Per Curiam. {¶ 1} Appellant, Sammy Montanez, is incarcerated on judgments of conviction arising out of Cuyahoga and Richland Counties. As a result of those convictions, Montanez is serving an aggregate sentence of life in prison with parole eligibility after 20 years. In November 2024, Montanez filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Fifth District Court of Appeals, arguing that his continued incarceration is unlawful because his "only journalized sentence" expired on June
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County, he had to serve the balance of 15 years plus the two-year Richland County sentence before becoming eligible for parole.
{¶ 4} In 2014, the Cuyahoga County trial court held a resentencing hearing without explanation and resentenced Montanez to "a total indefinite term of 18 years to life" in prison—i.e., an "[i]ndefinite prison term of 15 years to life plus [a]
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would support a penalty of that nature absent the appropriate violation of the Ohio Revised [C]ode."
{¶ 7} The warden filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Civ.R. 12(B)(6), asserting that Montanez had not served his maximum sentence and had failed to comply with R.C. 2969.25(C)(1) (providing that when an inmate files in the court of appeals a civil action against a government entity or employee and seeks waiver of the filing fees, the inmate must file an affidavit containing "[a] statement that sets forth the balance in the inmate account of the inmate for each of the preceding six months, as certified by the institutional cashier"). The Fifth District granted the warden's motion on the basis that Montanez had not served his maximum sentence of life in prison.
{¶ 8} Montanez has appealed to this court as of right.
ANALYSIS
{¶ 9} We review de novo a decision of the court of appeals dismissing a habeas corpus petition. State ex rel. Parker v. Black, 2022-Ohio-1730, ¶ 6.
{¶ 10} The Fifth District dismissed Montanez's habeas petition because the Cuyahoga County trial court had sentenced him to life in prison with parole eligibility after 18 years, of which Montanez had served only the minimum when he received his first parole hearing in May 2024. Montanez II at ¶ 5, 10-11. A writ of habeas corpus "is appropriate only if the petitioner is entitled to immediate release from prison." State ex rel. Carrion v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 1998-Ohio- 656, ¶ 4.
{¶ 11} The evidence attached to Montanez's petition demonstrates that he is imprisoned on two valid criminal judgments and that he has not yet served his maximum term under those judgments. Yet in support of two related propositions of law, Montanez maintains that he has served his maximum sentence because his Richland County sentence was ordered to be served after and consecutively to his Cuyahoga County sentence, and his Richland County sentence expired on June 25,
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2024, according to the correspondence between Montanez and the Bureau of Sentence Computation ("BOSC") that he attached to his petition. He maintains that DRC violated the separation-of-powers doctrine when it allegedly changed his sentence. Thus, Montanez reasons, he is entitled to immediate release.
{¶ 12} Montanez's arguments are inconsistent; he wants us to hold that DRC lacks authority to alter a valid criminal sentence but also to hold that correspondence that BOSC sent him is sufficient to alter the judgments of conviction, as long as the alteration is in his favor. Moreover, the exhibits attached to Montanez's petition show that a BOSC employee told Montanez in April 2024:
"You are currently serving on your Richland case and this expires on 06/25/2024 which is the date you will see the parole board. Your Cuyahoga case minimum was served first and the Richland sentence was added on top of that and determines your first parole board date."
{¶ 13} Still, Montanez contends that he "[p]ossesses a clear and legal right to be released as provided by law" and that "the State/respondent and the Habeas Court alike have arbitrarily changed the valid order of the trial court sentences."
Montanez's exhibits show that a BOSC employee informed him that he would appear before the parole board upon the expiration of his Richland County sentence—which he did. Because the parole board denied Montanez parole and continued his imprisonment for another ten years, he cannot show that he is entitled to habeas relief.
{¶ 14} A writ of habeas corpus "is generally available only when the petitioner's maximum sentence has expired and he is being held unlawfully."
(Emphasis in original.) State ex rel. Fuller v. Eppinger, 2018-Ohio-2629, ¶ 8. "An inmate is not entitled to a writ of habeas corpus upon completion of his minimum sentence." (Emphasis in original.) Id., citing State ex rel. Lockhart v. Sheldon, 2016-Ohio-627, ¶ 5. As the Fifth District recognized, Montanez's arguments ignore the fact that his maximum sentence is life imprisonment. Therefore, the
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Fifth District correctly dismissed Montanez's petition because a writ of habeas corpus "is appropriate only if the petitioner is entitled to immediate release from prison," Carrion, 1998-Ohio-656, at ¶ 4.
{¶ 15} Montanez also argues that the warden's motion to dismiss did not prove that Montanez's detention was lawful "or provide the habeas court with evidence that it had such authority." But in a habeas proceeding, "the burden is on the petitioner to establish his right to release, and the petitioner must demonstrate 'with particularity the extraordinary circumstances entitling him to habeas corpus relief.'" (Citation omitted.) DuBose v. McGuffey, 2022-Ohio-8, ¶ 16, quoting State ex rel. Wilcox v. Seidner, 1996-Ohio-390, ¶ 8. The respondent in a habeas proceeding is required to specify "only that he had [the defendant] in his custody and the authority for [the defendant's] imprisonment." Chari v. Vore, 2001-Ohio- 49, ¶ 14.
{¶ 16} Montanez also maintains that the court of appeals erroneously dismissed his petition for a writ of habeas corpus because the warden failed to file a return in compliance with R.C. 2725.14. Contrary to Montanez's claim, the Fifth District was permitted to sua sponte treat the warden's motion to dismiss as a return of the writ and proceed to judgment. See, e.g., State ex rel. Spitler v. Seiber, 16 Ohio St.2d 117, 118 (1968); Hammond v. Dallman, 63 Ohio St.3d 666, 667 (1992).
{¶ 17} Montanez is incarcerated on valid criminal judgments for a term of life in prison with parole eligibility after 20 years. He is not entitled to release from prison, and the Fifth District correctly dismissed his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
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The Law Office of Eric J. Allen and Eric Allen, for appellant. Dave Yost, Attorney General, and Jerri L. Fosnaught, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
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