six months due to "MULTIPLE ADVERSE STATE COURT JUDGMENTS . . . W/O ABILITY TO PAY."24
O'Neal lists bank accounts and other deposits of money totaling $57.79 and affirms that he does not own a home. In response to Question 16. Money or property due to you?, O'Neal asserts that he is owed $3,002.86 by Allstate for "lawsuits" and lists the above-styled Miscellaneous Proceeding as an asset.25
In support of his Application to Proceed in Forma Pauperis, O'Neal attached an Order recently issued by the United States Court of Federal Claims on March 10, 2026, denying his Motion for Leave to Change Venue because his Complaint against the United States had previously been dismissed without prejudice. Nevertheless, the Court approved his Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis.26
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II. Conclusions of Law A fundamental objective of the Bankruptcy Code is to provide a procedure by which honest but unfortunate debtors "can reorder their affairs, make peace with their creditors, and enjoy a new opportunity in life with a clear field for future effort."27The history outlined above reveals that O'Neal is clearly not an honest but unfortunate debtor seeking to reorganize his affairs by making peace with his creditors. Instead, he is a pro se litigant who seeks a lifetime in court harassing the same parties with no end in sight despite the Permanent Injunction Order recently issued by the District Court. The Bankruptcy Court is not the proper venue to relitigate matters previously decided by the Appellate, District and State Courts.
a. Standard to Reopen/Reinstate a Proceeding
Section 350(b) of the Bankruptcy Code states that a closed "case may be reopened in the court in which such case was closed to administer assets, to accord relief to the debtor, or for other cause."28 When determining whether to exercise their equitable powers, bankruptcy courts will "not re-open a bankruptcy case to allow an issue previously litigated in state court" to be relitigated in the bankruptcy court.29A bankruptcy case should also "not be reopened where it would be a futile exercise or waste of judicial resources. . . . If a moving party cannot obtain the substantive relief which it intends to seek, 'then there is no reason to grant a motion to reopen.'"30"The decision to re-open a case is a decision solely within the discretion of the bankruptcy court."31
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As an initial matter, the Court finds that it is unclear whether the Miscellaneous Proceeding can be reopened or reinstated pursuant to § 350(b) because "[t]he majority of courts, which have addressed the issue of whether Section 350(b) authorizes the reopening of a dismissed case, have . . . . held [that] a dismissed case may not be reopened under Section 350(b)," explaining that "only cases whose estates have been administered and closed may be reopened pursuant to that Section."32In this instance, O'Neal never obtained leave to file a bankruptcy petition because he failed to comply with the Order Requiring Surety Bond as affirmed on appeal. Thus, O'Neal never obtained relief from this Court to file a Chapter 7 petition and no activity has taken place in this matter since October of 2022 when the District Court affirmed the Order Requiring Surety Bond. Accordingly, there is no "case"
before the Court to reopen or reinstate to administer assets or to accord substantive relief to a debtor for purposes of § 350(b).
However, "the same result may be achieved if an order of dismissal is vacated pursuant to Rule 9024."33To determine whether cause exists to reopen or reinstate a dismissed proceeding, the Eleventh Circuit has explained that the Bankruptcy Code "incorporates the standards of Rule 60(b), Fed. R. Civ. P. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9024 . . . [under which] a party may be relieved from a final judgment or order for several reasons. Among these are the following: newly discovered evidence, fraud or misrepresentation, the judgment is void or has been discharged or vacated, and 'any other reason that justifies relief.' Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)."34Other non-exclusive factors considered by courts include:
"(1) the length of time the case was closed; (2) whether a nonbankruptcy forum has jurisdiction to determine the issue that is the basis for reopening the case; (3) whether prior litigation in the bankruptcy court determined that another court would be the appropriate forum; (4) the extent of the benefit to any
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party by reopening; and (5) whether it is clear at the outset that no relief would be forthcoming if the motion to reopen is granted."35
The Motion to Reinstate does not state cause to reinstate the miscellaneous proceedings, especially after four years. While O'Neal argues, in part, that he seeks to reinstate the Miscellaneous Proceeding because certain creditors obtained state court judgments against him after he failed to post the surety bond, in reality this appears to be yet another attempt by O'Neal, a vexatious litigant who is subject to a permanent injunction issued by the District Court, to continue his pattern of abusive and costly litigation. O'Neal states in the Motion to Reinstate that he seeks to "reinstate all previously filed pleadings, including an adversary proceeding, to recover $3,002.85 dollars that Allstate unlawfully paid to Huntsville hospital contrary to Medicaid regulations."36He further appears to challenge the $6,500.00 monetary sanction issued by the District Court, stating that "Allstate caused the Northern District Court to issue an invalid and unenforceable $6,500.00 thousand-dollar vexatious litigant monetary sanctions order contrary to knowing the tortfeasor was not covered when the accident happened."37
No action has been taken in this proceeding for more than three years after the District Court entered its Order in October of 2022, requiring O'Neal to post the $1,000.00 surety bond that he was required to file the with Bankruptcy Court with his initial Application for Leave to File. Further, it is clear O'Neal seeks to reopen the Miscellaneous Proceeding, not to reorganize his affairs by making peace with his creditors, but instead to continue the pursuit of claims against Allstate which have been foreclosed by the Permanent Injunction Order and to obtain relief from the monetary sanctions imposed therein. While O'Neal is correct that the District Court amended the Sanctions Order to eliminate the $1,000.00 surety bond requirement for bankruptcy actions, the Permanent Injunction Order
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nevertheless permanently enjoined O'Neal from commencing or purporting to commence . . . any . . . proceeding . . . without leave of this Court, against any person or entity that has encountered him in any capacity, or that has had any connection with litigation involving him in any way, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama," including "other litigants involved in any proceedings in which O'Neal has been involved."38The Permanent Injunction Order does not require or even support reinstatement of the bankruptcy proceeding, but merely removes the $1000 bond requirement. O'Neal still must meet the requirement of good faith filings to obtain leave to make filings in the bankruptcy court.
Turning to the facts before the Court, there has been no activity in this proceeding for more than three years and the Court finds no basis to reinstate the proceeding for the obvious purpose intended by O'Neal. The Bankruptcy Court is not the appropriate forum to file yet another Complaint against Allstate given that relief to proceed against Allstate and other defendants must be sought from the District Court pursuant to the Permanent Injunction Order.
The Court further finds that it is clear from the outset that no relief would be forthcoming if the Miscellaneous Proceeding were reinstated. O'Neal states that he has no income and it appears that he has very limited assets, if any, other than his purported lawsuit against Allstate which he has been permanently barred from continued pursuit without seeking relief from the District Court. Simply stated, O'Neal has nothing to reorganize. While certain creditors may have obtained judgments against O'Neal during the past three years, it does not appear that he has any assets or income to protect, nor any affairs to reorder in bankruptcy.
Additionally, the Court finds that even if this proceeding were reinstated to allow O'Neal to proceed under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, such case would very likely be subject to dismissal under 11 U.S.C. § 707(a) of the Bankruptcy Code pursuant to which the Court may dismiss a case after
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notice and hearing "for cause."39In the case of Piazza v. Nueterra Healthcare Physical Therapy (In re Piazza), the Eleventh Circuit held as a matter of first impression that "the power to dismiss a case 'for cause' in § 707(a) includes the power to involuntarily dismiss a Chapter 7 case based on prepetition bad faith"40"Bad-faith filings significantly burden the legal system in general and bankruptcy courts in particular."41Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit held that "[p]repetition bad faith unquestionably constitutes adequate or sufficient reason to dismiss a Chapter 7 petition."42
"[I]n light of its inherently discretionary nature, a totality-of-the-circumstances approach is the correct legal standard for determining bad faith under § 707(a)." 43
Under the totality-of-the- circumstances inquiry, "bad faith is ultimately 'evidenced by the debtor's deliberate acts or omissions that constitute a misuse or abuse of the provisions, purpose, or spirit of the Bankruptcy Code."44The determination of bad faith is a "fact-driven analyses" which "looks for 'atypical conduct' by a debtor which offends the 'honest and forthright spirit of the Bankruptcy Code."45Here, O'Neal's continued efforts to pursue litigation in this Court which has been permanently enjoined by the District Court clearly constitutes "atypical conduct . . which offends the 'honest and forthright spirit of the Bankruptcy Code."46For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court finds pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9024 and Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that O'Neal has failed to establish that the above-styled Miscellaneous Proceeding should be reinstated.
b. Vexatious Litigation
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"Federal courts have both the inherent power and the constitutional obligation to protect their jurisdiction from conduct which impairs their ability to carry out Article III functions."47"The All Writs Act is a codification of this inherent power and provides that "[t]he Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law."48The All Writs Act "allows courts 'to safeguard not only ongoing proceedings, but potential future proceedings, as well as already-issued orders and judgments" including the "power to enjoin litigants who are abusing the court system by harassing their opponents."49"A vexatious litigant does not have a First Amendment right to abuse the judicial process with 'baseless filings in order to harass someone to the point of distraction and capitulation."50Indeed, as explained by the Eleventh Circuit, courts have "a responsibility to prevent single litigants from unnecessarily encroaching on the judicial machinery needed by others, and a litigant 'can be severely restricted as to what he may file and how he must behave in his applications for judicial relief.'" 51
The Eleventh Circuit has confirmed that Bankruptcy courts are likewise empowered to enjoin litigants from abusing the court system by exercising both the authority provided by the All Writs Act, as well as their authority under "11 U.S.C. § 105(a), which provides that the court 'may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions" of the Bankruptcy Code.52
"Frivolous and vexatious lawsuits threaten the availability of a well-functioning judiciary to all litigants."53"A claim is frivolous if it is without arguable merit either in law or fact. And even if a
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complaint legally states a claim, a dismissal on grounds of frivolousness might be justified in certain narrow circumstances, such as a 'questionable claim' by a litigant with a 'long history of bringing unmeritorious litigation' or where 'an affirmative defense would defeat such action.""54 While overly litigious individuals may not "be completely foreclosed" from access to the courthouse, their right to proceed with continuous, repetitive, and abusive litigation is "neither absolute nor unconditional.'" 55
Instead, when faced with such litigants, conditions and restrictions "are necessary to preserve the judicial resource for all other persons."56 After carefully reviewing the Motion to Reinstate and the Application to Proceed Informa Pauperis, and the attachments to the pleadings, the Court finds that the relief requested in the Motion to Reinstate is frivolous. O'Neal has engaged in an ongoing and continuing vendetta against the same parties which have been litigated in the District Court and State Courts which he now seeks to continue in this Court. The Miscellaneous Proceeding will not be reopened after three years of inactivity simply to allow O'Neal to continue litigation that has been permanently enjoined by the District Court. The pattern of vexatious litigation in which O'Neal has engaged will not proceed in the Bankruptcy Court. As explained by the Eleventh Circuit in the case of Alderwoods Group, Inc. v. Garcia (In re Alderwoods Group, Inc.), 682 F.3d 958, 967 (11th Cir. 2012), bankruptcy courts are "duly established court(s) of equity" and as such, they have inherent "power to issue an injunction when necessary to prevent the defeat or impairment" of their jurisdiction. It is clear that O'Neal is not a pro se litigant looking for his day in court but instead seeks a lifetime in court pursuing the same defendants. There has been no activity in this proceeding for more than three years, during which time O'Neal has continued his pattern of harassing litigation against the same parties. He now seeks to reinstate this proceeding without any good faith purpose to reorganize or liquidate under the Bankruptcy Code but
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instead seeks another forum to litigate against the same defendants. The Motion to Reinstate presents no factual or legal basis for the relief sought. It has not been brought in good faith and constitutes unreasonable, vexatious litigation which cannot proceed in a court of equity. The Motion to Reinstate does not evidence an intent to obtain a fresh start in bankruptcy but rather to use this venue to continue O'Neal's years-long litigation against the same parties.
Reinstating a miscellaneous proceeding in which no activity has occurred for more than three years while the movant continued his pattern of vexatious litigation, most recently described by the District Court as "constant, abusive, and enormously costly,"57would be a futile exercise and waste of limited judicial resources under the circumstances outlined herein. The relief which O'Neal seeks, that is to reinstate a proposed Adversary Proceeding against Allstate and other defendants and to challenge the "invalid and unenforceable $6,500.00 thousand-dollar vexatious litigant monetary sanctions order"
which he alleges Allstate caused the District Court to issue, does not constitute cause to reinstate his Miscellaneous Proceeding.
Based upon the foregoing, the Court finds that the Motion to Reinstate should be denied pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105(a) and 350(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, Bankruptcy Rule 9024, and Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for all of the reasons stated herein as there is no effective relief available to O'Neal if the Miscellaneous Proceeding is reinstated. A separate Order will be entered in conformity with this Memorandum Opinion denying the Motion to Reinstate.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this the 27thday of March, 2026. /s/ Clifton R. Jessup, Jr.
Clifton R. Jessup, Jr.
United States Bankruptcy Judge