efforts, Petitioner may have never located the Respondent." Id.

21 Section 9007(b)(3) of Title 22, United States Code, does not specifically list investigator 22 fees as compensable. However, the list provided in that statute is not exclusive. Rather, it is 23 illustrative. See 22 U.S.C. § 9007(b)(3) (use of the term "including"). The test is whether such 24 expenses were necessary and related to the return of the child. Id. In Neves v. Neves, the court

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1 allowed investigative services fee because the court found such expense "to be reasonable and 2 necessary to the Petitioner's efforts" to have the abducted children returned to their country of 3 habitual residence. 637 F. Supp. 2d 322, 344 (W.D.N.C. 2009). Compare Siras v. Bah, 2026 WL 4 1558376, at *5 (M.D. Pa. June 2, 2026) (denying investigator fee services because the 5 unsuccessful surveillance efforts did not help the return of the child in any way). See also Ariza 6 v. Ash, 2023 WL 6131088, at *4 (W.D. La. Sept. 19, 2023) (finding that the costs, including 7 costs for investigative services, were reasonable and necessary for the child's return to Honduras 8 under the Hague Convention).

9 Based on the trial records, the court agrees with Petitioner that the investigator's services 10 played a vital role as the investigator successfully located the child in Guam. Accordingly, the 11 court finds the investigator services as necessary in the return of the child to Norway. The court 12 reviewed the invoice of On the QT and finds them reasonable. See Ex. 4 to Berman Aff. at 1-7,

13 ECF No. 59-4. The court grants the amount of $23,952.96. 14 4. Petitioner's Travel and Lodging Expenses

15 Petitioner requests the following amounts for his travel and lodging expenses. See Ex. 5 16 to Ex. 12, ECF Nos. 59-5 to 59-12. The total amount requested is $9,773.25. See Ex. 2 to

17 Berman Aff. at 2, ECF No. 59-2; Berman Aff. at ⁋⁋ 10-11, ECF No. 59. The court notes that

18 Petitioner did not request for lodging for two nights during the extended trial, with the trial 19 having ended on the evening of August 8, 2025. Petitioner also did not request for travel costs 20 from Japan to Guam during his July 30, 2025, trip to Guam. As noted below, he only requested 21 for travel costs from Oslo to Japan for his July 30, 2025, trip to Guam.

24

13 Respondent did not object to the currency conversion amounts provided by Petitioner.

16

9

10 Respondent objects to "[a]ll claimed travel expenses, except those strictly necessary to 11 returning [the minor child] to Norway[.]" Opp'n at 6, ECF No. 62. Respondent's objection has 12 no merit. Airfare and hotel expenses are allowed. See Siras, 2026 WL 1558376, at *3; Ariza, 13 2023 WL 6131088, at *4. The hearings and the trial occurred in this court's jurisdiction, in

14 Guam, and Petitioner is a resident of Norway and is located in Norway. Accordingly, the 15 reimbursements for Petitioner's economy airfares and hotels to allow him to attend critical court 16 proceedings are appropriate here. The court notes that Petitioner did not attend in-person the 17 final pretrial conference and hearing on all motions that were held on July 29, 2025. Rather, he 18 opted to attend that court proceeding via Zoom. See Minute Entry, ECF No. 42. Petitioner only 19 attended in-person the preliminary injunction hearing held on July 2, 2025, and the trial that 20 commenced on August 4, 2025, and concluded on August 8, 2025. See Minute Entries, ECF Nos. 21 23, 43-46, & 50.

22 Additionally, the court recognizes that the extra day or two of lodging prior to the hearing 23 and trial is reasonable. The court recognizes the unique situation of traveling to Guam from

24

14 Respondent did not object to the currency conversion amounts provided by Petitioner.

17

1 anywhere in the world other than Asia, with travel time of approximately 20 hours or more, and 2 with limited flight schedule availability unlike other places in the United States. The court also 3 takes into account potential flight delays, the crossing of the international dateline, and the 8- 4 hour time difference.

5 Respondent also objects to the business-class airfares from Seoul, Korea to Oslo,

6 Norway. Opp'n at 5, ECF No. 62. Respondent puts forth two arguments. First, the business-class 7 airfares should be reduced to economy-class tickets. Id. Second, the business-class airfares were 8 purchased through a corporate account using "UATP," presumably by Petitioner's employer 9 since Petitioner represented to the court at the end of the trial that his employer was going to 10 purchase business-class airfares for their return home. Id. Respondent argues that because "these 11 expenses were already absorbed by the company, Petitioner has not suffered any out-of-pocket 12 loss" and therefore should not be reimbursed. Id. at 5-6. The court agrees with Respondent on the 13 business-class airfares.

14 One of the two main purposes of 22 U.S.C. § 9007(b)(3) is "to restore the applicant to the

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1 in fact incur the costs. Accordingly, the court will not grant the reimbursement request of 2 $7,454.16, for the business-class airfares for Petitioner and the minor child on their return home 3 to Norway.

4 The court approves a total of $2,319.09,¹⁷for Petitioner's travel and lodging expenses.

5 F. Whether Ordering Respondent to Pay for the Necessary Expenses are Cleary Inappropriate

6

Under ICARA, the court is required to award the Petitioner's necessary expenses unless

7

such award "would be clearly inappropriate." 22 U.S.C. § 9007(b)(3). By providing for an award

8

of necessary expenses for the prevailing party, ICARA "contemplates the use of such awards as a

9

deterrent to violations of the Convention." Friedrich v. Thompson, 1999 WL 33951234, at *2

10

(M.D.N.C. Nov. 26, 1999). Respondent bears the burden of showing that it would be clearly

11

inappropriate to award the requested fees and costs. Id.

12

Without citing any caselaw, Respondent argues that ordering her to pay for the necessary

13

expenses incurred by or on behalf of the Petitioner is clearly inappropriate because (1) she has no

14

financial means to pay, and (2) she acted in good faith belief that she was protecting her child.

15

See Opp'n at 2-4, 6-7, ECF No. 62; Lee Decl., ECF No. 64.

16

Two main considerations have emerged in the courts' review of the "clearly

17

inappropriate" caveat under 22 U.S.C. § 9007(b)(3). First, "whether a fee award would impose

18

such a financial hardship that it would significantly impair the respondent's ability to care for the

19

child". Hulsh, 2021 WL 963770, at *5. Second, "whether a respondent had a good faith belief

20

that her actions in removing or retaining a child were legal or justified." Id. See also Ariza, 2023

21

WL 6131088, at *4; Homer v. Homer, 2022 WL 4290465, at *8 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 16, 2022)

22

(relevant considerations include "whether a full fee award would leave a respondent-parent with

23

24

19

1 a 'straitened' financial condition from caring for her child" and "the respondent's good-faith 2 belief that his actions were legal.").

3 1. Financial Situation

4 Respondent states that she is "currently unemployed, without assets," and unable to meet 5 even her own living expenses. Lee Decl. at 2, ECF No. 64. Other than a statement in her 6 declaration, Respondent provided no other evidence such as depleted bank account statements or 7 loss of her investments. It is, after all, Respondent's burden.

8 In response, Petitioner argues and reminds the court of Respondent's testimony at trial 9 that "she received an inheritance from her grandmother, that her brother manages funds for her 10 and her siblings, and that she receives money from her brother upon request." Reply at 2, ECF

11 No. 67. Further, Petitioner reminds the court of Respondent's testimony at trial that she took the 12 job at the Nikko hotel primarily for the health insurance benefits and that her employer testified 13 that Respondent's hours were reduced to no more than 32 hours per week with a salary of $13 14 per hour. Id. Petitioner argues that if Respondent's hotel job was truly her only source of income, 15 there was no way she would have been able to afford her monthly rental at Summer Towers with 16 rent ranging between $2,800 and $3,150, per month at that place. Id.

17 Petitioner also states that since he met the Respondent, "she has never held a job for more 18 than a few months" but nonetheless "always had the ability to pay for any expenses whenever an 19 expense arose." Høie Decl. at 2, ECF No. 68. Petitioner further states that Respondent would 20 "take months long trips" and was able to afford one of the most prestigious firms in Norway to 21 represent her in their child custody battle, in addition to her already existing government-paid 22 attorneys by the Norwegian government. Id. at 2-3.

23 The court reviewed Respondent's testimony at trial, and she testified that she has access 24 to additional funds besides her hotel employment income. On August 7, 2025, Respondent

20

1 testified that her family is "very comfortable" and although her family's money is not her own 2 money, she stated that they are "very giving". But more importantly and the main basis for this 3 court's decision, Respondent testified that she inherited money from her grandmother who 4 passed away in 1997. Although the inheritance "wasn't like too much money", Respondent 5 testified that it has grown through investments. Respondent indicated that her brother is the one 6 who does her investments, because he is in finance and holds an MBA and that he is "really good 7 at managing money". When asked further by counsel, Respondent testified that "he's pretty good 8 at it" so "whenever I need money, like he sends it and we kind of discuss like what to do, but I 9 don't know how to do funding, mutual fund, stock market, so he manages it."

10 In light of Respondent's own testimony at trial regarding her financial resources, and the 11 fact that her inheritance has been successfully managed by her brother for close to three decades, 12 the court does not find that Respondent has no financial resources simply because she is 13 unemployed. The court also notes that had Respondent's only source of income was her 14 $13/hour hotel job, she would not have been able to afford private schooling for the child, along 15 with the child's extracurricular activities that were revealed at trial.

16 Moreover, the factor of "whether a fee award would impose such a financial hardship that 17 it would significantly impair the respondent's ability to care for the child," is inapplicable here, 18 as the child is in Norway with Petitioner and he has custody of the child.

19 For the reasons stated, the court finds that Respondent has not met her burden that the 20 necessary expenses are "clearly inappropriate."

21 2. Good-Faith Argument

22 Respondent states that she genuinely believed the child was subjected to psychological 23 abuse and potentially physical abuse in the long run. Lee Decl. at 1-2, ECF No. 64. This was

24 Respondent's basis for the removal, as argued at trial and again, as argued here for the court to

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1 make a finding that the necessary expenses are clearly inappropriate.

2 The problem with Respondent's argument is that the good-faith consideration under the 3 "clearly inappropriate" caveat pertains to having removed the child believing the removal was 4 legal. That is not the case here. Respondent stipulated to the fact that she "failed to return [the 5 minor child] to Petitioner after a scheduled visitation and removed [the minor child] from

6 Norway without Petitioner's consent." Joint Stipulation at ⁋ 9, ECF No. 33. Respondent was

22