Uberre, Inc. v. Uber Technologies, Inc.

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Trademark Office (the "USPTO") and the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (the

"Board").

A. Jurisdiction in Board Proceedings

"Under the [Trademark Act, also known as the] Lanham Act, 60 Stat. 427, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq., an applicant can seek to register a trademark through an administrative process within the [USPTO]." B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 575 U.S. 138, 141 (2015). "[Trademark a]pplications to the USPTO are first subject to refusal by a USPTO examiner, following which applications are subject to refusal by way of an opposition proceeding." Mountain Gateway Order, Inc. v. Va. Comty. Coll. Sys., No. 91283412, 2024 WL 2863444, at *4 (TTAB 2024). For example, "if another party believes that the PTO should not register a mark because it is too similar to its own, that party can oppose registration before the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board." B & B Hardware, 575 U.S. at 141. The Board "determine[s] and decide[s] the respective rights of registration."

Trademark Act Section 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1067(a). "The Board's jurisdiction is strictly limited to determining the 'right to register.'" Conolty v. Conolty O'Connor NYC LLC, No. 91206045, 2014 WL 3427346, at *11 (TTAB 2014);⁴see also Trademark Act Sections 17, 18, 20, and 24, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1067, 1068, 1070, and 1092; In re Marriott Corp., 517 F.2d 1364, 1367 (CCPA 1975) ("[T]he issue in an opposition is the applicant's right to register and not opposer's right to exclusive use."). "[R]egistration

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of a trademark reflects no endorsement by the USPTO of the applicant's products or services." McDermott v. S. F. Women's Motorcycle Contingent, No. 91169211, 2006 WL 2682345, at *6 (TTAB 2006), aff'd, 240 F. App'x 865 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Case law has articulated several areas to which the Board's authority does not reach. "[T]he Board . . . does not have authority to determine whether a party has engaged in criminal or civil wrongdoings." McDermott, 2006 WL 2682345, at *6 (The Board is not the proper venue for bringing opposer's objections regarding applicant's conduct vis-à-vis men, such as allegations that applicant bans men from public streets during applicant's parade and that "large numbers of 'Dykes on Bikes' [use] THEIR MOTORCYCLES AS OFFENSIVE WEAPONS AGAINST MEN"). The Board is not authorized to determine the right to use, nor may it decide broader questions of infringement or unfair competition. FirstHealth of the Carolinas Inc. v. CareFirst of Md. Inc., 479 F.3d 825, 828 (Fed. Cir. 2007). The Board also does not possess injunctive powers to prohibit a party from using its mark, and cannot award monetary damages or attorneys' fees. See Gen. Mills Inc. v. Fage Dairy Processing Indus. SA, No. 91118482, 2011 WL 6001095, at *3 (TTAB 2011), judgment altered by settlement, No. 06:11-CV-01174-(DEP) (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 2013) & 2014 WL 343267 (TTAB 2014) (non-precedential)). The USPTO "should [not] undertake to police all the different regulatory statutes to ensure compliance therewith for that is manifestly not its function nor is it properly equipped to do so." In re Stellar Int'l, Inc., 1968 WL 8159, at *3 (TTAB 1968).

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Given the Board's jurisdiction, opposers are restricted to asserting only statutory grounds which negate the applicant's entitlement to registration. Young v. AGB Corp., 152 F.3d 1377, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Mountain Gateway Order, 2024 WL 2863444, at *5. An opposer may not rely on any claims not raised, or deemed raised, in the pleadings as the basis of its opposition. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(b)(2); see also Syngenta Crop Protection Inc. v. Bio-Chek LLC, No. 91175091, 2009 WL 691309, at *1, n.3 (TTAB 2009). The Board provides a list of examples of available statutory grounds in its publicly available procedural manual, the TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD MANUAL OF PROCEDURE ("TBMP")⁵in TBMP § 309.03(c)(1) (2025). One such example is likelihood of confusion. See id. ("Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d): That defendant's mark so resembles a mark registered in the Office, or a mark or trade name previously used in the United States by another and not abandoned, as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods or services of the defendant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.").⁶ Another such statutory ground for applications having an "intent-to-use" filing basis under Trademark Act Section 1(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b), is that the defendant did not have a bona fide intent to use the mark in connection with the identified goods/services as of the filing date of the application. See id.⁷ Yet another such ground

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is lack of a bona fide intent to use the mark in lawful commerce: If the goods/services on which a mark is intended to be used are unlawful, there can be no bona fide intent to use the mark in lawful commerce. In re JJ206, LLC, No. 86474701, 2016 WL 7010624, at *2 (TTAB 2016) (refusing intent-to-use application for marijuana devices prohibited by federal statute); John W. Carson Found. v. Toilets.com, Inc., No. 91181092, 2010 WL 1233881, at *9 (TTAB 2010) (bona fide intent to use legally lacking where nationwide permanent injunction enjoined applicant from making the use required to obtain its federal trademark registration).⁸

Allegations of "theft," however—which figure prominently in Opposer's response to the instant motion⁹—fall within the subject-matter of criminal law.¹⁰"Theft" of a

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trademark or anything else is not an available statutory ground upon which the Board may refuse registration. See, e.g., Trademark Act Section 13, 15 U.S.C. § 1063; McDermott, 2006 WL 2682345, at *6; see also C.H. Stuart Inc. v. S. S. Sarna, Inc., 1980 WL 39359, at *1 (TTAB 1980) (opposer sanctioned for serving "[im]proper and [ir]relevant" interrogatories which sought information dealing with whether officers of applicant have been convicted of a felony and whether applicant has ever been a party to any proceeding by the U. S. government or any agency, department or political subdivision, which were "oppressive and nothing short of harassment of applicant" as not relevant to the specific issues in the case).

B. Applicable Board Procedures

In accordance with Trademark Rule 2.116(a), "[e]xcept as otherwise provided, and wherever applicable and appropriate, procedure and practice in inter partes proceedings shall be governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." 37 C.F.R. § 2.116(a); see also Trademark Rule 2.120(a)(1), 37 C.F.R. § 2.120(a)(1) (wherever appropriate, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure relating to, inter alia, discovery, are applicable to Board inter partes proceedings except as otherwise provided). Responses to interrogatories and requests for production of documents must be served within thirty days from the date of service of such discovery requests, unless extended upon stipulation of the parties, or upon motion granted by the Board, or by order of the Board. Trademark Rule 2.120(a)(3), 37 C.F.R. § 2.120(a)(3). Although evidentiary matters pertain to matters of proof, the documents produced and responses served in the context of discovery are generally requested for purposes

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that include potential introduction of those documents and responses as evidence at trial. Accordingly, a responding party' should bear that purpose in mind. See Panda Travel Inc. v Resort Option Enters., Inc., No. 91174767, 2009 WL 5253036, at *2 (TTAB 2009) ("Each party has a duty to make a good faith effort to satisfy the reasonable and appropriate discovery needs of its adversary."). Generally, objections to responding to discovery on the basis of confidentiality are improper. The Board's Standard Protective Order is automatically in place in this proceeding and allows parties to protect confidential information by appropriately designating it as such. See Trademark Rule 2.116(g), 37 C.F.R. § 2.116(g) (automatically imposing the Board's Standard Protective Order).¹¹ Submissions must be made to the Board electronically via ESTTA and TTAB Center. Trademark Rule 2.126(a), 37 C.F.R. § 2.126(a). In addition, Trademark Rules 2.119(a) and (b), 37 C.F.R. § 2.119(a) and (b), require that every submission filed in a proceeding before the Board must be served upon the other party or parties, and proper proof of such service must be made. Parties or their attorneys or other authorized representatives may telephone the Board to inquire about the status of a case or to ask for procedural information, but not to discuss the merits of a case or any particular issue. TBMP § 105.

Strict compliance with the Trademark Rules of Practice and, where applicable, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, is required of all parties before the Board,

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whether or not they are represented by counsel. McDermott, 2006 WL 2682345, at *1, n.2. Consequently, "it is generally advisable for a person who is not acquainted with the technicalities of the procedural and substantive law involved in an opposition proceeding to secure the services of an attorney who is familiar with such matters."

Id.

Furthermore, "parties to proceedings before the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board . . . are required to conduct their business with decorum and courtesy."

Trademark Rule 2.192, 37 C.F.R. § 2.192. "[M]aking ad hominem attacks on opposing counsel and Board personnel" constitute lack of decorum and courtesy, and may justify sanctions. MySpace, Inc. v. Mitchell, No. 91181141, 2009 WL 1303469, at *1- 2 (TTAB 2009) (judgment sanction entered on second motion for sanctions following failure to serve discovery responses and continued personal attacks on opposing counsel, notwithstanding prior order warning applicant not to do so).

II. Background

Opposer challenges registration of the mark in Application Serial No. 97200373 for the standard character mark UBER TRAVEL¹²on the ground of likelihood of confusion under Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. § 1052, and pleads ownership of Application Serial No. 97397208 for the standard character mark ÜBER. 1

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TTABVUE. Applicant denies the salient allegations of the notice of opposition and pleads the affirmative defense of unclean hands. 7 TTABVUE. On April 4, 2024, the Board granted as conceded Applicant's unopposed motion to compel discovery. 9 TTABVUE (the "Compel Order"). The Board allowed Opposer thirty days to serve responses and responsive documents, without objection on the merits, to Applicant's interrogatories and requests for production. The Board warned Opposer that its failure to serve full responses to the discovery requests as ordered could result in sanctions. Id. at 2.

On May 6, 2024, Opposer served written responses and produced some documents. 14 TTABVUE 2; 15 TTABVUE. On May 31, 2024, Applicant moved for dicovery sanctions in the form of judgment ("First Motion for Discovery Sanctions").

10 TTABVUE (confidential motion); 15 TTABVUE (redacted motion for public viewing).¹³

In its September 30, 2024 order on Applicant's First Motion for Discovery Sanctions, the Board found that Opposer's produced documents, although timely, were "entirely irrelevant and non-responsive" and that its responses were "woefully deficient" and in "clear violation of" Trademark Rule 2.192, 37 C.F.R. § 2.192, for including "egregiously impertinent information" and being "inappropriate in tone."

14 TTABVUE 7-15 ("First Sanctions Order"). As a consequence, the Board granted Applicant's First Motion for Discovery Sanctions and entered sanctions against

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Opposer, which included 1) ordering Opposer and its then counsel¹⁴to review pertinent rules and procedural guidance; 2) ordering Opposer to serve revised responses and produce responsive documents to many of Applicant's discovery requests within thirty days of the Board's order; 3) prohibiting Opposer from

"including impertinent, irrelevant, or non responsive information" in its responses; 4) prohibiting Opposer from producing "non-responsive or irrelevant" documents as part of its document production; 5) prohibiting Opposer from "relying at trial on any documents requested by Applicant in its document requests dated December 18, 2024, which were not produced prior to May 31, 2024"; and 6) ordering Opposer and its counsel to "conduct themselves with decorum and courtesy throughout the remainder of this proceeding." Id. at 15-17. In addition, Opposer was warned that "to the extent it fails to fully comply with this order, Applicant's remedy may lie in an additional motion for sanctions, including judgment." Id. at 18. On November 19, 2024, a second motion for discovery sanctions in the form of judgment followed, which Applicant supplemented on December 31, 2024 and January 16, 2025 to include communications from Opposer received by Applicant and Applicant's counsel ("Second Motion for Discovery Sanctions"). 17, 21, 25 TTABVUE. On August 5, 2025, in view of, inter alia, the withdrawal of Opposer's counsel and that denial of the extension "could potentially result in entering judgment sanctions,"

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the Board extended Opposer's time to comply with the First Sanctions Order by thirty days and found moot Applicant's Second Motion for Discovery Sanctions, filed November 19, 2024. 30 TTABVUE ("Extension Order"). In its Extension Order, the Board warned the parties to "limit their submissions to discussion of the legal disputes at issue," stating that the Board has the discretion to deny consideration to submissions that do not relate to the relevant issues in this proceeding." 30 TTABVUE 5-6 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (b)(1)-(2) (parties must file motions and other papers that are "not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation ... [and] the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law")).

On August 28, 2025, Opposer submitted an eleven-page "Response" to the Extension Order.¹⁵

Now before us is Applicant's third motion for judgment as a discovery sanction under Trademark Rules 2.120(h(1) and 2.120(h)(2), filed September 11, 2025 ("Third Motion for Discovery Sanctions"), renewing its Second Motion for Discovery Sanctions and advising that, other than Opposer's August 28, 2025 submission to the Board, Opposer has "ignored" the directive of the Board's Extension Order. 32 TTABVUE 2.

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III. Sanctions¹⁶

A. Legal Standard

The Board has the power to enter appropriate sanctions, other than attorneys' fees or other expenses, against a party under, inter alia, Trademark Rules 2.120(h)(1) and (h)(2), 37 C.F.R. § 2.120(h)(1) and (h)(2), and Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2). See, e.g., SFM, LLC v. Corcamore, LLC, 978 F.3d 1298, 1302, 1307-08 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (referring to the Board's issuance of sanctions under Trademark Rule 2.120(h) and its "inherent authority to control its cases and docket"); MHW Ltd. v. Simex, Aussenhandelsgesellschaft Savelsberg KG, No. 91093359, 2000 WL 33416861, at *2 (TTAB 2000) (relying on the rule since redesignated as Trademark Rule 2.120(h)(1) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)); Baron Philippe de Rothschild S.A. v. Styl-Rite Optical Mfg. Co., No. 91095170, 2000 WL 1300412, at *7 (TTAB 2000) (Trademark Rule 2.120([h])(1)).

If a party fails to comply with an order of the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board relating to discovery, including an order compelling discovery, the Board may order appropriate sanctions as provided in Rule 37(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Trademark Rule 2.120(h)(1), including entry of judgment. If a party fails to provide any response to a set of interrogatories or to a set of requests for production of documents and things, and such party or the party's attorney or other authorized representative informs the party seeking discovery that no response will

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be made thereto, the Board may enter appropriate sanctions, including entry of judgment, as provided in Rule 37(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Trademark Rule 2.120(h)(2). Fifth Generation Inc. v. Titomirov Vodka LLC, No. 91226034, 2019 WL 5678392, at *5 (TTAB 2019).

The sanction of judgment is a harsh remedy, but it is proper where a less drastic remedy would be ineffective and strong evidence exists that a party has willfully evaded Board orders, rules, and procedures. SFM, 978 F.3d at 1307-08 (affirming entry of default judgment); Fifth Generation, 2019 WL 5678392, at *6-7 (entering judgment as a sanction for failing to comply with the Board's orders and pattern of avoiding discovery obligations where the lesser sanctions already imposed had little effect); MySpace, 2009 WL 1303469, at *1-2 (judgment sanction for failure to comply with Board's orders concerning discovery and ordering that applicant refrain from ad hominem attacks); TBMP § 527.01(b).

In addition, the Board's authority over the conduct of the proceedings Congress statutorily empowers it to entertain includes the authority to enter appropriate sanctions, including entry of judgment. SFM, 978 F.3d at 1302; Carrini Inc. v. Carla Carini S.R.L., No. 9187686, 2000 WL 1923320, at *4-5 (TTAB 2000). The factors considered in assessing sanctions under this authority are (1) bad faith conduct; (2) willful disobedience of Board orders; (3) length of delay or clear pattern of delay; (4) due warning that sanctions may be entered; (5) reasons for noncompliance; and (6) effectiveness of lesser or alternative sanctions. Carrini, 2000 WL 1923320, at *5.

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B. Third Motion for Discovery Sanctions

Opposer violated the Compel Order, the First Sanctions Order, and the Extension Order by failing to serve responses or responsive documents to several discovery requests. Opposer has refused to cooperate in the discovery process for over two years.¹⁷Opposer's discovery violations are repeated, egregious, and demonstrate Opposer's intent to thwart Applicant's discovery of information and documents the Board has already determined are discoverable.¹⁸There is no reason to assume that, given additional opportunities, Opposer will fulfill its obligations under the Federal and Trademark Rules and the Board's orders.¹⁹Rather, in opposing the Third Motion for Sanctions, Opposer states, under the signature of its "Chairperson," Brent Ritz,

"I am not to involve myself further with this case as it is [a] criminal matter,"

apparently referring to a "referr[al]" to "prosecutors and law enforcement" allegedly

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for the investigation of Applicant for its lack of a "CA-USDOJ Seller of Travel Registration," or possibly Applicant's alleged "attempt[ ] to steal [Opposer's] business through THEFT [for which t]hey are being stopped from doing so by President Trump, Governor Newsom, [t]he USDOJ and CA-USDOJ."²⁰In addition, Opposer indicates that its Chairperson has a certain medical diagnosis, and, "[a]t this juncture, . . . I acknowledge that the relevant time is approaching."²¹

Accordingly, Applicant's motion for discovery sanctions in the form of judgment is granted under Trademark Rule 2.120(h).

C. Board's Authority to Sanction

In addition to its numerous discovery violations, Opposer has repeatedly ignored other Board orders, rules, and procedures. This conduct, taken as a whole, also warrants the sanction of judgment pursuant to the Board's authority over the conduct of the proceedings to enter sanctions. Opposer demonstrates in its response to the Third Motion for Discovery Sanctions its continuation of a pattern of a failure to

"conduct itself with decorum and courtesy," as required by Trademark Rule 2.192 and the First Sanctions Order, by use of improper and inflammatory language and ad

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hominem attacks. In addition, Opposer continues its pattern of a failure to "limit [its] submissions to discussion of the legal disputes at issue" as required by the Extension Order. Following are some examples which demonstrate Opposer's clear pattern of delay and exceptionally inappropriate conduct:

• Opposer, in its response to the Third Motion for Discovery Sanctions, engages in inflammatory rhetoric and far exceeds the legal disputes at issue by 1) referring to Applicant as "CONVICTED FELONS" [sic] four times; 2) referring to Applicant as "THIEVES" [sic]; and, 3) including, as Opposer's primary basis for its response to the instant motion, allegations that Applicant is guilty or accused of "THEFT," "FELONY WAGE THEFT,"

"INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY THEFT," "FRAUD," "SEXUAL ASSAULT," "GRAND THEFT," and "DENIAL OF SERVICE WITH DISABILITIES" [sic]. 33 TTABVUE 2-8 (emphasis in original).²²

• Opposer asserts in its response brief that "[Applicant is] attempting to steal our business through THEFT." Id. at 3 (emphasis in original). As mentioned, "theft" is not an available statutory ground upon which the Board may refuse registration. See, e.g., Conolty, 2014 WL 3427346, at *11; McDermott, 2006 WL 2682345, at *6; Syngenta Crop Protection, 2009 WL 691309, at *1, n.3.

• To the extent Opposer's response brief includes accusations beyond the issue whether sanctions are appropriate, such as that Applicant's applied-for goods and services are unlawful or it would be legally impossible for Applicant to make the use required to obtain its federal trademark registration, see 33 TTABVUE 3 ("[Applicant] still does not have . . . a California Seller of Travel License . . . [and t]hey cannot do any commerce in travel"), these arguments are not relevant to the legal dispute presently before the Board, which is

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whether the Board should enter the sanction of judgment against Opposer for its continuing lack of decorum and courtesy and its continuing failure to serve its discovery responses and responsive documents.²³

• Opposer admits to communicating directly with Applicant a week prior to filing its response brief, 33 TTABVUE 6-7, despite Applicant stating in an earlier submission to the Board, served on Opposer, that contact with Applicant directly, rather than to its counsel, would be improper, 21 TTABVUE 3. Prior communications from Opposer directly to Applicant of record include the following excerpts which, no matter the purpose of the email, use a tone and language entirely inappropriate in relation to Board proceedings:

o "Merry Christmas Dara,²⁴. . . based on my recommendation, CA-USDOJ Attorney General and Seller of Travel Regulator Robert Bonta has a shotgun to all your heads . . . You, anyone associated with you, your attorneys, even breath [sic] in a way or file any document that is displeasing to Attorney General Robert Bonta or me or fail to notify us of any activity in writing, it will be met with the most dire consequences." 21 TTABVUE 7-8 (December 25, 2024 email from Opposer's email address²⁵ to, inter alia, "dara@uber.com").

o "Threaten me and it will be [sic] last mistake you ever make." 24 TTABVUE 3 (Dec. 27, 2024 email from Opposer's email address to, inter alia, dara@uber.com and Applicant's counsel).

o "In regard[ to Applicant's counsel] knowingly aiding and abetting convicted Felons to further their crimes, it would seem that they[ ] do not value their licenses to practice law or access to the USPTO." 21 TTABVUE 13 (Dec. 27, 2024 email from Opposer's email address to, inter alia,

"dara@uber.com").

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• Opposer mailed letters to the Board, without filing same through ESTTA, as required by Trademark Rule 2.126, nor serving same on Applicant's counsel, as required by Trademark Rule 2.119, suggesting an attempt to improperly discuss the merits with Board personnel. 23, 24 TTABVUE; see also 25 TTABVUE 4 (Applicant's supplemental briefing to its Second Motion for Discovery Sanctions, referring to the communications as "ex parte"); see also TBMP § 105 (parties or their representatives are not to initiate communications with Board personnel on the merits or any particular issue). These actions demonstrate a continuing lack of courtesy and decorum and a pattern of disobedience and violation of Board rules.

• Serving on Applicant wholly irrelevant and inflammatory discovery requests.

25 TTABVUE 8-16. These include:

o Opposer's RFA No. 4: Admit or Deny that [named individual], recently attended a Dinner Party, in late April, 2024, with well-known Racists, Anti-Women's Rights Advocates and group known for attempting to overthrow our Democracy . . .

o Opposer's RFA No. 5: Admit or Deny that Mark Zuckerberg is Head of the Jewbers.

o Opposer's RFA No. 22: Admit or Deny, [sic] that people related too [sic] Uber Technologies, Inc (ubercab) where [sic] involved in the assault on Paul Pelosi . . .

o Request for Production No. 6: Confirm that Muslim drivers are its largest targeted end users and the percentage of individuals that are Muslim drivers.

o Interrogatory No. 2: Was Uber Technologies, Inc. (ubercab) aware that Bin Mahfouz, father of Bin Mahfouz, sponsored Michael Huffington and Adriana Huffington, since at least 1994, when Michael Huffington ran for Senate? Bin Mahfouz, senior, being the business partner of Salem Bin Laden, Osama Biden Laden, older brother.

Despite being warned in the First Sanctions Order and Extension Order that the sanction of judgment may be entered, Opposer failed to comply with these Board orders. Accordingly, we find that Opposer willfully disobeyed prior Board orders to limit arguments to the relevant issues and to act with decorum and courtesy despite

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due warning that the sanction of judgment may be entered. Accordingly, the entry of sanctions against Opposer under the Board's authority to sanction is appropriate. We find that no lesser or alternative sanctions would be effective. In none of Opposer's six most recent submissions (23, 24, 26, 28, 31, 33 TTABVUE) has Opposer stated any intent to proceed forward with this proceeding.²⁶To the contrary, Opposer has repeatedly indicated that Opposer is of the belief that, due to various alleged legal matters involving Applicant - most of which in no way relate to the involved mark or the involved goods or services and none of which relate to the claims and defenses in this proceeding - this proceeding, which Opposer brought, "has zero validity."²⁷As explained above, the Board is not the proper venue for bringing an opposer's objections to an applicant's alleged criminal or civil wrongdoings, McDermott, 2006 WL 2682345, at *6; see also Conolty, 2014 WL 3427346, at *11. Even if it were pleaded and applicable, the unlawful use doctrine is narrowly applied, Stanley Bros. Soc. Enters., 2020 WL 3288093, at *5, and would not, in this case, give rise to any purported mandatory reporting requirement on behalf of the USPTO, see Gen. Mills, 1992 WL 296518, at *4, and Stellar Int'l, 1968 WL 8159, at *3, nor in any way justify Opposer's clear pattern of delay and exceptionally inappropriate conduct. The Board has repeatedly informed Opposer of its obligations in this proceeding, and Opposer's

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compliance therewith is expected. See McDermott, 2006 WL 2682345, at *1, n.2 (notwithstanding opposer's election to proceed pro se, strict compliance with the Trademark Rules of Practice and, where applicable, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, is required of all parties before the Board). In view of Opposer's persistent failure to comply with the Board's prior orders requiring Opposer to reform its behavior so as to act with decorum and courtesy and to limit its submissions to discussion of the legal disputes at issue, the sanction of entry of judgment under the Board's authority over the conduct of its proceedings now is warranted. See, e.g., MySpace, 2009 WL 1303469, at *1-2 (judgment sanction for failure to comply with Board's orders concerning discovery and ordering that applicant refrain from ad hominem attacks); Carrini, 2000 WL 1923320, at *5.

IV. Decision

Accordingly, judgment is entered against Opposer, and Opposition No. 91286153 is dismissed.