PER CURIAM
We ordered briefing in this matter to consider whether defendant Priority Management Group, L.L.C. ("PMG") is entitled to summary judgment, based on PMG's argument that it is a "qualified heath care provider" under the Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act ("Act") and that the allegations against it sounded in medical malpractice. See La. R.S. 1231.1, et seq. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and grant summary judgment.1
The Legislature enacted the Act in response to a "perceived medical malpractice insurance 'crisis.'" Dupuy v. NMC Operating Co., L.L.C., 2015-1754 (La. 3/15/16), 187 So. 3d 436, 439. The legislature "intended the [Act] to reduce or stabilize medical malpractice insurance rates and to assure the availability of affordable medical service to the public." Id. To achieve these goals, the Act provides two advantages to providers that qualify as "qualified health care providers" under the Act: a limit on the amount of damages, and the right to an opinion from a medical review panel before a plaintiff may proceed in litigation. Id.
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Plaintiffs alleged PMG intentionally underfunded a nursing home it manages, co-defendant Riverlands Home Group, LLC d/b/a Chateau St. James Rehab and Retirement ("Chateau"), which led to understaffing and inadequate care provided to Russell Alexander, who was a Chateau resident for several months before his death. Plaintiffs argue their claims against PMG are administrative negligence claims that do not involve healthcare and are therefore not subject to the Act. PMG, in its motion for partial summary judgment, contends that the allegations fall squarely within the protections afforded by the Act, as they are "malpractice" claims under the definitions set forth in the Act and qualify as "health care" rendered to Mr. Alexander. PMG further argues that plaintiffs "purposefully characterized" the claims against PMG as administrative negligence claims to avoid the Act's cap on damages. La. R.S. 40:1231.2.
As an initial matter, PMG met its burden of proof to establish a prima facie case that it is a "qualified health care provider" under the Act. Since 2003, the definition of a qualified provider under the Act has expressly included health care management companies, as well as any officer, employee, partner, member, shareholder, or agent thereof acting in the course and scope of his employment. La. R.S. 40:1231.1(A)(10). PMG enrolled as a qualified health care provider and held a certificate of enrollment from the Patient's Compensation Fund for the relevant time period in this case. Because PMG is a qualified health care provider, and plaintiffs did not refute this, the question becomes whether the claims constitute medical malpractice within the meaning of the Act or are more properly characterized as general negligence.
At the time of the alleged acts and omissions at issue here, the Act defined
"malpractice" as:
[A]ny unintentional tort or any breach of contract based on health care or professional services rendered, or which should have been rendered, by a health care provider, to a patient, including failure to
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render services timely and the handling of a patient, including loading and unloading of a patient, and also includes all legal responsibility of a health care provider arising from acts or omissions during the procurement of blood or blood components, in the training or supervision of health care providers, or from defects in blood, tissue, transplants, drugs, and medicines, or from defects in or failures of prosthetic devices implanted in or used on or in the person of a patient. La. R.S. 40:2131.1(13) (emphasis added).2The Act also defined "health care" as
"act or treatment performed or furnished, or which should have been performed or furnished, by any health care provider for, to, or on behalf of a patient during the patient's medical care, treatment, or confinement. . . ." La. R.S. 40:2131.1(9). Plaintiffs cause of action against PMG arises directly from "health care"
performed by PMG—specifically, by acts PMG took or failed to take during Mr. Alexander's care. Any determination as to whether PMG breached its duty of care to Mr. Alexander ultimately turns on the level and adequacy of the health care provided to him. Rather than analyzing these facts in light of the statutory definitions, the trial court improperly focused on whether PMG must have rendered
"core" medical treatment to a patient for its actions to be considered medical malpractice.3In doing so, the trial court disregarded the plain language of "health care" and "malpractice" under La. R.S. 40:2131.1(A) and presupposed a "hands on treatment" requirement that does not exist. Returning to first principles and reviewing the plain language of "health care" and "malpractice" in the Act, we find that there is no genuine issue of material fact that the claims here are medical
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malpractice claims, and PMG is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La. C.C. art.
966.
Although the statutory language alone answers the question presented here, understanding that the statute cannot provide an outline of every possible medical malpractice situation, this Court has set forth six factors to assess whether the conduct at issue sounds in medical malpractice or general negligence, as outlined in Coleman v. Deno, 01-1517 (La. 1/25/02), 813 So. 2d 303.4While the issue in this case typically presents on an exception of prematurity, reviewing courts also use to Coleman factors in the summary judgment context. Billeaudeau v. Opelousas Gen. Hosp. Auth., 16-0846, p.12 (La. 10/19/16), 218 So. 3d 513, 521. The claims against PMG meet the first two factors of Coleman, "whether the particular wrong is treatment related or caused by a dereliction of professional skill,"
and "whether the wrong requires expert medical evidence to determine whether the appropriate standard of care was breached." Coleman, p. 17, 813 So.2d at 315. The claims of understaffing and poor staffing directly relate to the degree of care that was, or should have been, provided to Mr. Alexander. Importantly, expert medical evidence will be required to establish both the standard of care for the sufficiency of nursing staff based on Mr. Alexander's needs, whether those medical needs were properly assessed, and whether PMG breached the standard of care by failing to ensure Chateau had sufficient resources to care for Mr. Alexander in accordance with his needs.5Compare, e.g., Williamson v. Hosp. Serv. Dist. No. 1 of Jefferson,
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04-0451, p.11-12 (La. 12/1/04), 888 So. 2d 782, 790 (finding that while expert testimony could be necessary to establish whether wheelchair maintenance was proper, expert medical testimony was not required).6
The claims against PMG also satisfy the remaining Coleman factors. The alleged acts or omissions of PMG, including the failure to provide sufficient competent staff to meet Mr. Alexander's needs, would require an assessment of his condition and plan of care during his stay at Chateau. Likewise, the injuries to Mr. Alexander would not have occurred if he had not sought treatment at Chateau, a nursing home managed by PMG. Finally, though Plaintiffs allege the underfunding of Chateau was "intentional," this does not establish an intentional tort sufficient to circumvent the requirements and protections of the Act.7
The Act grants qualified health care providers certain limitations on liability for unintentional torts that constitute medical malpractice as defined in the Act. To summarize, our review of this case indicates that the claims against PMG, a qualified health care provider, which allegedly caused the injuries to and death of Mr. Alexander, are "health care" and "malpractice" under the definitions set forth in La. R.S. 40:2131.8The claims do not sound in general negligence, but rather embody care by, inter alia, failing to ensure [the nursing home] had sufficient resources to maintain adequate staffing to meet plaintiff's needs in accordance with her plan of care."); Patterson v. Claiborne Operator Group, LLC, 55-264, p.14 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/15/23), 374 So. 3d 299, 310 (examining understaffing and inadequate staffing claims and finding that "they are all related to an alleged failure to provide care, which is the very essence of the LMMA") (emphasis in original).
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the very policies the Act is meant to promote. See Dupuy, supra. For these reasons, we reverse the denial of summary judgment and grant summary judgment in favor of PMG, finding these claims subject to the Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act.
REVERSED AND RENDERED.