IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Shawn Stewart is disciplined by published censure in accordance with Supreme Court Rule 225(a)(5) (2025 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 274) for violating KRPC 8.4(c).
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the costs of these proceedings shall be assessed to Stewart and that this opinion be published in the official Kansas Reports. WILSON, J., not participating.
* * *
LUCKERT, J., concurring: I write separately to concur generally with the majority holdings. Specifically, I agree that:
• Shawn E. Stewart made a negligent misrepresentation when, as found by the disciplinary hearing panel, he "misrepresented the amount of his 2019 net income on the [Pandemic Unemployment Assistance (PUA)] Questionnaire."
• In doing so, he violated Kansas Rule of Professional Conduct (KRPC) 8.4(c) (2025 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 426) (misconduct), which prohibits an attorney from making a misrepresentation.
• And he should be subjected to the discipline of published censure. I fully agree with the rationale of the first opinion, as far as it goes. This means I agree we can order published censure of Stewart based on Standard 5.13 of the American Bar Association's Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions. But given the broader discussion that separates the court in this decision, I write to clarify that I agree with the view that the Office of the Disciplinary Administrator must present clear and convincing evidence that any misrepresentation challenged under KRPC 8.4(c) must reflect adversely on the lawyer's fitness to practice law.
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In reaching this determination, I find ambiguity in the wording of KRPC 8.4(c) and discern that the framers of the ABA's model version of 8.4(c) intended that a lawyer should be professionally answerable only when the lawyer's conduct reflects adversely on the lawyer's ability to practice law. In my view, this is largely reflected in their comments. See, e.g., ABA Rule 8.4, Comments [2] (criminal liability for violations of law "reflect adversely on fitness to practice law," "that indicate lack of those characteristics relevant to law practice," or that "indicate indifference to legal obligation"); [4] ("Conduct related to the practice of law includes representing clients; interacting with witnesses, coworkers, court personnel, lawyers and others while engaged in the practice of law; operating or managing a law firm or law practice; and participating in bar association, business or social activities in connection with the practice of law."); [7] (discussing duty of those in public office and those holding "private trust such as trustee, executor, administrator, guardian, agent and officer, director or manager of a corporation or other organization"). While Kansas has not adopted all these comments, we have adopted enough that I read this same intent into the adoption of our rule. See KRPC 8.4, Comment [2] (same); Comment [4] (same as ABA Comment [7]).
Most important to this decision, I agree that Stewart's misrepresentation and the circumstances surrounding him at the time he made the misrepresentation, by his own admission, reflected on his overall inability to represent even himself or the corporation he administered and certainly any clients. I thus concur with the decisions that the ODA presented clear and convincing evidence of the KRPC 8.4(c) violation and that Stewart should be disciplined by published censure.
ROSEN, C.J., joins the foregoing concurring opinion in part.
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* * * ROSEN, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part: I join the first two majority holdings and Justice Luckert in her concurrence to the same. I write separately to dissent from the majority's holding that Stewart's behavior amounted to only a single violation of KRPC 8.4(c) (2025 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 426). I would hold there were more. See In re Stewart, 321 Kan. at ___, slip op. at 61-68, joining Part Two (Biles, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Nonetheless, I join the decision to impose only published censure due to the mitigating circumstances in this case.
* * *
BILES, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part: I agree with my colleagues (the "first" majority consisting of Chief Justice Rosen and Justices Luckert, Standridge and myself) that Stewart violated the rules of professional conduct and published censure is the appropriate discipline. I write separately on three points of disagreement, fully recognizing I'm just adding to the fractious discourse marring this court's disposition. In Part One, I explain why I dissent from the holding that misrepresentation under Kansas Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(c) (2025 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 426) requires separate proof to show it adversely reflects on a lawyer's fitness to practice law. That's not what the rule says. In Part Two, I address why the evidence supports the Office of the Disciplinary Administrator's exceptions to some conclusions by the hearing panel. In Part Three, I offer a counter perspective on my two colleagues' pejorative notions about our disciplinary process and what I write here.
Throughout, I emphasize that attorney discipline remains solely within this court's authority, and any real concerns should be handled through our rulemaking process to ensure our expectations are shaped by vital input from the bar and the public. After all,
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judicial branch administration is our job, and it is best done in this instance through traditional rulemaking. See Hays v. Ruther, 298 Kan. 402, Syl. ¶ 11, 409, 313 P.3d 782 (2013) (holding "[i]t is the exclusive constitutional province of the Kansas Supreme Court to restrict or restrain an attorney in the exercise of that attorney's license to practice law"; relying on article 3, section 1 of the Kansas Constitution); Martin v. Davis, 187 Kan. 473, Syl. ¶ 3, 357 P.2d 782 (1960) ("The practice of the law is so intimately connected and bound up with the exercise of judicial power in the administration of justice that the right to regulate the practice naturally and logically belongs to the judicial department of the government.").
PART ONE: ADDING AN EXTRA ELEMENT TO KRPC 8.4(C)
In an odd twist from our usual adjudications, a "second" majority (consisting of Chief Justice Rosen and Justices Luckert, Stegall, and Wall), distinct from the one concluding Stewart deserves published censure for violating KRPC 8.4(c), declares a misrepresentation prosecuted under KRPC 8.4(c) requires additional proof that it adversely reflects on a lawyer's fitness to practice law. 321 Kan. at __, slip op. at 28. My problem is that neither KRPC 8.4(c)'s plain text nor its obvious structure supports this discrete element of proof.
We interpret Kansas Supreme Court Rules by adhering to the rule's plain text. See In re Kline, 298 Kan. 96, 117-19, 311 P.3d 321 (2013) (examining the text of KRPC 8.4[c] to reject imposing an additional requirement that misconduct be "'egregious and flagrantly violative of accepted professional norms'" or committed with "malevolent intent" to be actionable); In re Pyle, 283 Kan. 807, 827-28, 156 P.3d 1231 (2007) (relying on the rule's plain language when addressing whether an attorney violated KRPC 8.4[d]). The second majority ignores this basic tenet of textual interpretation to advance a less clear and more outcome-oriented analysis.
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KRPC 8.4 provides:
"It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
"(a) Violate or attempt to violate the rules of professional conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another;
"(b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects;
"(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation;
"(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice;
"(e) state or imply an ability to influence improperly a government agency or official;
"(f) knowingly assist a judge or judicial officer in conduct that is a violation of applicable rules of judicial conduct or other law; or
"(g) engage in any other conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law." (Emphases added.)
A proper reading of KRPC 8.4 identifies subsection (a) through (f) as six specific categories of professional misconduct. Subsection (g) captures any other conduct that adversely reflects on a lawyer's fitness to practice law. But only subsections (b) and (g) call for explicit assessment on how the misconduct "reflects on" that lawyer's fitness, so the rule's text and structure unambiguously confine this deeper evidentiary inquiry to those two subsections. By contrast, subsection (c), which is the provision relevant here, flatly prohibits "conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation"
without further qualification. These differences necessarily carry meaning.
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This deliberate omission in KRPC 8.4(c) signals that "dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation" are so inherently damaging to the legal profession that no further showing is necessary. Its language is clear. Had the rule's drafters intended to demand additional proof of a lawyer's unfitness for every form of misconduct, they would have included that language in the opening clause, not just subsections (b) and (g) specifically. See Kansas Judicial Review v. Stout, 287 Kan. 450, 459, 196 P.3d 1162 (2008) (noting the same statutory interpretation principles apply to Supreme Court rules); In re Lietz Const. Co., 273 Kan. 890, Syl. ¶ 12, 47 P.3d 1275 (2002) (recognizing the canon of statutory construction that courts "presume that when the legislature expressly includes specific terms, it intends to exclude any items not expressly included in the specific list"
in a tax case); cf. 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 369 ("Each word or phrase is presumed to have a purpose and to have been included for a reason, and the act of choosing carefully some words necessarily implies others are omitted with equal care."). But the drafters chose not to apply that qualifier in subsection (c), so inserting additional language perverts established principles of textual interpretation. See State v. Smith, 309 Kan. 929, Syl. ¶ 3, 441 P.3d 472 (2019) ("When the legislative intention is clear and unmistakable, an appellate court . . . cannot delete vital portions from a statute or supply vital omissions. No matter what the Legislature may have intended to do, if it did not in fact do so under any reasonable interpretation of the language used, the defect is one the Legislature alone can correct."). I would stick to our traditional approaches. The second majority argues reading the rule as written leads to absurd results by treating any misrepresentation—however slight and regardless of its connection to a lawyer's fitness to practice law—as professional misconduct. 321 Kan. at __, slip op. at 77-79 (Stegall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). But that misunderstands and trivializes our methodical, multi-stage disciplinary system. And, just as importantly, this feared absurdity is unsupported by real-life examples taken from the many hundreds of disciplinary matters processed in Kansas.
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In this state's implementation of attorney discipline, minor mistakes or conduct lacking meaningful bearing on a lawyer's professional fitness—such as the "'puffs,'" and
"'white lies'" troubling the second majority—simply do not trigger disciplinary action under our rules, which we have made clear from the start. See KRPC Scope [14] (2025 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 315) ("The Rules of Professional Conduct are rules of reason. They should be interpreted with reference to the purposes of legal representation and of the law itself."); 321 Kan. at __, slip op. at 75 (Stegall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). So what justifies changing our rules now, through this judicial pronouncement in Stewart's case rather than using our routine rulemaking process? See generally Rules Open for Comment, available at https://kscourts.gov/Rules-Orders/Rules-Open-for- Public-Comment (accepting public comment on proposed new or amended rules). The second majority leaves this anomaly unexplained.
Let's reflect on how our existing "rules of reason" apply when a question of lawyer discipline arises. The process begins only after alleged misconduct is reported to the Disciplinary Administrator. Supreme Court Rule 208(a) (2025 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 255) ("An initial complaint or a report of attorney misconduct must be submitted to the disciplinary administrator."). The Disciplinary Administrator, like the court itself, is not a
"roving commission" out looking for opportunities to pass judgment on a lawyer's ethics. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610-11, 93 S. Ct. 2908, 37 L. Ed. 2d 830 (1973). It is a passive process initiated in reaction to a report, not proactive policing, except perhaps the random monitoring of law firm trust accounts. See Supreme Court Rule 236 (2025 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 301) (enabling the Disciplinary Administrator to conduct a compliance examination of any trust accounts). But that's not what is at issue. After receiving a complaint, the Disciplinary Administrator determines whether to investigate or dismiss it without any investigation because it is facially frivolous, factually inadequate, duplicative, or outside the disciplinary board's jurisdiction. Rule
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208(b). The Disciplinary Administrator is appointed by this court to exercise this gatekeeping function. Supreme Court Rule 205(a) (2025 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 248). Relevant here, no one asserts the Disciplinary Administrator should have declined to investigate Stewart or determined the initial complaint from the Kansas Department of Labor hearing officer was facially frivolous or factually inadequate. And the record before this court does not suggest otherwise. From my perspective, so far, so good. A complaint warranting investigation proceeds under a formal process outlined in Supreme Court Rule 209(a) and (b) (2025 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 256). These investigations are conducted by the Disciplinary Administrator's office, a state or local bar association's ethics and grievance committee, or an attorney appointed for that purpose, and any relevant findings are reported to the Disciplinary Administrator in writing. From that report, the Disciplinary Administrator prepares a summary and makes recommendations to a separate review committee. Rule 209(c)-(d).
This review committee, consisting of three Kansas attorneys selected by this court specifically for screening disciplinary actions, considers the docketed complaint, the respondent's written reply, the investigative report, any relevant attachments, and the Disciplinary Administrator's summary and recommendations. See Supreme Court Rules 204(b) & 211(a) (2025 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 248, 257); Internal Operating Rules of the Kansas Board for Discipline of Attorneys, B.1. (2025 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 306). The review committee can, by majority vote, (1) dismiss the complaint for lack of probable cause,
(2) dismiss the complaint for lack of clear and convincing evidence, (3) refer the respondent to the attorney diversion program, (4) issue an informal admonition to the respondent, or (5) forward the matter to a separate hearing panel. Rule 211(a). Any action other than dismissal requires the screening panel "find probable cause to believe that the respondent engaged in misconduct." Rule 211(b). Here, no one asserts any incorrect steps through Stewart's probable cause stage. Again, from my perspective, so far, so good.
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Simply put, these initial steps ensure minor mistakes with no bearing on the legal profession are screened out—a reality unlikely to escape notice among the many qualified attorneys practicing in Kansas. The notion that our disciplinary process is stacked against an unwitting lawyer who boasts about how big a fish they caught on vacation is so far-fetched it defies common sense. See 321 Kan. at __, slip op. at 75 (Stegall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). And as a Kansas bar member since 1978, I have witnessed this gatekeeping function work as designed. Cf. KRPC Preamble
[12] (2025 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 314) ("The legal profession's relative autonomy carries with it special responsibilities of self-government. The profession has a responsibility to assure that its regulations are conceived in the public interest. . . . Every lawyer is responsible for observance of the Rules of Professional Conduct. . . . Neglect of these responsibilities compromises the independence of the profession and the public interest which it serves."); In re Gamble, 319 Kan. 680, 558 P.3d 290 (2024) ("[E]quating a disciplinary complaint with 'crying in baseball' reduces the honorable and ethical duty of our profession to self-regulate into a toddler's outburst.").
Only after all these preliminary steps can a complaint move beyond the screening stage to a separate hearing panel (typically comprised of two disciplinary board members and an at-large, nonboard Kansas lawyer) that hears from both sides before issuing its recommendations. This is where the second majority feels compelled to save the day and protect against a nonexistent deluge of inconsequential accusations. And it does this by distorting the rule's plain text and structure and then amending it by judicial fiat rather than following the proper rulemaking process. This is not the way we should conduct our business.
I also take issue with the second majority's failure to seek additional briefing from the parties before fixing its perceived vital omissions in KRPC 8.4(c), simply because it deems it right. See Smith, 309 Kan. 929, Syl. ¶ 3; 321 Kan. at __, slip op. at 28. On many occasions, this court has expressed its displeasure in proceeding without the parties'
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input, yet this second majority dispenses with such simple fairness without explanation— even as some on the court acknowledge this steps into novel interpretive territory. See
321 Kan. at __, slip op. at 72 (Stegall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[W]e have never thoroughly analyzed the meaning of the word 'misrepresentation' in the code."); e.g., City of Wichita v. Trotter, 316 Kan. 310, 322, 514 P.3d 1050 (2022) (holding Court of Appeals "overstepped its role" by deciding an issue not raised by the parties and not giving them an opportunity "to respond in any way other than through spur of the moment answers in oral arguments"); Lumry v. State, 305 Kan. 545, 566, 385 P.3d 479 (2016) ("As we have previously cautioned, when 'an appellate court raises a new issue sua sponte, counsel for all parties should be afforded a fair opportunity to brief the new issue and present their positions to the appellate court before the issue is finally determined.'"); Lumry, 305 Kan. at 574 (Biles, J., concurring) (writing separately to criticize the dissent's advocacy sua sponte for a dispositive test "never before used in this state's jurisprudence or even argued by the parties"); State v. Puckett, 230 Kan. 596, Syl. ¶ 2, 640 P.2d 1198 (1982) ("Where an appellate court raises a new issue sua sponte, counsel for all parties should be afforded a fair opportunity to brief the new issue and to present their positions to the appellate court before the issue is finally determined."). The failure to solicit the parties' input here sets bad precedent.
Finally, it's unclear whether the second majority's holding overrules prior decisions. It doesn't say it does, so one would reasonably assume no precedent is disturbed today. After all, overruling precedent is a weighty act that demands careful and plain-spoken explanation. See State v. Sherman, 305 Kan. 88, Syl. ¶ 2, 378 P.3d 1060 (2016) ("Once a point of law has been established by a court, it will generally be followed by the same court . . . in subsequent cases when the same legal issue is raised. Stare decisis operates to promote system-wide stability and continuity by ensuring the survival of decisions that have been previously approved by a court."). Our practice has been to carefully and thoroughly analyze prior caselaw when departing from it. See, e.g., State v. Reynolds, 319 Kan. 1, 6-17, 552 P.3d 1 (2024); Hilburn v. Enerpipe Ltd., 309
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Kan. 1127, 1133-44, 442 P.3d 509 (2019); Bergstrom v. Spears Manufacturing Co., 289 Kan. 605, 607-10, 214 P.3d 676 (2009); Casco v. Armour Swift-Eckrich, 283 Kan. 508, 523-29, 154 P.3d 494 (2007).
Still, it seems reasonable to ask or at least anticipate whether prior decisions of this court remain good law, since that question surely lies ahead. Take In re Kline, for example. There, a former attorney general unsuccessfully battled the recommended indefinite suspension. He argued KRPC 8.4 "must be 'cabined' or constrained by narrowing principles" to limit this court's application of the KRPC and, "ensure that the rules are '[c]lear, [o]bjective, and [p]redictible.'" 298 Kan. at 114. To that end, Phillip Kline contended there could be no violation of KRPC 8.4(c), (d), and (g) unless the attorney's conduct was "'egregious and flagrantly violative of accepted professional norms that would be recognized by a reasonable attorney practicing in the same situation.'" 298 Kan. at 117. Kline also argued KRPC 8.4(c) required proof the lawyer acted with "'malevolent intent that rises above mistake.'" 298 Kan. at 119. In rejecting these arguments, the Kline court held:
"[A] holistic reading of our rules contradicts Kline's suggestion that KRPC 8.4(c), (d), and (g) should be confined by a professional norm standard. As the Preamble to the KRPC notes, some rules apply to lawyers not actively practicing or to practicing lawyers not acting in a professional capacity. Similarly, lawyers can be disciplined for conduct outside the profession if the conduct 'functionally relates' to the practice of law. Holding attorneys to a professional norm standard might hinder this court's ability to punish conduct that is not prohibited by professional norms but may still impact a licensed lawyer's fitness to hold that license. [Citations omitted.]" 298 Kan. at 118-19. The court also expressly declined "to inject such limiting language in the plain text of KRPC 8.4(c)." 298 Kan. at 119.
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So what happens to In re Kline? And what about other decisions related to KRPC 8.4, like In re Pyle, 283 Kan. at 827-32? In circumstances like these, it is necessary to assess and explain the potential impact on our precedent—consequences the second majority might intend without telling us or failed to recognize without a proper stare decisis analysis. We can't know what lies ahead when the second majority remains coy about what may lurk beneath this judicial addition to our rules. Again, this is a bad way to conduct our business.
PART TWO: EXCEPTIONS BY THE DISCIPLINARY ADMINISTRATOR'S OFFICE A third cohort of this Stewart court forms yet another majority (consisting of Justices Luckert, Stegall, Wall, and Standridge) to reject the ODA's exceptions to the hearing panel's findings. 321 Kan. at __, slip op. at 28-46. Again, I part company here because the panel got it wrong by (1) finding Stewart's false weekly certifications did not violate KRPC 8.4(c), (2) failing to give the preclusive effect of the KDOL default judgment contemplated by our rules, and (3) not recognizing certain aggravating factors. These demonstrated exceptions bolster the case for finding transgressions of our rules and imposing published censure.
Standard of review
When a hearing panel makes factual findings, "[e]ach finding of fact must be established by clear and convincing evidence." Kansas Supreme Court Rule 226(a)(1)(A) (2025 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 275). And when this court reviews a panel's affirmative findings, it does so under a clear and convincing evidence standard. See In re Gamble, 319 Kan. at 695 ("Whether submitted by evidence through an adversarial system or by uncontested agreement, we review it under the same standard—ascertaining the existence of clear and
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convincing evidence to support a legal conclusion."); In re Murphy, 312 Kan. 203, 218,
473 P.3d 886 (2020) (clear and convincing evidence is evidence causing the factfinder to believe the truth of the facts asserted is highly probable).
But a panel's negative findings should be reviewed differently, since such determinations result from a party's failure to bear the burden of proof imposed on that party. In In re Lober, 276 Kan. 633, 636-37, 78 P.3d 442 (2003), the court noted: "This court views the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendations made by the disciplinary panel as advisory, but gives the final hearing report the same dignity as a special verdict by a jury or the findings of a trial court." (Emphasis added.) In this regard, Short v. Sunflower Plastic Pipe, Inc., 210 Kan. 68, Syl. ¶ 4, 500 P.2d 39 (1972), is instructive: "Absent arbitrary and capricious disregard of undisputed evidence or some extrinsic consideration such as bias, passion or prejudice on the part of the trial judge, the [negative] finding cannot be disturbed."
Stewart's false weekly certifications
Our "third" majority concludes clear and convincing evidence does not establish Stewart violated KRPC 8.4(c) when he falsely certified "under the penalty of perjury"
that he did not "'work in or receive any compensation for self-employment during the week being claimed.'" 321 Kan. at __, slip op. at 34-43. On the "work" prong, the third majority accepts the final hearing report's paragraphs 46 (finding KDOL's forms lack of definition for "work") and 51 (finding the absence of evidence showing Stewart's work was compensable). 321 Kan. at __, slip op. at 36-37. On the "compensation" prong, it likewise adopts the panel's findings that while his one-lawyer firm received $124,881 during the relevant period, that compensation went to the firm, not to him personally (e.g., ¶¶ 52, 105-07), and that the KDOL form lacked a definition of "'income'" (e.g., ¶¶ 137, 138). 321 Kan. at __, slip op. at 40-43. To be clear, I'm on board with the third
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majority to the extent that ample evidence supports these findings. My concern is this:
Why do they matter when Stewart admits he actively worked in and received compensation for self-employment?
A quick review of the evidence supports Stewart's admission, but the panel determined otherwise because it misinterpreted the form's plain language. The questionnaire simply asked: "Did you work in or receive compensation for self- employment during the week being claimed?" (Emphasis added.) Obviously, it uses "or,"
the conjunction that joins alternatives, to treat working in and receiving compensation for self-employment as independent triggers requiring disclosure. It directs a claimant to report any self-employment activity, regardless of payment, and any compensation, regardless of personal income. This disclosure was not limited to compensated work or attorney's income, contrary to a narrower interpretation preferred by my colleagues. Stewart received "compensation for self-employment," i.e., any "[r]emuneration and other benefits received in return for services rendered," when his firm collected $124,881 in fees for services he provided to his client. See Black's Law Dictionary 356 (12th ed. 2024) (defining "compensation"). Stewart even concedes drawing on those funds for his own use. And he "acknowledged that he behaved dishonestly" in certifying these forms, explaining he did so out of concern that his law firm would not survive the pandemic and continued applying for Pandemic Unemployment Assistance benefits to create a "'financial safety net.'"
This undisputed evidence begs the question: Is it reasonable to find Stewart did not engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation when he certified he did not "work in or receive any compensation for self-employment"? See Short, 210 Kan. 68, Syl. ¶ 4; Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary (defining "arbitrary" as
"existing . . . as a capricious and unreasonable act of will"). Put differently, do the panel's
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affirmative findings support its legal conclusion that Stewart did not violate KRPC 8.4(c)? I answer no, and my response remains the same even if I accept the panel's factual findings relevant to Stewart's weekly claims.
None of the panel's factual determinations justify or excuse Stewart's admitted misconduct under KRPC 8.4(c). By certifying he did not work in or receive compensation for self-employment, Stewart made a materially false assertion—conduct that plainly constitutes "dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation" under KRPC 8.4(c). See Black's Law Dictionary 1195 (12th ed. 2024) (defining "misrepresentation" as "[t]he act or an instance of making a materially false or misleading assertion about something, usu[ally] with the intent to deceive"). This is underscored by Stewart's response to one of the form's other questions. When asked to "[c]hoose the reason [he was] unemployed as a result of COVID-19," he deliberately selected 23 times the admittedly false option: "My place of employment is closed as a direct result of COVID-19." And he did that despite the availability of an alternative option that more accurately reflected his situation: "I am self-employed . . . and experienced a significant reduction of services because of the COVID-19 public health emergency." To me, this is telling.
A reasonable lawyer's reading would consider the latter option more fitting given his self-employed status, indicating his repeated selection of the former choice was, at best, materially misleading. See KRPC 8.4(c) ("It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation."
[Emphases added.]); Black's Law Dictionary 1195. Moreover, Stewart testified he did not recall selecting the former option and clarified "his place of employment could not have closed because he operated his office out of his house." This shows his repeated certifications were not given "truthfully."
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I would hold his false certifications go beyond something that is merely facially frivolous because they demonstrate "'actual harm to the legal profession.'" See In re Busch, 287 Kan. 80, 87, 194 P.3d 12 (2008). They reflect much more than a singular low- risk, inadvertent mistake. They constitute a series of errors that cumulatively amount to negligent misrepresentation at a minimum with considerable leaning towards fraud with a purpose to secure public funding during a national emergency. This most certainly undermines the integrity of Kansas lawyers.
To be sure, determining a person's intent is challenging. We can never truly know what someone is thinking, requiring us to best judge it based on the evidence available— their actions. Perhaps most apt is Justice Stewart's famous quote on identifying obscenity—"I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within that shorthand description; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it . . . ." Jacobellis v. State of Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197, 84 S. Ct. 1676, 12 L. Ed. 2d 793 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). Even so, this inquiry is not outside our wheelhouse.
The totality of circumstances—i.e., the certifications made under penalty of perjury, the continued receipt of benefits while actively working and being paid, and Stewart's own admissions—support a plain-as-your-face finding that his conduct was not merely negligent but shaded toward knowing misrepresentation, if not outright deceit. Not finding an affirmative fact of knowing misrepresentation under this evidence is capricious. See Short, 210 Kan. 68, Syl. ¶ 4 ("Absent arbitrary and capricious disregard of undisputed evidence . . . , the [negative] finding cannot be disturbed."). The default order's preclusive effect
As to the ODA's exception to the panel's refusal to accept the Kansas Department of Labor appeals referee's default order, our third majority upholds the panel, reasoning it
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was not bound by KDOL's default determination. 321 Kan. at __, slip op. at 44. I disagree, and so do our rules. Kansas Supreme Court Rule 220 (2025 Kan. S. Ct. R. at
268) provides:
"(a) Deferral. If a civil action, administrative agency action, or other proceeding is pending against a respondent based on substantially similar allegations as a disciplinary matter, the following provisions will apply:
(1) the investigation of an initial complaint or a report will not be deferred unless specifically authorized by the disciplinary administrator; and
(2) the investigation of a docketed complaint and prosecution of a formal complaint will not be deferred unless specifically authorized by the review committee, the hearing panel, or the Supreme Court.
"(b) Judgment or Ruling. Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c), a certified copy of a judgment or ruling in any action involving substantially similar allegations as a disciplinary matter is prima facie evidence of the commission of the conduct that formed the basis of the judgment or ruling, regardless of whether the respondent is a party in the action. The respondent has the burden to disprove the findings made in the judgment or ruling.
"(c) Judgment or Ruling Based on Clear and Convincing Evidence. For the purpose of a disciplinary board proceeding, a certified copy of a judgment or ruling described in subsection (b) that is based on clear and convincing evidence is conclusive evidence of the commission of the conduct that formed the basis of the judgment or ruling. The respondent may not present evidence that the respondent did not commit the conduct that formed the basis of the judgment or ruling." (Emphases added.) Here, KDOL's default order qualifies under subsection (b). It applies to "any action," clearly referring to the same "civil action, administrative agency action, or other proceeding" described in subsection (a). The ruling issued by the KDOL appeal referee,
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an administrative adjudicator acting within an agency proceeding, addressed allegations identical, not just "substantially similar," to those raised in the present proceeding. See K.S.A. 2024 Supp. 44-709(d). And Rule 220(b) makes clear such an order constitutes
"prima facie evidence of the commission of the conduct that formed the basis of the judgment," carrying substantial weight in our disciplinary process. While the panel dismissed the default order on the ground it did not contain any affirmative findings, there is no basis for doing so in the rule. It does not even require the respondent to be a party in the action, underscoring its broad application and the legal effect such rulings carry when deciding disciplinary matters. Subsection (c) reinforces this conclusion because it heightens the consequences for judgments established by clear and convincing evidence to prohibit a lawyer in a disciplinary matter from presenting any contrary evidence.
I would agree with the ODA. Although the default order may not serve as conclusive proof, it creates a rebuttable presumption that shifts the burden to Stewart to disprove the referee's finding of fraud. And since Stewart did not attempt to rebut this presumption, the panel erred by failing to accord the default order the evidentiary weight required by Rule 220(b).
Aggravating factors
Our third majority also adopts the final hearing report's paragraphs 121 (dishonest or selfish motive) and 122 (pattern of misconduct). Although this maintains internal consistency, my colleagues overlook that "some evidence" clearly shows these aggravating factors exist, which is all that is required. See In re Ayesh, 313 Kan. 441, 466, 485 P.3d 1155 (2021) ("'Unlike the standard for proving attorney misconduct, the panel does not need clear and convincing evidence to consider aggravating and mitigating
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factors.' Nonetheless, 'some evidence of those circumstances still must be presented for weighing.' [Citations omitted.]"); Short, 210 Kan. 68, Syl. ¶ 4 (standard of review for negative findings).
As to paragraph 121, I find Stewart's selfish motive in dishonestly applying for PUA assistance in an attempt to "establish a 'financial safety net.'" See Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary (defining "selfish" as seeking "one's own advantage"). His conduct remains selfish, even if he acted for the benefit of his law firm or family, because his motive was centered on securing personal or closely affiliated financial gain through misrepresentation, rather than acting out of altruism or public interest. The third majority rationalizes Stewart's culpability by characterizing his actions as the product of "confusion, carelessness, and mistakes, . . . compounded by his daily drinking." 321 Kan. at __, slip op. at 44. Certainly, Stewart's admitted alcoholism may be considered a mitigating factor in this context, but that does not diminish his culpability as an independent aggravating factor. The presence of mitigation here does not erase aggravation; both can coexist and must be assessed on their own terms. And given Stewart's stipulated admission of dishonesty and selfish motive, the panel's failure to find this aggravating factor is arbitrary and capricious, particularly when an applicable standard of proof is merely "some evidence."
Finally, the panel's failure to find a pattern of misconduct is arbitrary and capricious as a matter of law, given the evidentiary weight, because the panel erroneously applied a higher standard of proof (clear and convincing evidence) rather than the correct
"some evidence" standard. For example, Stewart repeatedly selected an entirely inapplicable option: "My place of employment is closed as a direct result of COVID-19."
He made this choice 23 times. But by his own admission, this could not be true because he was self-employed and worked from home. Consequently, the panel erred in finding otherwise.
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PART THREE: THE RORSCHACH TEST OF ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE
Recognizing my remaining comments extend the discourse surrounding this court's adjudication even further, I nevertheless feel compelled to offer my own views that sharply diverge from those of two of my colleagues. See 321 Kan. at __, slip op. at 49-82 (Stegall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Wall, J.). To me, their observations resemble interpretations of ambiguous inkblots in a Rorschach test, prone to subjectivity and personal bias. And to that extent, I concede mine are likely subject to the same infirmities, but I simply don't see what they do. Over the decades since becoming a licensed bar member, I have (1) participated in disciplinary proceedings as an at-large panel member that recommended disbarment for a young lawyer, (2) represented a disbarred attorney who showed his rehabilitation and was reinstated to practice law with dignity for the remainder of his life, (3) reported a concern that resulted in an attorney's disbarment, (4) reported a concern that was dismissed during the initial screening process, (5) testified as a witness in a reinstatement hearing, (6) responded to a complaint against me, which was screened out by the Disciplinary Administrator, and (7) served as a member of this court on more than 225 attorney disciplinary proceedings. I am well-acquainted with the system and, like any of us, have my own understanding of how it operates. I think it works well. My experiences have shown attorney discipline is far more complex and nuanced than it might appear because it is deeply shaped by human behavior and circumstances. See, e.g., Badgerow, Apocalypse at Law: The Four Horsemen of the Modern Bar: Drugs, Alcohol, Gambling, and Depression, 77 J.K.B.A. 19 (Feb. 2008) ("There are many reasons for the type of conduct that leads to complaints by clients, opposing parties and counsel, and even judges, but to generalize about the causes is to invite criticism. Each case is as individual as the lawyer-respondent and the circumstances confronting him at
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the time.") (reprinted with permission from 18 No. 3 Prof. Law. 2 [2007]). The stakes are high—not only because human beings are involved, but because our profession plays a vital role in the function of society's resolution of disputes and the protection of individual rights. Stewart's case is no exception.
Against this backdrop, I disagree with my two colleagues that alcohol "had next to nothing to do with the facts of this case." See 321 Kan. at __, slip op. at 95. Stewart said it did, and I believe him. He appeared before our court to describe himself as a "man who has admitted his wrongs and a man who's sober." When declaring alcohol "reigned and ruled [his] life," he referred to the income statements on the KDOL forms underlying this disciplinary complaint and conceded, "I guess I didn't care at the time." From what I observed, I saw an attorney rejoicing in his sobriety with the support of family, friends, and fellow attorneys, while acknowledging the disciplinary complaint against him was
"necessary, was self-induced and self-inflicted," and stating, "[T]he discipline of censure is appropriate."
Similarly, I do not share my two colleagues' apparent concern that the adversarial process in disciplinary cases is being undermined "in favor of a mitigation only approach that treats every ethics case like a social problem." See 321 Kan. at __, slip op. at 95. Kansas lawyers representing respondents know how to advocate for their clients. Of course, some are more skilled than others, but all legal representation involves assessing risks and ultimately following the client's direction in what best serves that client's interests. And I have never seen a case result in discipline that had no basis for it—even when the parties or some members of the presiding panel or the court disagreed on the merits or the appropriate sanctions. Said differently, innocent lawyers are not being led to slaughter, and I know of no reason to believe serious misconduct escapes notice when it surfaces.
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What's more, my two colleagues repeatedly imply Stewart was poorly represented in this matter. They assert: His counsel "left almost no room for Stewart to defend himself"; his counsel's "handling of this case" likely left "substantive defenses on the cutting room floor and undermine[d] the adversarial process that we rely on"; his counsel did not demonstrate he "endeavored to fully understand the way the highly complex Pandemic Unemployment Assistance Program was intended to work"; and "a review of this record shows clearly that Stewart was faced with counsel on both sides who advocated for his guilt." (Emphasis added.) 321 Kan. at __, slip op. at 83, 92, 94. Again, I do not share their portrayal.
If nothing else, this court's fractured decision unequivocally illustrates the perils facing Stewart's counsel in evaluating client risk. This court is all over the place in its analysis. More importantly, we do not know what occurred between attorney and client, nor are we aware of the outcome of counsel's work product. Stewart and his attorney exhibited a unified front to advocate for a particular disposition, which is how it is supposed to be. Reinforcing this, my assessment of Stewart's appearance before our court was one of a man who was not being led astray, not forced to say anything he did not believe, and sincere when he said, "I'm not a victim here." He was not someone being thrown under a bus or forced to "'fall on his sword.'" 321 Kan. at __, slip op. at 92. Finally, Justices Stegall and Wall's portrayal of my reasoning illustrates all too well my earlier point about the Rorschach test of attorney discipline. 321 Kan. at __, slip op. at ___. Readers can judge for themselves just how accurate or distorted their descriptions are. But I think such characterizations show that when it comes to attorney discipline, some only see what they already believe.
To sum up, I believe my two colleagues' stated hope of bringing a "high degree of clarity" to this case and the disciplinary process, with their "fat tails" and "thin tails"
analogies, does not achieve that end. See 321 Kan. at __, slip op. at 70, 97-103. Such
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efforts would be better directed toward doing the work of proposing revisions to our rules that address their concerns. Those proposals could then be vetted through the established judicial rulemaking process with the necessary input from members of the bar and the public. That is how we better achieve clarity.
STANDRIDGE, J., joins Part One of the foregoing concurring and dissenting opinion.
ROSEN, C. J., joins Parts Two and Three of the foregoing concurring and dissenting opinion.
* * *
STEGALL, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part: Shawn Stewart's disciplinary case has fractured this court in complex ways that reveal deep underlying disagreements about the attorney discipline process as it currently operates in Kansas. As such, it is significant beyond a mere resolution of the matter of Stewart's alleged ethical lapse and any appropriate sanction. A high degree of clarity is required to explain precisely what the court holds today, and to flesh out the rationale for the various schools of thought existing on the court. This separate opinion takes on that task—in four parts. First, we will explain how we concur with the legal holding of the lead opinion. Second, this opinion describes how we disagree with the ultimate conclusion reached by the per curiam opinion that Stewart violated Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct (KRPC) 8.4(c) (2025 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 426). In our view, the complicated facts, when fully understood, make it clear that the only misrepresentation found by the panel does not adversely reflect on Stewart's fitness to practice law. Third, we will tackle the difficult and elusive subject of the "culture" of the attorney disciplinary process in Kansas with the aim of showing that this case is emblematic of the negative impact of that culture
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on clear and consistent adjudication of these cases. And finally, we will offer an insight gleaned from public choice theory as a helpful and necessary framework to guide reform of the attorney disciplinary process in Kansas.
DISCUSSION
What KRPC 8.4(c) means Let's begin with where we concur. We agree and expressly join that portion of the per curiam opinion that states that when the ODA charges a "misrepresentation" as a violation of KRPC 8.4(c), "the ODA must prove by clear and convincing evidence both that the alleged misrepresentation was made and that the misrepresentation adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law." In re Stewart, 321 Kan. at ___, slip op. at
2. Practically speaking, this is the most important holding to come out of Stewart's case, as well as being the point of greatest agreement on the court. See 321 Kan. at ___, slip op. at 49 (Luckert, J., concurring); 321 Kan. at ___, slip op. at 50 (Rosen, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Likewise, we concur with the lead opinion's rejection of the exceptions to the hearing panel report taken by the ODA. Finally, we agree with Justice Luckert that KRPC 8.4(c) is ambiguous. 321 Kan. at ___, slip op. at 49 (Luckert, J., concurring). But we find the per curiam opinion and the concurring opinions on this point to be lacking in explaining precisely how that ambiguity is to be resolved. We take the opportunity here to offer our rationale.
We begin, as always, with the plain language of the rule itself. KRPC 8.4(c) states:
"It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation." (2025 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 426). On its face, the plain text prohibits any and all misrepresentations by a lawyer either within or without the practice of law. See Supreme Court Rule 203(a) (2025 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 247) ("An attorney is required to act at all times, both professionally and personally, in conformity
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with the standards established by the Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct, the Rules Relating to Discipline of Attorneys, and the attorney's oath of office."); Supreme Court Rule 203(b) (2025 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 247) ("Misconduct is a ground for discipline, regardless of whether the act or omission occurred in the course of an attorney-client relationship."); In re Mintz, 298 Kan. 897, 907, 317 P.3d 756 (2014) ("In many cases, we have recognized that violations of the KRPC can occur for dishonest conduct outside the practice of law."); In re Kline, 298 Kan. 96, 119, 311 P.3d 321 (2013) ("[L]awyers can be disciplined for conduct outside the profession if the conduct 'functionally relates' to the practice of law.").
And yet we have in the past found that certain misrepresentations do not violate KRPC 8.4(c). In re Morton, 317 Kan. 724, 748, 538 P.3d 1073 (2023) (misrepresentation that was "either immaterial or [at most] negligent" was not a rule violation under KRPC 8.4[c]); In re Pyle, 283 Kan. 807, 827, 156 P.3d 1231 (2007) (no KRPC 8.4[c] violation when incorrect statement reflected "mistake rather than malevolence"). In fact, a complete review of our precedent on KRPC 8.4(c) demonstrates that we have never thoroughly analyzed the meaning of the word "misrepresentation" in the code. Further, our precedent shows a case-by-case approach that could appear inconsistent when it is unsupported by a precise legal analysis of the black letter meaning of the rule itself. The per curiam opinion relies on In re Sutton to hold that a negligent misrepresentation may be a violation of KRPC 8.4(c). In re Stewart, 321 Kan. at ___, slip op. at 27. There, the panel found that the respondent had negligently given inaccurate information to two school principals that no court order regarding school attendance was in effect when, in fact, an order was in effect. The panel in Sutton also found that the respondent had engaged in dishonest conduct. To avoid the "questionable result" of
"negligent dishonesty," we noted that misconduct under KRPC 8.4(c) can be merely negligent and held that regardless, published censure was the appropriate reprimand for conduct that involved either dishonesty or negligence. 306 Kan. 503, 506-07, 510-11, 394
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P.3d 836 (2017) ("misrepresentation—a form of misconduct that is also covered by KRPC 8.4[c]—can be merely negligent"). But our caselaw is not so simple. In Morton, we held that an attorney's inadvertent publication of an unfinished website featuring other firms' branding as a template was not a violation of KRPC 8.4(c). In that case, we were confident that the attorney's actions were immaterial, mistakes, and (at most) negligent.
317 Kan. at 748-49. Given this lack of clarity on an important provision of the code, we should perform the necessary legal analysis to arrive at a binding legal meaning of the term
"misrepresentation" in KRPC 8.4(c). Legal interpretation of the rules is a question of law over which we exercise plenary review. See In re Bryan, 275 Kan. 202, 211, 61 P.3d 641 (2003) ("Interpretation of the Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct is a question of law over which this court has unlimited review."). Our method of statutory interpretation is well settled and applies equally to the interpretation of other written codes such as the Rules of Professional Conduct. See generally Office of Discip. Co. v. Anonymous Atty.,
327 A.3d 192, 201 (Pa. 2024) ("When interpreting statutory language, we do so 'not in isolation, but with reference to the context in which it appears[,]' and we extend the same rationale to interpreting our own rules."); Cohen v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 339 Conn. 503, 521, 261 A.3d 722 (2021) ("[W]hen we are required to interpret the Rules of Professional Conduct, our review is plenary, and the rules of statutory interpretation apply."); In re Disciplinary Action Against Feland, 820 N.W.2d 672, 680 (N.D. 2012) ("When we interpret a rule, we apply the established rules of statutory construction and look to the language of the rule to determine its meaning."). If the text of a rule is plain and unambiguous, we will not look beyond the plain meaning or alter it. State v. Keys, 315 Kan. 690, 698, 510 P.3d 706 (2022) (appellate court should not speculate about the legislative intent behind clear language and should refrain from reading something into the [rule] that is not readily found in its words). Where an ambiguity exists, however, we must apply our canons of construction to
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resolve that ambiguity. State v. Betts, 316 Kan. 191, 198, 514 P.3d 341 (2022) (if language or text is unclear or ambiguous the court uses canons of construction or legislative history to construe the Legislature's intent). An ambiguity exists when the text of a rule is reasonably subject to multiple interpretations. Glaze v. J.K. Williams, 309 Kan. 562, 564, 439 P.3d 920 (2019) (quoting Petty v. City of El Dorado, 270 Kan. 847, 851, 19 P.3d 167 [2001]) ("'A statute is ambiguous when two or more interpretations can fairly be made.'"). To ascertain the true meaning, we must look beyond the text. In so doing, a reviewing court may consider legislative history, the full import of the code as a whole, the purpose of the rule, and the effect various interpretations may have on the legal profession. State v. Strong, 317 Kan. 197, 203, 527 P.3d 548 (2023) (appellate courts should consider various provisions of an act in pari materia); Friends of Bethany Place v. City of Topeka, 297 Kan. 1112, 1123, 307 P.3d 1255 (2013) ("[I]f . . . language is subject to multiple interpretations, a reviewing court '"may look to the historical background of the enactment, the circumstances attending its passage, the purpose to be accomplished, and the effect the [rule] may have under the various constructions suggested." [Citation omitted.]'"); In re Wrongful Conviction of Warsame, 320 Kan. 92, 96, 563 P.3d 1281 (2025) ("The plain text does not say, so the court must resort to tools of construction, including an examination of legislative history."). Moreover, we construe the rules to avoid absurd results and presume the drafters did not intend to enact useless or meaningless provisions. State v. Smith, 311 Kan. 109, 114, 456 P.3d 1004 (2020). The term "misrepresentation" found in KRPC 8.4(c) is at the core of this disciplinary case. Black's Law Dictionary defines "misrepresentation" as "[t]he act or an instance of making a materially false or misleading assertion about something, usu[ally] with the intent to deceive." Black's Law Dictionary 1195 (12th ed. 2024). See also Webster's New World College Dictionary 935 (5th ed. 2016) (defining "misrepresent" as,
"to represent falsely; give an untrue or misleading idea of"). Though misrepresentation may be a common enough word, its ordinary dictionary definition is inadequate to tell us with precision exactly the kinds of statements the drafters intended to prohibit under
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KRPC 8.4(c). For example, Black's Law Dictionary suggests that most of the time, a misrepresentation requires an "intent to deceive," but not always. How are practitioners or those charged with enforcing the code to know where that line is? There is nothing in the plain text or definition of the word itself that guides this all-important inquiry. Indeed, we know from our caselaw discussed above that "not all misrepresentations" are "created equal." See In re Knopp, 305 Kan. 493, 518, 384 P.3d 428 (2016) ("The court appreciates respondent's counsel's point that not all misrepresentations to courts are created equal. Some turn out to be more consequential than others.").
Everyday life is full of such examples of the inconsequential—and often comic— foibles of human misrepresentations. What of the lawyer who "puffs" about his or her prowess in some athletic endeavor? See Shakespeare, Henry IV, Part 1, Act 2, scene 4 (Falstaff regaling the tavern crowd with a story of him fighting off a large and ever- changing number of attackers on the road to Gad's Hill, while Prince Hal and Poins, the only two attackers, listen on). The rules of professional conduct surely do not prohibit the occasional "foot niblick"—a technique employed by amateur golfers to improve a ball's lie with their feet and referred to by one author as the "[b]est club in the bag to speed up play." Pedroli & Tiegreen, Let the Big Dog Eat!: A Dictionary of the Secret Language of Golf 39 (2000). Even honorable members of the bench are known for occasional
"misrepresentations" on the links. See Caddyshack (Orion Pictures 1980) (humorous portrayal of Judge Smails employing the foot wedge—"Why don't you improve your lie?
Yes, yes. Winter rules.").
If indeed the code condemned every misrepresentation, even more serious matters such as shielding children from generational trauma through "white lies" could subject an attorney to discipline. See Star Wars: Episode VI—Return of the Jedi (Lucasfilm Ltd. 1983) (Obi-Wan explains to Luke that Darth Vader did betray and kill his father "from a certain point of view."). These are silly cultural and literary references, to be sure, but the silliness is the point. The code is not intended to punish lawyers regaling their friends
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with tall tales about "the one that got away." Stone, The One that Got Away 11 (1947) ("You know what they say about fishermen? The only time they tell the truth is when they call other fishermen liars."). This lack of clear guidance in the plain text itself is a hallmark of ambiguity.
Justice Biles dismisses our concern by testifying to his confidence in our disciplinary process and its "gatekeeping function" to "screen[] out" a lawyer's "minor mistakes" that have "no bearing on the legal profession." See 321 Kan. at ___, slip op. at 56 (Biles, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). This response is troubling on many levels. First, it is not obvious why it is a good thing for a gatekeeper to "screen out"
actual violations of the law. Indeed, on what basis would such a gatekeeper make those decisions? If every single misrepresentation is in fact a violation of our rules, as Justice Biles suggests, why would we want to countenance an enforcement arm that simply ignores most violators? Second, Justice Biles' "trust the prosecutor" approach amounts to an abdication of the judicial role. In what other context would we simply trust the prosecutor with unfettered discretion to decide who to charge and who not to charge? We do not permit that approach in the criminal law context nor should we permit that here. See State v. Harris, 311 Kan. 816, 823, 467 P.3d 504 (2020) ("If a law 'makes everyone' a violator, then 'prosecutors and the police [will] both define the law on the street and decide who has violated it.'").
"[T]he day-to-day decisions of prosecutors fill in the blanks left by the legislature when it crafts necessarily broad and general criminal statutes. This 'prosecutorial discretion' is an immensely powerful tool . . . . [T]he Kansas Supreme Court ha[s] limit[ed] the level of discretion the legislature may give to prosecutors. The basic principle is clear: when crafting a statute, the legislature must not delegate the ability to decide what the law says on an ad hoc basis to the executive or judicial branches. Laws that delegate too much discretionary authority to non-legislative actors to define criminal conduct are necessarily void for vagueness. A vague law 'invite[s] arbitrary power' and 'threaten[s] to transfer
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legislative power to police and prosecutors, leaving them the job of shaping a vague statute's contours through . . . enforcement decisions.'" Stegall, Something There Is that Doesn't Love a Wall, 46 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 361, 371-72 (2023). Why would we accept this kind of glaring flaw in our attorney disciplinary system that we reject elsewhere? And even when a disciplinary case does not ultimately result in unwarranted sanction, the process itself can harm a respondent. In re Valdez, 321 Kan. 198, 213, 574 P.3d 835 (2025) (Stegall, J., concurring) ("Now, years later, after countless news stories, public outcry, lawyers hired, weeks and months of investigations and hearings, and a subsequent election for Douglas County District Attorney at which the respondent was unseated in part because of these charges—here we are. Was it worth it?
No, it was not.").
Therefore, because the meaning of misrepresentation as used in KRPC 8.4(c) is ambiguous, we turn to our canons of construction to determine what types of misrepresentation are prohibited by our ethics rules. We begin with the very last substantive rule in our code, KRPC 8.4(g): it is misconduct for a lawyer to "engage in any other conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law."
(Emphasis added.) (2025 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 426). The use of the word "other" clearly indicates that the modifier in KRPC 8.4(g) applies equally to all the subsections in KRPC
8.4 itself. That is, each subsection is designed specifically to prohibit conduct "that adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law." It is not a stretch to say that KRPC 8.4(g)—especially coming as it does at the very end as a "catch-all" provision— modifies and clarifies the fundamental purpose of the entire code of conduct. A wise man explaining the animating principle of all law once observed that "[o]n these hang all the law and the prophets." Matthew 22:40 (King James). With respect to the rules of attorney discipline, the same could be said of KRPC 8.4(g). All the rules hang on the principle that the conduct proscribed is anything that adversely reflects on an
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attorney's fitness to practice law. The whole rest of the code is, in a sense, a footnote to KRPC 8.4(g). A very important footnote, to be sure, as the code expounds and explains in great detail all the ways an attorney might demonstrate unfitness to practice law. This is good and necessary as it provides concrete and specific binding guidance to both attorneys in practice and those charged with enforcing the code—as well as providing full notice and due process protections. But we must never lose sight of the animating principle of the code, which is both simple and profound. The license to practice law is a public trust, and an attorney's fitness to hold that trust is the singular and overriding concern of the code. Indeed, it is impossible to imagine a rule violation for conduct that does not adversely reflect on an attorney's fitness to practice law. We find further support for this notion elsewhere in the code. In the preamble, structure, and comments to our code of professional conduct, the drafters provide helpful insight. For example, the drafters explicitly clarify the scope of the rules by stating that
"[t]he Rules of Professional Conduct . . . should be interpreted with reference to the purposes of legal representation and of the law itself." (Emphasis added.) KRPC Scope
[14] (2025 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 315). Recognizing the impossibility of regulating every instance of human behavior, the code states: "The Rules simply provide a framework for the ethical practice of law." KRPC Scope [16] (2025 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 315). Turning to the rules in KRPC 8.1-8.5, the title of that section is instructive: "Maintaining the Integrity of the Profession." (Emphasis added.) (2025 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 423). The first line of KRPC 8.4 is as telling: "It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . ." (Emphasis added.) (2025 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 426). And lastly, the comments to KRPC 8.4(b) establish that when considering criminal matters, the code is fixated on holding attorneys
"professionally answerable only for offenses that indicate lack of those characteristics relevant to law practice." KRPC 8.4, comment [2] (2025 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 426) ("Many kinds of illegal conduct reflect adversely on fitness to practice law, such as offenses involving fraud and the offense of willful failure to file an income tax return. However, some kinds of offense carry no such implication. Traditionally, the distinction was drawn
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in terms of offenses involving 'moral turpitude.' That concept can be construed to include offenses concerning some matters of personal morality, such as adultery and comparable offenses, that have no specific connection to fitness for the practice of law. Although a lawyer is personally answerable to the entire criminal law, a lawyer should be professionally answerable only for offenses that indicate lack of those characteristics relevant to law practice. Offenses involving violence, dishonesty, or breach of trust, or serious interference with the administration of justice are in that category. A pattern of repeated offenses, even ones of minor significance when considered separately, can indicate indifference to legal obligation." [Emphasis added.]). Hence, we arrive at the definitive interpretation of KRPC 8.4(c) which mandates that before a violation may be proven, two elements must be met: (1) the existence of a misrepresentation; and (2) that the misrepresentation adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law.
Stewart's misrepresentation does not adversely reflect on his fitness Having gotten this far, we are left to ask—generally, how will a court know when a misrepresentation adversely reflects on a lawyer's fitness; and specifically, does Stewart's misrepresentation adversely reflect on his fitness to practice law? It is here that we depart from the per curiam opinion and the other concurring opinions. Neither the per curiam opinion nor the separate concurring opinions ventures an answer to the crucial first question. They merely jump to the declaration that Stewart's misrepresentation does adversely reflect on his fitness. At first blush, this conclusion seems reasonable enough. After all, Stewart was filling out a government form applying for taxpayer funded benefits. As a lawyer, "he should have been more careful" is the basic rationale. But the other opinions offer no legal framework for reaching the decision. A careful review of the facts, meanwhile, puts the following conclusion beyond
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question—Stewart's misrepresentation cannot have adversely reflected on his fitness to practice law because Stewart's declared 2019 net income (entered on his Pandemic Unemployment Assistance [PUA] application in May of 2020), only became inaccurate long after it was made as a function of his 2019 tax return filed in October of 2020. Moreover, a review of the PUA program itself conclusively demonstrates that Stewart's inaccurate estimate of his 2019 net income was utterly irrelevant as a matter of law to the benefits he was entitled to under the PUA program. On these facts, as shown in great detail below, Stewart's error was at most a mere mistake that should have been irrelevant to his benefit calculation by the state agency in charge of administering the program. But before doing a deep dive into the facts, we answer the general question—what legal framework should a court use to determine when a misrepresentation adversely reflects on a lawyer's fitness to practice law? At the outset, it is important to observe that
"fitness" is a broad category encompassing far more than a lawyer's ability to write a contract or try a case. As we have already said, the license to practice law is a public trust. A lawyer's character and integrity are paramount to the maintenance of that trust. A lawyer's character for telling the truth in all the many circumstances where the truth goes hand-in-glove with maintaining professional trust—and his or her reputation for doing so—is perhaps his or her greatest single asset in the practice of law. Nothing in this extensive discussion should be read to suggest otherwise, or to undermine this critical function of attorneys in our democratic society.
And yet we know from ordinary human experience that certain modes of speech are governed by a markedly relaxed standard. Because these kinds of unique facts and fine distinctions are often present in disciplinary cases, they are traditionally evaluated on a case-by-case basis. So too here, any "bright line" rule we might devise would be inappropriate. In re Spradling, 315 Kan. 552, 592, 509 P.3d 483 (2022) ("'We prefer to examine the particular circumstances of each disciplinary case'" and declining to "dictate any bright line rule for defining when an attorney has violated [the] KRPC.") (quoting In
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re Ketter, 268 Kan. 146, 153, 992 P.2d 205 [1999]). This principle runs throughout our disciplinary process from establishing rule violations, to our evaluation of aggravating and mitigating factors, to our decision on the appropriate sanctions, if applicable. See In re Geeding, 270 Kan. 139, 147, 12 P.3d 396 (2000) (rejecting a bright-line rule when considering aggravating and mitigating factors, opting instead to consider the facts on a case-by-case basis); In re Daniels, 320 Kan. 365, 381, 568 P.3d 846 (2025) (acknowledging that "'[b]ecause each case is unique, past sanctions provide little guidance'") (quoting In re Bishop, 285 Kan. 1097, 1108, 179 P.3d 1096 [2008]). Consistent with our entire approach to the code, we would answer the question in each case with a complete digestion of the totality of the circumstances. To guide that process, we discern the following factors as relevant: (1) the respondent's state of mind;
(2) the injury done, if any; (3) the seriousness of the matter; (4) the relationship between the affected parties; (5) the respondent's conduct following the misrepresentation; (6) the presence or absence of a selfish motive; and (7) any other factors a factfinder would deem relevant when considering whether the respondent's actions adversely impacted their fitness to practice law.
In examining our suggested factors, state of mind is quite obviously relevant. Where a negligent misrepresentation occurs during the practice of law, for example, that misrepresentation may indicate such a lack of care for truth-telling that an attorney's competence under the rules is legitimately called into question. Mere mistakes of the everyday variety—a math error for example—may not. Intentional misrepresentations when combined with other factors we have identified—such as a selfish motive or a matter of significant importance—clearly do give rise to a presumption that the lawyer may be unfit to practice law.
Misrepresentations that cause real injury and harm to another person are more damaging to the public trust than ones which do not. Similarly, the relationship between
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the parties matters. Is there a reliance interest such that a misrepresentation places one party at a disadvantage? Was the misrepresentation made to take advantage of a power imbalance between the parties?
Likewise, the substance of the misrepresentation is a key component of the evaluation. Matters of importance relating to the practical purpose and function of the rule of law—financial dealings, dispensing justice, preserving rights, establishing social status and standing, and the like—are all guarded by a rigorous attention and care for the truth. These are to be distinguished from trivial and expected everyday patterns of speech—including social norms of communication, humor and sarcasm, exaggeration, puffing, metaphor, and other modes of human interplay that do not rely on a denuded and hyper-literal interpretive process.
The final two factors also work in tandem. Where a lawyer makes a misrepresentation out of a selfish motive or for some ill-gotten private gain, we may again presume a breach of the public trust. Where a lawyer acts expeditiously to correct a misrepresentation if and when he or she becomes aware that it has injured another, we may view it as a species of mistake or misunderstanding common to human experience. Now, applying this all to the current matter. Stewart has admitted to making a
"misrepresentation." The hearing panel found Stewart applied to the PUA program in May 2020. The application form required the respondent to identify his quarterly 2019 net income. He stated that he made $30,000 each quarter, for an annual total of $120,000. At the time of this application, he could not reference his 2019 tax return because it was not filed until October 2020. The 2019 tax returns indicate his "gross profit" was $145,000 while—after claiming significant deductions including for the use of a personal vehicle and personal home office—his "net profit" for that year was $36,722. The hearing panel concluded this was a negligent misrepresentation.
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Critically, the panel found that "'there was no evidence the respondent knew what his actual net loss or profit from the Law Firm was when he filled out the PUA application.'" In re Stewart, 321 Kan. at ___, slip op. at 17. Indeed, because Stewart's law firm was taxed as a pass-through entity, it is a complete non sequitur to speak of "actual net loss or profit" prior to the completion of the taxpayer's schedule C on his or her tax return. Schedule C offers the taxpayer significant leeway to claim or not claim a whole variety of deductions to gross income for business expenses. Stewart's gross income actually exceeded his net income estimate in May of 2020 on the PUA application. His taxable income (which the PUA program equates with net income for self-employed persons), in reality did not exist as a discrete number until his tax return was filed. This is because that figure depends entirely on the voluntary claiming of deductions by the taxpayer, something which had not yet occurred when Stewart applied to the PUA program.
Even more importantly, the record before us does not indicate that any of the parties endeavored to fully understand the way the highly complex Pandemic Unemployment Assistance program was intended to work. The law was passed as an emergency response to the COVID-19 pandemic and implemented in record speed. This necessity left in its wake a slew of confused state officials faced with carrying out a congressional mandate with little time to digest its minutia and inner-workings. And applicants for benefits were often just as confused, as the panel and lead opinion recognize. 321 Kan. at ___, slip op. at 31.
All parties below appear to have simply assumed that because respondent's 2019 tax return—once it was filed—showed a significant discrepancy with his stated self- employment income on his initial application under the PUA, he must have lied or misrepresented his income. It would have behooved the ODA, the panel, and Stewart's counsel to have dug a little deeper. In fact, Stewart's estimated self-employment income for 2019 of $120,000 fell well short of the gross earnings he actually reported on his tax
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return of $145,000. Crucial to both this case and to the computation of benefits under the PUA is the mechanism of how one is to move from the gross earnings figure to a net taxable income figure. And this cannot be done without the completion of a schedule C on a person's tax return—yet another complex government form that contemplates all kinds of possible deductions to gross income in order to arrive at a lower taxable income. There is simply no way a self-employed person eligible for numerous tax deductions can know with any precision the reduction of gross profits to net profits—and hence to net income—without actually completing a tax return. Understanding this, the regulations implementing the PUA anticipated this situation and told state administrators of the unemployment benefit program what they should do in these circumstances. The PUA statute says that: "the assistance authorized under subsection (b) for a week of unemployment shall be calculated in accordance with section 625.6 of title 20, Code of Federal Regulations." 15 U.S.C. § 9021(d)(2). These are the regulations governing the federal Disaster Unemployment Assistance (DUA) program, which was the already-existing program making benefits available to self-employed persons. In effect, Congress understood that it already had in place a program which made unemployment benefits available to a wider group of American workers and decided to repurpose those rules for use during the COVID-19 pandemic. Turning to those regulations, section 625.2(u) defines "[w]ages" as "remuneration for services performed for another, and, with respect to a self-employed individual, net income from services performed in self-employment." 20 C.F.R. § 625.2(u). However, "net-income," (the term used by the PUA application) is not defined in these regulations. Next, 20 C.F.R. § 625.6(a)(2) states that: "The self-employment income to be treated as wages for purposes of computing the weekly amount under this paragraph (a) shall be the net income reported on the tax return of the individual as income from all self-employment that was dependent upon the performance of services by the individual."
But section 625.6(a)(2) goes on to explain that "[i]f an individual has not filed a tax
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return for the most recent tax year that has ended at the time of such individual's initial application for DUA, such individual shall have a weekly amount determined in accordance with paragraph (e)(3) of this section." 20 C.F.R. § 625.6(a)(2). Turning to section 625.6(e)(3):
"For purposes of a computation of a weekly amount under paragraph (a) of this section, if an individual submits documentation to substantiate employment or self-employment in accordance with paragraph (e)(1), but not documentation of wages earned or paid during the base period set forth in paragraph (a)(2) of this section, including those cases where the individual has not filed a tax return for the most recent tax year that has ended, the State agency shall immediately redetermine the weekly amount of DUA payable to the individual in accordance with paragraph (b) of this section." (Emphasis added.) 20 C.F.R. § 625.6(e)(3).
Thus, we finally reach section 625.6(b):
"[I]f the individual has insufficient wages from employment or insufficient or no net income from self-employment (which includes individuals falling within paragraphs (a)(3) and (b)(3) of § 625.5) in the applicable base period to compute a weekly amount under paragraph (a) of this section, the individual shall be determined entitled to a weekly amount equal to 50 percent of the average weekly payment of regular compensation in the State." (Emphasis added.) 20 C.F.R. § 625.6(b).
Thus, on this record, it is clear the state failed to properly assess respondent's initial PUA application in the first place. This is because the state application never specifically asked for his 2019 tax return, which it should have done under the regulations. Because states had been operating and had some familiarity with the DUA program and regulations, it should not have come as a surprise that the applicant's prior year tax return would be required. A quick, nonexhaustive, survey of other states' online DUA applications show that tax returns are a standard item required from applicants. See
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Nebraska: DUA Eligibility ("You will need a . . . complete set of your federal income tax return from the most recent completed tax year.); Florida: DUA Eligibility Requirements ("If you are self-employed, you will need proof of your self-employment:
Tax Returns."); Iowa: How to Apply and Receive DUA ("You will need . . . a complete set of your federal income tax return from the most recent completed tax year."); Louisiana: Affected Parishes Eligible for DUA ("If you are self-employed, your 2023 federal income tax return and schedules can serve as proof of prior wages."); Arizona:
Eligibility ("Required documentation includes a Social Security number and a copy of the most recent federal income tax form or check stubs, or documentation to support that the individuals were working or self-employed when the disaster occurred."); Maine: How to Apply for DUA ("The documents you need to provide . . . could include . . . your most recent federal income tax form . . . ."); Missouri: Unemployment Benefits Available to Victims of Severe Storms ("A copy of the most recent federal income tax forms or check stubs may also be required [self-employed individuals should also provide Schedules SE and Schedule C or Schedule F]."); New York: What information must I provide when applying for UI or DUA benefits? ("Applicants must provide proof [e.g., income tax return, bank statements] to document employment or self-employment or to document work that was to begin on or after the date of the disaster."). Had the Kansas Department of Labor (KDOL) simply followed the regulations, it would have recalculated Stewart's benefits not according to speculative income figures, but according to a percentage of state averages. As a matter of law, it is correct and relevant to say that a PUA applicant's "net income" is a completely imaginary category of information until a tax return is filed and births it into existence. The regulations make it clear that until a tax return is filed, the applicant has no net income and benefits must be calculated on an equity-based state average figure. Indeed, under the proper state-average figure, it appears Stewart would in fact have been entitled to some benefits. This demonstrates his claim to benefits was certainly made in a good faith belief that he would receive something.
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We do not make all these observations to castigate anyone involved. The pandemic was a difficult time for everyone, especially government officials trying in warp-speed to inject necessary support into the economic life of the nation. Rather, we take the time here to parse through these details to illustrate that this case of
"misrepresentation" is not nearly as simple as everyone below seemed to think it was. And that matters. Had the state simply followed the law, this entire domino chain would never have fallen.
Having clarified what happened, we undertake a brief analysis of these unique facts through the lens of the factors we have identified.
1. State of mind In examining state of mind, the ODA failed to show the respondent intentionally misrepresented his 2019 quarterly income because, at the time, he could not access his tax return indicating the actual income, and the application form itself failed to explain how a self-employed person should calculate their net income. Because of these factors, the respondent testified that his income representations were estimates. This evidence supports inferences of confusion, misunderstanding, and neglectful conduct, but does not rise to the level of proving the more culpable intentional conduct by clear and convincing evidence. See In re Pyle, 283 Kan. at 827 (finding a "mistake rather than malevolence"
was not a violation of KRPC 8.4[c]).
Such actions rooted in confusion differ from the types of misrepresentations we have sanctioned in the past. See In re McVey, 317 Kan. 266, 275, 280, 527 P.3d 900 (2023) (finding KRPC 8.4[c] violation for intentionally converting escrow funds and when client had to go to great lengths to recover assets); In re Christian, 281 Kan. 1203,
135 P.3d 1062 (2006) (attorney engaged in dishonesty in violation of KRPC 8.4[c] by
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knowingly and repeatedly converting attorney fees belonging to the firm for his own use); In re Islas, 279 Kan. 930, 112 P.3d 210 (2005) (attorney violated KRPC 8.4[c] by making false writings, false application for driver's license, false statement to driver's licensing agency when he attempted to avoid license suspension, and attempting to reinstate his license). And as already explained, KDOL itself bears part of the blame for the misrepresentation in the first instance by failing to either require applicants to provide their 2019 tax returns or to state that such returns had not yet been filed.
2. Injury While Stewart received a benefit which cost the state funds, those losses to the state were temporary and at least partially caused by the state's negligence. Since approximately October of 2021, Stewart has made efforts to find a way to pay back the money he received, even in the face of difficulty. In these discussions, legal counsel for KDOL informed Stewart's counsel that KDOL "did not have a procedure for accepting payments." However, by the time of Stewart's argument before this court, he had paid back the entire amount. See generally In re Pistotnik, 316 Kan. 96, 108, 512 P.3d 729 (2022) ("[R]espondent made a timely, good-faith effort to make restitution and remedy the consequences of his misconduct.").
While Stewart's actions were not victimless, the actual injury to the state was minimal given that Stewart was actually entitled to benefits. Compare with In re Dennis,
286 Kan. 708, 737, 188 P.3d 1 (2008) (violation of KRPC 8.4[d] based on "the respondent's repeated failure to comply with court orders and discovery deadlines [which] seriously prejudiced the court, the other parties to the litigation, and opposing counsel"); In re Mitchell, 280 Kan. 656, 123 P.3d 1279 (2005) (attorney informed client that she attended a hearing in his child support action and that the court took the matter under advisement; she had not attended hearing; default judgment was entered against client).
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3. Seriousness of the matter This was a serious matter. Stewart received a significant amount of unemployment compensation from government agencies. This was certainly more than an annoyance. See In re Pyle, 283 Kan. at 825-26 ("[R]espondent's conduct ranks as mere whining— petty, annoying, and childish, but far from the dramatic abandonment of honest practice that typifies our Rule 8.4[c] cases."). The seriousness of the misrepresentation itself, however, is significantly mitigated by the unique facts present here. Stewart received benefits based on a genuine misunderstanding of his eligibility for the pandemic assistance program which was induced in part by inadequate guidance by the state. The program was in some sense a square peg in a round hole because it provided unemployment benefits to self-employed individuals, who are typically not eligible for unemployment assistance. And unemployment benefits are determined by reference to
"wages," which is a definition not synonymous with terms in the federal tax code, like
"taxable income." Compare 26 U.S.C. § 63(a) (taxable income is gross income minus eligible deductions), with K.S.A. 2024 Supp. 44-703(o) (wages are "all compensation for services, including commissions, bonuses, back pay and the cash value of all remuneration, including benefits, paid in any medium other than cash"). Furthermore, the forms Stewart was required to fill out were not well suited for the way he received income. Attorneys who work on contingency fee arrangements may put in long hours of
"work" only to receive compensation at a date far into the future, if ever. KDOL even explained, and the panel accepted, that many applicants struggled to understand what the benefit applications were asking for and how undefined terms such as "income," "gross income," "net income," "work," and "wages" should be interpreted. With this in mind, Stewart's case is not analogous to previous conduct we have considered to be serious. See In re Borich, 316 Kan. 257, 267, 274, 514 P.3d 352 (2022) (violating KRPC 8.4[c] by paying clients personal funds and saying it was an arbitration
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award); In re Devkota, 280 Kan. 650, 123 P.3d 1289 (2005) (attorney engaged in dishonest conduct by signing his clients' names to answers to interrogatories and prevailing upon his nonlawyer employee to verify, by notarization, that the false signatures were genuine); In re Trester, 285 Kan. 404, 412, 172 P.3d 31 (2007) ("We have no qualms, however, saying that holding oneself out as an attorney in a state in which he or she has no license to practice law and giving the impression the attorney is authorized to practice law generally in that state engages in conduct that violates KRPC 8.4[c]."); In re Landrith, 280 Kan. 619, 124 P.3d 467 (2005) (numerous violations through false accusations against others); In re Nathanson, 279 Kan. 921, 112 P.3d 162 (2005) (attorney prepared, fraudulently signed, and filed pleadings and correspondence using name of another attorney); In re Wenger, 279 Kan. 895, 112 P.3d 199 (2005) (attorney engaged in dishonest conduct by advising his clients that he had filed cases and set hearings and doctor's appointments when he in fact had not); In re Ware, 279 Kan. 884, 112 P.3d 155 (2005) (attorney, as in-house counsel, falsified employer's internal documents to make it appear as though she had taken action on a discrimination case filed against it when she had not); In re Singleton, 279 Kan. 515, 111 P.3d 630 (2005) (attorney misrepresented documents to judge); In re Rock, 279 Kan. 257, 105 P.3d 1290 (2005) (attorney converted client funds, abandoned clients, and committed other misconduct).
4. Relationship of the parties In considering the relationship of parties, we note that Stewart's misrepresentations did not affect his legal work or his clients. Instead, the parties involved were engaged in an arms-length transaction, with neither party being at any particular disadvantage or in reliance on the other. While government programs that rely on applicants to self-report and self-certify eligibility do impose an obligation of truthfulness, applicants to such programs also rely on government instructions with respect to the information and documentation required. Here, both parties to the transaction failed—a hallmark of
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misunderstanding rather than genuine misrepresentation. Compare In re Boaten, 281 Kan. 390, 132 P.3d 870 (2006) (attorney converted to his own use settlement proceeds belonging to his clients and repeatedly testified falsely before the hearing panel); In re Janoski, 316 Kan. 370, 370-71, 516 P.3d 125 (2022) (finding violations of KRPC 8.4[c] for lying to ex-spouse about hitting her phone from her hand intentionally while she recorded respondent stalking her); In re Ware, 279 Kan. at 889 (attorney, as in-house counsel, falsified employer's internal documents).
5. Post-misrepresentation conduct and selfish motive The hearing panel found that Stewart applied for assistance during the pandemic after his only client's operations had closed due to the pandemic. He further continued to apply for PUA benefits to use as a "financial safety net" due to his concerns that his law firm would not weather the pandemic. The record indicates that Stewart had a good-faith belief that he was entitled to benefits, and in the week he received what he believed was
"personal income," he did not file for benefits. After he initially stopped receiving benefits, he made efforts to contact the KDOL to find out why. He ultimately sought to rectify any harm and did, in fact, make full repayment to the state—even of amounts he almost certainly would have been entitled to. In short, Stewart's actions are consistent with a misunderstanding of his eligibility, not a devious scam. Considering all of this, we would find that Stewart's misrepresentation does not rise to the level of adversely affecting his fitness to practice law. Face down in the gravy—an observation on the "culture" of attorney discipline in Kansas It is a frequently observed fact that the culture of attorney discipline in Kansas incentivizes the defense to employ a "mitigation only" strategy that has been described by this court as a tendency to "fall on your sword" when faced with ethics allegations from
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the ODA. See In re Gamble, 319 Kan. 680, 702-03, 558 P.3d 290 (2024) (Stegall, J., dissenting) (Counsel's position was that "vague" stipulations were made "'[f]or better or for worse'" so that "the parties could 'go on down the road'" and respondent stated that he agreed to stipulate to a violation because he thought it was practically "'the best thing to do'" for himself, his family, his clients, and his practice). So much so that we are anecdotally aware that the mitigation only strategy has become a regular piece of advice at prominent ethics CLEs across the state. Such an approach to defending ethics cases is incentivized by the perceived threat that the ODA will add "failure to cooperate" charges anytime a respondent does not "fall on his sword" combined with the proliferation in recent years of probationary outcomes in ethics cases (more about that later). We must also acknowledge clearly and plainly that this culture has been principally incentivized by the disciplinary decisions of this court. In other settings—the criminal or civil law, for example—any court commentary on the culture of litigation carried out by another branch of government would likely be tendentious at best. An overreach at worst. In the context of attorney discipline, however, this court is the final arbiter of a profession that is self-policing. We are the branch of government constitutionally authorized to regulate the behavior of the bar. The ODA is an agency responsive only to us. We take pains here to observe that all the actors in this process ultimately take their cues from this court. We ascribe and can discern no ill-motives on the part of either the disciplinary defense bar or the ODA.
Stewart's counsel's handling of this case illustrates how responding to the strong incentive to take a mitigation only approach will likely leave substantive defenses on the cutting room floor and undermine the adversarial process that we rely on. In a case where there were significant substantive defenses available to the respondent—discussed at length above—none were raised. In fact, a review of this record shows clearly that Stewart was faced with counsel on both sides who advocated for his guilt.
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Here, Stewart's mitigation strategy started early. In March 2024, Stewart and his counsel, along with the ODA, filed a joint stipulation in which Stewart stipulated to behaving "dishonestly" and to violating KRPC 8.4(c). Consistent with these stipulations, Stewart's counsel's narrative before the panel was to accept the ODA's accusation at face- value. Several statements and questions exemplify this strategy:
• "May it please the Panel, counsel, Mr. Stewart, this is a classic, classic story. We have a good person, a good lawyer, clean record, never had any problems who makes what I call a major mistake, uses bad judgment that led us to where we are today."
• "[H]e applied for and received, and he'll admit to you incorrectly and wrongly, a large sum of money. He's not going to whine today. He's not going to blame anybody else. He's going to point the finger at himself."
• "This is not about evidence, anything, other than the fact that he was wrong, my colleagues are right he was wrong, he violated it, and he must stand up to the plate and accept what is given out."
• "What he did was wrong and he stood up to the plate and admitted he was wrong. It was hard. It was hard when my colleagues was cross- examining him because he answered yes and he got quieter because he had to admit, we use the word transgressions a lot, his sins, his faults, the things he did bad."
• "I understand all of that. What he did was wrong. My colleagues are right about that. Hence why he stipulated to the violation. Hence why he entered into a stipulation that saved the Panel three and four days a hearing."
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Of course, the majority of the "stipulations" were rejected by both the hearing panel and by this court. (As an aside, the hearing panel is to be commended for its thorough and independent review of the case, despite the stipulation.) A single lone violation was found by the slimmest of margins here. Saving the panel "three or four"
days for a hearing is not a mitigating fact. Skipping the trial is the antithesis of justice in a legal culture where the adversarial process has broken down. Our trust and confidence in what amount to plea agreements is at its nadir when the record demonstrates that both sides have prosecuted the complaint without exploring viable defenses. Moreover, counsel didn't simply make legal concessions, he asked Stewart questions which left almost no room for Stewart to defend himself.
• "Q. You agree that you violated the rules as indicated by my colleague and by the Chair of the Panel, correct?
"A. I do."
• "Q. Well, this is more than reckless, this is dishonest. You've already agreed to that, right?
"A. Yeah."
• "Q. But all of that begs the question, doesn't it? You stipulated to the fact that you accepted money that you shouldn't have?
"A. Right."
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Counsel went as far in closing as to commend the KDOL for cutting off Stewart's benefits and the ODA for pursuing discipline.
• "I wonder—if this complaint had never happened, I wonder that if the Department of Labor hadn't cut him off and said, [']We think there's some fraud here,['] where he'd be today. He sure as hell would still be drinking. He sure as heck would still be abusive by drinking to his family, to his kids. He wouldn't be a good father. He wouldn't be a good lawyer."
And while we have identified several legitimately confusing aspects of PUA benefits, counsel's primary mitigation argument before the panel was to highlight Stewart's struggles with alcohol. Though Stewart didn't want to "put the entire case on the back of Coors Light," counsel still characterized Stewart as being "face down in the gravy every day for years." Counsel characterized Stewart as "a guy who has a good practice, a guy making okay money, a guy who had a chance to do real well, [who was] knocked to his knees early on because of alcohol and because he was neither smart enough or healthy enough to realize that that was a problem." While Stewart's relationship with alcohol is a serious matter, it had next to nothing to do with the facts of this case. At oral argument, counsel's understanding as to why the panel only found one violation of the KRPC was that "[t]he panel listened to the mitigation evidence. . . . [T]hey thought he should be given a second chance." But mitigation evidence, by definition, should not drive findings as to whether a violation occurred. This culture of undermining the adversarial process in favor of a mitigation only approach that treats every ethics case like a social problem causes bad facts to morph into bad law. And now we are several cases deep into this bad law. "Bad facts make bad law. So goes a common legal maxim. The corollary truth that bad law tends to make more bad law is less well
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known but perhaps the more frequent (and more damaging) occurrence. [Citation omitted.]" In re Adoption of T.M.M.H., 307 Kan. 902, 921, 416 P.3d 999 (2018) (Stegall, J., concurring in result and dissenting).
Multiple justices have previously expressed our concerns with the state of attorney discipline in Kansas:
"In my judgment, a pattern has emerged in recent years of the Disciplinary Administrator's office wielding the code as a sword rather than a shield. And beyond that, after a thorough review of the record, I have never seen such a blatantly unfair and illogical prosecution in a disciplinary matter. Given this, it is not surprising that the attorney discipline defense bar has embraced a strategy of falling on that sword to achieve a favorable recommendation from the ODA or to avoid facing additional allegations. See In re Spencer, 317 Kan. 70, 85-86, 524 P.3d 57 (2023) (rejecting the jointly agreed to sanction of a 90-day suspension because of the Disciplinary Administrator's faulty legal theory of liability); In re Huffman, 315 Kan. 641, 682-83, 509 P.3d 1253 (2022) (stating that harsh criticism of a judge demonstrated 'a serious lack of judgment' but did not rise to the level of an ethical violation under either KRPC 3.5[d] or KRPC 8.2[a]); In re Todd, 308 Kan. 133, 136, 418 P.3d 1265 (2018) (rejecting the disciplinary panel's conclusion that respondent had violated KRPC 8.1[b] despite respondent filing no exceptions).
"Now, there is no question that bare-knuckle plea bargaining is common and is the prerogative of prosecutors. When respondents admit to facts—even if they do so under undo pressure—they are stuck with those admissions. The existence of this practice does, however, impose a high responsibility on courts to thoroughly evaluate the struck bargain for both factual and legal appropriateness. We are not a rubber stamp. See K.S.A. 22-3210(a)(4) (requiring courts in criminal matters to be 'satisfied that there is a factual basis for the plea' before accepting a guilty plea); State v. Ebaben, 294 Kan. 807, 812-13, 816, 281 P.3d 129 (2012) (finding an insufficient factual basis for a guilty plea)." In re Gamble, 319 Kan. at 710-11 (Stegall, J., dissenting).
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A prosecution is within its right to seek admissions. Courts rely on the defense bar to uphold the adversarial nature of the process. And while pleas based on mitigation only strategies are not inappropriate in certain cases, they should not become the default approach lest prosecutorial discretion go unchecked by rigorous testing. On "fat tails" and a direction for reform
We conclude with an admittedly unorthodox final observation. As we noted above, we acknowledge that comments such as these from a reviewing court stray outside the bounds of this particular case (even when, as here, this particular case illustrates our concerns) and would ordinarily indicate a court that is drifting away from its proper judicial lane. But attorney discipline is unique. Here, this court has not only a responsibility to rule in particular cases, but the added responsibility to oversee and guide the entire process. And so we take this opportunity to explain in some detail a regulatory wrinkle we are convinced is now present in the process. We do so not as a species of the unfortunate and aptly named "bench slap"—but in the hopes that elucidating and identifying this common feature of regulatory bodies may draw attention to its prevalence in helpful ways that will aid all actors in the process going forward. When we think about the law of averages, we usually visualize it as something akin to what mathematicians would call a "bell curve." McLeod, Introduction to the Normal Distribution (Bell Curve), Simple Psychology (Oct. 11, 2023). So if you imagine the average height of 100 people in a room, you understand instinctively from observation that there are a tiny number of very short people; a small number of kinda- short people; a large number of normal-height people; a small number of kinda-tall people; and a tiny number of very tall people. That is an "equalized" distribution curve. So the "tails" of the curve are "thin" because they consist of very few people and—in terms of averages—the few very short people cancel out the few very tall people and the average falls where the vast majority of people actually are.
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Now think about how human beings calculate risk. When we make decisions, we are always calculating the possible risk inherent in potential futures. And we tend to think about risk distribution in the same way we think about height distribution in the human population. That is—as a thin-tailed bell curve. So, there are a tiny number of possible futures with almost zero risk; a tiny number of possible futures with existential risk; and a huge number of possible futures with modest and manageable risk. The bell curve approach to risk and decision making is brilliantly illustrated in the children's fable Goldilocks. Goldilocks wants to avoid extremes and finds comfort right in the middle— not too hot, not too cold, but just right.
But what if, in complex systems, risk is not distributed evenly across a nice bell curve? What if our normal understanding of averages has blinded us to another possibility? What if the average height of 100 people in a room is actually a function of 50 very short people and 50 very tall people? That distribution curve looks quite different from a bell—it has "fat-tails" instead of "thin-tails." A growing body of scholarship and study from the world of statisticians and public choice theorists is making the compelling case that when it comes to risk assessment in large systems, the curve is not a normal distribution. It is in fact not a curve at all but a hockey stick—one long thin-tail of relatively low risk met at the end by one spiking fat-tail of very high risk. A simple illustration demonstrates how decision making in the face of potential risk might work when a person intuitively understands he or she is dealing not with a normal distribution, but with a fat tail. If forced to choose, would a rational actor rather fall 1 time off a 20-foot wall, or fall 10 times off a 2-foot wall? Why should it matter which choice is made? The person is going to fall a total of 20 feet no matter what. Doesn't the risk all just average out? Well, obviously not. This is a simple example of what statisticians call "risk acceleration" in the fat-tail. It is why one prominent theorist makes the bold claim that "[w]e worry too much about diabetes and too little about ebola
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. . . . This is an error of reasoning that comes from not understanding thick tails." Taleb, Statistical Consequences of Fat Tails: Real World Preasymptotics, Epistemology, and Applications 51 (3d ed. 2025).
Now, consider the role of a regulator whose job it is to protect the public from risks associated with whatever activity he or she is regulating. Of interest to us here is the job of regulating attorney conduct in Kansas in order to reduce or eliminate the risk posed to the public and to our system of justice by unethical lawyers.
How is that risk distributed across the population of Kansas lawyers? Most people will think of it the way Goldilocks does; the way we think about height averages—as a bell curve. If we symbolize risk as walls of varying heights that people could fall off of and get hurt, those who regulate attorney conduct likely assess the risk distribution this way—there are a small number of 2-foot walls (low risk); a small number of 20-foot walls (high risk); and a large number of 10-foot walls between them (medium risk). But what if the risk distribution is actually a fat-tail, not a bell curve? That is, what if the
"average risk" does not land in the middle, but is actually a function of a very high number of 2-foot walls (an overly zealous advocate, for example, or an attorney who accidentally deposits a retainer into the firm's operating account) and a very small number of 200-foot cliffs (an attorney with multiple DUIs, for example, or one who lies to a court, or one who steals from a client)? This difference would be very important for a regulator of risk to know and understand. In fact, it would dramatically change how he or she approached the job.
Scholars in the field of ethics—covering everything from corporate compliance to police misconduct—have come to recognize that this very error has distorted compliance law in dangerous ways. As one scholar put it,
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"Although ubiquitous, the normal distribution is far from the only statistical model available to predict future events. In many areas, scientific thought 'has moved away from the idea of equilibrium' embodied by the bell curve toward what are called 'fat-tail' distributions. These distributions, which are often found in complex systems, represent an important alternative way of understanding probabilities." Haugh, The Power Few of Corporate Compliance, 53 Ga. L. Rev. 129, 158 (2018).
"[T]he thicker the tails of the distribution, the more the tail wags the dog, that is, the information resides in the tails and less so in the 'body' (the central part) of the distribution." Taleb, Statistical Consequences of Fat Tails 29. Put simply, "fat tails" exist when major outliers skew an average. And fat tails are more common than one might think:
"The most difficult policy issues often involve some chance of catastrophic outcomes, but conventional analysis may underestimate the seriousness of the situation. Economic modeling and policy analysis are often based on the assumption that extreme harms are highly unlikely, in the technical sense that the 'tail' of the probability distributions is 'thin'—in other words, that it approaches rapidly to zero. Thin tails allow extreme risks to be given relatively little weight. A growing body of research, however, focuses on the possibility of fat tails, which are common in systems with feedback between different components." Farber, Uncertainty, 99 Geo. L.J. 901, 904 (2011).
As a regulator, understanding whether one is dealing with a fat-tail distribution or a bell curve distribution has a significant impact on policy choices. And confusing the two can lead in bad directions. Public choice theorists often refer to this confusion— mistaking a fat-tail for a bell curve—as "probability neglect." And they predict what will happen when a regulating body suffers from probability neglect. "[R]egulatory agencies
. . . may neglect the issue of probability, in a way that can lead to either indifference to real risks or costly expenditures for little or no gain. If agencies are falling victim to probability neglect, they might well be violating relevant law." Sunstein, Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and Law, 112 Yale L.J. 61, 63 (2002).
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Put another way, if regulators believe they are dealing with a normalized bell- curve with an equalized distribution of the kinds of behaviors regulators focus on, they will approach their job in a certain way. They will look for regulatory opportunities in the heart of the distribution curve, and they will treat most if not all such opportunities in a rehabilitative posture. If unethical behavior is more-or-less equally distributed across the curve, a regulator may view his or her job as essentially a traffic-cop—keeping the entire crowd ethical by way of handing out somewhat indiscriminate small fines. If the regulator has mistaken the curve, however, this approach comes with dramatically negative unintended consequences. For if the regulator is in fact dealing with a "fat tail"
distribution, the traffic-cop approach is likely to result in over-regulation where it is not needed and under-regulation where it is. That is, "indifference to real risks" combined with "costly expenditures for little or no gain." The worst of both worlds. This fat-tail problem posits—in a highly simplified summary—that regulators tend to be blind to fat-tail risks. They are accustomed instead to interpreting the data in a way that produces a normal distribution. They suffer from probability neglect. As a consequence, two things happen. First, they will over-regulate in a way that sweeps up benign behaviors into the regulatory net; and second, they will underestimate catastrophic risk by treating all offenders as appropriate subjects of mitigation and rehabilitation. When it comes to behavioral regulation—of a police force for example—this insight is being used to tailor a regulatory scheme to the actual distribution of risk in the regulatory pool.
"The available evidence is that there are a small number of police officers who are responsible for an outsized share of serious police misconduct. The ability to scrutinize and terminate officers who are in the tail of misconduct could have an outsized
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impact on serious misconduct without significantly undermining the job security generally enjoyed by police officers." Schanzenbach, Policing the Police: Personnel Management and Police Misconduct, 75 Vand. L. Rev. 1523, 1567 (2022). This is to say, scholars argue that eliminating probability neglect within the hotly contested world of constraining and punishing police misconduct will generate a "best of both worlds" regulatory environment that is sensitive to real risks posed by bad actors while eliminating costly burdens imposed on good actors.
We suggest that the attorney discipline process in Kansas may have fallen into this public policy error and it is possible the ODA suffers from a common regulatory ailment—probability neglect. In rough metaphoric terms, the ODA—incentivized by the decisions of this court—may be worrying too much about diabetes and not enough about ebola. Our own observations suggest that the vast majority of Kansas lawyers are ethical—and even their mistakes are relatively risk-free to the public. Unethical lawyers, on the other hand, form a fat-tail in the distribution curve—they are disproportionately responsible for most ethical violations and their behavior presents the highest risk to both the public and to our system of justice as a whole.
The regulatory practice we observe attending this situation in Kansas is as public choice theorists would predict. Over-regulation of the entire distribution curve combined with over-use of mitigation defenses and rehabilitative strategies that are inadequate to address the risks that exist in the fat-tail. This is the counterintuitive pattern of both over- and under-regulation that has emerged in the past decade of disciplinary cases in Kansas. On the one hand, the disciplinary process exacts a high cost on relatively innocent or inconsequential behavior and generates little to no public benefit or risk reduction—while on the other hand, the same process appears to perpetuate high risks by keeping the worst offenders in the pool via rehabilitative and probationary practices. See e.g., Oral Argument at 13:33, In re Trummel, No. 128,882 (Kan. S. Ct. argued Dec. 16, 2025) (J.
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Biles, asking the ODA why published censure would protect the public from an attorney who had mismanaged client funds and failed to communicate with a client in a child custody matter); In re Daniels, 320 Kan. at 378, 381 (imposing discipline of published censure for diligence and communication violations after ODA recommended suspension with probation); In re Gamble, 319 Kan. at 695 (a majority of the court imposed a six- month suspension, stayed contingent on a successful one-year probation; three justices dissented arguing there was no ethical violation and the complaint should have never been prosecuted); In re Fulcher, 319 Kan. 105, 119, 552 P.3d 1255 (2024) (staying a two-year suspension in favor of probation); In re Davis, 318 Kan. 450, 456-57, 543 P.3d 1143 (imposing two-year probation following a period of six months' suspension contrary to the ODA's recommendation of a two-year probation period), reinstatement granted
319 Kan. 662, 557 P.3d 28 (2024); In re Spencer, 317 Kan. 70, 80, 524 P.3d 57 (2023) (a majority of the court imposed the lesser sanction of published censure rather than the jointly recommended 90-day suspension to be stayed during one-year probation); In re Sedgwick, 317 Kan. 826, 840-42, 539 P.3d 1033 (2023) (ODA sought three-year suspension stayed for three years' probation; however, the court imposed six-month suspension stayed during three-year probation); In re Morton, 317 Kan. at 751 (court held that published censure was the appropriate discipline, rather than the ODA's recommendation of disbarment); In re Huffman, 315 Kan. at 685, 688 (ODA recommended indefinite suspension; court imposed two-year suspension, stayed after the first 90 days provided that respondent enter into an approved probation plan); In re Long,
315 Kan. 842, 855, 511 P.3d 952 (2022) (indefinitely suspending an attorney when ODA had recommended a one-year suspension); In re Martinez, 315 Kan. 245, 257, 506 P.3d 909 (2022) (staying a three-year suspension in favor of probation); In re Shepherd, 310 Kan. 739, 753-55, 448 P.3d 1049 (2019) (ODA recommended indefinite suspension, stayed for five years of probation; court imposed two-year suspension with eligibility for probation after one year), reinstatement granted 312 Kan. 827, 483 P.3d 1046 (2021).
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In response, we would both narrow and deepen the application of our disciplinary code. That is, we would narrow it to reduce the over-regulation and wasted cost of chasing the low-risk majority of the thin-tail; and we would deepen it to cut off the fat- tail by reducing our reliance on rehabilitative strategies such as probation.
CONCLUSION
Stewart's case is a cautionary tale. To lawyers in Kansas—low-risk mistakes may still land you in trouble; be scrupulous; recognize the regulatory environment you currently operate in and respond accordingly. To the disciplinary defense bar—we cannot do our job unless you do yours; the adversarial process we depend on depends in turn on you. To the ODA—consider whether probability neglect is a feature of attorney conduct regulation in Kansas; we all want the same thing, an ethical bar we can be proud of. WALL, J., joins the foregoing concurring in part and dissenting in part opinion.
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