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Isaiah Parris Bentley v. Commonwealth of Kentucky

IMPORTANT NOTICE

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION

THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED."

PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, RAP 40(D), THIS

OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE

CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER

CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE; HOWEVER,

UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS,

RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR

CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED

OPINION THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE

BEFORE THE COURT. OPINIONS CITED FOR

CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN

UNPUBLISHED DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A

COPY OF THE ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG

WITH THE DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO

THE ACTION.

1

RENDERED: DECEMBER 18, 2025

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Supreme Court of Kentucky 2024-SC-0495-MR

ISAIAH PARRIS BENTLEY APPELLANT

V.

ON APPEAL FROM GRAVES CIRCUIT COURT

HONORABLE KEVIN D. BISHOP, JUDGE

NO. 22-CR-00005

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE

MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT

AFFIRMING

After robbing a Cash Express in Mayfield, Kentucky, Isaiah Parris Bentley and a co-defendant, James Hawks, led police on an extensive chase which involved several exchanges of gunfire between Bentley and law enforcement. Bentley was convicted of two counts of attempted murder, attempted first-degree assault, first-degree wanton endangerment, first-degree robbery, and complicity to fleeing and evading. During the penalty phase, Bentley was also convicted of being a felon in possession of a handgun. The trial court sentenced Bentley to seventy years in prison. She now appeals as a matter of right. After review, we affirm the judgment of the Graves Circuit Court.

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FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 2021, Isaiah Parris Bentley1lived in Lone Oak with James Hawks, Austin "Allison" Dillow,2and William Cole. Bentley did not testify at trial, but her co-defendant, James Hawks, testified and provided a version of events.3 The four roommates were behind on rent and bills and had received an electricity cut-off notice.

Hawks was out drinking at a bar until 3:00 a.m. on December 31, 2021, and was too intoxicated to drive, so Dillow picked him up and took him back to the apartment. Once there, he, Dillow and Bentley discussed obtaining money from Cash Express. Hawks claimed they only discussed borrowing money, and that he believed Bentley was going to get a loan. He recalled "jokes" about robbing a Cash Express, but did not believe Bentley and Dillow were serious. Bentley suggested they go to Cash Express and around 8:00 a.m., Bentley woke Hawks to drive there. Hawks testified that Dillow gave Bentley a black semiautomatic handgun to use as collateral. Dillow testified on Bentley's

1 Bentley, a biological male, identifies as female and uses feminine pronouns. Prior to trial, Bentley's counsel moved the trial court to recognize Bentley's preferred pronouns and that request was granted without objection. We likewise use the same pronouns in this Opinion.

2 In Bentley's brief, she spells Allison's last name "Dillow," while the Commonwealth spells it "Dillo." We defer to Bentley's spelling throughout this Opinion.

3 Before Bentley's trial, Hawks pled guilty to four counts of first-degree wanton endangerment, complicity to first-degree robbery, and first-degree fleeing or evading police. He was sentenced to fourteen years in prison, and, as part of his plea agreement, he was required to testify truthfully at Bentley's trial.

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behalf and denied that they talked about committing a robbery. Around this time, Bentley and Dillow were in a relationship.

According to Hawks, Bentley stated the Mayfield Cash Express would be easier to rob, but he suggested to Bentley that they go to a closer Cash Express location in Paducah. He drove Bentley there in his white S-10 pickup truck. Hawks claimed that Bentley went inside without the gun, was in there for about twenty minutes and returned, stating it was taking too long. Surveillance video showed Bentley inside Cash Express wearing grey sweatpants, a grey sweatshirt with a Calvin Klein logo, black stocking cap, surgical mask, gloves and sunglasses. Bentley again suggested going to the Mayfield Cash Express.

Hawks was not concerned that Bentley would commit a crime, even on the drive to Mayfield when Bentley told Hawks "keep driving if something happens." Hawks stated that Bentley directed him to cover his license plate with mud at the car wash next to the Mayfield Cash Express. Hawks explained he wore a hooded sweatshirt with the logo of his former employer, which he obscured with black electrical tape to avoid identification. Later in his testimony, the Commonwealth pressed Hawks to tell the truth about when he was aware of the robbery plan. After being reminded that his plea deal depended on him testifying truthfully, Hawks admitted that when he left the apartment that morning, he knew he and Bentley were going to commit a robbery at Cash Express.

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The Cash Express in Mayfield had an interior security camera that was not functional. Manager Shelby Walker and Assistant Manager Keila Gargis worked that morning. After 10:00 a.m., Gargis saw a white pickup truck park outside, but no one entered the Cash Express for approximately twenty minutes. Walker also saw the pickup truck in the parking lot. Around 10:30 a.m., Bentley entered the Cash Express and approached Walker at the counter. Gargis sat at her desk, some distance behind Walker. Bentley was dressed the same as she was at the Paducah location, but without the sunglasses and gloves. Bentley showed documents to Walker and asked what was needed for a loan. Walker told her the documents were insufficient and started to explain what was needed, but Bentley pulled out a black handgun, pointed it at Walker, and said "how about you give me everything in your drawer instead?" Bentley threw a gray plastic bag toward her onto the counter. Walker raised her hands, apologized, and asked Bentley not to hurt her.

Bentley walked through the gate next to Walker's register and instructed her not to push any buttons or call the police. Walker explained she would have to push a button to open the cash drawer, and Bentley gave her permission to do so. Bentley held the bag open and told her to fill it, but Walker raised her hands again and continued to apologize. Customer Melissa Smith walked in to pay a bill and stopped when she saw Bentley next to Walker. Bentley ordered her not to move, but Smith backed away then fled to her vehicle where her husband was waiting. Bentley

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pulled currency from the drawer, leaving only the one-dollar bills. On the way out of the Cash Express, Bentley dropped most of the five-dollar bills. Walker immediately called 911, and Gargis ran to the door to watch Bentley leave. Walker told the 911 dispatcher what Bentley wore and described Bentley as a light-skinned black male, and described the driver of the truck as a white male. She explained that the two men turned south in a white S-10 pickup truck. Smith gave the dispatcher the same description. A severe tornado struck Mayfield just three weeks prior, devastating the area and killing twenty-four people. As a result, police officers from other departments and agencies helped to patrol the city. Glasgow police officers driving their marked patrol cars were the first to encounter Hawks and Bentley. Officer Johnny Vance was parked at Mayfield Elementary School when he heard the information about the robbery and perpetrators over the portable Kentucky State Police (KSP) radio he was given for local communication. Based on the descriptions given by Walker and Gargis, the perpetrators were believed to be traveling on KY 121, which ran behind Mayfield Elementary. Officer Vance drove south on KY 121, met the white S-10 traveling the opposite direction, and turned around to follow. He stopped behind the S-10 at the intersection of KY 121 and KY 58 and informed other Glasgow officers about it over his car radio. Glasgow Officer Howard Garrison drove through the intersection from KY 58, saw the S-10 and that its occupants matched the perpetrators' description, and turned around to position himself a few cars behind Officer Vance.

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Officer Garrison told Officer Vance he was there so that Officer Vance could stop the S-10. When Officer Vance activated his blue lights and siren, Hawks accelerated the truck to more than eighty miles per hour. Officer Vance pursued, and Officer Garrison followed. During his testimony, Officer Vance described KY 58 as like a tunnel in certain parts of the road because of debris that was cleared from the road stacked on both sides.

According to Hawks, at this point he believed Bentley stated an intention to "smoke" the officers. Officer Vance was a few car lengths behind the S-10 when Bentley climbed partly out of the window and sat on the lower window frame. Bentley's right hand gripped something in the interior, she pointed the gun at Officer Vance and shot at him. Officer Vance did not hear the shot over his siren, but he could see the semiautomatic handgun firing. Officer Vance swerved to the left through a gap in the debris into a lawn, then re-entered the road even closer to the truck. When Officer Garrison had a clear view of the S- 10, he could see Bentley hanging out of the window and pointing toward them. Officer Garrison heard the gun shots. Bentley went back into the truck then came back out onto the window frame and fired more shots at Officer Vance. Jason Fitzgerald, who lived on KY 58, was in his driveway when the pursuit passed. The S-10 decelerated as it went up the incline near Fitzgerald's house, and he saw Bentley climb out of the window, point a handgun at the police car, and fire multiple shots. It was Fitzgerald's lawn that Officer Vance swerved onto. Fitzgerald also owned a camper dealership one- half mile east of his house, where KY 131 met KY 58. Hawks turned north

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onto KY 131. A tractor-trailer impeded Officers Vance and Garrison at that intersection. They lost sight of the S-10 and stopped their pursuit. Graves County Sheriff's Chief Deputy Jeremy Prince testified that he and other officers traveled up KY 131. An off-duty sheriff's sergeant who lived on KY 131 near I-69 broadcast that the S-10 turned southbound onto I-69. The officers followed in that direction. While most officers remained on I-69, Chief Deputy Prince exited northbound to US 45.

KSP Trooper William Propes and Detective Nathan Moore were at Post 1 in Hickory, north of Mayfield, when they learned of the incidents. They turned their vehicles south onto US 45 from Post 1 to look for the S-10. Hawks, who used Bentley's smartphone to navigate, had turned from I-69 onto US 45 toward McCracken County.

Trooper Propes met the S-10 first on that four-lane road. He and Detective Moore both turned around the median, positioning Detective Moore nearest to the S-10. Detective Moore activated his lights and siren of his unmarked SUV, but Trooper Propes passed Detective Moore in his marked car to lead the pursuit. Chief Deputy Prince caught up and followed Detective Moore. At this point in the pursuit, Hawks exceeded ninety miles per hour in the S-10.

Trooper Propes testified that Bentley sat on the window frame and beckoned him with both hands. When Bentley pointed a handgun at him, Trooper Propes swerved into the grass median and heard multiple gunshots. After Trooper Propes swerved, Detective Moore saw Bentley hanging out of the

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window and pointing a firearm at Detective Moore. Detective Moore ducked for cover behind the front support of his SUV's frame, swerved onto the median, and reported shots fired over his radio. At this point, Chief Deputy Prince had a clear view of Bentley firing the handgun at police. Chief Deputy Prince also ducked down for more protection and swerved.

Bentley went back into the truck while Trooper Propes and Detective Moore re-entered the road. As the pursuit approached Post 1, Bentley came out of the passenger window again. A KSP captain waited in front of the post with a spike strip to throw across the road. When he did so, Bentley got back in the truck and Hawks drove around the strip and onto the median. Near where Baldree Road crosses US 45, Bentley again came out of the window and pointed the handgun at Trooper Propes. Trooper Propes had a clear backdrop, and he fired multiple rounds from his rifle through his own windshield at Bentley. Bentley went back inside the truck while Trooper Propes filed more rounds. Ultimately, Trooper Propes shot toward Bentley eleven times. Some of the bullets entered the S-10, but there was no evidence of any police cruisers being struck by gunshots, and no officers were injured. Chief Deputy Prince saw the black handgun tumbling down the right lane of US 45, and Hawks pulled off on the right shoulder and stopped. Hawks testified that he saw Bentley's arm point toward the sky, but he never heard the gun fire. Bentley was lightly wounded and bleeding from being shot. She falsely claimed to be a runaway juvenile from Illinois. While inside an ambulance at the scene, Bentley asked to speak to police. KSP Sergeant

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Corey Hamby, a detective supervisor, responded and Bentley told him that Hawks did not know Bentley would commit the robbery or shoot at police. Sergeant Hamby collected the handgun from the side of the road. From the truck, police seized a plastic Walgreen's bag containing money. KSP Captain Terry Green later interviewed Bentley and she told Captain Green that the handgun belonged to her girlfriend or ex-girlfriend. She admitted to pointing the handgun at police, but claimed to have pointed it into the air before firing, which she identified as a "scare tactic." Bentley admitted to throwing the handgun out of the truck window.

A Graves Circuit Court jury found Bentley guilty of attempted murder of Trooper Propes, attempted first-degree assault of Detective Moore, first-degree wanton endangerment of Chief Deputy Prince, attempted murder of Officer Vance, first-degree robbery, and complicity to first-degree fleeing or evading. During the second phase of trial, the jury heard evidence of Bentley's October 2013 conviction for second-degree robbery and found Bentley guilty of being a convicted felon in possession of a handgun.

The jury recommended maximum sentences of twenty years for each of the attempted murders, ten years for attempted first-degree assault, five years for first-degree wanton endangerment, twenty years for first-degree robbery, five years for complicity to first-degree fleeing or evading, and ten years for being a convicted felon in possession of a handgun. The jury recommended the sentences run consecutively for a total sentence of seventy years. The trial court followed the jury's recommendation and sentenced Bentley accordingly.

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ANALYSIS

I. The trial court properly denied Bentley's motions for directed verdicts for the criminal attempt offenses committed against law enforcement officers.

Bentley argues she was entitled to directed verdicts as to the three criminal-attempt offenses she was convicted of-two counts of attempted murder and one count of attempted first-degree assault. Defense counsel moved for a directed verdict at the close of the Commonwealth's case and renewed his motion at the close of all evidence. The trial court denied Bentley's motions each time.

Bentley was convicted of attempted murder as to Trooper Propes and Officer Vance. She was also convicted of the attempted first-degree assault of Detective Moore. Bentley argues she was entitled to directed verdicts as to these offenses. When presented with a motion for a directed verdict, the trial court must draw all fair and reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the Commonwealth. If the evidence is sufficient to induce a reasonable juror to believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty, a directed verdict should not be given. For the purpose of ruling on the motion, the trial court must assume that the evidence for the Commonwealth is true, but reserving to the jury questions as to the credibility and weight to be given to such testimony.

Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (Ky. 1991). On appeal, we must determine "whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Commonwealth v. Woods,

657 S.W.3d 902, 906 (Ky. 2022) (quoting Potts v. Commonwealth, 172 S.W.3d 345, 349 (Ky. 2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

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Both murder and assault are specific intent crimes, requiring the jury to find Bentley acted intentionally with respect to each of the offenses she challenges. Murder requires the intent to cause the death of another person, Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 507.020, and first-degree assault requires an intent to cause serious physical injury. KRS 508.010. The criminal attempt statute, KRS 506.010, states in relevant part that

(1) A person is guilty of criminal attempt to commit a crime when, acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for commission of the crime, he or she: . . .

(b) Intentionally does or omits to do anything which, under the circumstances as he or she believes them to be, is a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in his commission of the crime.

(2) Conduct shall not be held to constitute a substantial step under subsection (1)(b) of this section unless it is an act or omission which leaves no reasonable doubt as to the defendant's intention to commit the crime which he or she is charged with attempting. Put simply, Bentley must have intended to kill or seriously injure the involved officers and taken a substantial step to do so.

Bentley claims the evidence only supported wanton endangerment because she fired a handgun in the vicinity of others. She points to Swan v. Commonwealth, 384 S.W.3d 77, 102 (Ky. 2012), which states the type of conduct recognized as wanton includes shooting into a crowd, an occupied building or an occupied automobile. Hawks testified that Bentley's arm was pointed toward the sky during the police chase, and he never heard the gunfire. She also asserts that she shot into the air as a scare tactic. She acknowledges that she may have behaved wantonly by shooting towards occupied vehicles but asserts that her conduct was not intentional.

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"[T]he question on a directed verdict motion is not necessarily what evidence supporting the defendant was solicited, but rather what evidence the Commonwealth produced in support of its burden of proof." Sutton v. Commonwealth, 627 S.W.3d 836, 848 (Ky. 2021). Despite Hawks's testimony, the officers saw Bentley commit the offenses from a short distance away, in broad daylight, and testified accordingly. Officer Vance testified that while he pursued the S-10 on KY 55, the passenger shot at him, and that she shot while the gun was pointed straight at him. Officer Vance even demonstrated Bentley's conduct by holding his arm nearly straight out. Officer Garrison testified that as Officer Vance swerved, he saw the passenger pointing back toward them, firing a weapon. While he did not see the weapon himself, he heard the shots and saw the passenger's arm pointed nearly straight out of the window. Fitzgerald, who witnessed a portion of the pursuit, also testified that the passenger was out of the window, pointing a gun at law enforcement and shooting.

Trooper Propes testified that as he pursued the S-10 on US 45, Bentley pointed a gun directly at him and fired. Once Trooper Propes swerved, Detective Moore could see Bentley point an object directly at where Trooper Propes had just been and realized from the cartridge case ejections that Bentley was shooting. Additionally, Chief Deputy Prince testified that after both vehicles in front of him had swerved, he could see Bentley sitting on the window frame, firing a handgun at the three of them. At that point, he swerved and ducked down for protection.

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"Intent can be inferred from the actions of an accused and the surrounding circumstances. The jury has wide latitude in inferring intent from the evidence." Cox v. Commonwealth, 553 S.W.3d 808, 814 (Ky. 2018) (quoting Anastasi v. Commonwealth, 754 S.W.2d 860, 862 (Ky. 1988)). The jury could reasonably infer from this conduct that Bentley attempted to murder Officer Vance and Trooper Propes and attempted to commit first-degree assault against Detective Moore.

To reiterate, when presented with a motion for directed verdict a trial court must look at all evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth. Woods, 657 S.W.3d at 906. Here the Commonwealth produced evidence that would allow a reasonable juror to conclude Bentley intended to kill and cause serious physical injury by shooting directly at the victims. The testimony clearly supported the attempt to commit murder and first-degree assault, as the officers testified that Bentley clearly pointed a gun at them and shot repeatedly, causing the officers to swerve and duck for cover to avoid being hit. Fitzgerald, the local resident who witnessed part of the pursuit, provided testimony consistent with the officers' version of events. As such, we conclude that a "rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt[,]" Id., and therefore the trial court did not err in denying Bentley's motions for directed verdict.

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II. The trial court did not err by denying Bentley's request for a second competency evaluation.

After the Commonwealth presented its final witness, defense counsel informed the trial court that Bentley was experiencing concerning psychological symptoms. Bentley started to hear voices, which counsel asserted impacted her ability to participate in the trial. As a result, defense counsel requested a renewed competency evaluation. The trial court reviewed Bentley's pretrial competency evaluation report, which concluded that Bentley had no intellectual disability or mental illness and could rationally participate in the proceedings. The trial court also noted that the parties previously stipulated to Bentley's competency, and that it had not witnessed anything to indicate sudden manifestations that would raise competency concerns. As a result, the trial court denied defense counsel's request. Bentley argues on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to order a second competency evaluation.

KRS 504.100(1) provides as follows: "If upon arraignment, or during any stage of the proceedings, the court has reasonable grounds to believe the defendant is incompetent to stand trial," the court shall order a competency evaluation. The United States Constitution prohibits trying a defendant who is incompetent to stand trial. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 173 (1975).

"Due process under the Fourteenth Amendment requires that where substantial evidence that a defendant is not competent exists, the trial court is required to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the defendant's competence to stand trial." Woolfolk v. Commonwealth, 339 S.W.3d 411, 422 (Ky. 2011).

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A person is incompetent to stand trial when, as a result of mental condition, they lack "capacity to appreciate the nature and consequences of the proceedings against [them] or to participate rationally in [their] own defense."

KRS 504.060(5). This Court reviews a trial court's competency decision by determining "[w]hether a reasonable judge, situated as was the trial court judge whose failure to conduct an evidentiary hearing is being reviewed, should have experienced doubt with respect to competency to stand trial." Woolfolk, 339 S.W.3d at 423 (quoting Turner v. Commonwealth, 153 S.W.3d 823, 832 (Ky.

2005)).

On Bentley's counsel's motion, the trial court ordered an evaluation pertaining to competency and criminal responsibility in March 2023. Dr. Susan Brittain-Seitz, a psychologist, evaluated Bentley at the Kentucky Correctional Psychiatric Center (KCPC). Dr. Brittain-Setiz administered several psychological and intelligence tests, as well as a specific test for malingering. According to the report, Bentley answered questions falsely or otherwise deliberately underperformed to feign psychiatric symptoms and cognitive deficits.

Dr. Brittain-Seitz stated that Bentley claimed to hear voices, but noted that what Bentley described was akin to an inner monologue or self-talk, and did not suggest psychosis. Further, the voices did not appear to disturb Bentley. Given Bentley's feigning of psychiatric symptoms, Dr. Brittain-Setiz believed that Bentley's reports of hearing voices were likely disingenuous. She observed no symptoms of psychosis, mania, or chronic thought disorder. The

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report also concluded that the complexity of Bentley's vocabulary led Dr. Brittain-Seitz to estimate that Bentley's intelligence was in the average range. Ultimately, Dr. Brittain-Seitz opined that Bentley was competent to stand trial. After receiving this report, Bentley stipulated to competency. Bentley argues that she was unable to focus on witness testimony, participate in her own defense, or testify on her own behalf because she was suffering from an acute mental health episode. As a result, she asserts the trial court should have allowed the defense to seek an opinion from an expert before continuing prosecution. But these types of general assertions do not satisfy the constitutional or statutory requirements for ordering a second competency evaluation. Here, there was nothing concrete presented to the judge to justify halting the proceedings in the midst of trial to have Bentley reevaluated. It is incumbent on counsel to make an affirmative showing of the need for a second competency evaluation.

Additionally, during her competency evaluation, Bentley reported that she heard voices. Dr. Brittain-Seitz reasoned that these voices were more akin to an inner monologue and that the "voices" did not disturb or distress Bentley. As such, there were no "reasonable grounds" to believe Bentley became incompetent mid-trial, KRS 504.100(1), and certainly no substantial evidence of incompetence that violated Bentley's due process rights. Woolfolk, 339 S.W.3d at 422.

It is within the trial court's sound discretion to determine whether

"reasonable grounds" exist to question competency, though once such grounds

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do exist, a competency hearing is mandatory. Gray v. Commonwealth, 233 S.W.3d 715, 718 (Ky. 2007). A trial court is in the best position to observe a defendant's conduct and demeanor from the outset of the proceedings, "and to evaluate the circumstances, including Appellant's demeanor and deportment, occurring during the course of the trial." Woolfolk, 339 S.W.3d at 423. In denying Bentley's motion for a second competency evaluation, the trial court noted Bentley's demeanor at trial and also stopped the proceedings to review the competency evaluation report. Upon review, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Bentley's motion for a second competency evaluation.

III. The trial court did not err in excluding hearsay evidence of Bentley's drug use.

Next Bentley claims that the trial court erred in barring the introduction of Bentley's statements made during an interview at the jail. Specifically, Bentley sought to admit, through testimony from Captain Green, that during the interview, Bentley claimed to have been awake and using amphetamine for twelve days leading up to the offenses, and to have ingested an ounce of methamphetamine. When Bentley attempted to elicit this testimony from Captain Green during his testimony, the Commonwealth objected, labeling the testimony as hearsay. The trial court sustained the Commonwealth's objection and stated that the testimony could come in through avowal or through Bentley's own testimony.

Bentley ultimately chose to exercise her right to remain silent. But, by avowal, Green testified that he interviewed Bentley and she disclosed that she

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had been awake for twelve days abusing methamphetamine prior to the robbery and shooting. She explained that she used one ounce of methamphetamine the morning of the robbery. Bentley now argues the trial court erred in excluding the testimony regarding her drug use, and specifically hindered her constitutional right to present a defense.

"Trial courts enjoy substantial discretion in admitting or excluding evidence at trial." Daugherty v. Commonwealth, 467 S.W.3d 222, 231 (Ky. 2015). A trial court's evidentiary rulings are reviewed for an abuse of discretion, requiring us to determine whether the trial court's decision was

"arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles."

Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999). Hearsay, an out of court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, Kentucky Rule of Evidence (KRE) 801(c), is inherently unreliable. Harrison v. Commonwealth, 858 S.W.2d 172, 176 (Ky. 1993). Generally, hearsay evidence is inadmissible unless a delineated exception applies. "The essence of the rule prohibiting the admission of hearsay evidence is the absence of an opportunity for cross-examination." Barnes v. Commonwealth, 794 S.W.2d 165, 167 (Ky. 1990). Cross-examination under oath is the best way to safeguard the discovery of the truth and testing the value of the assertions made under oath. Combs v. Commonwealth, 74 S.W.3d 738, 743 (Ky. 2002).

Here, Bentley chose to exercise her constitutional right to remain silent. While Bentley was well within her right to decline providing testimony, she is

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not now entitled to have her self-serving statements elicited through the testimony of Captain Green. Our hearsay rule is grounded in the notion that untrustworthy evidence should not be presented to the jury, and Bentley's statements regarding her drug use lacked conventional impressions of reliability, as they were made out of court, not under oath, and, most importantly, were not subject to cross-examination to allow for assessment of her demeanor and credibility. Despite the trial court's exclusion of these statements, Bentley maintained sufficient avenues for developing her defense. Therefore, the trial court did not err in excluding this testimony.

IV. A voluntary intoxication instruction was not warranted.

Bentley argues she was entitled to a jury instruction on voluntary intoxication. Bentley requested a voluntary intoxication instruction and the trial court denied her request, stating that such an instruction was not supported by the evidence.

Under Rule of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 9.54(1), "it is the duty of the trial court in a criminal case to instruct the jury on the whole law of the case."

Thomas v. Commonwealth, 170 S.W.3d 343, 348-49 (Ky. 2005). Notably, this duty does not require the trial court to "place before the jury 'speculative theories . . . merely because the testimony includes some basis for the speculation.'" Lackey v. Commonwealth, 468 S.W.3d 348, 355 (Ky. 2015) (quoting Brown v. Commonwealth, 313 S.W.3d 577, 626 (Ky. 2010)). When a trial court declines to give an instruction on a specific claim, the decision is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Sargent v. Shaffer, 467 S.W.3d 198, 204

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(Ky. 2015). On appellate review, we must determine whether the trial court's decision was "arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles." English, 993 S.W.2d at 945.

"'Voluntary' intoxication means intoxication caused by substances which the defendant knowingly introduces into his body, the tendency of which to cause intoxication he knows or ought to know . . . ." KRS 501.010(4). KRS 501.080(1) provides that voluntary intoxication is a defense to a criminal charge if it "[n]egatives the existence of an element of the offense . . . ." Bentley was ultimately convicted of specific intent crimes, like murder and first-degree assault. A criminal defendant "is always entitled to have this defense submitted to the jury if his evidence is sufficient to indicate the degree of intoxication required . . . to prevent his forming an intent to commit" the crime. King v. Commonwealth, 513 S.W.3d 919, 923 (Ky. 2017) (citations omitted). Bentley asserts that, during the time period surrounding the offenses, she was using methamphetamine daily and in large amounts. Bentley also claimed to be on a sleepless methamphetamine binge and to have used an ounce of methamphetamine the morning of the offenses. She provided testimony regarding her drug use by avowal, but that information was never presented for the jury's consideration. This Court's determination of whether a trial court abused its discretion in declining to give a voluntary intoxication

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instruction depends on the evidence presented at trial. See Luna v. Commonwealth, 460 S.W.3d 851, 881-84 (Ky. 2015).4 Hawks provided some vague testimony about Bentley's drug use. Hawks testified that the night before the offenses, after he left the bar around 3:00 a.m., Bentley and Dillow were smoking something from a glass pipe in their apartment. Although Bentley and Dillow were still awake when Hawks went to bed, he did not know what the pair did, and he of course did not see Bentley use drugs again. Dillow claimed to have used drugs with Bentley daily during the time frame surrounding the offenses, but did not specify what drug they used or how much. Dillow did not recall seeing Bentley use drugs immediately prior to committing the offenses. Chief Deputy Prince testified that he had extensive training in manifestation of drug impairment, and Sergeant Hamby was formerly a road trooper who observed a lot of people under the influence. Both officers interacted with Bentley at the crime scene and neither saw anything indicating that Bentley was under the influence or impaired. In sum, the only evidence in support of a voluntary intoxication instruction was Dillow's testimony that, during the time surrounding the offenses, she knew Bentley was using methamphetamine daily, and Hawks's testimony that he saw Bentley and Dillow smoking something from a pipe in

4 Even if these introduced statements were admitted, in Brafman v. Commonwealth, 612 S.W.3d 850, 857-59 (Ky. 2020), the Court held that a trial court was within its discretion in declining to give a voluntary intoxication instruction solely based on the defendant's testimony that she used methamphetamine and ecstasy and drank whiskey for days leading up to the crime. The trial court concluded that because the claims were not supported before the jury by any other witness, the trial court properly declined to instruct on voluntary intoxication.

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the early morning hours before the offenses. There was no testimony that Bentley appeared to be under the influence of drugs at any point in time. "Our case law requires more than mere evidence of alcohol consumption. Instead, a voluntary intoxication instruction is appropriate 'where there is evidence reasonably sufficient to prove that the defendant was so drunk that he did not know what he was doing.'" Luna, 460 S.W.3d at 882 (quoting Harris v. Commonwealth, 313 S.W.3d 40, 50 (Ky. 2010)). In light of this standard, no evidence here supported an instruction for voluntary intoxication and, as such, the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

V. The trial court did not err in allowing the Commonwealth to present contextual evidence regarding the Mayfield tornado.

In December 2021, the Mayfield community was devastated by a fatal tornado which caused extensive damage and took the lives of many residents. Prior to trial, in a motion in limine defense counsel requested that all references to the tornado be excluded during trial, asserting that such references were irrelevant and that the probative value of the evidence did not outweigh the danger of undue prejudice to Bentley. The Commonwealth reasoned they needed to be able to explain the presence of multiple police agencies and why police cameras were not working, given the damage to the infrastructure of two police forces. Further, the Commonwealth believed the tornado played a role in why Cash Express did not have video camera, why debris from the storm made it difficult to find the shell casings, and that the tornado factored into Bentley's decision to go to the Cash Express in Mayfield.

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Bentley countered that the Commonwealth could tell the jury that cameras were not working, that the jurors would know about the tornado, and that there was no evidence that Bentley went to the Mayfield Cash Express because of the storms, asserting that Bentley was unfamiliar with Mayfield and Hawks drove them there. The trial court determined that the fact of the tornado was appropriate background information about the setting, and the prejudicial effect of presenting the information did not outweigh the probative value. The trial court only limited references to fatalities. We review a trial court's evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion, requiring us to determine whether the trial court's decision was "arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles."

Commonwealth, 993 S.W.2d at 945. "'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." KRE 401. "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." KRE 403.

Discussion of the Mayfield tornado provided context which explained the circumstances surrounding the crimes. The discussion explained why officers from other agencies were in the city and participated in the pursuit, why debris made it difficult to discover shell casings from the shooting, and the absence of

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police camera recordings at trial.5According to the evidence, both the Graves County Sheriff's Office and the Mayfield City Police Department were displaced from their officers and did not yet have secure docking stations for uploading recordings. Further, the officers from Glasgow did not bring their body worn cameras because their docking stations were in Glasgow and the cameras lacked the capacity to store the recordings for the week-long shifts they had in Mayfield.

Bentley emphasizes that during closing argument, counsel for the Commonwealth theorized "hey, we'll go to Mayfield. And I would submit to you that, based on the condition of our community, that had to play a factor. [She's] thinking that would be an easier target." This inference was contemplated by the evidence presented at trial. Hawks testified that Bentley suggested going to Mayfield, and that he was unsure why she brought up the location because they lived in Lone Oak. He also testified that on the morning of the robbery he suggested going to a different Cash Express that had reopened a new location in Paducah. Five or six cars were parked in front of the Paducah Cash Express and Bentley eventually came out of the store, stating it was taking too long and again suggested going to Mayfield. Purportedly, neither Hawks nor Bentley was familiar with the Mayfield area as

5 Bentley asserts that Trooper Propes's car-mounted camera was not functional on the day of the robbery for reasons unrelated to the tornado. The Commonwealth concedes this point, but we find it inconsequential. There were numerous eyewitnesses, mainly law enforcement officers, who provided first-hand accounts of the events in question, rendering the absence of a police recording of the events less problematic.

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Hawks used his phone to navigate once they fled from the Mayfield Cash Express.

Bentley asserts the Commonwealth created a false narrative used to inflame the jury, in violation of KRE 404(b).6But evidence of the tornado and the devastation it caused does not constitute character evidence. Generally, evidence of other wrongs or acts is inadmissible to prove action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion. KRE 404(b). But evidence regarding the tornado is not evidence of another crime, wrong, or act. Nothing about the tornado reflected adversely on Bentley's character, or contributed to proving some predisposition to committing the offenses at issue. It merely establishes the state of the community in which the crimes occurred, and the effects of the disaster on law enforcement agencies and their operations. All evidence must be evaluated under KRE 403 to determine whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by danger of undue prejudice. The evidence of the tornado and its lasting effects was relevant to establish the context surrounding the offenses and the police pursuit. None of the evidence was improper, nor did it unduly prejudice Bentley. As such, the trial court did not err in admitting testimony regarding the Mayfield tornado.

6 The Commonwealth argues that Bentley's argument is improperly preserved because she now argues the trial court should have limited the use of evidence of the tornado, which she did not argue below. In any event, the parties argued whether evidence of the tornado was admissible during trial and therefore we conclude this argument is properly preserved for our review.

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VI. The issue of Bentley's parole eligibility is not properly before this Court.

Bentley argues the implementation of a new statutory scheme which affects her parole eligibility violates the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. House Bill 5, also known as the Safer Kentucky Act, created KRS 532.046(1), which prohibits any form of early release to a person who was previously convicted of a felony and who used a firearm in the commission of an offense and in furtherance of a crime. 2024 Ky. Acts ch. 174, §2, eff. July

15, 2024.

Bentley's crimes occurred in December 2021, before the legislature enacted House Bill 5. Because a firearm was used in the commission of Bentley's offenses and she was already a felon, she will never be eligible for parole under the new statutory scheme. During the penalty phase of trial, a Department of Corrections (DOC) Probation and Parole officer testified that Bentley's use of a firearm in furtherance of the crimes, after having been convicted of a felony, rendered Bentley ineligible for parole or other early release. The judgment of conviction made no mention of the applicability of KRS 532.046(1) or Bentley's eligibility for parole. It also did not include a finding that Bentley was previously convicted of a felony, although that was implicit in the conviction for possession of a handgun by a convicted felon. Currently, 501 Kentucky Administrative Regulation 1:030 does not address changes to the law under House Bill 5. The DOC started the certification process to amend the regulation and has until the end of February 2026 to file a proposed amendment with the Regulations Compiler for

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publication, hearing, and comment. 51 Ky.R. No. 12, Cumulative Supplement L-29 (June 1, 2025). See also L-28 (summarizing the KRS 13A.3104 certification process), 1925 (summarizing the KRS Chapter 13A.3104 regulation review procedure). As of November 1, 2025, no proposed amendment has been published in the monthly Administrative Register of Kentucky. The DOC applies the law in determining an inmate's eligibility for parole. In Hoskins v. Commonwealth, 158 S.W.3d 214, 215 (Ky. App. 2005), a defendant argued he was improperly classified as a violent offender, resulting in a longer period of time before he would be eligible for parole consideration. The trial court determined that Hoskins was not entitled to relief because the classification was an administrative determination by the DOC rather than a judicial determination. Id. at 216. The appellate court affirmed and held:

[w]e agree with the Commonwealth that Hoskins's attack on his violent-offender classification is not procedurally correct. As noted by the Commonwealth, it appears that the correct path for Hoskins to have taken was to proceed against the Department of Corrections with an original action before the Franklin Circuit Court. Id. at 217. Therefore, the trial court correctly denied Hoskins's Criminal Rule (CR) 60.02 motion to correct his sentence.

In Mason v. Commonwealth, 331 S.W.3d 610, 628-29 (Ky. 2011), defendant Mason requested that this Court order the DOC to classify him as a non-violent offender, thus beneficially altering his parole eligibility. The Court declined to address Mason's violent offender classification or parole eligibility, noting that the DOC was not a party to the appeal and therefore not properly before the Court to defend its action or confess error. Id. at 629. Further, the

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Court noted that Mason was free to file a separate action against the DOC, such as a declaratory judgment action, to seek to have his parole eligibility re- calculated. Id. Further, as the Commonwealth notes, KRS 454.415 requires an inmate to exhaust administrative remedies before filing an action to challenge the DOC's sentence calculations.

Here, we need not determine whether application of the statute violates a prohibition on ex post facto principles. The DOC—the agency that determines parole eligibility and creates administrative regulations to comply with statutes such as KRS 532.046—is not a party to this action and was not included in the proceedings below. We also note that in Blakemore v. Commonwealth, 2024- SC-0370-MR, the Department of Public Advocacy attorney representing Blakemore appended to his brief a statement from the DOC which indicates that it applies KRS 532.046 only to offenses committed on or after the statute's effective date, July 15, 2024. The statement was included in materials distributed during a Continuing Legal Education seminar presented by a Division Director of the DOC. This further supports our conclusion that to render a determination regarding the retroactivity of the statute and its applicability to Bentley, the DOC must be made a party to any action challenging the statute's applicability.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the Graves Circuit Court.

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All sitting. Bisig, Conley, Goodwine, Keller, and Nickell, JJ., concur. Lambert, C.J., and Thompson, J., concur in result only.

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:

Kayla D. Deatherage Kathleen Schmidt Assistant Public Advocates

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:

Russell M. Coleman Attorney General of Kentucky James Havey

Assistant Solicitor General

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