United States v. Bowman

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constitutional law that was previously unavailable to him. Accordingly, Defendant's pro se motion for a writ of error coram nobis is DENIED.

Background

Defendant was convicted on several charges following a jury trial, including (1) conspiracy to commit bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (Count One); (2) attempted armed bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(a), (d) and 2 (Count Two); (3) using a firearm during a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and 2 (Count Three); and (4) being a felon in possession of ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2) (Count Five). (See Doc. 233 at 1.) The district court²sentenced Defendant to a total sentence of 192 months' imprisonment (specifically, "60 months on Count 1, 108 months on Counts 2 and 5, said terms to run concurrently. 84 months on Count 3 which is to run consecutively to the sentences imposed in Counts 1, 2 and 5"). (Doc. 233 at 2.)

Defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, and his conviction was affirmed by the Eighth Circuit following a review of the record. See United States v. Bowman,

205 F. App'x 472, 472-73 (8th Cir. 2006). Additionally, Defendant filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which was denied by the district court. See Bowman v. United States, No. 4:08-cv-00109- GAF (W.D. Mo. Aug. 18, 2008), certificate of appealability denied, No. 10-3852 (8th Cir. Apr. 7, 2011). Defendant was released from custody on May 3, 2018, and completed his term of supervised release on May 2, 2023. Defendant now moves for a writ of error coram nobis.

Discussion

A writ of error coram nobis is a long-standing common law remedy intended to correct errors of fact that impact the validity of the underlying judgment. United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 506 (1954). "The writ of error coram nobis is an extraordinary remedy reserved for correcting errors of the most fundamental character." Id. at 12. It is the proper way to "attack[ ] the validity of a sentence which has already been served." Mustain v. Pearson, 592 F.2d 1018, 1021 (8th Cir. 1979). The authority for federal courts to grant this remedy is found in the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), and is articulated as "a step in the criminal case and not, like habeas

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corpus . . . the beginning of a separate civil proceeding." Baranski v. United States, 880 F.3d 951, 954 (8th Cir. 2018) (citing Morgan, 346 U.S. at 506).

A writ of error coram nobis is nevertheless "of the same general character as [a motion] under 28 U.S.C. § 2255." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The Eighth Circuit has echoed that this "extraordinary remedy" may only be applied when a "fundamental error" has been committed, warranting relief for a criminal defendant who is no longer in custody. Id. at 956. A defendant must "show a compelling basis before coram nobis relief will be granted." United States

v. Camacho-Bordes, 94 F.3d 1168, 1173 (8th Cir. 1996). In addition, coram nobis relief is not available "unless a petitioner can show that he . . . suffers from ongoing civil disabilities, or adverse collateral consequences, due to his . . . allegedly wrongful conviction[.]" Tufte v. United States,

16 F.3d 1228 (Table), at *1 (8th Cir. 1994) (unpublished disposition per curiam) (citation omitted). The Supreme Court has cautioned that "judgment finality is not to be lightly cast aside; courts must be cautious so that the extraordinary remedy of coram nobis issues only in extreme cases." United States v. Denedo, 556 U.S. 904, 916 (2009). Coram nobis relief is not warranted where the error complained of was not of the most fundamental character or could have been raised earlier on direct appeal or in a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion. Comacho-Bordes, 94 F.3d at 1173; Azzone

v. United States, 341 F.2d 417, 419 (8th Cir. 1965) (per curiam) ("Coram nobis may not be used as substitute for an appeal."); see Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 338 (1992) (successive habeas petition raising identical grounds as prior petition must generally be dismissed).

I. Defendant's Conviction under § 2113(a) and (d) Is a Crime of Violence

Here, Defendant contends that he is "actually innocent" of the offense charged under § 924(c) because attempted armed bank robbery is not a crime of violence after Taylor. Further, Defendant claims that the Government deprived him of constitutional rights by bringing this

"erroneous charge" and "giv[ing] a jury instruction that misl[ed] the jury into believing that attempt and conspiracy charges were crimes of violence . . . ." (Doc. 417 at 3.) The burden is on the movant to show he is entitled to coram nobis relief on the merits of his claim. Willis, 654 F.2d at

24. "[T]he Eighth Circuit has required movants to show a compelling basis for coram nobis relief."

Kandiel v. United States, 964 F.2d 794, 796-97 (8th Cir. 1992).

Ultimately, Defendant has failed to show a fundamental error in his conviction or otherwise demonstrate a compelling reason for coram nobis relief because attempted robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (d) categorically remains a crime of violence post-Taylor. The Taylor opinion

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narrowly interprets the definition of a "crime of violence" as it applies to attempted Hobbs Act robbery. 596 U.S. at 860 (holding that Taylor's attempted Hobbs Act robbery conviction does not support a separate § 924(c) conviction as a matter of statutory interpretation because the conviction does not "require the government to prove the use, attempted use, or threatened use of force"). However, the Eighth Circuit in the post-Taylor context has concluded that attempted bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), unlike attempted Hobbs Act robbery, is categorically a crime of violence. See United States v. Spratt, No. CR23-4011-LTS, 2023 WL 4108201, at *3 (N.D. Iowa June 21, 2023) (denying Spratt's motion to dismiss charged offense under § 924(c) predicated on attempted bank robbery in violation of § 2113(a), distinguishing Taylor and finding that attempted bank robbery under § 2113(a)—unlike attempted Hobbs Act robbery as discussed in Taylor—constitutes a crime of violence), aff'd 141 F.4th 931, 936-37 (8th Cir. 2025) (holding that attempted bank robbery is a crime of violence).³

The Eighth Circuit is not alone in reaching the conclusion that attempted bank robbery under § 2113(a) is a crime of violence. In Henderson v. United States, No. 21-11740, 2025 WL 1078231 (11th Cir. Apr. 10, 2025), the Eleventh Circuit concluded that "an attempted bank robbery is a crime of violence because it requires proof that the defendant used, attempted to use, or threatened to use force" and accordingly an offense under § 2113(a) is a "valid predicate offense"

for a § 924(c) conviction. Id. at *5. Courts have also concluded that attempted armed bank robbery under § 2113(d) is a crime of violence post-Taylor. See United States v. Straite, __ F.4th __, 2026 WL 137868 (4th Cir. 2026) ("When a defendant has been properly convicted of an attempted armed robbery under Section 2113(d), he has committed a crime of violence under Section 924(c)(3).").⁴Finally, the Third Circuit in United States v. Vines, 134 F.4th 730 (3d Cir. 2025), held that attempted bank robbery under both § 2113(a) and (d) were crimes of violence. Id. at 733 ("Even without a weapon, attempted bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a)'s first paragraph is

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a crime of violence because it requires making the attempt 'by force and violence, or by intimidation.' And adding a gun makes the robbery no less violent.").⁵ Here, Defendant was charged with and convicted of attempted armed bank robbery in violation of § 2113(a), (d) and Section 2. In light of the foregoing precedent, the Court concludes that Defendant's offense under § 2113(a) and (d) is a crime of violence and thus was a valid predicate offense for his conviction under § 924(c). Therefore, Defendant is not entitled to coram nobis relief because he has not shown any error in his conviction or provided any other compelling reason for such relief.

II. Defendant Has Shown No Adverse Collateral Consequences

In his motion for writ of error coram nobis, Defendant did not argue or provide any evidence that he is presently suffering any ongoing civil disabilities or adverse collateral consequences due to his conviction. (See generally Doc. 417.) "The Eighth Circuit has . . . stated that a person seeking coram nobis relief must demonstrate that he presently suffers adverse legal consequences which stem from the conviction he is challenging." Hunter v. United States, 317 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1148 (D.N.D. 2004) (citing Stewart v. United States, 446 F.2d 42, 43-44 (8th Cir. 1971));⁶see also Baranski v. United States, No. 4:11-cv-123 CAS, 2016 WL 1258583, at *23 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 31, 2016) ("[C]oram nobis relief is not available 'unless a petitioner can show that he

. . . suffers from ongoing civil disabilities, or adverse collateral consequences, due to his . . . allegedly wrongful conviction." (quoting Tufte, 16 F.3d 1228, at *1)), aff'd 880 F.3d 951 (8th Cir. 2018). In Stewart, the Eighth Circuit found that the movant "must demonstrate that he is suffering from present advense [sic] consequences" to be entitled to coram nobis relief and remanded to the district court to consider movant's contention that he was suffering present adverse consequences. Stewart, 446 F.2d at 44.

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Here, however, Defendant has made no claim that he is suffering adverse collateral consequences or civil disabilities as a result of his conviction. Defendant was aware that he was required to "demonstrate he is suffering civil disabilities" in seeking coram nobis relief. (Doc. 417 at 3 (quoting United States v. Castro, 26 F.3d 557, 559 (5th Cir. 1994).) Based on the record before it, the Court cannot conclude that Defendant is suffering adverse collateral consequences or civil disabilities. This serves as an independent basis upon which to deny Defendant coram nobis relief.

III. Permitting Coram Nobis Relief Is Procedurally Improper

Finally, even if Defendant were entitled to the relief he seeks on the merits, he is procedurally barred from seeking coram nobis relief at this time because he has not presented credible new evidence or identified a new rule of constitutional law that was previously unavailable to him which would entitle him to a second challenge to his conviction after his previously unsuccessful § 2255 motion.

In Baranski, the Eighth Circuit held that § 2255(h)(1) and (h)(2)—the restrictions on second or successive § 2255 motions—apply to a petition for writ of error coram nobis by a petitioner no longer in custody. 880 F.3d at 956. Here, Defendant previously filed a motion under

28 U.S.C. § 2255, which was denied by the district court. See Bowman v. United States, No. 4:08- cv-00109-GAF (W.D. Mo. Aug. 18, 2008), certificate of appealability denied, No. 10-3852 (8th Cir. Apr. 7, 2011). Thus, Defendant's instant motion for writ of error coram nobis is treated the same as a second or successive § 2255 motion and Defendant must show "(1) newly discovered evidence that, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found the movant guilty of the offense; or (2) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable." Id. at 955. Defendant relies solely on the holding in Taylor to challenge his § 924(c) conviction. However, Taylor does not provide a new rule of constitutional law which would warrant relief. As discussed above, Taylor interprets the definition of "crime of violence" as it relates to Hobbs Act robbery. Therefore, even assuming Taylor is retroactive, it does not provide a new rule of constitutional law and he is not entitled to relief because his § 924(c) conviction rests on a predicate

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offense of attempted bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (d), which as discussed at length above is still considered a crime of violence post-Taylor.⁷

Conclusion

Accordingly, after careful consideration and for the reasons explained above, Defendant's pro se motion for a writ of error coram nobis, (Doc. 417), is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/ Roseann A. Ketchmark

ROSEANN A. KETCHMARK, JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DATED: June 2, 2026