Supreme Court of Texas ══════════
No. 24-1033
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Fasken Oil and Ranch, Ltd., Fasken Land and Minerals, Ltd., and Fasken Management, LLC, as General Partner of Fasken Oil and Ranch, Ltd., and Fasken Land and Minerals, Ltd., Petitioners,
v.
Baldomero A. Puig, III, Emily P. Kenna, James W. Puig, and Priscilla P. Oberton,
Respondents
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On Petition for Review from the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth District of Texas ═══════════════════════════════════════
Argued March 3, 2026
JUSTICE BLAND delivered the opinion of the Court. We are once again asked to determine whether to calculate a "free of cost" royalty interest based on gas produced at the wellhead or gas processed and sold downstream. Unless the parties agree otherwise, a cost-free royalty on produced minerals is calculated free of exploration and production costs, but it bears costs incurred to enhance and transport the raw minerals for downstream sale. Parties can deviate
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from this rule with language reflecting a royalty calculated on the enhanced, downstream products or language that adds postproduction costs to the base royalty.1
The operators historically valued the royalty interest at issue in this case at the well. Thus, the operators deducted postproduction costs from the sales price obtained at market downstream to arrive at the value of the raw minerals produced at the well. In 2021, the royalty owners challenged this practice, contending the royalty instead is based on a downstream sales price for processed gas. The trial court ruled for the royalty owners, but it granted the operators permission to appeal. The court of appeals accepted the appeal and affirmed. We reverse. By its plain language, the deed reserves a royalty on minerals "produced from the above described acreage," not a royalty on minerals transported, processed, or otherwise enhanced for sale at an unspecified downstream point. The deed lacks language indicating that the royalty is calculated based on processed gas at a point downstream rather than gas produced at the well. Nor does the deed specify that the royalty is based on gross proceeds from a downstream sale. The term
"free of cost forever" in the deed restates the rule that the royalty is calculated without deduction of costs incurred in exploring for and producing the minerals. Standing alone, the phrase does not transform
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a royalty on raw minerals into a royalty on processed minerals sold downstream as products.
I
B. A. Puig, Jr., the Puigs' predecessor in interest, reserved a nonparticipating royalty interest when he sold Webb County ranchland to Palafox Exploration Company in 1960 (the "Puig Deed").2The deed provides:
There is SAVED, EXCEPTED AND RESERVED, in favor of the undersigned, B. A. Puig, Jr., out of the above described property, an undivided one-sixteenth (1/16) of all the oil, gas and other minerals, except coal, in, to and under or that may be produced from the above described acreage, to be paid or delivered to Grantor, B. A. Puig, Jr., as his own property free of cost forever. Said interest hereby reserved is Non-Participating Royalty . . . .
Fasken Oil and Ranch, Ltd.,3the successor in interest to Palafox Exploration Company, operates oil and gas wells on the relevant leaseholds. After Fasken produces minerals from the wells, it transports, treats, processes, and sells them as condensate and natural gas. Fasken historically deducted the costs incurred between the wellhead and the point of sale from the price obtained for the processed gas to arrive at a market value used to calculate the Puigs' royalty on the produced minerals.
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In 2021, the Puigs challenged this calculation and sued Fasken. The Puigs sought a declaration that their royalty is free of downstream postproduction costs, meaning it is calculated based on the sales price obtained for enhanced minerals at a downstream market rather than the market value of the raw minerals when produced. Fasken responded that the Puigs' royalty is calculated based on the value of gas "produced from the above described acreage," not a downstream sales price. The trial court granted summary judgment for the Puigs, ruling that the royalty is calculated free of postproduction costs with the exception of severance taxes, which the Puigs concede they bear. The trial court also certified an interlocutory appeal on a controlling question of law: "Does the [deed's] 'free of cost forever' language preclude the deduction of post-production costs?"4
The court of appeals accepted the appeal and affirmed.5Relying on Chesapeake Exploration, L.L.C. v. Hyder,6the court concluded that
"free of cost forever" expresses an intent to free the royalty of downstream costs for determining the market value of the produced minerals.7
We granted Fasken's petition for review.
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II
Fasken contends that the deed establishes a valuation based on minerals "produced from the above described acreage;" that is, the value of the minerals at the wellhead. The Puigs respond that the royalty is calculated based on a downstream sales price that, while not specified in the lease, is implied by the "free of cost forever" language and, in their view, the absence of any specific valuation point for the produced minerals.
The parties presented their competing positions in cross motions for summary judgment.8When a trial court denies one cross motion and grants the other, "we review both, determine all questions presented, and render the judgment the trial court should have rendered."9We construe the deed as a whole to ascertain the parties' intent and attempt to harmonize provisions so none are rendered meaningless.10We give terms their "plain, grammatical, and ordinary meaning unless doing so 'would clearly defeat the parties' intentions' or the instrument shows the parties used the terms in a different or technical sense."11
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A
A nonparticipating royalty is a nonpossessory interest that
"entitles its owner to a share of the production proceeds, free of the expenses of exploration and production."12Unless the parties agree otherwise, a nonparticipating royalty is subject to postproduction costs incurred to prepare raw oil or gas for sale downstream, "including taxes, treatment costs to render [the minerals] marketable, and transportation costs."13This is because "[t]he value of gas 'at the well' represents its value in the marketplace at any given point of sale, less the reasonable cost to get the gas to that point of sale."14To deviate from this general rule, a royalty agreement must "'plainly and in a formal way' express[] [the parties'] intent . . . to 'operate differently.'"15
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We have recognized two primary ways parties may free a royalty interest from the postproduction costs it usually bears.16The first is by setting the valuation point of the royalty downstream of the well.17The second is by employing explicit terms that add some or all postproduction costs to the royalty base.18This deed does neither. We start with the valuation point. The Puig Deed describes a geographic location: minerals "produced from the above described acreage." "[T]o 'produce' is to make or create a product that did not previously exist, and not to refine or improve a product already in existence."19As the Court has explained, "[p]roduction is the process of bringing minerals to the surface, and production for raw gas occurs at
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the wellhead."20Although parties to a deed can set the valuation point and the valuation method independently, absent contrary language, a royalty in minerals "produced" and nothing more is a royalty valued at the well.
Not only is the valuation location in this case geographically distinct, so is the type of gas.21A royalty in "produced," unprocessed minerals free of costs contrasts with a royalty in "processed" or enhanced minerals. "The market price of the processed gas reflects the value of the unprocessed gas at the well only if reasonable postproduction processing costs are deducted."22A royalty on processed gas, in contrast, "share[s] in the enhanced value of production but not the expenses incurred to make it so."23
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We interpreted similar "produced" language in Carl v. Hilcorp Energy Co., in which we concluded the deed calculated a royalty on "gas
. . . produced from said land and sold or used off the premises" based on the value of the gas at the well.24The disputed deed in Carl included a
"market value at the well" term unlike the deed in this case.25The
"produced from the above described acreage" in the Puig Deed, however, is functionally equivalent to the at-the-well term in Carl: it identifies
"the physical spot at which [the Puigs'] interest in the products arises,"26 indicating "that the royalty interest is in the minerals as they come out of the ground, not after . . . 'post-production' efforts have increased the minerals' value."27
The Puig Deed contrasts with agreements calling for a valuation away from the wellhead that employ terms it critically lacks. In BlueStone Natural Resources II, LLC v. Randle, we explained that
"gross proceeds" language differs from an at-the-well valuation point or a net-proceeds measurement.28A deed calling for valuation based on the
"amount realized," "proceeds," "gross value received," or another
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gross-proceeds term is "based on point-of-sale proceeds."29Absent limiting language, such terms may create a royalty free from postproduction costs.30
"Produced from the above described acreage" is the opposite of a term that sets the valuation at a downstream point. While minerals must be produced regardless of a royalty interest valuation point, in the absence of language calling for a royalty on transported, processed, treated, or otherwise enhanced minerals downstream, a royalty on minerals "produced" is a royalty valued at the wellhead. The term "free of cost forever" does not change the valuation point or formally relieve the royalty of any postproduction costs incurred to enhance the value of the produced minerals. "Forever" refers to the temporal duration of the royalty interest, not to the geographic location of valuation.31We have said that language similar to the "free of cost forever" language in this deed does "nothing to change the valuation point,"32much less to a location where the enhanced minerals are sold. When a royalty provision calls for valuation at the well, a cost-free term does not free a royalty of postproduction costs because such costs are not
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incurred to produce the minerals.33This is true even when the cost-free term refers to specific postproduction costs, like the clause in Heritage Resources, Inc. v. NationsBank, which expressly stated "there shall be no deductions from the value of Lessor's royalty [for] processing, cost of dehydration, compression, transportation or other matter to market such gas."34Absent reference to another valuation point or calculation method in the deed, cost-free language merely restates the rule that a royalty interest is free of costs incurred in exploring for and producing the raw minerals.35
For the same reason, "free of cost forever" does not "'plainly and in a formal way' express[] [the parties'] intent" to reallocate postproduction costs.36This general reference emphasizes that the reserved royalty interest is free of production costs. The Puig Deed employs language traditionally used to create a mineral interest, and the cost-free term in the granting clause distinguishes the royalty interest reserved from a mineral interest that typically bears such costs.
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The Puig Deed provides for a royalty on minerals "in, to and under or that may be produced from the above described acreage." We interpreted a similar phrase in Temple-Inland Forest Products Corp. v. Henderson Family Partnership, Ltd.37The deed in that case, much like the deed here, had a granting clause reserving an interest "in, to and of all oil, gas, and other minerals . . . that may be produced from the following described land."38We observed this language ordinarily creates a mineral interest,39but "free of cost" language elsewhere in the deed indicated the parties' intent to convey a royalty interest, not a mineral interest.40"[F]ree of cost forever" clarifies the grantor's reservation of a royalty free of production costs, rather than a mineral
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interest burdened by them, in deed language that could be construed as creating either.
The Puigs urge that their deed identifies the interest as a
"Non-Participating Royalty Interest," which sufficiently distinguishes their interest from a mineral interest without cost-free language. As we have recognized, however, drafters often use cost-free language to stress that an agreement conveys a royalty interest free of production costs.41
"[F]ree of cost forever" restates the rule that the royalty is free of the costs of exploring for and producing the minerals. The Puigs' construction of the language "would improperly convert the royalty interest from a royalty on raw products at the well to a royalty on refined, downstream products."42We cannot rewrite or add to the deed to reach such a result.43
The deed's in-kind provision further supports the construction that "free of cost" refers to exploration and production costs when valuing the minerals "produced from the above described acreage." The royalty in the Puig Deed is "to be paid or delivered," meaning that it can be paid in cash or delivered in kind at the well.44But the deed does not
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designate who chooses between the two alternatives. In Hyder, we allowed a cash royalty to be free of postproduction costs even if the royalty in kind bears them, noting that the royalty owner in that case held the right to choose between the two.45As we more recently observed in Burlington Resources Oil & Gas Co. v. Texas Crude Energy, LLC, however, it would be strange for parties to contract for the value of the royalty to turn on the method of delivery.46
Unlike the agreements in Hyder and Burlington Resources, the Puig Deed does not grant the Puigs the right to choose between a cash or an in-kind royalty. If the royalty is free of postproduction costs when paid in cash but not when delivered in kind, the Puigs have every incentive to choose a cash royalty.47Fasken, in contrast, has every incentive to choose to deliver the royalty in kind, avoiding the penalty for enhancing the value of the raw minerals postproduction.48A contract who receives a royalty in kind is entitled to the owner's share of the minerals produced as an alternative to the share's cash value. See Nettye, 639 S.W.3d at 684, 685 n.5.
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that permits either party to manipulate the price via the method of delivery without establishing who chooses the method is far less plausible than a contract that, by fixing valuation of the royalty based on minerals produced at the wellhead, provides for a royalty of equal value regardless of the method of delivery. Parties are "free to contract for . . . odd results,"49but we will not reach to find them outside the text of the deed.
Finally, though our construction turns solely on the deed's text,50 we note that the parties' uniform course of conduct is consistent with our reading of the deed's language. The Puigs do not dispute that their royalty payments have historically been burdened by postproduction costs. This "seem[s] normal and reassuring" in light of our interpretation of the text.51
B
The court of appeals relied on the Court's opinion in Hyder to reach its conclusion that the "free of cost forever" language in the Puig Deed includes postproduction costs. This phrase, plucked from its context, ignores the Court's holistic analysis of the Hyder lease. In Hyder, the lease at issue contained three royalty provisions. From the outset, we noted the general rule that "a royalty is free of production
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expenses but 'usually subject to post-production costs.'"52Applying this general rule to the first two royalty clauses in the lease, we concluded: (1) the oil royalty was burdened by postproduction costs because it was paid based on market value at the well; and (2) the gas royalty was free of postproduction costs because it was paid based on
"the price actually received" by the operator.53We then turned to the third royalty clause, calling for "'a perpetual, cost-free (except only its portion of production taxes) overriding royalty of five percent (5.0%) of gross production obtained' from directional wells."54 While we agreed that "cost-free" may "literally refer[] to all costs,"55that phrase alone does not free a royalty of postproduction costs because it says nothing about a valuation point. To the contrary, we acknowledged that cost-free language commonly refers to production costs only.56It was the lease's additional language in Hyder that provided crucial context to the "cost-free" term. Most notably, the royalty provision contained a parenthetical exempting "production taxes" from
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the "cost-free" term.57This exemption, we concluded, showed the parties' intent to deviate from the general rule.58Because the Court characterized the taxes as a postproduction cost, "[i]t would make no sense to state that the royalty is free of production costs, except for postproduction taxes."59As the Court put it, such a reading is akin to stating "no dogs allowed, except for cats."60Having concluded that the parenthetical reflected the parties' intent to free the royalty from other kinds of postproduction costs, the Court considered the remaining language of the royalty provision. "[G]ross production obtained"
addressed the volume used to value the royalty, not the valuation point.61And because the royalty owner retained the right to choose the method of delivery (and its consequences), the in-kind provision did not overcome the specific exclusion of one postproduction expense as an indication that others were to be included.62
In contrast, the Puig Deed contains no reference to postproduction expenses indicating the parties intended "free of cost forever" to reallocate postproduction costs or to base the royalty on an
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unspecified sales price for processed gas as opposed to the stated royalty on produced gas. The deed does not include other royalty clauses employing downstream valuation points, nor does it expressly grant the royalty owner the right to elect whether to take the royalty in cash or in kind. Unlike the lease in Hyder, this deed reserves a royalty on minerals produced at the well where "there aren't any postproduction costs to 'deduct.'"63
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The Puig Deed restates the rule that a royalty is free of costs incurred in exploring for and producing minerals. It reserves a nonparticipating royalty in minerals produced at the well that bears the usual postproduction costs. We hold that the "free of cost forever"
language refers to raw minerals produced at the wellhead, not to processed minerals sold downstream. Thus, it does not preclude deduction of postproduction costs from a downstream sales price to arrive at the market value of raw minerals produced at the wellhead. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals, render partial summary judgment for Fasken, and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Jane N. Bland
Justice
OPINION DELIVERED: April 10, 2026