Ralph John Waska v. State of Alaska

NOTICE

Memorandum decisions of this Court do not create legal precedent. See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d) and Paragraph 7 of the Guidelines for Publication of Court of Appeals Decisions (Court of Appeals Order No. 3). Accordingly, this memorandum decision may not be cited as binding authority for any proposition of law, although it may be cited for whatever persuasive value it may have. See McCoy v. State, 80 P.3d 757, 764 (Alaska App. 2002).

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ALASKA

RALPH JOHN WASKA,

Appellant,

v.

TATE OF ALASKA,

Appellee.

S

Court of Appeals No. A-14446 Trial Court No. 4EM-21-00106 CR

MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 7187 — March 4, 2026 Appeal from the Superior Court, Fourth Judicial District, Bethel, Nathaniel Peters, Judge.

Appearances: Dylan L. Hitchcock-Lopez, Ashburn & Mason, P.C., under contract with the Public Defender Agency, and Terrence Haas, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant. Robert Bacaj, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Stephen J. Cox, Acting Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.

Before: Wollenberg and Terrell, Judges, and Mannheimer, Senior Judge. ^*

Judge MANNHEIMER.

*

Sitting by assignment made pursuant to Article IV, Section 11 of the Alaska Constitution and Administrative Rule 23(a).

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In April 2021, in Kotlik, Ralph John Waska shot and killed his friend Yago Pitka. According to Waska's later statement to the Alaska State Troopers, Waska and Pitka were socializing in Waska's home when Pitka started threatening Waska, and the two men "had a little fight". After a time, the two men ceased fighting, but Pitka refused to leave Waska's house despite Waska's ordering him to leave. Waska retrieved a shotgun and again ordered Pitka to leave his house. When Pitka again refused to leave and began to advance on Waska, Waska shot him.

Waska was originally charged with murder for this homicide, but he ultimately reached a plea agreement with the State. Under the terms of this plea bargain, Waska pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of criminally negligent homicide.¹ Because Waska was a third felony offender for purposes of presumptive sentencing, he faced a presumptive sentencing range of 6 to 10 years' imprisonment under AS 12.55.125(d)(4). The plea bargain called for Waska to receive a sentence of 6 years to serve with an additional 3 years suspended, unless Waska proved one or more mitigating factors — in which event he might receive a sentence of as little as 3 years to serve with an additional 3 years suspended.

At his sentencing, Waska raised one non-statutory mitigating factor (extraordinary potential for rehabilitation) and three statutory mitigating factors under AS 12.55.155(d):

• that his killing of Pitka was significantly affected by some degree of threat or compulsion, albeit insufficient to constitute a complete defense, subsection 155(d)(3);

• that his killing of Pitka was significantly provoked by Pitka's own behavior, subsection 155(d)(7); and

AS 11.41.130.

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• that his killing of Pitka was among the least serious conduct within the statutory definition of criminally negligent homicide, subsection 155(d)(9).

More specifically, Waska contended that even if his killing of Pitka was unlawful, this killing was significantly influenced by Pitka's alleged initial fight with Waska, by Pitka's alleged ensuing refusal to leave Waska's home, and by Pitka's alleged continued threatening behavior.²

The sentencing judge rejected all of Waska's proposed mitigating factors, and the judge therefore sentenced Waska to the term of imprisonment prescribed by the plea bargain: 6 years to serve with an additional 3 years suspended. In this appeal, Waska challenges the sentencing judge's rejection of his three proposed statutory mitigating factors.

Waska contends that the sentencing judge's consideration of

mitigator (d)(9) was flawed because the judge failed to consider Waska's mental state when the judge evaluated whether Waska's conduct was among the least serious within the definition of the offense. (For this purpose, a person's mental state is an aspect of their conduct.³) But the record shows that the sentencing judge did consider Waska's mental state and motive — in particular, the fact that Waska was reacting to the altercation with Pitka — when the judge concluded that this mitigator had not been established.

As the sentencing judge noted, the offense of criminally negligent homicide is normally reserved for instances where a defendant acts without any purpose to injure or kill another person. Thus, the act of purposely shooting another person, even

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upon provocation, would not appear to be among the least serious conduct within the definition of this offense.

For these reasons, we affirm the judge's ruling on mitigator (d)(9). But with respect to the sentencing judge's rulings on mitigators (d)(3) and (d)(7), we are unable to resolve Waska's appeal because the sentencing judge seemingly made contradictory findings of fact.

Before the sentencing judge addressed statutory mitigators (d)(3) and (d)(7), the judge addressed Waska's argument regarding the non-statutory mitigator of extraordinary potential for rehabilitation. And during the judge's discussion of this non-statutory mitigator, the judge seemingly accepted Waska's account of how the homicide occurred.

Regarding the events that led to the homicide, the judge declared that he believed that he "under[stood] why it happened". The judge recited a detailed version of events, drawn from the account that Waska offered to the troopers: how Waska and Pitka had been drinking together, how they argued and fought with each other, and how Pitka then refused to leave Waska's house — which prompted Waska to threaten Pitka with a shotgun. Then, when Pitka advanced on Waska again, Waska shot him.⁴The

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judge declared that Waska's description of these events established why the offense occurred "by clear and convincing evidence".

(The judge nevertheless found that Waska had not established the mitigator of extraordinary potential for rehabilitation because Waska had failed to show that the underlying causes of his behavior — which the judge described as Waska's excessive drinking, his tendency to become violent when he drank, and his fear of being victimized by younger men — were both readily correctable and unlikely to recur.) But a few minutes later, when the judge turned to the statutory mitigators, the judge expressed substantial doubt that the homicide had occurred as Waska described it. The judge repeatedly declared that Waska's version of events could not be trusted — that Waska was "an extremely poor historian about this event". The judge noted that Waska did not describe the details of the shooting to the troopers until two days after the event, "when he had a chance to sober up and think about what he had done". The judge suggested that Waska, "possibly as a [method of] self-preservation", had fabricated "a story that coincided with his history and the physical evidence".

The judge acknowledged that "the physical evidence … lines up with Mr. Waska's story", but the judge added that "the physical evidence lines up with many different versions of what could have happened on the night in question." The judge referred to Waska's account of the homicide as "self-serving statements … [from] two days after the incident", statements made after Waska "had a chance to reflect [on his situation]".

Mr. Pitka apparently started to advance with his fists up, and that's when

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The judge then declared that he "[didn't] put a whole lot of weight [on Waska's] statements about what happened and how it happened, or that Mr. Pitka actually provoked Mr. Waska to a significant degree."

A reviewing court cannot assess the appropriateness of a sentence when the sentencing judge has failed to make findings of fact that allow meaningful review.⁵ Given the substantial disparity between the sentencing judge's analysis of the evidence when he decided the non-statutory mitigating factor of extraordinary potential for rehabilitation and the judge's analysis of the evidence when he decided the statutory mitigating factors, we must remand Waska's case to the superior court so that the judge can clarify his analysis of the facts relevant to statutory mitigators (d)(3) and (d)(7). The superior court shall hold a hearing to resolve these matters. If, upon reconsideration, the superior court again concludes that Waska has failed to prove mitigating factors (d)(3) and (d)(7), the court shall make findings to support this conclusion. If, on the other hand, the superior court finds that Waska has proved one or both of these mitigating factors, the court shall determine the weight to be accorded those factors. If the superior court determines that the mitigating factor(s) do not require any modification of Waska's sentence, the court shall make findings to support this conclusion. And if the superior court determines that the mitigating factor(s) call for a different sentence, the court shall make findings and shall resentence Waska. In any event, the superior court shall notify this Court of its decision, and of any modification of its judgement, within ninety days from the issuance of this opinion. The superior court may seek an extension of this deadline if one is required. We retain jurisdiction of this case while the superior court reconsiders these matters on remand.

State v. Bumpus, 820 P.2d 298, 305 (Alaska 1991).

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