Bass v. Martuscello

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

JOHANN ALEXANDER BASS a/k/a Johann Bass, Petitioner,

v. 9:25-CV-1207 (ECC/TWD)

DANIEL F. MARTUSCELLO,

Respondent.

APPEARANCES: OF COUNSEL:

JOHANN ALEXANDER BASS

Petitioner, pro se

174 Genesee Street Apt. 2

Auburn, New York 13021 HON. LETITIA JAMES ROBERT C. McIVER, ESQ. Attorney for Respondent Ass't Attorney General New York State Attorney General

The Capitol

Albany, New York 12224

THÉRÈSE WILEY DANCKS

United States Magistrate Judge

DECISION and ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Johann Bass seeks federal habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Dkt. No. 1, Petition ("Pet."); Dkt. No. 1-1, Exhibits.¹Respondent was directed to answer the Petition. Dkt. No. 2, Decision and Order ("September Order"). Shortly thereafter,

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petitioner filed the instant motion to "stay" his parole. Dkt. No. 4, Motion; Dkt. No. 5, Response in Opposition; Dkt. No. 6, Reply.²Respondent's answer deadline has been stayed, pending resolution petitioner's motion. Dkt. No. 7, Letter Request (seeking extension of the answer deadline); Dkt. No. 8, Text Order (staying deadline). For the reasons which follow, petitioner's motion is denied and respondent shall file an answer within thirty (30) days of this Decision and Order.

II. PENDING HABEAS PETITION

Petitioner's federal habeas action challenges his 2023 conviction from Cayuga County, pursuant to a guilty plea, for third degree robbery. Pet. at 1-2; People v. Bass, 240 A.D.3d 1443, 1143-44 (4th Dep't 2025). Petitioner argues that he is entitled to federal habeas relief because (1) "the state court decision denying petitioner's motion to vacate . . . is unreasonable based on the facts presented and violates petitioner's federal right to due process," Pet. at 5-12; (2) petitioner's counsel was constitutionally ineffective for "refus[ing] to file a motion to challenge false or mistaken material testimony at the state grand jury because he believed that the time had elapsed to do so[,]" id. at 13-15; and (3) "counsel failed to investigate petitioner's criminal history to correct the mistaken belief that a life sentence was required," id. at 16-18.

The undersigned performed an initial review, determining that "it [did not] plainly appear[] from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief

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in the district court[.]" Rule 4, Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2243. The undersigned concluded that the Petition was not immediately frivolous and, pursuant to Rule 4, directed respondent to file an answer.

III. MOTION TO STAY PAROLE³

Petitioner's motion requests that his present period of parole be stayed pending the outcome of his habeas petition. Dkt. No. 4 at 1, 7. The Court construes this as a motion for release pending a determination on his federal habeas petition.

Federal courts have jurisdiction to grant release, through bail or other means, to habeas petitioners for the duration of their habeas action. Mapp v. Reno, 241 F.3d 221, 226 (2d Cir. 2001); see also Ostrer v. United States, 584 F.2d 594, 596 n.1 (2d Cir. 1978) ("The district court has inherent power to enter an order affecting the custody of a habeas petitioner who is properly before it contesting the legality of his custody."). However, "the standard for [release] pending habeas litigation is a difficult one to meet: [t]he petitioner must demonstrate that the habeas petition raise[s] substantial claims and that extraordinary circumstances exist[] that make the grant of [release] necessary to make the habeas remedy effective."

Mapp, 241 F.3d at 226 (internal quotation marks omitted). "In short, [the court asks whether]

. . . this case is distinguishable from other habeas corpus cases[.]" Jackson v. Bennett, No.

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1:01-CV-8971, 2002 WL 126679, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2002) (citing Richard v. Abrams,

732 F. Supp. 24, 25 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (quotations omitted)). Here, Petitioner fears that the constitutional violations from his underlying state court criminal proceedings will continue, resulting in a potential parole revocation hearing and reincarceration. Dkt. No. 4 at 5-6; see also Dkt. No. 6 at 2-3 (explaining that his "conviction was obtained unconstitutionally, and Petitioner knows . . . that the Judge and District Attorney acted very vindictively, violating his Federal Constitutional rights and he does not trust them[.]"). Petitioner shares that, while he has a good relationship with his parole officer, he has had negative experiences during his parole. Dkt. No. 4 at 2-5. The first was when he received inconsistent information about the therapeutic interventions and education he is expected to participate in and complete. Dkt. No. 4 at 2-5; see also Dkt. No. 6 at 3 (arguing that "[a]ttending any necessary drug counseling is not the problem but such requirements must be based on a clinical need and not according to a forty-two-month-old evaluation,"

since "Petitioner is 100% drug free."). The second was the contradictory instructions on the financial support he could expect for his vocational training to facilitate his re-entry back into gainful employment and society. Dkt. No. 4 at 2-5.

Petitioner argues that he is entitled to release pending the duration of his habeas action because the Court's statement, that "it is not plainly apparent that petitioner is not entitled to relief," must "mean that the Court has identified one or more constitutional issues as well as other legal issues that will result in relief from the conviction and sentence." Dkt. No. 4 at 2. Consequently, "there is a likelihood of success." Dkt. No. 4 at 8.

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However, petitioner has incorrectly conflated two different standards together. Just because pleadings have not been deemed frivolous does not automatically render them meritorious. Regardless, the undersigned need not determine whether petitioner has established a substantial probability of success on the merits of his habeas corpus claim because he has failed to demonstrate extraordinary circumstances which justify relief. Petitioner primarily argues that "irreparable injury may arise when continued detention or restrictions on liberty impose significant harm that cannot be undone." Dkt. No. 4 at 8. Petitioner cites to cases, claiming that the potential of reincarceration constitutes such injury. Dkt. No. 4 at 8-9. Finally, petitioner contends that "because he has already served more than the minimum sentence set by the state court, the Respondent and . . . the People of the State of New York would suffer no injury if the Court issues an Order stopping Petitioner's Parole."

Dkt. No. 4 at 9.

Petitioner's conclusory arguments are unavailing. Petitioner contends he should be granted release because he otherwise would be continually harmed - by remaining in custody on parole or, potentially, revocation and reincarceration - until his federal habeas petition is ultimately granted. Petitioner relies on the contents of his pleading to demonstrate the validity of his habeas claims. He provides no other facts or reasoning for said rationale. However, "an alleged violation of a constitutional right does not constitute an extraordinary circumstance because such a circumstance does not, on its own, distinguish petitioner's case from other habeas cases." See Calix v. United States, No. 1:20-CV-9680, 2024 WL 463541, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2024) (quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Iuteri v. Nardoza, 662 F.2d 159, 162 (2d Cir. 1981) (reversing order granting bail and finding "nothing

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