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Filed 5/1/26 Dept. of Human Resources v. SEIU, Local 1000 CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES et al., Plaintiff, Cross-defendants and Appellants, v.
SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL
UNION, LOCAL 1000,
Defendant, Cross-complainant and Respondent.
C101001
(Super. Ct. No. 34-2023- 00336705-CU-PA-GDS) After the Service Employees International Union, Local 1000 (SEIU) filed a grievance in 2018 to allow nursing staff at Pelican Bay State Prison (Pelican Bay) to keep treatment room doors open for safety reasons, an arbitrator ordered that the nursing staff be allowed to do so during treatment, and the trial court confirmed the arbitration award. Later, in 2021, another grievance was submitted, this time to allow dental assistants and hygienists working at Pelican Bay to keep the same treatment room doors open. An arbitrator ordered that the dental staff be allowed to do so, and the trial court confirmed the arbitration award.
The California Department of Human Resources (CalHR) and California Correctional Health Care Services (CCHCS) now claim (1) the trial court erred in giving
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res judicata effect to the prior arbitration award pertaining to nursing staff, and (2) the arbitrator exceeded his authority in issuing an award inconsistent with public policy. Finding no merit in the claims, we will affirm the trial court's order.
BACKGROUND
CalHR is responsible for meeting and conferring with bargaining representatives regarding the terms and conditions of state employment. (Gov. Code, §§ 19815, subds. (a), (b), 19815.4, subd. (g), 3513, subd. (j).) CCHCS employs bargaining unit 20 dental assistants and hygienists working at California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) facilities, including Pelican Bay. SEIU represents bargaining unit 20 dental assistants and hygienists.
The State of California and SEIU were parties to a memorandum of understanding (MOU) covering the terms and conditions of employment of bargaining unit 20 employees during the period from January 2, 2020 to June 30, 2023. A predecessor MOU covered the period from July 2, 2016 to January 1, 2020.
In 2018, SEIU filed a grievance with CCHCS on behalf of Laura Hernandez, now Laura Slavec. The grievance arose from a directive from Pelican Bay's Chief Nurse to nursing staff to close treatment room doors during nonmaximum-custody-inmate patient treatment. The matter proceeded to arbitration before arbitrator Norman Brand. The issues submitted for arbitration were (1) whether the closed-door directive violated articles 10.3 and 10.30 of the July 2, 2016 to January 1, 2020 MOU, and (2) what an appropriate remedy would be for a violation.
In a decision dated February 5, 2020, arbitrator Brand evaluated the work environment and safety concerns of nurses working at Pelican Bay. The decision did not mention dental assistants or hygienists. The arbitrator concluded that the closed-door directive violated articles 10.3 and 10.30.D of the MOU, and that requiring nursing staff to close treatment room doors when treating nonmaximum-custody-inmate patients created an immediate and recognizable threat to the health and safety of nursing staff.
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In so ruling, the arbitrator found that the closed-door directive was not required by a prior March 5, 2018 memorandum governing health care encounters. The arbitrator ordered that the nursing staff at Pelican Bay be allowed to leave treatment room doors open if they were uncomfortable providing medical services to nonmaximum-custody- inmate patients in a room with a closed door. The trial court confirmed the arbitration award.
In 2021, Laura Slavec, a registered dental assistant who worked at Pelican Bay, filed a grievance protesting a March 24, 2021 directive from the Regional Dental Director to keep dental treatment doors at the prison closed during treatment. According to the grievance, closed doors impeded the ability of correctional officers to hear what was occurring in treatment rooms. The grievance also stated that the directive was inconsistent with the Brand arbitration award. It acknowledged the Brand arbitration award addressed nursing staff only, explaining that at the time of the Brand decision the dental staff were not required to close treatment room doors.
The grievance alleged the closed-door directive implicated articles 10.3 and 10.30 of the MOU. Article 10.3 provided,
"When an employee in good faith believes that the employee is being required to work where an immediate and recognizable threat to the employee's health and safety exists, the employee will so notify the employee's supervisor. The supervisor will immediately investigate the situation and either direct the employee to perform some other task away from the occupational hazard(s) or proclaim the area safe and direct the employee to proceed with the employee's assigned duties. This direction shall normally be after consulting with higher level supervisory or management staff. If the Union or the employee still believes the unsafe condition(s) exist, the Union or the employee may file a grievance alleging a violation of this section in accordance with the Health and Safety grievance procedure."
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Article 10.30 provided,
"A. It is the policy of the State employer to enforce safety and health, policies, procedures, and work practices and protect employees from harm in connection with State operations.
"B. To this end, the parties agree that it is in the parties' mutual best interest to endeavor to make the work site free from situations, circumstances, or conditions that constitute an immediate and recognizable threat to the health and safety of employees.
"C. It is the intent of this Health and Safety Grievance Procedure to ensure a prompt response to employees who feel that a situation exists which constitutes an immediate and recognizable threat to the employee's health and safety.
"D. When an employee in good faith believes that the employee is being required to work where an immediate and recognizable threat to the employee's health and safety exists, the employee will so notify the employee's supervisor. The supervisor will immediately assess the situation, direct any necessary corrective action to eliminate any immediate and recognizable threat to the employee's health and safety, and either direct the employee to temporarily perform some other task or direct the employee to proceed with the employee's assigned duties. If the Union or the employee still believe the immediate and recognizable threat to the employee's health and safety exists, the Union or the employee may file a grievance alleging a violation of this section at Step 2 of the grievance procedure as follows:
"1. Health and Safety Grievance - Step 2
"a. If the grievant is not satisfied with the decision rendered by the grievant's supervisor, the grievant may appeal the decision in writing, within five (5) calendar days after receipt of the decision to the department head or designee as the second level of appeal.
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"b. The person designated by the department head as the second level of appeal shall respond to the grievance in writing within fourteen (14) calendar days. A copy of the written response shall be sent concurrently to the SEIU Local 1000 Headquarters.
"2. Health and Safety Grievance - Step 3
"a. If the grievant is not satisfied with the decision rendered pursuant to Step 2, the grievant may appeal the decision in writing, within five (5) calendar days, after receipt of the decision to the CalHR as the third level of appeal. The Union shall concurrently send a copy of the appeal to the affected department(s).
"b. The Director of the CalHR or designee shall respond to the grievance in writing within fourteen (14) calendar days.
"c. If the grievance is not resolved at Step 3 within twenty-four (24) hours after receipt of the third step response, the Union shall have the right to submit the grievance to arbitration.
"d. The arbitration shall take place no later than fourteen (14) days following the Union's request unless the parties mutually agree otherwise.
"e. Arbitration shall be in accordance with section 6.11(B) of Article 6 [relating to the selection of an arbitrator] unless otherwise provided."
SEIU forwarded the grievance to CCHCS for resolution. When CCHCS denied the grievance, SEIU appealed the decision to CalHR and subsequently requested arbitration pursuant to the January 2, 2020 to June 30, 2023 MOU. The issues submitted for arbitration were (1) whether the closed-door directive from CCHCS to dental staff at Pelican Bay violated articles 10.3 and 10.30 of the January 2, 2020 to June 30, 2023 MOU, and (2) what an appropriate remedy would be for a violation. An evidentiary hearing was held before arbitrator Edward Scholtz on June 1, 2, and 6, 2022. Sections of the National Fire Protection Association Part 80 Standard for Fire Doors and Other Opening Protectives (NFPA 80) were admitted into evidence. Section 5.2.13.1 of NFPA 80 stated: "Door openings and the surrounding areas shall be
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kept clear of anything that could obstruct or interfere with the free operation of the door."
Section 5.2.13.3 provided: "Blocking or wedging of doors in the open position shall be prohibited." CDCR Fire Chief Jesse Corrales testified that National Fire Protection Association provided national guidance for all fire departments and fire marshals, and the State of California and CDCR had adopted its standards.
Section 703.2 of the 2019 California Fire Code was also admitted into evidence. It stated, in relevant part: "Fire doors and smoke barrier doors shall not be blocked or obstructed, or otherwise made inoperable." Corrales testified that Pelican Bay was required to comply with section 703.2.
Kenneth Martin, the Associate Director of Accreditation and Licensing Compliance, testified regarding California Code of Regulations, title 8, section 5199, which sets forth requirements for negative-pressure isolation rooms. A copy of the regulation was admitted into evidence.
In addition, evidence was presented, described post, regarding the asserted safety risks in a prison setting when treatment room doors are closed.
CCHCS argued that the closed-door directive was issued for fire safety compliance and to avoid the spread of aerosol transmissible germs and diseases, and that the prior Brand arbitration award did not bind the arbitration in this case. SEIU countered that the closed-door directive created an immediate and recognizable safety risk for dental assistants, and the Brand arbitration decision was binding on the issue before the arbitrator.
In an opinion dated December 12, 2022, arbitrator Scholtz found in favor of the grievant. The arbitrator found the following facts: Pelican Bay had a long-standing practice of keeping dental treatment room doors open during treatment, but dental staff were instructed on April 14, 2021, to keep treatment room doors closed. The directive was not enforced until April 2022. The Brand arbitration award involved the same clinic rooms and doors at Pelican Bay. Dental treatments were performed with sharp
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instruments within reach of inmate patients. Many dental procedures resulted in severe pain. It was difficult to predict how prisoners who had a history of violence would react to the infliction of such pain. Officer staffing for Pelican Bay clinics had decreased over time. The dental clinics had at most two officers for multiple treatment rooms. Officers monitored the clinic and had other duties. The officers were often unavailable to stand outside treatment rooms. The previous solution of keeping treatment room doors open allowed officers to intervene if necessary. Correctional officers testified it was important for treatment room doors to remain open so that officers could hear what was happening in the treatment rooms, given that inmate patients could use syringes and other sharp instruments as weapons, and none of the safety measures in place were sufficient to eliminate the dangers created by the directive to close doors. None of the dental staff were armed or trained to restrain an inmate. At times, dental assistants were alone with inmate patients. CCHCS implemented various safety measures to control aerosol transmission and none of the prison's witnesses could state the effectiveness of air purifiers with open versus closed doors. Treatment room doors are fire-rated doors required to be closed, but magnetic hold-open devices could be installed to existing fire doors to allow doors to remain open.
The arbitrator reached the following conclusions. Being in a small room behind a heavy sound-proof door with an inmate patient prone to violence, and with many sharp instruments within reach and no custody staff inside the room, presented a substantial safety risk to dental staff. The concern about aerosol transmission from dental procedures did not justify the closed-door directive. The directive was not required by law or court order, although the arbitrator did not specifically discuss the NFPA 80 or Fire Code requirements. The arbitrator ordered that the closed-door directive be rescinded and that dental staff be allowed to leave dental treatment room doors open during treatment.
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CalHR and CCHCS filed a petition in the trial court to vacate or correct the Scholtz arbitration award. The petition alleged that the award violated the public policies set forth in the California Fire Code, NFPA, California Code of Regulations, title 8, section 5199, and the requirement that the Legislature approve the expenditure of funds. SEIU filed a cross-petition to confirm the arbitrator's award, arguing among other things that the prior Brand arbitration award was entitled to res judicata effect. The trial court ruled that the Brand arbitration award had res judicata effect as to whether the Fire Code prohibited keeping the treatment room doors open, and CalHR and CCHCS could not relitigate the issue; but even if res judicata did not apply, the trial court rejected the public policy contentions because they asserted incorrect conclusions of fact and law. In addition, it concluded the arbitrator did not mandate a legislative appropriation because the award did not require the installation of magnetic hold-open devices. The trial court granted the petition to correct the arbitration award by striking the award against CDCR, striking the retention of jurisdiction by the arbitrator, and correcting the reference to the MOU. It denied the petition to vacate the award and granted SEIU's cross-petition to confirm the award, as modified.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review a trial court's order confirming an arbitration award de novo but apply the substantial evidence test to determinations of disputed factual issues. (Lindenstadt v. Staff Builders, Inc. (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 882, 892, fn. 7; accord Condon v. Daland Nissan, Inc. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 263, 267.) We also review de novo whether the arbitrator's award exceeded the arbitrator's powers and whether the trial court correctly applied the doctrine of res judicata. (Honchariw v. FJM Private Mortgage Fund, LLC (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 893, 899 (Honchariw); Department of Human Resources v. International Union of Operating Engineers (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 861, 873 (Department of Human Resources); Johnson v. GlaxoSmithKline, Inc. (2008)
166 Cal.App.4th 1497, 1507 (Johnson); Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. v. United
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Transportation Union (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 416, 423, disapproved on another point in Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp. (1994) 9 Cal.4th 362, 377 (Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.).)
DISCUSSION
I
CalHR and CCHCS argue the trial court erred in giving res judicata effect to the prior Brand arbitration award.
Res judicata can apply to a judgment confirming an arbitration award. (Bucur
v. Ahmad (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 175, 185; Kelly v. Vons Companies, Inc. (1998)
67 Cal.App.4th 1329, 1335-1337.) The doctrine encompasses claim preclusion and issue preclusion. (DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber (2015) 61 Cal.4th 813, 823 (DKN Holdings LLC).) Issue preclusion, also known as collateral estoppel, precludes relitigation of issues actually litigated and decided in a prior proceeding, even if the second proceeding raises different causes of action. (Samara v. Matar (2018) 5 Cal.5th 322, 326-327 (Samara); DKN Holdings LLC, at p. 824.) In contrast, claim preclusion bars relitigation of entire causes of action that were or should have been brought in a previous proceeding involving the same parties. (Grande v. Eisenhower Medical Center (2022) 13 Cal.5th 313, 323; DKN Holdings LLC, at p. 824.)
Issue preclusion is pertinent here because the trial court ruled that the Brand arbitration award was res judicata as to whether the Fire Code prohibited keeping fire doors at Pelican Bay open during treatment. Issue preclusion applies (1) after final adjudication on the merits (2) of an identical issue (3) actually litigated and necessarily decided in the first proceeding and (4) asserted against one who was a party in the first proceeding or in privity with such a party. (DKN Holdings LLC, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 825; Lucido v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 335, 341.) The identical issue requirement involves whether identical factual allegations were at stake in the two proceedings. (Lucido, at p. 342.) An issue is necessarily decided in a prior proceeding if
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the issue was not " 'entirely unnecessary' " to the judgment in the first proceeding. (Ibid.; see Samara, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 327.) Application of issue preclusion also requires an assessment of whether the public policies underlying the doctrine - i.e., preservation of the integrity of the judicial system, promotion of judicial economy, and protection of litigants from harassment by vexatious litigation - support application of the doctrine in a particular case. (Lucido, at p. 342-343; Johnson, supra, 166 Cal.App.4th at p. 1508.) The party asserting res judicata bears the burden of establishing that it applies. (Lucido, at p. 341; Johnson, at p. 1508.)
The trial court ruled that whether the Fire Code required keeping the treatment room doors closed during treatment had been previously litigated by the same parties in the Brand arbitration, and the Brand arbitration award was a final determination on the merits of that issue; therefore, CalHR and CCHCS were prohibited from relitigating that issue. We find no error in this ruling.
The issue whether fire safety codes prohibited holding open the treatment room doors during treatment was litigated and decided in the Brand arbitration. The arbitration in the present case involved the same doors and treatment rooms as in the Brand arbitration. Arbitrator Brand rejected the claim that the Fire Code required keeping clinic treatment room doors closed at all times. The Brand arbitration award was confirmed by the trial court and nothing in the record indicates there was an appeal from the trial court's order. The order is a final adjudication on the merits as to whether keeping the treatment room doors open during treatment violated the Fire Code. And the claim of issue preclusion is made against CCHCS, a party to the Brand arbitration proceeding and the subsequent petition to confirm the Brand arbitration award. CalHR is in privity with CCHCS because CalHR and CCHCS share " 'an identity or community of interest' "
with regard to the Brand arbitration, with " 'adequate representation' " of that interest, such that CalHR " 'should reasonably have expected to be bound' " by that arbitration award. (DKN Holdings LLC, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 826.) CalHR represented CCHCS in
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the Brand arbitration. The Brand arbitration award was confirmed against CalHR and CCHCS, which were represented by the same counsel.
Giving res judicata effect to the Brand arbitration award furthers the public policies of minimizing repetitive litigation, preventing inconsistent judgments, and protecting against vexatious litigation.
CalHR and CCHCS nevertheless argue that the Brand arbitration award has no res judicata effect because it involved the July 2, 2016 to January 1, 2020 MOU, whereas the present arbitration involved the January 2, 2020 to June 30, 2023 MOU. But because the relevant articles in the two MOUs -- articles 10.3 and 10.30 -- are substantially identical, CalHR and CCHCS have not established that the involvement of the two successive MOUs bars the application of issue preclusion.
II
CalHR and CCHCS also contend that arbitrator Scholtz exceeded his authority in issuing an award inconsistent with public policy.
Federal and California law provide limited grounds for judicial review of an arbitration award. (Richey v. AutoNation, Inc. (2015) 60 Cal.4th 909, 916 (Richey); Cable Connection, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc. (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1334, 1344 (Cable Connection, Inc.); see also Foreman Roofing, Inc. v. United Union of Roofers Etc. Workers (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 99, 105; Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Teamsters (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 430, 436-437 (Safeway Stores, Inc.).) Pertinent here, upon the petition of a party to the arbitration, the court must vacate the arbitration award if it determines that the "arbitrators exceeded their powers and the award cannot be corrected without affecting the merits of the decision upon the controversy submitted."
(Code Civ. Proc., § 1286.2, subd. (a)(4); see Code Civ. Proc., § 1286.4; Gueyffier v. Ann Summers, Ltd. (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1179, 1184.) An arbitrator does not exceed his or her powers merely by erroneously deciding a contested issue of law or fact. (Gueyffier, at
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p. 1184; Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 366; Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1, 28 (Moncharsh).)
Because parties to an arbitration agreement impliedly agree that the arbitrator's decision will be binding and final and that even legal errors are not an excess of arbitral authority, a court may not review the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the arbitrator's award or the legal validity of the arbitrator's reasoning unless the arbitration agreement clearly provides otherwise. (Cable Connection, Inc., supra, 44 Cal.4th at pp. 1340, 1361; Moncharsh, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pp. 9-11, 25; Safeway Stores, Inc., supra,
83 Cal.App.3d at pp. 435-437.) In general, we cannot review an arbitrator's decision for errors of fact or law, even if the error causes substantial injustice to the parties. (Richey, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 916; Moncharsh, at pp. 6, 11.)
A limited exception to the above rule exists where the arbitrator's decision contravenes an explicit legislative expression of public policy. (Moncharsh, supra,
3 Cal.4th at p. 32.) However, the California Supreme Court has cautioned that courts should be reluctant to apply this exception because the Legislature has expressed its strong support for arbitration and the finality of arbitration decisions. (Ibid.; accord Aramark Facility Servs. v. SEIU, Local 1877 (9th Cir. 2008) 530 F.3d 817, 823.) To establish the invalidity of an arbitration award under the exception, the party seeking to vacate the award must establish the existence of an " 'explicit,' " " 'well defined' " and
" 'dominant' " public policy that is " 'ascertained "by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public interests." ' "
(Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. Mine Workers (2000) 531 U.S. 57, 62; Honchariw, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 899; Department of Human Resources, supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at p. 873; Jordan v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 431, 443; Social Services Union v. Alameda County Training & Employment Bd. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1458, 1465; United Brotherhood of Carpenters Etc., Local 642 v. DeMello
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(1972) 22 Cal.App.3d 838, 840; DiRussa v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. (2d Cir. 1997)
121 F.3d 818, 825.) As we have explained, we find no error in applying issue preclusion to this case. In any event, CalHR and CCHCS have not established the type of clear, explicit legislative expression of public policy that would require the treatment doors to remain closed in this specific context. Deputy State Fire Marshall Supervisor Shane Wilson testified that under the California Fire Code, fire doors with a magnetic hold-open device may remain open. Section 705.2.3 of the California Fire Code provides for hold-open devices for doors. And section 705.2.2 supports the conclusion that fire doors may be kept open, stating: "Where required by the fire code official, a sign shall be permanently displayed on or near each fire door . . . to read as follows: [¶] 1. For doors designed to be kept normally open, "FIRE DOOR - DO NOT BLOCK." [¶] 2. For doors designed to be kept normally closed, "FIRE DOOR - KEEP CLOSED." Section 5.2.13.3 of NFPA 80 stated that blocking or wedging doors open was prohibited, but the portions of NFPA 80 in the record do not address whether other methods for keeping doors open are permitted. None of the Fire Code or NFPA 80 sections CalHR and CCHCS cite state that the treatment room doors must be kept closed in this context.
The arbitrator recommended that Pelican Bay install Fire Code compliant magnetic hold-open devices for the treatment rooms. Citing California Dept. of Human Resources v. Service Employees International Union, Local 1000 (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1420, CalHR and CCHCS argue that the recommendation violated public policy by requiring the expenditure of funds for which there was no legislative appropriation. California Dept. of Human Resources held that salary increases must be approved by the Legislature and an arbitration award increasing salaries in excess of what was explicitly approved by the Legislature violated public policy. (Id. at pp. 1423, 1434.) The public policy in that case was based on statutes such as Government Code section 3517.5, which required legislative approval of collective bargaining agreements. (See California Dept.
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of Human Resources, at p. 1425, fn. 5.) Here, however, CalHR and CCHCS do not cite authority that would require legislative approval of a Pelican Bay decision to install magnetic hold-open devices.
Citing California Code of Regulations, title 8, section 5199, subdivision (e)(5)(D)(8), CalHR and CCHCS further argue that the arbitration award violated public policy because it increased the likelihood of airborne transmissible germs and disease. Subdivision (e)(5)(D) of section 5199 specifies requirements for airborne infection isolation rooms or areas. An airborne infection isolation room or area is a room or area "that is maintained at negative pressure to adjacent areas in order to control the spread of aerosolized M. tuberculosis and other airborne infectious pathogens." (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 5199, subd. (b).) There is no evidence the dental clinic treatment rooms at Pelican Bay were airborne infection isolation rooms. CCHCS's Chief Dentist testified that CCHCS facilities did not have negative pressure rooms. CalHR and CCHCS have not shown the applicability of a public policy expressed in section 5199.
In addition, CalHR and CCHCS suggest that to the extent the Scholtz arbitration award required a correctional officer to be present during dental treatment, it imposed staffing conditions, interfering with CCHCS's duty to provide adequate dental care, and it mandated funds for additional staffing that had not been appropriated by the Legislature. We do not address this contention because it was asserted without supporting argument and citation to legal authority. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B); Okasaki v. City of Elk Grove (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1043, 1045, fn. 1; Keyes v. Bowen (2010)
189 Cal.App.4th 647, 656.) CalHR and CCHCS also claim that the Scholtz arbitration award violated public policy because it will subject CCHCS and Pelican Bay to potential liability for Fire Code violations, employee and inmate complaints, and California Occupational Safety and Health (Cal OSHA) fines. However, as we have explained, CalHR and CCHCS have not
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established that the treatment room doors cannot be open in this context. Nor do they show the likelihood of employee or inmate complaints. As for their contention that the Scholtz arbitration award will expose CCHCS and Pelican Bay to Cal OSHA fines, CalHR and CCHCS cite testimony by Kenneth Martin that Cal OSHA fined San Quentin State Prison for a "failure to limit egress or access to" its dental clinic. But Martin did not describe San Quentin's dental clinic treatment room door practice, the specific problem there with egress or access, or how the circumstances at San Quentin compared to those at Pelican Bay such that Pelican Bay would be exposed to Cal OSHA fines. CalHR and CCHCS have not convinced us that this case falls within the limited public policy exception permitting judicial review of an arbitration award.
DISPOSITION
The trial court's order denying the CalHR and CCHCS petition to vacate the arbitration award and granting the SEIU cross-petition to confirm the arbitration award, as corrected, is affirmed.
/S/
MAURO, J.
We concur:
/S/
EARL, P. J.
/S/
KRAUSE, J.
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