United States v. Ademeko Maclin-Carney

our review to the subjects that counsel discusses. See id. We grant the motion and dismiss the appeal.

BACKGROUND

Maclin-Carney and her brother were charged in connection with the kidnapping of James "Ed" Good in 2022. See 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1). Defendants lured Good to an abandoned house under the guise of hiring him for a flooring project. Good was maced, bound, held at gunpoint, and thrown into the trunk of a car with broken glass. Defendants attempted to hold him for ransom, but Good escaped and was eventually located by police. Later that day, Good told police that Maclin-Carney was the woman who had maced him, but he was unable to identify her in the initial photo lineup because she had a different hairstyle. When an updated photo was used in a subsequent lineup, Good identified Maclin-Carney. Five days after Good's escape, officers arrested Maclin-Carney.

Prior to trial, Maclin-Carney filed several motions. She first filed a motion in limine to preclude the "search history related to the penalty for murder" that was found during a forensic examination of a phone that officers recovered from her. The court denied the motion.

Maclin-Carney also filed two motions relating to the discovery of threatening letters and phone calls. The letters instructed Maclin-Carney's family members to fabricate an alibi. One letter also contained the names of Good and his wife, as well as one of the prosecutors, Bryan Freres. Maclin-Carney's aunt, Laura Nash, testified that Maclin-Carney instructed her to give the names to Maclin-Carney's mother with the intent to have those people "disappear" if she "got an adverse outcome at trial." The discovery of the letters triggered an investigation that uncovered calls from Maclin- Carney stating that Good, Freres, and the trial judge would all "fall on their ass one by one." Maclin-Carney moved to disqualify the trial judge, see 28 U.S.C. § 455, and Freres, see id. § 528. The judge granted the motion to disqualify herself but did not rule on the motion to disqualify Freres. After the case was reassigned, the new judge denied the motion to disqualify Freres without prejudice.

Maclin-Carney also filed a motion in limine to bar the government from presenting evidence of the alleged phone calls and letters. The court denied the motion with respect to the letters requesting a fabricated alibi, so long as evidence of Maclin- Carney's incarceration at the Macon County Jail was excluded from testimony and

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exhibits. It also directed counsel not to discuss threats against the Goods, the judge, and Freres at trial.

At trial, the government presented evidence tying Maclin-Carney to the kidnapping. Good testified that he recognized Maclin-Carney from two previous flooring projects and identified her by name to officers. He also made an in-court identification of Maclin-Carney.

Surveillance video was introduced showing a car matching Maclin-Carney's silver Kia arriving at the abandoned house before Good. Investigators also matched a piece of a bumper—found in the yard of the house—to the Kia. Maclin-Carney was arrested in the same Kia.

Forensic evidence from Maclin-Carney's phone revealed the presence of two apps installed before the kidnapping and uninstalled within five minutes of the final ransom call. One allows the caller to hide the phone number from the recipient, and the other allows the user to remotely gain control of a different phone. The internet search history on the phone also contained searches, conducted before the kidnapping, about Good, his business, and the penalty for third-degree murder.

Physical forensic evidence also tied Maclin-Carney to the kidnapping, including DNA on Good's notebook and fingerprints found on the can of pepper spray recovered from the scene. The government's DNA expert testified that there was "strong support"

to conclude that Maclin-Carney's DNA was on the steering wheel of Good's car, which was found abandoned. Forensic testing confirmed that fibers from Good's clothing were inside the trunk liner of the Kia.

The government also introduced the alibi-fabrication letters. Maclin-Carney objected to the admission of the letters as unfairly prejudicial, as she had decided not to put on any alibi defense. But the court overruled her objection, determining that the letters were "evidence of consciousness of guilt." An FBI forensic handwriting expert testified that the handwriting in the letters matched the handwriting of Maclin-Carney. Nash produced a new letter while on the witness stand, stating she had not previously produced it because of "threats on my life." The court did not let Nash testify about the new letter, and Maclin-Carney moved for a mistrial, arguing that Nash

"implied that [Maclin-Carney] threatened her life or someone on her behalf." The court denied the motion and gave a limiting instruction.

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After the government rested, Maclin-Carney moved for judgment of acquittal, see FED. R. CRIM. P. 29(a), arguing that because the indictment charged in the conjunctive, the government needed to prove that the defendants "willfully and unlawfully seized, confined, inveigled, decoyed, kidnapped, abducted, and carried away" Good (emphasis added). And because the government failed to prove that the defendants carried Good, she argued, acquittal should be entered on all charges. The court denied the motion, reasoning that Good was carried when the defendants transported him in the car. Maclin-Carney later submitted proposed jury instructions that used the same language as the indictment, which the court did not accept. Rather, the court used the pattern jury instruction which contains the disjunctive "or," as opposed to the conjunctive "and."

After the jury convicted Maclin-Carney, she filed combined post-trial motions, including a further motion for judgment of acquittal, see F ED. R. CRIM. P. 29(c), a motion for new trial, see F ED. R. CRIM. P. 33, and a motion for arrest of judgment, see FED. R. CRIM. P. 34. She argued that the evidence was insufficient to convict. She also listed every adverse ruling against her, contending that they amounted to cumulative error. Thus, she argued, the court was required either to vacate the verdict and order a new trial or to enter a judgment of acquittal. The court denied the motion, reasoning that the evidence was sufficient to convict Maclin-Carney, that she failed to develop any new arguments in her motion, and that the motion for arrest of judgment was untimely. The court sentenced Maclin-Carney to 360 months' imprisonment, within her guidelines range of 360 months to life (based on a total offense level of 42 and criminal history category of II). Maclin-Carney's offense-level calculation included several enhancements, notably a two-level increase for obstruction of justice, see U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. The court justified the sentence based on the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), highlighting the seriousness of the offense; Maclin-Carney's history and characteristics, including education level, perceived lack of remorse, and attempt to fabricate an alibi; and the need for specific deterrence. It also highlighted several mitigating factors, including her family life and mental health struggles, but found that the aggravating factors were "off the charts."

ANALYSIS

In his Anders brief, counsel first considers whether Maclin-Carney could argue that the district court erred by denying her motion in limine to bar evidence of her internet searches. We agree with counsel that any challenge to the motion would be

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frivolous. While there is some prejudicial effect from admitting the search for third- degree murder—a charge Maclin-Carney did not face—that prejudice did not outweigh the evidence's probative value because it evinced her intent to use potentially lethal violence as part of the scheme to kidnap Good. See United States v. Eads, 729 F.3d 769, 777 (7th Cir. 2013).

Counsel also considers, but rightly declines to challenge, the denial of Maclin- Carney's motion to disqualify Freres. As counsel correctly points out, there is no caselaw in our circuit discussing whether a prosecutor, after receiving threats, should be dismissed. "Although the issue is one of first impression in this circuit, that does not automatically lead to the conclusion that it is nonfrivolous and cannot be resolved in an Anders posture without briefing." United States v. Easter, 553 F.3d 519, 525 (7th Cir.

2009).

Maclin-Carney points to 28 U.S.C. § 528 to suggest that her threat against the prosecutor gave him a personal interest in the outcome of the prosecution that disqualified him from continuing to represent the government in this case. The statute directs the Attorney General to promulgate regulations requiring disqualification of prosecutors from participating in cases where it "may result in a personal … conflict of interest, or the appearance thereof." Id. The statute does not, however, define its own terms, leaving that to the regulation. The regulation, in turn, defines a "personal relationship" as one involving a "close and substantial connection of the type normally viewed as likely to induce partiality," and which may be presumed in the case of parents, siblings, children, and spouses. 28 C.F.R. § 45.2(c)(2). As Freres was threatened"but had no other relationship with Maclin-Carney"there are no nonfrivolous arguments that could be made that there was a personal conflict of interest under 28 U.S.C. § 528 and 28 C.F.R. § 45.2. Maclin-Carney's reading of the statute to mandate disqualification of prosecutors for receiving threats from defendants would encourage "shopping" for prosecutors and would only encourage further threats. See, e.g., United States v. Walsh, 47 F.4th 491, 500 (7th Cir. 2022) (recusal not required when defendant threatens judge). We decline the invitation to adopt a reading of section 528 that is neither textual nor sensible.

Counsel next rejects any argument that the evidence was insufficient to convict Maclin-Carney. Evidence is insufficient when no rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Scott, 150 F.4th 929, 934 (7th Cir. 2025). Here, the government presented ample evidence connecting the

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kidnapping to Maclin-Carney—her car, her phone, the video surveillance footage, forensic evidence, and witness identification.

Counsel also considers whether Maclin-Carney could challenge the admission of the alibi-fabrication letters. The government provided evidence—the testimony of handwriting experts—that Maclin-Carney wrote the letters. And the letters were directly relevant to her consciousness of guilt, which was itself circumstantial evidence that she was guilty. See United States v. Frazier, 129 F.4th 392, 406 (7th Cir. 2025). Under these circumstances, counsel could not raise a nonfrivolous argument that the court abused its discretion in admitting the letters.

Counsel also rightly rejects any argument that the court abused its discretion by denying Maclin-Carney's motion for a mistrial. Under the abuse of discretion standard, we will reverse a district court's denial of a mistrial only if "we have a strong conviction that the district court erred," such that the defendant was deprived of a fair trial. United States v. Danford, 435 F.3d 682, 686 (7th Cir. 2006). While Nash's comment that she had not disclosed the letter because of threats to her life was incendiary, it would be frivolous to argue that the court should have granted the motion when it gave a limiting instruction to disregard that testimony and Nash did not identify who threatened her. Id. at 687. Jurors are presumed to follow limiting instructions, see Yu Tian Li v. United States, 648 F.3d 524, 531 (7th Cir. 2011), and particularly given that Nash did not specify who made the threat, we have no reason to doubt that it was curative here. Next, counsel examines and rightly rejects as frivolous any challenge to the jury instructions for the elements of kidnapping. Maclin-Carney objected to the pattern jury instructions' use of the disjunctive "or" rather than the conjunctive "and" that appears in the text of the indictment. But a district court does not abuse its discretion when it gives jury instructions "in the disjunctive in the context of a conjunctively worded indictment." United States v. Rice, 520 F.3d 811, 817 (7th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). And beyond this, the jury instruction accurately reflected the law. Counsel also considers whether it would be frivolous to argue that there was a fatal variance to the indictment. But again, counsel is correct that the government's evidence did not prove facts different from those alleged in the indictment. See United States v. Heon Seok Lee, 937 F.3d 797, 806 (7th Cir. 2019). The jury instruction stated that the Government must prove that Maclin-Carney "willfully and unlawfully seized confined, inveigled, decoyed, kidnapped, abducted, and carried away" Good.

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While Maclin-Carney argued that she had never physically carried Good, driving him satisfies this element. See, e.g., Frazier, 129 F.4th at 403-04. Counsel also rightly concludes that no non-frivolous challenge can be made to the court's denial of Maclin-Carney's post-trial motions. In considering the denial of a motion for a judgment of acquittal, we ask "whether evidence exists from which any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. Doody, 600 F.3d 752, 754 (7th Cir. 2010). And when reviewing the denial of a motion for new trial, we consider whether the evidence against the verdict is so strong that it would be a miscarriage of justice to let the verdict stand. See United States v. Friedman, 971 F.3d 700, 713 (7th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). A challenge to the denial of either motion would be frivolous because, for the reasons already mentioned, ample evidence supported Maclin-Carney's guilt. And as to her motion for arrest of judgment under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 34, it is clear that the court had jurisdiction over the charged offense, see 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and her motion does not offer an explanation to the contrary. To the extent her motion can be construed as one attacking the indictment pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure Rule 12(b)(3), the motion was untimely because motions alleging a defect in instituting the prosecution must be made before trial. See F ED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b)(3)(A). Next, counsel evaluates whether Maclin-Carney could plausibly challenge her sentence but concludes, correctly, that doing so would be frivolous. He considers whether she could make a procedural challenge to her sentence on appeal. But the court correctly calculated her guidelines range and, regardless, she agreed with the calculation, so any potential challenge to it would be forfeited. See United States v. Boyle,

28 F.4th 798, 802 (7th Cir. 2022). Next, counsel considers, and rightly rejects, several arguments that could be brought under plain-error review. He first questions whether it was proper to add the two-year obstruction of justice enhancement given that the alibi-fabrication letters were never delivered to their intended recipients. But the enhancement applies to defendants who attempt to obstruct justice, as Maclin-Carney did here. See United States v. Ranjel,

872 F.3d 815, 820 (7th Cir. 2017). Counsel also questions whether the court considered Maclin-Carney's mitigating factors in calculating her sentence. But the court addressed her principal arguments in mitigation, namely her difficult upbringing, responsibilities as a parent, and struggles with mental health and substance abuse. The court even went so far as to say that the

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sentence imposed was lower than it originally anticipated because of these mitigating factors, so she cannot make a nonfrivolous argument that the factors were not considered in the sentencing calculation. See United States v. Sanchez, 989 F.3d 523, 540 (7th Cir. 2021).

Counsel considers whether it was proper for the court to take Maclin-Carney's lack of remorse into consideration when calculating its sentence. But there are no nonfrivolous arguments to support this argument—the court properly considered lack of remorse here as to lack of rehabilitation and deterrence. See United States v. Keskes,

703 F.3d 1078, 1090-91 (7th Cir. 2013). Next, he questions whether there are any nonfrivolous arguments that Maclin- Carney's sentence was substantively unreasonable. Her within-guidelines sentence is presumptively reasonable, and we will uphold a sentence if the court adequately explained its reasoning. See United States v. Major, 33 F.4th 370, 384 (7th Cir. 2022). Here, the court explained with reference to the § 3553(a) factors, emphasizing the seriousness of the offense (referring to kidnapping as a "horrible crime" that "leaves scars and wounds that are deep and last a very, very long time"); characteristics of the defendant (stating that Maclin-Carney "didn't show remorse in prison"); and deterrence (reasoning that, given her age upon release, she is unlikely to reoffend). Finally, counsel considers whether any nonfrivolous challenges can be made to the two-year term of supervised release. Maclin-Carney did not object to the term of supervised release and therefore waived any challenge to its conditions. See United States v. Flores, 929 F.3d 443, 449 (7th Cir. 2019). In any event, the term of supervised release was within guidelines range and is presumed reasonable on appeal. See United States v. Lickers, 928 F.3d 609, 621 (7th Cir. 2019). No facts in the record would rebut this presumption.

We GRANT counsel's motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.

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