Filed 3/2/26 P.T. v. A.T. CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
P.T.,
Plaintiff and Appellant, v.
A.T.,
Defendant and Respondent.
B344162
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 24STFL08632) APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Jeffrey W. Korn, Commissioner. Reversed and remanded.
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Yan Zhao, Julian W. Poon, Ryan Azad; Family Violence Appellate Project, Elissa Gray, Shuray Ghorishi and Jennafer Dorfman Wagner for Plaintiff and Appellant.
No appearance for Defendant and Respondent.
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Plaintiff P.T. alleged defendant A.T., an Ohio resident, abused her on a persistent basis throughout their decade-long marriage, including during the nearly four years the parties lived in California. After the parties moved to Ohio in 2019, P.T. returned to California in 2024 and sought a restraining order against A.T. under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA; Fam. Code, § 6200 et seq.).1A.T. moved to quash the case for lack of personal jurisdiction. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the action. We reverse. We conclude California has jurisdiction over A.T. based on the alleged abuse he committed while present in the state.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
P.T. and A.T. lived together in California for approximately four years until October 2019. A.T. is in the military, and the parties moved to Ohio in 2019 when he was permanently stationed there. They had a son in December 2023. P.T. also has an adult daughter from a previous marriage. P.T. returned to California from Ohio with her children in June 2024. About two months later, P.T. filed a petition for legal separation of marriage in Los Angeles County Superior Court.
In October 2024, P.T. filed a request for a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against A.T. In her supporting declaration, P.T. described sexual, physical, mental, and emotional abuse allegedly perpetrated by A.T. against her from 2013 to early October 2024. This included A.T. allegedly hitting P.T. "on an approximately weekly basis," raping and sexually
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assaulting her multiple times, calling her derogatory names, throwing things at her, threatening her, and hitting her daughter with a belt, leaving marks.
P.T. further said a military protective order had been issued against A.T., through which A.T. was ordered to coordinate visits with the parties' son through a sergeant. P.T. stated A.T. made no effort to coordinate visits and instead filed a false kidnapping report concerning their son in early October 2024, which made her feel "harassed and unsafe."
(Boldface omitted.) The trial court issued a temporary restraining order on October 18, 2024, pending a hearing scheduled for November 2024.
Prior to the hearing, A.T. moved to quash P.T.'s "entire [l]egal [s]eparation case," asserting that California did not have jurisdiction over the parties. A.T. said an Ohio court had dismissed a petition by P.T. for a restraining order against him in August 2024 and that he had already filed a divorce action in Ohio. He further submitted a copy of a temporary restraining order he obtained from an Ohio court in early September 2024 that restricted P.T. from moving out of Ohio with the parties' son. At the November 2024 hearing on P.T.'s DVRO request, the trial court noted A.T.'s "contest on court jurisdiction" was "part of this case." The court questioned whether it had personal jurisdiction over A.T. because some of the events did not "appear to really be connected here." The court continued the hearing to December 2024.
P.T. filed a supplemental declaration addressing jurisdiction. She stated that the parties lived in California from approximately December 2015 to October 2019. She asserted that when the parties lived in the state, A.T. called her
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derogatory names, yelled at her on an almost daily basis, and frequently threw things at her. She also declared he hit her on an approximately weekly basis, raped and sexually assaulted her multiple times, and hit her daughter with a belt, leaving marks on her back.
P.T. declared that after A.T. violently pushed her and reversed his car into her in Ohio in May 2024, she moved back to California and had been living in the state. She asserted that after she returned to California, A.T. continued to harass her. She said that in July 2024, A.T. called her phone carrier and disabled the internet and phone line she was paying for, requiring her to get a new phone number. She also pointed to the police report A.T. filed in early October 2024 and asserted that A.T. failed to serve her with any of the Ohio court documents he filed or to coordinate visitation as required by the military protective order. P.T. asserted A.T. was aware she was living in California when he did this and felt he was trying to get her in trouble with the law.
The trial court heard argument concerning its jurisdiction at the continued DVRO hearing. The court stated it was aware
"there really aren't specific time limitations, as far as abuse," and
"abuse . . . even for many years before . . . might be a basis for issuing a DVRO," but it was "a little concerned with . . . how far back does that go?" It noted allegations going back five years would extend beyond when Family Code section 3044's presumption concerning child custody applies. The court did not believe that a party moving back to a state "where there were events over five years ago" conferred jurisdiction. The court dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction. P.T. appealed.
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DISCUSSION
A. Legal Principles of Personal Jurisdiction
California courts may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the California or United States Constitution. (Code Civ. Proc., § 410.10.) Due process requires a nonresident defendant to have "sufficient 'minimum contacts'" with the state to satisfy "'"traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."'" (Doe v. Damron (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 684, 689 (Damron).) "As a matter of fairness, a defendant should not be 'haled into a jurisdiction solely as the result of "random,"
"fortuitous," or "attenuated" contacts'" with the state. (Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434,
445.)
Personal jurisdiction may be either general or specific. (Damron, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 689-690.) Only specific jurisdiction is at issue in this appeal.
The plaintiff has the initial burden of demonstrating facts justifying the exercise of jurisdiction. The plaintiff "'must present evidence sufficient to justify a finding that California may properly exercise jurisdiction over the defendant.'" (Zehia v. Superior Court (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 543, 552.) If the plaintiff succeeds, the burden shifts to the defendant to demonstrate the exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable. (Ibid.) On undisputed facts, the issue of personal jurisdiction is a question of law we review de novo. (Damron, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 690; David L. v. Superior Court (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 359,
367.)
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B. A.T.'s Actions While in California are Sufficient to Support the Exercise of Personal Jurisdiction
P.T. argues A.T.'s acts of alleged abuse committed in California constitute minimum contacts with the state sufficient for specific jurisdiction. We agree.
Specific jurisdiction focuses on the relationship between the defendant, the forum, and the litigation. (Damron, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 691.) "Specifically, (1) the defendant's own actions must connect him or her to the forum state [citation] and
(2) the litigation must arise from or relate to the defendant's actions." (Ibid., fn. omitted; see also Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court (2021) 592 U.S. 351, 359-360 ["'there must be "an affiliation between the forum and the underlying controversy, principally, [an] activity or an occurrence that takes place in the forum State and is therefore subject to the State's regulation"'"].)
The requirements for specific jurisdiction are met when a claim is based on the actions of a nonresident who tortiously injured a plaintiff while present in the state. (Damron, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 691.) In such a case, the defendant establishes a sufficient connection with the state to satisfy due process. (Id. at pp. 691-692 ["'it is reasonable and fair to require a defendant whose voluntary acts have given rise to a cause of action in a state to litigate his responsibility for that conduct at the place where it occurred'"].)
P.T.'s DVRO request was in large part based on past acts that allegedly occurred in California. A.T.'s alleged abuse of P.T.
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included sexual, physical, and verbal acts2that took place for multiple years in California, which A.T. did not deny. The acts could not be described "as a '"random," "fortuitous," or
"attenuated"' basis for jurisdiction that falls short of the minimum contacts." (Damron, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 692.) The state has the power to exercise jurisdiction over an individual who commits an act in the state that gives rise to the claim at issue. (Ibid.)
That these acts occurred in the state from 2015 to 2019 does not divest California of personal jurisdiction to hear P.T.'s DVRO request. Statute of limitation issues have "nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the court to adjudicate claims." (Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc. (1984) 465 U.S. 770, 778 (Keeton).) "'[T]he statute of limitations is not jurisdictional but merely serves a procedural function and constitutes an affirmative defense'" to be
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pleaded and proved. (Amaro v. Anaheim Arena Management, LLC (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 521, 541.)
Additionally, pursuant to the DVPA, trial courts may issue a restraining order based on "reasonable proof of a past act or acts of abuse." (Fam. Code, § 6300, subd. (a).) The DVPA does not contain a statutory time limit on past acts that may be considered as a basis for issuing a restraining order. (See id. at § 6301, subd. (d) ["length of time since the most recent act of abuse is not, by itself, determinative. The court shall consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether to grant or deny a petition for relief"].) Although the trial court noted A.T.'s actions would fall outside Family Code section 3044's presumption concerning child custody, section 3044 is not part of the DVPA and does not impose a time limit on seeking a DVRO for past abuse.3
Moreover, P.T. was not seeking a DVRO based solely on the alleged past acts from 2015 to 2019. A.T. allegedly not only continued the abuse after the parties moved to Ohio, but also when P.T. returned to California in June 2024. According to P.T., A.T. disabled the internet and phone line P.T. was paying for and filed a fraudulent kidnapping report concerning the parties' son when he knew P.T. was living in California. Even if these alleged
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acts do not on their own support specific jurisdiction,4they may indicate the alleged abuse was ongoing.
The burden therefore shifted to A.T. to present "'a compelling case that the presence of some other considerations would render jurisdiction unreasonable.'" (Damron, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 692.) "Relevant interests include, among others, the forum state's interest in adjudicating the case, the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief, and the burden on the defendant of appearing in the forum." (Id. at pp. 692-693.)
There is no dispute that California has an interest in domestic violence and abuse committed in the state. (Keeton, supra, 465 U.S. at p. 776 [it is beyond dispute that a state has significant interest in redressing injuries that occur within the state]; Damron, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 693 ["'"'[T]orts involve wrongful conduct which a state seeks to deter, and against which it attempts to afford protection'"'"].) "California law protects people from domestic violence, holds abusers to account, and provides a remedy for victims of spousal abuse that occurs in the state—without regard for whether the abusers or victims reside here." (Damron, at p. 693.)
Furthermore, "[t]he record is devoid of any evidence that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over defendant would be
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unreasonable." (Hogue v. Hogue (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 833, 839.) A.T. did not claim it would be inconvenient or burdensome to adjudicate the case in California. He did not say he had any difficulty appearing for the DVRO hearings.5A.T. thus has not demonstrated the exercise of jurisdiction is unreasonable.6
C. A.T.'s Motion to Dismiss is Denied
A.T. filed a motion to dismiss P.T.'s appeal arguing the correct legal basis for the trial court's dismissal was claim preclusion.7We deferred ruling on the motion and considered it together with the merits of the appeal. A.T. contends that P.T.'s DVRO petition is "substantially similar" to the restraining order request the Ohio court dismissed in August 2024 and the same claims cannot be pursued in California. We conclude claim preclusion does not bar P.T.'s DVRO request.
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"Claim preclusion 'prevents relitigation of the same cause of action in a second suit between the same parties or parties in privity with them.'" (DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber (2015) 61 Cal.4th 813, 824.) "Claim preclusion arises if a second suit involves (1) the same cause of action (2) between the same parties
(3) after a final judgment on the merits in the first suit. [Citations.] If claim preclusion is established, it operates to bar relitigation of the claim altogether." (Ibid.) In determining whether two actions involve identical causes of action, California courts apply the primary rights theory. (Boeken v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. (2010) 48 Cal.4th 788, 797.) "'[T]he primary right is simply the plaintiff's right to be free from the particular injury suffered.'" (Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto Co. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 888, 904.) Further, "'[u]nder well settled law, the doctrine of res judicata does not apply where there are changed conditions and new facts which were not in existence at the time of the prior judgment, and upon which such judgment was based.'" (Neil Norman, Ltd. v. William Kasper & Co. (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 942, 947 (Neil).)
The Ohio court dismissed the petition P.T. filed there because there was "no evidence that [P.T.] was in imminent physical danger."8However, California law protects against a
"very broad category of abusive conduct" and is "'not limited to the actual infliction of physical injury or assault.'" (Hatley v.
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Southard (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 579, 590.) Indeed, P.T. was seeking a DVRO to prohibit A.T. from disturbing her peace, among other things, and thus the actions concern different harms.
Moreover, claim preclusion does not apply because P.T.'s DVRO request includes allegations of abuse, such as A.T.'s filing of an allegedly fraudulent police report, that occurred after the Ohio court dismissed P.T.'s request for a protection order. Consequently, this action concerns changed conditions and new facts not considered by the Ohio court. (Neil, supra, 149 Cal.App.3d at p. 947.)
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DISPOSITION
The order is reversed and the matter remanded to the trial court for further proceedings on the merits of P.T.'s DVRO petition. The temporary restraining order issued on October 18, 2024, is reinstated upon issuance of this court's remittitur and will remain in effect for 21 days, subject to extension for good cause. The trial court is ordered to conduct a new hearing within the time set forth in Family Code section 242. We express no opinion on the merits of the petition. P.T. is awarded her costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS
MORI, J.
We concur:
ZUKIN, P. J.
COLLINS, J.
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