II. OUR NEW PROCEDURAL RULING
IS NOT ENOUGH TO REOPEN THE CASE
Rule 60(b) is a narrow exception to finality. It lets a party move for relief from a judgment based on five enumerated grounds: mistake, new evidence, fraud, voidness, or satisfac- tion of the judgment. R. 60(b)(1)-(5). If none of those catego- ries fits, there is an equitable catchall at the end of the Rule:
"any other reason that justifies relief." R. 60(b)(6). Instead of the one-year time limit for motions based on the first three grounds, 60(b)(6) motions need only "be made within a rea- sonable time." R. 60(c)(1). We review the denial of a 60(b) motion for abuse of discretion. Cox v. Horn, 757 F.3d 113, 118 (3d Cir. 2014).
In 2010, before Williams's latest sentence, the Supreme Court ruled that a resentencing on all counts generates a new judgment. So even if the defendant challenged the prior judg- ment in a federal habeas petition, a new habeas petition chal- lenging the new judgment does not count as second or
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successive. Magwood, 561 U.S. at 341-42. Four years ago, our Court applied Magwood, holding that a renewed habeas peti- tion after resentencing does not count as a second or successive challenge to any of the convictions for which he was resen- tenced. Lesko v. Sec'y, Pa. Dep't of Corr., 34 F.4th 211, 225 (3d Cir. 2022). Williams claims that this holding qualifies as a "rea- son that justifies relief," casting his sentence adjustment as akin to a Magwood resentencing. R. 60(b)(6). But our new pro- cedural decision alone does not warrant 60(b) reopening, and there is no need to remand.
A. A change in case law alone is not enough of an extraordinary circumstance to warrant reopening
Because Rule 60(b) is an exception to the ordinary finality of judgments, we police its bounds with care. Its first five cat- egories specify substantive requirements, and its first three are cabined by a one-year time limit.
To get around those subject-matter and time limits, litigants are tempted to invoke Rule 60(b)(6)'s catchall. But catchalls are not unlimited—they are cabined by a couple of interpretive canons. First, there is the ejusdem generis canon: After the list of specifics, the catchall implicitly requires circumstances sim- ilar to those listed. Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 199 (2012). Second, there is the presumption against superfluity. Id. at 174. Reading 60(b)(6) broadly would swallow up (b)(1) through (5) and gut the one-year time limit where it applies (in subparts (1)-(3)). Rather than redundant, "[t]hese provisions are mutually exclu- sive." Pioneer Inv. Servs. v. Brunswick Assocs., 507 U.S. 380, 393 (1993). In other words, (b)(6) applies only if (b)(1) through
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(5) would not. BLOM Bank SAL v. Honickman, 605 U.S. 204, 211 (2025). Likewise, the (b)(6) catchall cannot be used to bring claims that belong under other parts of the federal rules. One cannot "repackage tardy Rule 59(e) motions [to alter or amend a judgment] based on legal errors." Kemp v. United States, 596 U.S. 528, 538 (2022). Nor can one use (b)(6) to cover a motion that "is in substance a successive habeas peti- tion." Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 531 (2005). The upshot is that "Rule 60(b)(6) is available only in nar- row circumstances"; its standard is "stringent" and "very strict." BLOM Bank SAL, 605 U.S. at 211, 213, 214. To prevail, the movant must show "extraordinary circumstances where, without such relief, an extreme and unexpected hardship would occur." Sawka v. Healtheast, Inc., 989 F.2d 138, 140 (3d Cir.
1993).
Rule 60(b)(6) is "equitable and case-dependent." Cox, 757 F.3d at 115. To apply it, "a district court must consider the full measure of any properly presented facts and circumstances attendant to the movant's request." Id. at 122. Relevant factors may include the type and effect of any change in law, the merits of the underlying claim for relief, the age of the conviction, the movant's diligence, the movant's actual innocence, and the existence of a death sentence. Id. at 124-26; Satterfield v. Dist. Att'y Phila., 872 F.3d 152, 164 (3d Cir. 2017) (innocence). We have acknowledged that a change in law may be one such factor. Cox, 757 F.3d at 124; Satterfield, 872 F.3d at 161. Even though a change in law is relevant, the Supreme Court has left open whether such a change, unaccompanied by other equitable factors, can justify 60(b)(6) relief on its own. See
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Polites v. United States, 364 U.S. 426, 433 (1960); see also Kemp, 596 U.S. at 540 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). Yet we have never held that a change in law, without other supporting equitable factors, sufficed. See Bracey v. Superintendent Rock- view SCI, 986 F.3d 274, 296-97 (3d Cir. 2021) (remanding in part because habeas court had denied movant's request to hold hearing and develop record and had refused to consider under- lying merits at all); Cox, 757 F.3d at 126 (remanding in part to consider death sentence and merits); Satterfield, 872 F.3d at 162 (remanding in part to consider meritorious claim). Indeed, we have stressed "that intervening changes in the law rarely justify relief from final judgments under 60(b)(6)." Cox, 757 F.3d at 121 (emphasis in original). That is on top of the reality that extraordinary "circumstances will rarely occur in the habeas context." Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 535.
New procedural rules rarely apply retroactively in criminal (or habeas) cases. They do so only in narrow circumstances. Sometimes, a new rule creates a right to engage in "private indi- vidual conduct," placing that conduct beyond the reach of crim- inal law. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 307 (1989) (plurality opinion); see also Edwards v. Vannoy, 593 U.S. 255, 272 (2021); 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A) (new constitutional rules made retroactive by the Supreme Court). When that happens, the retroactivity bar falls away. And the ordinary rule for civil cases is that new decisions apply only to pending cases, not closed ones. See Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749, 758-59 (1995).
Though Rule 60(b)(6) opens a wee crack in that rule against retroactivity, it does not license an end-run around it. Similarly, the First Step Act's compassionate-release provision requires
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"extraordinary and compelling reasons" for a reduced sen- tence. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). There, as here, "extraordi- nary" is "not so flexible as to encompass any consideration."
Rutherford v. United States, 608 U.S. ___, 146 S. Ct. 1320, 1332 (2026). For instance, a nonretroactive change in sentenc- ing law does not warrant compassionate release. Id. at 1331. So too, an actual-innocence argument is not an extraordinary and compelling reason to reduce a sentence, but is reserved for habeas corpus. Fernandez v. United States, 608 U.S. ___, 146 S. Ct. 1292, 1304 (2026); see Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 531 (holding that it is improper to use a Rule 60(b)(6) motion to request relief that is "in substance" or "at least similar enough" to a habeas petition).
We have previously held, over a dissent, that a new decision can count as one factor supporting a petitioner's showing of
"extraordinary circumstances" even if it falls outside the nar- row retroactivity exception. Bracey, 986 F.3d at 295 & n.18. But it cannot suffice as the dispositive factor, amounting to extraordinary circumstances all on its own, unless it falls within a retroactivity exception. Rather, a Rule 60(b)(6) movant must show that the new precedent is "accompanied by appro- priate equitable circumstances" that collectively rise to that demanding standard. Satterfield, 872 F.3d at 161.
B. Unless the movant proffers supporting facts, no remand is required
Instead of weighing the equitable Cox factors, the District Court jumped straight to the meat of Williams's Lesko argu- ment against finding his petition was barred as second or suc- cessive. And the magistrate judge merely gestured at them.
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Neither addressed whether there were "extraordinary circum- stances" or "extreme and unexpected hardship." Sawka, 989 F.2d at 140. Often, if a district court fails to weigh the Cox fac- tors, we will remand to let it exercise its equitable discretion in the first instance. Bracey, 986 F.3d at 296; Cox, 757 F.3d at
124. Yet "we may affirm the judgment on any grounds sup- ported by the record, including those not reached by the Dis- trict Court." Downey v. Pa. Dep't of Corr., 968 F.3d 299, 309 (3d Cir. 2020). We will do so "if we can determine from the record on appeal that a petitioner cannot show extraordinary circumstances as a matter of law." Bracey, 986 F.3d at 296. Williams, "of course, bears the burden of establishing enti- tlement to such equitable relief" by "properly present[ing] facts and circumstances attendant to [his] request." Cox, 757 F.3d at
122. He has not done so. His motion never mentions any hard- ship, let alone extreme or unexpected ones. Nor did his habeas petition or brief before this Court.
Nor does Williams cite any extraordinary circumstances favoring relief. He does not press "a new constitutional rule or right for criminal defendants" like those that trigger retroactiv- ity. Id. at 124; see also Bracey, 986 F.3d at 296 (emphasizing
"the constitutional nature of that change in law"). He merely claims a right to petition for a writ of habeas corpus under § 2244(b), relying on the Supreme Court's interpretation in Magwood and our holding in Lesko. But, as in Gonzalez, it is
"hardly extraordinary" that a court "arrived at a different [stat- utory] interpretation." 545 U.S. at 536.
Plus, Williams offered scant argument that he is likely to succeed on the merits of his habeas claims or the balance of
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equitable factors. See Cox, 757 F.3d at 124. The claims he wants to revive do not challenge his good-time credits. Rather, five of the six claims in his habeas petition recycle challenges to his underlying conviction that were already considered and denied on the merits. The sixth claim, the only one that even touches innocence, goes not to his underlying conviction but to a prior 1991 conviction that was used to enhance his 2013 sen- tence. But convicts "generally may not challenge [an] enhanced sentence through a petition under § 2254 on the ground that the prior conviction was unconstitutionally obtained." Lacka- wanna Cnty. Dist. Att'y v. Coss, 532 U.S. 394, 404 (2001). In any event, Williams did not address the merits of any of his claims in his 60(b) motion, unlike in Bracey. Finally, he never explained his lack of diligence or showed a death sentence. See Cox, 757 F.3d at 125-26.
To be sure, Williams addressed some of the Cox factors on appeal. But he did not raise them in his motion. And it is the motion that matters, for "pro se litigants still must allege suffi- cient facts … to support a claim." Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (discussing Rule 12(b)(6)). Without any "properly presented facts and circum- stances," the District Court has nothing to "liberally construe."
Cox, 757 F.3d at 122 (first quotation); Higgs v. Att'y Gen. of the U.S., 655 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 2011), as amended (Sept. 19, 2011) (second quotation). Thus, this is the rare case where remand would be futile. See Bracey, 986 F.3d at 296-97 & n.19.
Williams filed his motion under Rule 60(b)(1). And that is exactly what it was—a claim of "mistake" due to a new proce- dural application of an old Supreme Court case, but an untimely
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one. Though the District Court acted out of an admirable solic- itude for pro se litigants, construing his pro se habeas petition liberally, courts should not recharacterize such petitions as fall- ing under 60(b)(6). Williams's petition alleged no exceptional circumstances or extraordinary hardship. His only argument is that the District Court got its Magwood analysis wrong, and that Lesko confirmed its wrongness. It is simply a procedural hook to seek reopening. Under 60(b)(6), that is insufficient as a matter of law.
* * * * *
Williams has had many bites at the apple. Because he did not properly present any facts showing extraordinary circum- stances or extreme and unusual hardship, there is no need to remand. The District Court properly denied his Rule 60(b) motion to reopen the denial of his habeas petition; we will AFFIRM. Counsel for Appellant
Samuel G. Saylor [Argued]
OFFICE OF FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER
Counsel for Appellee
Rusheen R. Petti [Argued]
ALLEGHENY COUNTY OFFICE OF THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY