Albert Thomas v. Chicago Teachers' Pension Fund

Background

Because we are reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we recount the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, Thomas. See Thompson v. Holm, 809 F.3d 376, 378 (7th Cir. 2016).

Thomas, an African American man born in June 1956, worked as a Senior Accountant at the Fund beginning in March 2015. Assigned to the Reporting Team, Thomas handled monthly and annual financial reports and managed banking and health insurance benefit payment reconciliations.

Between 2017 and 2019, Thomas was supervised by Michael Aguilar, who left the Fund in November 2019 but returned in mid-2021. Thomas alleges that in 2018, Aguilar called him the n-word while no one else was present. Aguilar denies the allegation, and no other Fund employee testified ever hearing Aguilar use the racial epithet. Thomas did not report this alleged incident to the Fund's Human Resources unit, nor could he recall whether he reported it as part of other internal complaints he made. In July 2018, Thomas was formally disciplined for poor work performance. Then in 2019 he applied for promotion to the position of Manager of Accounting Operations at the Fund. An African American woman was selected for the position instead of him. Thomas later applied for the same position two other times. In February 2020, he was not offered an interview, and in January 2021, he applied but Michael Aguilar was rehired for the position (the name of which had changed).

Sometime in January 2022, Thomas's supervisors met with him to listen to his concerns about Aguilar's directions on internal accounting controls on bank reconciliations. The next month the Fund placed Thomas on a thirty-day paid suspension for failing to timely and accurately complete bank reconciliations. Following his suspension, Thomas was granted a leave of absence pursuant to the Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"). Upon his return from leave in July 2022, Thomas was assigned to work on outstanding health insurance reconciliations. In August 2022, Thomas's employment was terminated for failure to timely complete assignments. Thomas sued the Fund in April 2021, alleging a variety of discrimination claims, including under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq., and the Illinois Human Rights Act ("IHRA"), 775 ILCS 5, et seq. In November 2021, the district court granted the Fund's motion to dismiss all of Thomas's claims. Thomas appealed. In a December 6, 2022 Order, we affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded this case to the district court. Several of Thomas's claims, including

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alleged sex-discrimination, were time-barred because Thomas's charge of discrimination—which was required to exhaust his administrative remedies before suit—did not cover specific claims in his amended complaint. But we also ruled that Thomas could proceed on certain race- and age-discrimination claims based on his February 2020 failure to promote claim and his failure to receive a pay raise claim. On remand, the operative pleading was Thomas's Third Amended Complaint against the Fund, which alleged race discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII and the IHRA, and age discrimination in violation of the ADEA and the IHRA. In July 2024, after the parties engaged in discovery, the district court set a briefing schedule for dispositive motions. The Fund moved for summary judgment, which Thomas opposed. The district court granted the Fund summary judgment on all counts in March 2025. Thomas moved to reconsider, but the district court struck the motion for failure to follow Northern District of Illinois Local Rule 5.3 and the district judge's standing order requiring that there be notice of the motion's presentment. The district court also entered an order taxing Thomas with $3,253.40 of the Fund's costs. Thomas appeals.

District Court's Memorandum Opinion and Order

The district court's consideration of the Fund's summary judgment motion began with procedural deficiencies in Thomas's filings under Northern District of Illinois Local Rule 56.1. That rule sets the requirements for litigation of a summary judgment motion. The movant is to file "a statement of material facts … that attaches the cited evidentiary material." Id. at (a)(2). The nonmovant is to file a response to the movant's statement of material facts "that attaches any cited evidentiary material not attached to the [movant's] statement [of material facts]." Id. at (b)(2). In responding, the nonmovant must admit, dispute, or admit in part and dispute in part the asserted facts. Id. at (e)(2). A response is not to set forth any new facts, that is "facts that are not fairly responsive to the asserted fact to which the response is made." Id. If the nonmovant wants to assert a new fact non-responsive to the movant's asserted facts, the nonmovant can file a statement of additional material facts. Id. at (b)(3). That statement is to attach any cited evidentiary material not attached in the statement filed under Local Rule 56.1(a)(2) or in the Local Rule 56.1(b)(2) response.

Local Rule 56.1 proved to be the undoing of Thomas's case in the district court. The Fund's reply brief identified that several of his responses did not adhere to the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 and Local Rule 56.1. The district court agreed with the Fund. Thomas admitted to many of the Fund's material statements, but in violation of Local Rule 56.1(b)(3), he also improperly provided additional information in his responses. This resulted in the court striking many of

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Thomas's responses, which meant that the Fund's material statements were deemed admitted. In violation of Local Rule 56.1(e)(3), Thomas failed to attach evidentiary material to dispute another of the Fund's material statements, which was deemed uncontested and admitted in full. Two of Thomas's responses relied on inadmissible hearsay (in violation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)(2)), so those Fund statements were deemed admitted. Thomas further attempted to submit additional material facts without following Local Rule 56.1(b)(3) and (d), so those were stricken. The resulting undisputed facts, per the district court, could be summarized in just a few pages. Those facts included Thomas's race, the job he held at the Fund, who his supervisors were, descriptions of his job applications, who was placed in those jobs, and their credentials. The undisputed facts also noted that Thomas alleged race discrimination by Aguilar for allegedly using the n-word, and they surveyed Thomas's performance reviews, which led to his suspension and ultimately his termination. Based on the record before it, the district court dismissed Thomas's IHRA claims because he failed to include evidence that he had exhausted his administrative remedies. The district court also granted the Fund summary judgment on Thomas's race- and age-discrimination claims and his claim of retaliation because the undisputed facts showed that Thomas's job performance did not meet the Fund's legitimate expectations to sufficiently prove his claims.

We review summary judgment decisions de novo, resolving "factual disputes in [the nonmovant's] favor and granting him the benefit of all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidentiary record." Adams v. Reagle, 91 F.4th 880, 887 (7th Cir. 2024). The "movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law" upon a showing "that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact." F ED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).

Discussion

In this successive appeal, Thomas argues that he should be allowed to proceed to a jury trial on his various claims. Whether he was qualified to perform his job is a genuine question of material fact, which he submits cannot be disregarded just because the local rules were not followed. Thomas maintains that a procedural issue should not result in a case being dismissed on its merits when there is a genuine dispute of facts. Thomas argues there is evidence of pretext—the person who was promoted over him is the same person who purportedly called him the n-word. And Thomas was chosen to train those who were selected over him for the Manager of Accounting Operations position because they did not know the job. Thomas can understand summary judgment being granted to the Fund if there was no evidence in support of his claims. But that is not the case here, he asserts, so Thomas submits that the Fund in effect has been granted default judgment.

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The Fund responds that Thomas's poor job performance was a legitimate reason for its decisions not to promote him, to suspend him, and ultimately to terminate his employment. According to the Fund, the district court did not abuse its discretion in its application of the local rules, including as to summary judgment practice and requiring notice of presentment of the motion for reconsideration, as well as in its award of costs under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54.

First, we consider the district court's application of Local Rule 56.1 to the summary judgment submissions, which we review for abuse of discretion. Igasaki v. Ill. Dep't of Fin. & Pro. Regul., 988 F.3d 948, 956-57 (7th Cir. 2021); Curtis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 807 F.3d 215, 218-19 (7th Cir. 2015).

Evaluation of Thomas's responses to the Fund's statement of material facts bears out the district court's decisions. In its memorandum opinion and order, the court supplied reasons for its decisions, which accurately tracked the local rule's requirements. At various points in his submissions, Thomas inserted additional non- responsive facts, did not attach evidentiary material, relied on hearsay, and failed to properly submit additional material facts. So, the district court was well within its discretion to deem the Fund's material statements admitted and to strike Thomas's responses. Because Local Rule 56.1 was properly applied to the parties' submissions, the district court did not abuse its discretion.

"The purpose of Rule 56.1 is to have the litigants present to the district court a clear, concise list of material facts that are central to the summary judgment determination." Curtis, 807 F.3d at 219. Thomas incorrectly asks us to ignore the local rule. "Compliance with local rules like Rule 56.1 ensures the facts material to the issues in the case and the evidence supporting such facts are clearly organized and presented for the court's summary judgment determination." Id. That is precisely what occurred here. The roll of undisputed facts the district court gleaned from the record was shaped by the parties' submissions, followed by the district court's correct application of Local Rule 56.1.

Given the four-plus year duration of this case, its extensive discovery, the parties' broad summary judgment filings, and the district court's close review of their submissions, Thomas cannot correctly claim that a "default judgment" has been entered against him.

Second, we review de novo the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Fund. Thomas has advanced claims of race discrimination (Count I), age discrimination (Count III), and retaliation (Count V). To survive an employer's summary judgment motion on those claims, an employee's job performance must meet the employer's

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legitimate expectations. That is the case whether the undisputed facts are considered under the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (to determine whether a discrimination claim should survive when there is no direct evidence), or the alternative approach of Ortiz v. Werner Enters., Inc., 834 F.3d 760, 765 (7th Cir. 2016) (to consider whether a reasonable factfinder would conclude that the plaintiff's protected characteristic caused the complained-of adverse employment action).

Examination of the undisputed facts found by the district court show that Thomas's performance at work did not satisfy the "legitimate expectations" standard. He was formally disciplined in July 2018 for poor work, and his performance gradually declined between 2021 and 2022. Thomas began to argue with his supervisor Aguilar about how to perform bank reconciliations in late 2021, which delayed his work. In 2021 and 2022, Thomas consistently failed to complete these reconciliations on time or accurately. In January 2022, he met with Fund leadership, who instructed Thomas that he must listen to Aguilar and complete his work. Still, Thomas continued to argue with Aguilar and failed to finish his assignments. He was suspended for thirty days. Following his suspension, Thomas applied for and was granted a leave of absence under the FMLA. He returned to work on July 9, 2022 and was assigned outstanding health insurance reconciliations. Thomas continued to fail to complete his work responsibilities on time and to be insubordinate, so he was terminated. These facts show that Thomas failed to meet the Fund's legitimate expectations of a Senior Accountant in his position. Therefore, the district court correctly concluded that Thomas failed at the second prong of the McDonnell Douglas test of proving a prima facie case for discrimination or a retaliation claim, and that his claims did not survive the Ortiz standard. Indeed, Thomas does not argue that the record evidence shows that his work met the Fund's legitimate expectations. Rather, he submits the district court did not consider evidence it should have as to his work performance. But for the reasons relayed above, the district court properly decided the scope of the undisputed facts based on the parties' submissions.¹

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Two final items: Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) allows a party to move to alter or amend a judgment within 28 days of entry. Northern District of Illinois Local Rule 5.3, "Review of Judge's Procedures and Notice of Motions and Objections,"

requires parties to consult the procedures on filing and presenting motions of the judge to whom a case is assigned. That local rule also provides that a judge may require that a motion be accompanied by a notice of presentment, specifying the date and time at which a motion is to be heard. The district judge's standing order here requires that all motions must be noticed for presentment pursuant to Local Rule 5.3. Thomas moved to reconsider the grant of summary judgment to the Fund, but failed to comply with Local Rule 5.3 when doing so. Accordingly, the district court declined to hear his motion to reconsider. That court did not abuse its discretion in doing so. There was no selective invocation of this local rule, as the Fund's motions were filed in compliance with it, and the district court heard and resolved those motions. And the examples Thomas cites in support of his position that the presentment requirement need not be followed involved different judicial officials than here. Finally, Thomas objects to the district court taxing $3,253.40 under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54 for the Fund's costs of eleven deposition transcripts. Review of such a decision is for an abuse of discretion. Lauth v. Covance, Inc., 863 F.3d 708, 718 (7th Cir. 2017). "The proper inquiry is whether the deposition was 'reasonably necessary' to the case at the time it was taken, not whether it was used in a motion or in court." Cengr

v. Fusibond Piping Sys., Inc., 135 F.3d 445, 455 (7th Cir. 1998) (quoting Finchum v. Ford Motor Co., 57 F.3d 526, 534 (1995). Contrary to Thomas's contention, these transcripts meet that requirement. Ten of the eleven depositions were noticed by Thomas, and the eleventh was of Thomas himself. Therefore, we see no abuse of discretion in the district court's decision to award costs.

A FFIRMED.

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