United States v. Chad Pease

2 Opinion of the Court 25-10543 gage in sexual activity and commission of a felony offense involv- ing a minor by a registered sex offender. He argues that the district court erred by denying him a reduction for acceptance of responsi- bility under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1.

"We review a district court's determination of a defendant's acceptance of responsibility for clear error." United States v. Andres,

960 F.3d 1310, 1318 (11th Cir. 2020). Under the deferential standard of clear-error review, "we will not disturb a district court's findings unless we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." United States v. Clarke, 562 F.3d 1158, 1165 (11th Cir. 2009) (citation modified). We review de novo a defend- ant's claim that the district court mistakenly believed it lacked au- thority to a grant a reduction under the guidelines. See United States

v. Hansen, 262 F.3d 1217, 1255 (11th Cir. 2001). Under the Sentencing Guidelines, a defendant is entitled to a two-point reduction of his offense level "[i]f [he] clearly demon- strates acceptance of responsibility for his offense." § 3E1.1(a).

"[T]he reduction is intended to reward defendants who express contrition for their wrongdoing and evidence a desire to reform their conduct." United States v. Williams, 627 F.3d 839, 844 (11th Cir. 2010). To determine whether the two-point reduction applies, the district court must consider, among other things, whether the defendant "truthfully admitt[ed] the conduct comprising the of- fense(s) of conviction, and truthfully admitt[ed] or not falsely den[ied] any additional relevant conduct for which the defendant is accountable under [U.S.S.G.] § 1B.3 (Relevant Conduct)," as well

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25-10543 Opinion of the Court 3 as "the timeliness of the defendant's conduct in manifesting the ac- ceptance of responsibility." § 3E1.1, comment. (n.1(A), (H)). Be- cause the district court is in a "unique position to evaluate a defend- ant's acceptance of responsibility," we give its decision "great def- erence on review." United States v. Gonzalez, 70 F.3d 1236, 1239 (11th Cir. 1995) (citation modified).

A defendant's decision to stand trial "does not automatically preclude a defendant from consideration for such a reduction."

§ 3E1.1, comment. (n.2). "In rare situations a defendant may clearly demonstrate an acceptance of responsibility for his criminal conduct even though he exercises his constitutional right to a trial."

Id. Although "[t]his adjustment is not intended to apply to a de- fendant who puts the government to its burden of proof at trial by denying the essential factual elements of guilt, is convicted, and only then admits guilt and expresses remorse," it may apply "where a defendant goes to trial to assert and preserve issues that do not relate to factual guilt." Id.

Mr. Pease pled not guilty and proceeded to a jury trial. At trial he asserted, among other things, the defense of entrapment. We have previously noted that a defendant would not be "barred as a matter of law from receiving an adjustment [for ac- ceptance of responsibility] merely because he asserted an entrap- ment defense at trial, even though some courts have viewed the assertion of an entrapment defense as the virtual antithesis of ac- ceptance of responsibility." Joiner v. United States, 103 F.3d 961, 963 (11th Cir. 1997).

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4 Opinion of the Court 25-10543 A district court errs when it believes that, as a matter of law, it is prohibited from granting a reduction based on acceptance of responsibility because the commentary to the Guidelines "does not include any conduct that would automatically preclude a defend- ant from receiving the reduction." United States v. Mathews, 874 F.3d 698, 709 (11th Cir. 2017). Here, however, the district court never suggested that Mr. Pease's assertion of an entrapment de- fense legally precluded him from an acceptance of responsibility adjustment. To the contrary, the court indicated that a defendant who puts the government to its burden of proof and proceeds to trial is generally not entitled to an acceptance of responsibility ad- justment but allowed Mr. Pease to seek such an adjustment if he had a "compelling argument" to make. See D.E. 85 at 5-6. See also United States v. Whyte, 928 F.3d 1317, 1335 (11th Cir. 2019) ("The reduction may be available, in a rare case, even when the defend- ant proceeds to trial[.]") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

We discern no clear error on the part of the district court in denying an acceptance of responsibility adjustment. The probation officer noted that Mr. Pease had not accepted responsibility for his conduct. See PSI Addendum. Indeed, at sentencing Mr. Pease sought to minimize his behavior by indicating that he had not been taking his bipolar medication and that was related to his risky and impulsive actions. See D.E. 85 at 7, 9-10. "It is . . . clear that a defendant has not accepted responsibility where he proceeded to

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25-10543 Opinion of the Court 5 trial and consistently attempted to minimize his role, despite evi- dence to the contrary." United States v. Caraballo, 595 F.3d 1214, 1233 (11th Cir. 2010) (citation modified).

We affirm Mr. Pease's sentence.

AFFIRMED.

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