O R D E R
Brock Fredin, a social media commentator, appeals the dismissal of his diversity action alleging that a journalist (and others) defamed him by reporting on his well- documented history of harassing women and comparing that conduct to his recent criticism of a judicial law clerk in a high-profile legal proceeding. We affirm.
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We recount the facts as alleged in Fredin's complaint, accepting his well-pleaded factual allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor. See O'Brien
v. Village of Lincolnshire, 955 F.3d 616, 621 (7th Cir. 2020). We also draw upon the * We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. APP. P. 32.1
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documents Fredin attached to his complaint, including the allegedly defamatory news article at issue. See id.
Fredin, a Wisconsin citizen, operates an X (formerly known as Twitter) account in which he criticized Allison Greenfield, the law clerk of the state-court judge presiding over a civil fraud case brought by the State of New York against President Donald Trump and others. Fredin accused Greenfield of violating ethics rules, being politically biased against President Trump, and leaking inside information about the trial to reporters. Fredin rose to prominence after President Trump reposted Fredin's criticism on social media and himself criticized Greenfield. Soon thereafter, a reporter named Adam Klasfeld, who was covering the fraud case, wrote an article in an online publication called The Messenger that exposed Fredin's history of harassing women—all well-documented through court records of restraining orders and criminal charges against Fredin. Adam Klasfeld, The Story Behind Trump's Gag Order Involves a Man Under Criminal Investigation for Stalking, T HE MESSENGER (Dec. 14, 2023), https://perma.cc/C9DG-CWF2?type=image. Klasfeld reported that Fredin had harassed multiple women by creating websites in their names, emailing their employers and colleagues with accusations of criminal conduct, and filing complaints with their professional organizations. We will later examine the specific statements, but for now it suffices to say that Klasfeld made clear he was relying on court records. Klasfeld, for instance, repeatedly qualified the accusations against Fredin with phrases like "a court found," "court records show," and "[the judge] wrote."
Klasfeld compared Fredin's past harassment of these women to his treatment of Greenfield. According to Klasfeld, Fredin filed a bar complaint against Greenfield, reported her to various state agencies and disciplinary committees, and posted on his social media a website (with a URL using Greenfield's name) inviting viewers to criticize her and call for her disbarment.
The civil-fraud trial and Fredin's claims of misconduct against Greenfield were also covered by a journalist for Law360 named Frank Runyeon. Frank Runyeon, Trump Attys Hit With Gag Order Over Law Clerk Comments, L AW360 (Nov. 3, 2023), https://perma.cc/REQ4-MMML. Runyeon posted a link to the article on X, summarizing the contents as "Law clerk Allison Greenfield did not violate ethics rules with her >$500 political campaign donations, legal experts told @Law360 … ."
Before these articles were released, a "third party" (who Fredin "believed" to be Klasfeld, Runyeon, and Greenfield) contacted Fredin's employer. Fredin did not allege what the third party said to his employer. Fredin was later fired.
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II
Fredin sued Klasfeld, Runyeon, Greenfield, and The Messenger's owner (JAF Communications) in federal court, invoking diversity jurisdiction to bring claims under Wisconsin law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Fredin alleged that (1) Klasfeld's article was defamatory because, in Fredin's view, the accusations of stalking and harassment were lies and the article implied he had "criminally harass[ed]" a public official; (2) the defendants conspired to discourage Fredin from seeking proof of Greenfield's misconduct by publishing those allegedly defamatory articles; (3) the defamation amounted to intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (4) the defendants had conspired to tortiously interfere with his employment.†
Upon the defendants' motions, the district court dismissed Fredin's complaint without prejudice. Each claim, the court ruled, was defective under both Wisconsin law and New York law (the parties disputed which state's law controlled). In relevant part, the court explained that Fredin's defamation claim against Klasfeld failed because
(1) Klasfeld's reporting on Fredin's history of harassment was substantially true based on court records, and (2) Klasfeld's comparison of that history to Fredin's behavior towards Greenfield was protected opinion. Turning to Fredin's claims about a conspiracy between the defendants to defame him and interfere with his employment, the court explained that the allegations were too vague and conclusory to state a claim. And for substantially the same reasons, the court ruled that Fredin's allegations of intentionally inflicting emotional distress were insufficient. Despite dismissing the complaint, the district court granted Fredin time to file an amended complaint. But Fredin did not do so. After the time to amend passed, the court entered final judgment for the defendants.
III
In this diversity case, we apply state law for the substantive issues and federal law to all procedural issues, including pleading standards. Wertymer v. Walmart, Inc., † Fredin also asserted that other portions of Klasfeld's article were defamatory (e.g., insinuating that he was coordinating with President Trump and that he
"physically attacked" women), but he does not renew those arguments on appeal, and so we do not consider them. See Bradley v. Village of University Park, 59 F.4th 887, 897 (7th Cir. 2023). We also say nothing more about Fredin's argument—similarly abandoned on appeal—that Runyeon's tweet was defamatory.
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142 F.4th 491, 495 n.1 (7th Cir. 2025). Fredin argues that Wisconsin law should govern over New York law. Because he cannot state a claim under either state's law, we assume for the sake of this analysis that Wisconsin law applies.
A. Defamation
Under Wisconsin's defamation law, a plaintiff "must allege a false statement that was communicated to a third person that is unprivileged and capable of defamatory meaning." Wagner v. Allen Media Broad., 3 N.W.3d 758, 768 (Wis. Ct. App. 2024). Truth is an "absolute defense" to defamation. Terry v. J. Broad. Corp., 840 N.W.2d 255, 266 (Wis. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting Anderson v. Hebert, 798 N.W.2d 275, 280 (Wis. Ct. App. 2011)). Wisconsin requires only that the statement at issue be "substantially true," not that it be true "in every particular." Id.
i. Pleading Standards
Fredin first argues that the district court erred at the pleading stage by not accepting as true his allegations that Klasfeld's words were false statements and not nonactionable opinions. But we see no error in the district court's handling of this issue. At the pleading stage, courts can and do adjudicate whether a statement is factually true or a matter of protected opinion. See, e.g., Fin. Fiduciaries, LLC v. Gannett Co., 46 F.4th 654, 665-66 (7th Cir. 2022) (applying Wisconsin law); Pippen v. NBCUniversal Media, LLC, 734 F.3d 610, 612, 616 (7th Cir. 2013); Ladd v. Uecker, 780 N.W.2d 216, 218, 220-21 & 220 n.4 (Wis. Ct. App. 2010). Courts must accept only well-pleaded facts as true when deciding a motion to dismiss. See O'Brien, 955 F.3d at 621. Courts need not, and should not, accept conclusory allegations that are contradicted by documents attached to the pleadings (like Klasfeld's article) or central to the claims (like the court records Klasfeld relied on). See Fin. Fiduciaries, 46 F.4th at 663-64.
ii. Substantial Truth
Fredin next challenges the district court's conclusion that Klasfeld's reporting was substantially true. As best we can tell, he faults Klasfeld for disseminating false accusations by his victims. But that argument misrepresents the nature of Klasfeld's article. Klasfeld did not report that he had spoken with the women and repeated their accusations but rather that he was relaying what courts have said about Fredin's interactions with women. By limiting his reporting in this way, Klasfeld inoculated himself from liability. See Fin. Fiduciaries, 46 F.4th at 666 (applying Wisconsin law to distinguish non-defamatory reporting on what a court said the plaintiff did from
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potentially defamatory reporting on what the defendant believed the plaintiff had done). Whether Fredin's accusers are lying—a view rejected by every court to have considered the issue—is beside the point. What matters is whether Klasfeld's characterization of the court documents is substantially true.
The district court did not err by concluding that the reporting was substantially true. A side-by-side comparison of Klasfeld's reporting and the relevant court documents makes this clear:
• Klasfeld reported that Fredin "has been hit with 50-year restraining orders barring him from
contacting three women."
• According to a federal district court in Minnesota, three women
"have been awarded 50-year harassment restraining orders"
against Fredin. Fredin v. Middlecamp, No. 17-CV-03058 (SRN/HB), 2020 WL 6867424, at *2 (D. Minn. Nov. 23, 2020) (Fredin I), aff'd, 855 F. App'x 314 (8th Cir.
2021).
• Klasfeld reported that Fredin "has been criminally convicted multiple times for violating two of those orders."
• Another order from that court shows Fredin has twice been convicted of violating those orders. Fredin v. Middlecamp,
500 F. Supp. 3d 752, 765, 767 (D. Minn. 2020) (Fredin II), aff'd,
855 F. App'x 314 (8th Cir. 2021).
• Klasfeld reported that Fredin "is currently under criminal
investigation for more suspected restraining order violations and possible stalking."
• Wisconsin court records show that Fredin was under investigation for stalking at the time of Klasfeld's article and has since been convicted. See Wisconsin v. Fredin, No. 2024CF000209 (St. Croix County).
• Klasfeld reported that Fredin "has attacked the targeted women in their professional circles, created
• The federal district court in Minnesota recounts that Fredin has harassed his victims by
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harassing websites about them, and filed formal complaints against them, according to court filings."
contacting their colleagues, schools, and professional organizations with accusations of
"criminal conduct," "solicit[ing] others to file complaints" against them, and creating websites revealing personal information like home addresses. Fredin II,
500 F. Supp. 3d at 762-67. This behavior warranted restraining orders. Id.
• Klasfeld reported that Fredin has filed "retaliatory lawsuits" against his victims.
• That same court concluded that Fredin "has used litigation in a bad-faith effort to circumvent the 50-year [harassment restraining orders] issued against him" and noted that state courts have agreed. Fredin I, 2020 WL 6867424, at *10.
• Klasfeld reported that Fredin has
"openly threatened other courtroom clerks whose judges ruled in favor of one of his victims. 'Remember, each clerk is going to get reported to the Professional Responsibility Board and websites are going up exposing you for your failure to protect,'
Fredin wrote in an appellate brief from September 2020."
• That same court used nearly the same language: "Fredin has expressly threatened to post websites about court staff and file ethics complaints in retaliation for unfavorable rulings[:] …
'Remember, each clerk is going to get reported to the Professional Responsibility Board and websites are going up exposing you for your failure to protect.'" Id. at *3. As this comparison shows, Klasfeld's reporting was not defamatory.
iii. Opinion
Fredin also generally challenges the district court's conclusion that Klasfeld was expressing an opinion when Klasfeld compared Fredin's past harassment to Fredin's
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criticism of Greenfield. Fredin highlights Klasfeld's references that his criticism
"echoes" and "mirror[s]" his "pattern" of "harassing" and "threatening" other women. In Fredin's view, Klasfeld's references conjured notions of criminal harassment, which the district court should have viewed as an actionable statement of fact. Wisconsin's defamation law distinguishes between fact and opinion. Purely factual statements can be defamatory. Wagner, 3 N.W.3d at 775 n.9 (citing R ESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566, 170-72 (1977)). This includes, for example, attributing a criminal record to one who has none. See Teague v. Schimel, 896 N.W.2d 286, 301 (Wis. 2017). But a pure expression of opinion that discloses underlying facts is not actionable "no matter how defamatory" the opinion. Wagner, 3 N.W.3d at 775 n.9. It is not defamatory, for example, to report accurately on one's business practices—such as slow delivery or losing loaned items—and then characterize those practices with phrases like "rob," "ripped off," "cheat," "victim," or "scam." Terry, 840 N.W.2d at 265-66. Even though the opinion might imply criminality, the characterization is not actionable. Id.
With this distinction in mind, the district court made no error concluding that Klasfeld's comparison was nonactionable opinion. As the court noted, Fredin does not dispute the factual basis for Klasfeld's reporting. Fredin filed a complaint against Greenfield with four disciplinary organizations and mailed the complaint to her judge. He also posted on his social media a website that used Greenfield's name as the URL, branded her a "Democratic Operative and Hack," shared her photo, and called for her to be disbarred. Because Fredin's defamation claim rests on whether Klasfeld came to the correct opinion from disclosed, truthful facts, the claim fails as a matter of law. See id.
iv. Public Figure Status & Conspiracy
The parties spill much ink over whether Fredin is a public figure. But because public figure status determines merely how at fault the defendant must be for defaming the plaintiff, that determination matters only if a statement is plausibly defamatory. See Wagner, 3 N.W.3d at 768. Since we agree with the district court that Klasfeld's article was not defamatory, we need not address Fredin's public figure status. And because no individual defendant defamed Fredin, we do not address whether the defendants conspired to defame him. See N. Highland Inc. v. Jefferson Mach. & Tool Inc., 898 N.W.2d 741, 747 & n.11 (Wis. 2017) (holding that conspiracy is dependent on individually wrongful acts).
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B. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Fredin contests only in general terms the dismissal of his claim for intentional distress. He argues that publishing false accusations of criminal behavior qualifies as the kind of "extreme and outrageous" behavior required to sustain his claim. See Munger v. Seehafer, 890 N.W.2d 22, 43 (Wis. Ct. App. 2016). But as we have explained, Klasfeld's reporting was substantially true, and Fredin points us to no authority suggesting that non-defamatory statements qualify as "extreme and outrageous" behavior.
C. Tortious Interference with a Contract
Fredin asserts in only cursory fashion that his allegations about tortious interference with a contract were sufficient to survive dismissal. The allegations concern circumstances that preceded the publication of Klasfeld's article: "a third party, believed to be Defendant Klasfeld, Greenfield, and Runyeon working together,"
contacted his work, and then "continued their actions, intentionally constituting a disruption of [Fredin's] work, likely involving several additional instances of contact, until present."
We agree with the district court that these allegations are too vague and conclusory to state a claim. Such conclusory allegations, "devoid of 'further factual enhancement,'" are the sort that the Supreme Court has instructed federal courts to reject. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007)).
D. Civil Rights Claim
Fredin next asserts that he pleaded a civil rights claim—that Greenfield, a government employee, retaliated against him for his speech disparaging her—and that we should remand for discovery on that issue. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. But Fredin waived this claim by not raising it in the district court. He had the responsibility to develop his arguments and "indicate their relevance under the correct legal standard.'' See Puffer v. Allstate Ins. Co., 675 F.3d 709, 718 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Econ. Folding Box Corp. v. Anchor Frozen Foods Corp., 515 F.3d 718, 721 (7th Cir. 2008)). But unlike his other claims, he did not list a civil rights claim in his complaint, and he never indicated he sought to raise such a claim in response to the defendants' motions to dismiss. And perhaps most critically, the district court gave Fredin the chance to amend his complaint, but he
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declined to do so, and he may not do so now on appeal. See Gonzalez v. Feinerman,
663 F.3d 311, 315 (7th Cir. 2011).
E. Judicial Bias
Finally, we understand Fredin to argue that the district court was biased against him and should have recused itself because, in his view, it misapplied the pleading standards and its order "track[ed] the rhetoric of the accused publications." But legal error does not suggest bias (and, of course, the court did not err here), see Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994), and any purported "tracking" of the language from Klasfeld's article was a natural part of analyzing a defamation claim.
AFFIRMED
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