Filed 2/19/26 Ayala v. Somatdary CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
JOSE AYALA,
Plaintiff and Appellant, v.
SOMATDARY, INC. et al., Defendants and Respondents.
B345789
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 21STCV09623) APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Upinder Kalra, Judge. Affirmed.
Cummings & Franck, Scott O. Cummings, Lee Franck and Andrew Butzen for Plaintiff and Appellant.
No appearance for Defendants and Respondents.
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INTRODUCTION
This case provides an example of an attempted abuse of the default process, only prevented by the diligence of the trial court. Plaintiff and appellant Jose Ayala applied for a default judgment of nearly $10 million against his previous employer, including almost 30 years' full salary, despite admitting he quickly obtained superior employment elsewhere. When a defendant defaults, legal proceedings cease to be adversarial because there is only one side active before the trial court. (LCPFV, LLC v. Somatdary Inc. (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 743, 753 (LCPFV).) Other courts of appeal have cautioned attorneys against treating a defendant's default as an
"unalloyed gift." (Kim v. Westmoore Partners, Inc. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 267, 271 (Kim).) Similar warnings apply to the use of requests for admission, served after the defense has abandoned litigation, to manufacture evidence. (LCPFV, supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at p. 753.) Trial courts have an obligation to act as vigilant gatekeepers, preventing plaintiffs from taking advantage of the absence of an opponent. (Kim, supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at pp. 272-273.) Here, the trial court awarded only $3,869.39, for court costs, finding Ayala and his counsel made a "calculated effort" to extract a windfall from their absent opponents. Ayala appeals, arguing the court went beyond its gatekeeping role. We see no error, and therefore affirm.
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FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
We describe the facts as they were presented to the trial court.1
Respondent2Somatdary, Inc. (Somatdary) hired Ayala to work as a plumber in April 2015. Ayala was fired in February 2020. After his termination, in March 2021, he filed a complaint alleging wage and hour violations against Somatdary and his former supervisor, respondent Abbas Pournahavandi. The complaint also named two other defendants: human resources contractors ADP Total Source FL XVI, Inc. and ADP Total Source, Inc. (collectively ADP).
All parties participated in the litigation until December 2022, when counsel for Somatdary and Pournahavandi filed a motion to withdraw. In January 2023, Ayala settled with ADP. In February 2023, the trial court determined the settlement between Ayala and ADP was in good faith; the court also permitted counsel for Somatdary and Pournahavandi to withdraw. Without counsel of record, Somatdary was unable to participate in the litigation any further. (Prato v. Gioia (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 651, 656, fn. 2.) Pournahavandi made no further appearances.
In May 2023, Ayala served more than 100 requests for admission, asking Somatdary to admit essentially all the material allegations against it.
1 As noted below, in its ruling on Ayala's application for damages, the trial court also set an order to show cause re: sanctions against Ayala's counsel. Ayala appealed the setting of the OSC and designated his counsel's declarations in response to the OSC as part of the record on appeal. However, declarations submitted after the decision from which an appeal is taken are not relevant to the determination of that appeal. (See Delta Stewardship Council Cases (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 1014, 1074 (Delta Stewardship) [points not submitted to the trial court are forfeited].)
2 No respondent has chosen to file an appellate brief.
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At the same time, Ayala sought leave to file a first amended complaint. In August 2023, Ayala filed a motion to deem the requests for admission as admitted;3unopposed, that motion was granted in September 2023. Ayala then obtained leave to file a second amended complaint in November 2023. The second amended complaint added multiple new claims for wrongful termination in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act, among other statutes. Ayala now asserted 25 causes of action and sought $5,185,192.69 in damages.
In February 2024, the court entered the defaults of Somatdary and Pournahavandi. In May 2024, Ayala filed a request for default judgment seeking $9,878,446.80 in damages. However, the supporting declaration of counsel identified the amount of damages as $6,761,343. Concerned by the large disparity between these two numbers and the amount demanded in the complaint, the trial court opted to hold an evidentiary hearing and require live witness testimony.
That hearing was held on November 25, 2024. The trial court admitted exhibits and heard testimony from Ayala. There was no court reporter present. On February 21, 2025, the court issued a written ruling. In its ruling, the trial court determined that five of the claims alleged in the operative second amended complaint were facially insufficient—the court had already sustained a demurrer as to three of them, without leave to amend, and two more were improperly pled. Following LCPFV, the court also determined that the 108 admissions deemed admitted in September 2023 had no evidentiary value. It further found Ayala's testimony contradictory and inconsistent; in fact, at one point, Ayala's own counsel
3 The appellate record begins with this motion. We rely on the register of actions and the trial court's summary for our description of prior pleadings.
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objected to Ayala's testimony on the ground that it contradicted his other evidence. Therefore, the court found none of Ayala's testimony credible. The court declined to award any damages, and rejected the request for attorney's fees on the ground that the bills were unreasonably inflated. It awarded Ayala only $3,869.39 in costs, and directed counsel to prepare a proposed judgment within 30 days. The court also set an order to show cause why it should not sanction plaintiff's counsel for potential breaches of the Rules of Professional Responsibility.
On April 18, 2025, Ayala appealed from the court's order.
DISCUSSION
Ayala argues the trial court failed to apply the correct standard of evidence. He contends the court was required to credit the evidence he submitted because it was not contradicted. We are not persuaded. However, before we discuss the merits of Ayala's argument, we must decide a threshold issue—whether the trial court's order denying damages is an appealable order.4
4 Although Ayala's notice of appeal requests review of the trial court's decision to set an OSC re: sanctions, nowhere in any brief does Ayala discuss the appealability of that decision. However, the trial court's register of actions indicates the hearing on the OSC has already been held; no order appears in the appellate record, and there is no indication any sanctions were imposed. Therefore, even assuming an order setting an OSC is appealable, the issue is moot. (See People ex rel. Alameda County Taxpayers' Assn., Inc.
v. Brown (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 919, 931.)
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I. Appealability A trial court's order may only be appealed if a statute renders it appealable. (Griset v. Fair Political Practices Com. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 688, 696 (Griset).) Ayala's opening brief assumes without discussion that the trial court's order of February 21, 2025, was a judgment, rendered appealable by Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1, subdivision (a)(1). However, the court's order of February 21, 2025, does not appear to be a judgment. It expressly contemplates subsequent proceedings, including the hearing on the OSC and the submission, review, and entry of a proposed judgment. The register of actions indicates that a judgment was subsequently entered on May 12, 2025 (after the notice of appeal was filed). That judgment is not in the record, nor has there been any request to augment the record to include it.
We requested supplemental briefing on the question of whether the trial court's order is an appealable judgment, given that it contemplates the subsequent entry of a judgment. In his supplemental brief, Ayala argues the trial court's ruling was a default judgment because it contained the header
"Final Ruling" and said, "judgment is to be entered . . . for costs of $3,869.39."
However, the title of the document is not determinative. (Griset, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 698.) And the future tense of the phrase "judgment is to be entered" cuts against Ayala; as already noted, it contemplates future proceedings other than mere compliance or noncompliance. (See Ibid.) In the alternative, Ayala contends his notice of appeal falls under California Rules of Court, rule 8.104(d), which renders valid any notice of appeal "filed after judgment is rendered but before it is entered" and further grants appellate courts discretion to hear appeals filed "after the superior court has announced its intended ruling, but before it has rendered
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judgment." Application of those rules here is complicated by the absence of the judgment itself from the record. However, the record also contains no indication that the judgment deviated from the court's ruling. Therefore, we presume the judgment matches the ruling, and construe this as a premature appeal from the judgment. (See Sanchez v. Westlake Services, LLC (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1100, 1106 [collecting cases].)
II. Merits Our power to review a trier of fact's findings on damages is "severely circumscribed." (Johnson v. Stanhiser (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 357, 361 (Stanhiser).) We may interfere with the trial court's ruling only if it is "so out of proportion to the evidence that it shocks the conscience." (Ibid.) A. The Standard of Proof
After the defendant has defaulted, the plaintiff is charged with producing prima facie evidence to support his damages. (Stanhiser, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at pp. 361-362.) Prima facie evidence simply means evidence sufficient to prove a particular fact if uncontradicted. (People v. Van Gorden (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 634, 636-637.)
Ayala argues the trial court improperly applied a "preponderance of the evidence" standard instead of the prima facie standard. However, the introductory paragraph of the court's order shows it applied the correct standard. The court explained: "[w]hile the standard of proof at a default judgment hearing is slight—prima facie evidence—[Ayala] here nevertheless failed to meet [his] evidentiary burden with credible evidence." Nothing in the record suggests the trial court applied a preponderance of the evidence standard.
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B. The Evidence At the default judgment hearing, Ayala presented his own testimony, certain charts he prepared, various earnings statements and pay stubs, and a doctor's note. The trial court excluded the requests for admission deemed admitted in September 2023 from consideration. It also determined Ayala was not credible on any subject. Ayala now challenges those rulings.
1. Requests for Admission LCPFV governs here, and the trial court correctly followed it.5We note that Somatdary and Pournahavandi were also the defendants in LCPFV, and there, as here, they became inactive in the litigation when their counsel withdrew. (LCPFV, supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at pp. 748-749.) There, as here, the plaintiff served over 90 requests for admission on Somatdary and Pournahavandi after they became inactive, obtained an order deeming those requests admitted, and attempted to use them as evidence to support a damages request of over $1 million. (Id. at pp. 750-752.) The trial court found the requests for admission had no evidentiary value because they were served after Somatdary and Pournahavandi had left the case. (Id. at pp. 751-752.) The court of appeal affirmed, explaining that propounding requests for admission on an absent opponent was clearly a tactic to manufacture evidence which was otherwise lacking. (LCPFV, supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at pp. 756-757.) A trial court is entitled to neutralize this tactic by disregarding the requests for admission. (Id. at p. 757.)
5 Ayala briefly argues, with only a general citation to the statute governing requests for admission, that LCPFV was wrongly decided. We are not persuaded.
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Ayala attempts to distinguish LCPFV on the grounds that here Somatdary and Pournahavandi remained active in the litigation, using a
"personal attorney," upon whom the requests for admission were served. However, this "personal attorney" was never counsel of record. Further, this argument was not presented to the trial court before the ruling was issued. Therefore, it is forfeited. (Delta Stewardship, supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at p. 1074.) Ayala also attempts to distinguish LCPFV on the grounds that the requests for admission here were not his only proof, and therefore he was not manufacturing evidence to supply a complete lack thereof. For the reasons given below, we are not persuaded Ayala had other credible evidence to support his claimed damages.
Finally, Ayala complains that the trial court should have individually analyzed each request for admission rather than "only" discussing 33 of them. In the absence of authority, we are not inclined to impose such an onerous requirement on our hard-working trial courts.
2. Ayala's Testimony Ayala appears to argue that once his testimony is offered, the prima facie standard requires that he be believed. That is not the law.
"The requirement of a proof of damages is meaningless if it can be fulfilled by [just] any evidence." (Kim, supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at p. 288.) The credibility of a witness is the province of the trial court. (Pacho Limited Partnership v. Eureka Energy Co. (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 598, 610.) No trial court is bound to accept the testimony of any witness, even if uncontradicted. (Johnson, Baker & Palmer v. Record Mach. & Tool Co. (1960) 183 Cal.App.2d
200, 209.)
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Further, Ayala's testimony was contradicted—by Ayala. The trial court's order explains in detail how Ayala's testimony on the stand contradicted his declaration, his charts, and his other evidence. We note that Ayala's own counsel at one point objected to his testimony on the grounds that it contradicted other evidence. The court was entitled to determine that Ayala was not credible. (Evid. Code, § 780, subd. (h).) C. Damages
Ayala sought damages in 14 separate categories: (1) $163,239.39 in unpaid commissions, (2) $114,696 for unpaid hourly wages, (3) $69,858 in meal and rest break penalties, (4) $5,000 in unreimbursed necessary business expenses, (5) $550 in wage statement penalties, (6) $6,840 for a final pay penalty, (7) $357,000 in past lost wages, (8) $2.1 million in future lost wages,
(9) $28,500 in medical expenses, (10) $1,025,000 in emotional distress damages, (11) $2.5 million in punitive damages, (12) $2,865,697.90 in prejudgment interest, (13) $244,286.25 in attorney's fees and (14) costs of $7,119.39.
On appeal, Ayala abandons his claims for wage statement penalties, medical expenses, emotional distress damages, punitive damages, and prejudgment interest, by failing to present argument on those subjects. (Sierra Palms Homeowners Assn. v. Metro Gold Line Foothill Extension Construction Authority (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1127, 1136.) Ayala likewise does not challenge the amount of the court's costs award. We discuss the remaining claims in sequence.
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1. Unpaid Commissions In support of his claim for unpaid commissions, Ayala presented a series of statements labeled "Servicemen's Payroll Calculation." These statements do not show Ayala being underpaid. For example, he claimed he should have received $1,002.40 for the pay period ending June 15, 2015. But the payroll statement shows him receiving more: $1,809.05. As the trial court explained, nothing in the statement calculations set forth the terms of Ayala's employment, or showed those terms had been violated in a way that caused Ayala any harm.
2. Other Unpaid Wages and Penalties The remaining claims for unpaid hourly wages, meal and rest break penalties, unreimbursed expenses, and final pay penalties, are solely supported by Ayala's testimony. His wage and salary statements do not show any violations or damages on their face. As discussed, the trial court was entitled to disbelieve Ayala's testimony. Having done so, the court did not err in finding these claims unsupported by the evidence.
3. Past and Future Lost Wages Ayala calculated his past lost wages by taking his monthly salary at the time he was fired, multiplying it by 12 to get a projected yearly income, and then multiplying that number by 4.25 to cover the four-plus years since his termination. He calculated his future lost wages by taking his projected yearly income at the time of separation and multiplying it by 25, on the assumption his termination would continue to affect his wages until he ceased working altogether.
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Ayala's salary at the time he was fired can be gleaned from his wage statements. However, as the trial court pointed out, a lost wages claim is also premised on the inability to find other work. (Martinez v. Rite Aid Corp. (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 958, 973 (Martinez).) And Ayala's declaration states that he obtained subsequent employment. When the court questioned him about this, Ayala admitted he had almost immediately gone to work for competing plumbing companies, earning substantially more than his salary at Somatdary. Further, he was currently employed full time in a permanent position for a gas company, again earning substantially more than he had at Somatdary. Based on these admissions, the court chose not to believe Ayala's claims that he had lost any income in the past or would lose any income in the future.
Ayala argues the trial court reversed the burden of proof by requiring him to show that he mitigated his damages. That is not what happened. Ayala testified that he obtained subsequent employment, but nevertheless claimed damages amounting to his full annual salary for the rest of his working life. The court reasonably found a fundamental conflict between Ayala's claim that he had lost (or would lose) the benefit of a full salary for nearly 30 years, and his testimony that he has been fully employed for most of the time since his termination. The court properly fulfilled its duty to prevent Ayala from using the default process to obtain a windfall. (Kim, supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at pp. 271-273.)
Ayala also argues his subsequent employment was not the same as or substantially similar to his job at Somatdary, and therefore should be excluded from any damages calculation. There are three problems with this argument. First, as Ayala concedes, there is a split of authority on this point. (Compare Villacorta v. Cemex Cement, Inc. (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1425,
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1432 with Martinez, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at pp. 974-976.) Second, the only evidence Ayala cites in support of his assertions about his subsequent employment is a declaration of counsel stating counsel's opinion, filed after the court's ruling was issued. And that signals the third problem: this point was not argued below, and is therefore forfeited. (Delta Stewardship, supra,
48 Cal.App.5th at p. 1074.)
4. Attorney's Fees Ayala points out that a trial court has no discretion to deny attorney's fees unless special circumstances render an award unjust. (Simers v. Los Angeles Times Communications LLC (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 940, 951.) However, he fails to discuss the authorities holding that an unreasonably inflated bill is just such a special circumstance. (Snoeck v. ExakTime Innovations, Inc. (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 908, 920.) The trial court found a "pattern of profound billing irregularities,"
including charges of over $10,000 for template work, billing at the lead attorney's rate for motions he did not prepare and hearings he did not attend, and billing for "meritless" work related solely to the case against ADP. Based on this, and on its finding that counsel had tried to "exploit the default judgment process" by seeking inflated damages, the court found special circumstances warranted the denial of fees.
We defer to the trial court's evaluation of the value of services rendered before it. (LCPFV, supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at p. 759.) Ayala acknowledges this and does not contest the trial court's findings. He argues instead that the trial court should have "analyzed" every billing entry, and that the value of his counsel's work could not have been zero. However, "[t]he trial court is not required to state each charge it finds reasonable or unreasonable." (Ibid.)
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And if counsel inflate their bills, they run the risk of losing the entire award. (Id. at p. 760.)
Further, the court did find that the value of counsel's services was zero. Counsel were unable to obtain damages for their client, other than reimbursement of court costs. Counsel prepared detailed declarations for Ayala that were contradicted by his live testimony, and signed their names to pleadings asking for damages amounts that were both inflated and contradictory. We will not disturb the trial court's conclusion that such services provide no real value to the client or the court. (See LCPFV, supra,
106 Cal.App.5th at p. 759.)
III. Conclusion Ayala worked for Somatdary as a plumber for just under five years. By his own admission, he obtained full employment and a higher rate of pay
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DISPOSITION
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Appellant shall bear his own costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
ZUKIN, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
COLLINS, J.
TAMZARIAN, J.
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