M.R. v. C.H.

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and secured an emergency ex parte Protection from Abuse ("PFA") order against Father.¹The order directed Father not to contact Mother, approach her, or otherwise

"threaten, molest, attack, harass[,] or commit any other act of abuse against" her or N---

.²It was initially set to expire on November 17, 2025, but it was later extended to January 14, 2026.³On December 16, 2025, Mother filed a motion seeking to obtain certain therapy records.⁴Over the next two days, Father secured a lawyer, responded to that motion, moved for interim relief, sought his own PFA, and filed the present custody-modification petition.⁵

On December 19, 2025, with the ex parte PFA in effect and all those petitions and motions pending, Father posted the single video specifically identified in Mother's Motion to Restrict Public Postings. The video showed N--- walking with Father's help (though only his legs and arms were visible), and it bore the caption, "Thx for joining. If you have any legal advice for dealing with manipulative / emotional abusers please share I'd really appreciate it."⁶

The parties both appeared on January 14, 2026, for the scheduled trial on their PFA cross-petitions, but Father ultimately agreed to dismiss his petition and sign a consent order in Mother's favor.⁷The consent order proscribed precisely the same conduct as the ex parte, except that Father was permitted to communicate with Mother on Our Family Wizard about N---'s well-being.⁸

About two weeks later, after Mother found the video now at issue, she filed three motions with nearly identical allegations: (1) a motion to hold Father in contempt of the ex parte PFA,⁹(2) a motion to extend the consent PFA and modify it to explicitly prohibit social-media posts about "any Family Court litigation, Petition[er,] and their child in

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common,"¹⁰and (3) the present Motion to Restrict Public Postings.¹¹When Father filed timely responses to all three on February 9, 2026, his contentions, too, were largely duplicative.¹²

Mother's Argument

Mother requests "an Order restricting [Father's] public posting on Facebook, Strava, Instagram[,] and other social media outlets regarding any Family Court matter, Mother[,] [or] their minor child, N---." In Mother's view, when Father shared a single video post with the 700 or more Instagram users that follow him—including friends and family members shared with Mother—he violated the ex parte PFA order in effect at the time. Most of those followers know Mother and Father well enough to "draw the immediate conclusion that he is referring to Mother . . . and disparaging her character by calling her a 'manipulative / emotional abuser.'" Moreover, any of them could freely share the video to an even wider audience. Mother further argues that Father's "posts"

not only caused her reputational harm and extreme distress but also threaten to harm N---.

Father's Response

Father does not dispute that he shared the video at issue, but he asserts that he has posted nothing on social media since the consent PFA on January 14, 2026. He also denies, for several reasons, that the video is enough to justify Mother's demand. First, he denies that he violated the PFA order. In part, he relies on the fact that he shared the video before the consent PFA period, even though the ex parte was in effect. He also notes that the caption expressly asked for "legal advice". While he did refer generically to "manipulative / emotional abusers" (in the plural), he did not name, depict, or tag Mother, send the video to her, or name N---. Finally, he claims that,

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according to his Instagram privacy settings, only a "limited audience of close family and friends" can see his content.

Second, he disputes Mother's claims that his video somehow harmed her or N---. He points out that Mother's motion offers no specific evidence of reputational harm, such as lost professional opportunities. He questions how the single video referenced by Mother could possibly harm a nineteen-month-old toddler without access to social media. And Father suggests that, if Mother was in fact extremely distressed by the post, her reaction was simply not a reasonable one.

Third, Father contends that Mother's requested order would violate his First Amendment rights. In his view, it would be not only a content-based restriction (subject to strict scrutiny), but also a prior restraint (long viewed with even greater suspicion).¹³ He argues that Mother cannot show a compelling government interest because nothing about his post was objectively threatening or harmful and because she "offers no evidence of [reputational or emotional] harm [that is] occurring or . . . likely to occur."

Moreover, his video was not forcibly inflicted on anyone—a user who disliked it could easily unfollow him—and the proposed injunction is not narrowly tailored because it is insufficiently broad.

Finally, Father requests an award of attorney's fees, submitting that Mother's motion (and her two parallel motions) are unfounded and were filed in bad faith without first seeking an out-of-court resolution.

Analysis

In custody matters, this Court has long exercised the power to order parents not to make disparaging remarks about each other in front of their children, and not to allow

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others to do so, either.¹⁴Derogatory remarks can be and often are contrary to a child's best interests.¹⁵Because protecting children's interests is a legitimate and significant (or even compelling) state interest, it is fairly well established—though not entirely uncontroversial—that an order to refrain from making such remarks in the presence of such children can survive First Amendment scrutiny.¹⁶

Similarly, a finding of domestic violence may justify enjoining speech that takes the form of harassment or threats. State law broadly authorizes the Court to restrain an abuser from "contacting or attempting to contact" his or her victim or committing domestic violence, which includes any "course of alarming or distressing conduct."¹⁷ The Court may further grant "any other reasonable relief necessary or appropriate to prevent or reduce the likelihood of future domestic violence."¹⁸A court does not violate the First Amendment in ordering a party to desist from abuse, even when that abuse takes the form of speech.¹⁹Because protecting victims of abuse is a powerful state interest, narrowly tailored injunctions designed to prevent abusive conduct are constitutionally appropriate.²⁰

Here, Father argues that the speech-limiting injunction Mother seeks is different and broader, and his argument raises weighty constitutional questions concerning the

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proper balance between the First Amendment rights of parents and the duty of this Court to promote the best interests of children. But not all those questions are now before the Court. Although Mother filed three total motions upon discovering Father's Instagram post, both her motion for contempt and her motion to modify were filed in the ongoing PFA matter and are appropriately addressed in the first instance by the Commissioner. Consequently, the Court need not now decide whether Father's video was the sort of "abuse" or "harassment" proscribed by the PFA, whether the PFA ought to be modified to limit such social-media activity in the future, or whether either of those findings would itself run afoul of the First Amendment.

The only question now before the Court is whether enjoining Father's social- media use is justifiable as an interim custody order to preserve "the stability and best interests of [N---]" during the litigation.²¹This Court clearly has authority to enter such temporary orders.²²The difficulty for Mother, however, is this: without alleging any facts demonstrating harm to N---, she nevertheless seeks a sweeping injunction far broader than those often found appropriate in similar cases. At the same time, she vaguely alleges reputational and emotional harm, appearing to gesture at a tort cause of action that cannot be heard in this Court—and that would not merit an injunction in any event. In short, she fails to explain why the Court should grant relief, let alone whether it may constitutionally do so.

An injunction is a form of "forward-looking relief" that is warranted only when there is "a reasonable apprehension of a future wrong"—not just harmful conduct in the past.²³Mother objects only to a single video posted in December, and her evidence of future harm to N--- is limited to an unsupported contention that "[t]he posts [sic] will remain on Instagram, social media[,] and/or the Internet indefinitely and could impact the Child's life indefinitely and harm the mother-child relationship." N--- is not yet two years old and has no access to social media. Moreover, the video does not name

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Mother or specifically disparage her, and it may well be removed long before N--- sees it. Mother's sheer speculation about possible future harm cannot support the sweeping interim injunction she seeks.

The absence of an imminent, significant future wrong is also a fatal constitutional defect. As Father observes, Mother is asking the Court to impose a prior restraint upon his speech. Both the First Amendment and the Delaware Constitution generally bar such speech-limiting injunctions.²⁴"A prior restraint occurs when government suppresses speech based on its content before the speech is uttered."²⁵Here, Mother seeks to have the Court enjoin Father from making any social media posts referencing her, N---, or (any) Family Court litigation. Some authority suggests that, in abuse cases, an injunction against speaking about a victim online may be a constitutionally tolerable contact-based restriction, necessary to prevent an abuser from using social media "to exercise control over the victim in public" and continue the cycle of abuse.²⁶However, that authority is not applicable here. Before the Court is a custody matter, not a PFA case, and there has been no judicial finding of abuse. Moreover, the provisions related to N--- and to Family Court litigation are unambiguously based on content. As a content-based prior restraint, Mother's proposed order faces a "heavy presumption against its constitutional validity" even if it is "not unconstitutional per se."²⁷ A valid restraint must address a harm that is both "grave" and "all but certain" to occur, and that cannot be prevented by less restrictive means.²⁸Arguing in front of a child is not preferable and may be harmful, but "general concern for the best interests of the

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child[] will not necessarily allow a court to broadly restrain a parent from making disparaging comments about the other to third parties."²⁹

In evaluating whether the harm is sufficiently grave and certain to merit such a restraint, courts have consistently refused to issue injunctions like the one Mother seeks. One Connecticut judge concluded that broad restrictions on parents' online speech violate the Constitution: only orders "narrowly tailored to prevent disparaging comments between the parents in front of the children, [and thus] . . . to protect the interests of the children, [are] permissible."³⁰The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court went further, finding that court-imposed non-disparagement orders are constitutional only in "extreme circumstances" where there is a showing of "grave, imminent harm" to a child.³¹And other courts limit these prohibitions to defamation, true threats, or other categories of speech entirely unprotected by the First Amendment.³² Like the other jurisdictions, the Court here will not issue an injunction because Mother's speculation falls well short of showing grave harm to N--- that is near-certain to occur (based on the single post she identifies), and is simply not enough under any standard. In addition, Mother's proposed injunction is enormously overbroad.³³She seeks to prohibit Father from using social media to express anything about any Family Court matter, about Mother, or about N---. Taken literally, that proposal sweeps far beyond what might be necessary to protect N---'s best interests. It forbids Father from writing about how much he loves N---. It forbids him from writing about how proud he is of her. And it forbids him from criticizing or discussing proceedings in Family Court entirely unrelated to this one. Consequently, granting Mother's motion would run well afoul of constitutional limits.

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Conclusion

Because Mother fails to show that Father's possible future use of social media threatens harm to N---'s best interests, or that her requested injunction is necessary and narrowly tailored to prevent such harm, her motion must be DENIED. To grant it would be to violate Father's rights under both the First Amendment and the Delaware Constitution. However, the Court cautions the parties that feckless, impulsive, or spiteful public missives by either parent, though constitutionally protected, will undermine the opportunity for healthy, productive co-parenting. As part of determining N---'s best interests under 13 Del. C. § 722, the Court will consider the extent to which each parent has facilitated—or sabotaged—the beneficial involvement of the other in N---'s life.³⁴ Evidence of disparagement on social media or elsewhere will be weighed appropriately alongside all other evidence relevant to N---'s best interests.³⁵

Attorney's Fees

Without evidence to the contrary, Mother appears to have submitted her motion in good faith. Accordingly, Father's request for Attorney's Fees is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

March 4, 2026 / Eliza Hirst /____________ Date Written Order Issued ELIZA HIRST, JUDGE

cc: Petitioner via email and regular mail Respondent(s) via regular mail Date emailed/mailed: XX/XX/XXXX